ITAT Delhi Judgments — September 2026

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had failed to follow the provisions of Section 250(6) of the Act by not adjudicating the appeal as per law, particularly by not deciding the jurisdictional grounds raised by the assessee. The CIT(A) observed that the assessee should get an opportunity to present their case and file evidence, indicating a failure to adjudicate the legal grounds alleging that the reopening of assessment was bad in law. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order restoring the matter to the AO without deciding these legal grounds was not in accordance with the law laid down by the jurisdictional High Court. Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's grounds related to the denial of effective appellate adjudication and set aside the impugned order. The matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for deciding the appeals afresh after affording the assessee an effective opportunity of hearing and deciding all grounds, including the jurisdictional ones, in accordance with law. The finding in the lead case was to apply mutatis mutandis to the other appeals. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the impugned orders of the NFAC were passed ex-parte without affording the assessee a proper opportunity of hearing. While the Revenue contended that sufficient opportunities were provided, the Tribunal observed that notices were issued via the ITBA portal. The assessee had provided an email address in Form 35, but it was not explicitly stated that notices could be served via email. Consequently, it appeared that notices issued through e-proceedings might not have come to the assessee's knowledge. Therefore, the Tribunal found it to be an appropriate case to grant the assessee an opportunity to contest the matter on merits. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, with a direction to the NFAC to issue fresh notices to the assessee on the email address provided in Form 35 and thereafter pass a fresh order.

The Tribunal permitted the assessee to withdraw its appeals. The reasoning was based on the explicit submission made by the assessee's counsel, supported by a letter from the assessee, expressing the desire to withdraw the appeals. The Departmental Representative did not oppose this request. Therefore, the Tribunal acceded to the assessee's request. The ratio decidendi is that an assessee has the right to withdraw its appeals if it so chooses, provided there is no objection from the revenue and the request is properly communicated. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeals as withdrawn. No issue was left undecided.

The Tribunal permitted the assessee to withdraw its appeals. The reasoning was based on the explicit submission made by the assessee's counsel, supported by a letter from the assessee, expressing the desire to withdraw the appeals. The Departmental Representative did not oppose this request. Therefore, the Tribunal acceded to the assessee's request. The ratio decidendi is that an assessee has the right to withdraw its appeals if it so chooses, provided there is no objection from the revenue and the request is properly communicated. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeals as withdrawn. No issue was left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the ground relating to the initiation of proceedings under Section 147 of the Act being without jurisdiction is sustained. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court in M/s L-1 Identity Solutions Operating Company Pvt. Ltd. The Court observed that for issuing a notice under Section 148 beyond three years, the conditions under Section 149(1)(b) must be satisfied, requiring the income escaping assessment to exceed Rs. 50 lakhs in respect of the specified assessment year. While Section 149(1A) allows for cumulative income escaping assessment across multiple years to exceed Rs. 50 lakhs, this is subject to the income being represented in the form of an 'asset' or 'expenditure in relation to an event or occasion'. In the present case, the Hon'ble High Court found no singular occasion or event that resulted in income of more than one previous year exceeding Rs. 50 lakhs. The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer erred in proceeding on the basis that it was open to add income alleged to have escaped assessment for different previous years to determine the threshold figure of Rs. 50 lakhs. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that there was substance in the assessee's contention that the reopening was based on incorrect facts. The records indicated that an assessment order under Section 143(3) was passed on 11.08.2014. The AO's reasons for reopening, which stated that the assessee's return was processed under Section 143(1) and no assessment was made, were factually incorrect. The Tribunal found that when the foundational facts for the assumption of jurisdiction are recorded incorrectly, the assumption of jurisdiction is vitiated. Furthermore, since the reopening was after the expiry of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the first proviso of Section 147 was applicable. This required the AO to record reasons specifically indicating the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The Tribunal noted that the AO's incorrect premise that no Section 143(3) assessment was made meant the AO had not applied his mind to the specific failure of the assessee to disclose material facts. Consequently, there was a patent illegality in the assumption of jurisdiction. The Tribunal sustained grounds 2 to 4 of the assessee's appeal, quashed the impugned assessment order, and allowed the appeal.

The Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. The assessee's counsel presented a detailed explanation for the withdrawal, citing a mistake in the Tax Audit Report regarding the reason for disallowance (delay in depositing employees' contribution to PF and ESI, wrongly reported as service tax delay) and the inability to obtain a corrigendum. The assessee also stated that the disallowance amount was not substantial. In light of these submissions and the assessee's request, the Tribunal found no impediment to allowing the withdrawal. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. No other issues were decided by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal held that the Revenue's grounds of appeal lacked merit. The Tribunal emphasized that various judicial precedents, including CIT-7 Vs. RRJ Securities Ltd., PCIT Vs. Ojjus Medicare (P) Ltd., and CIT Vs. Jasjit Singh, have settled the issue that for the purpose of Section 153C(1), the calculation of the block period should be based on the date of receiving the concerned seized material by the assessee's jurisdictional Assessing Officer. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had correctly applied these dates to conclude that none of the assessment years involved fell within the specified period of ten assessment years. Regarding the pending SLP in the Ojjus Medicare case, the Tribunal stated that the mere pendency of an SLP is not a ground to deviate from a binding decision of the jurisdictional High Court. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision quashing the Section 153C assessments. All other pleadings on merits were rendered academic. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.

The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeal of the assessee for statistical purposes. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) observed that the fundamental documents linking the property sale to share trading were not furnished. However, the Tribunal found these observations contrary to the documents available on record, specifically mentioning a bank statement at pages 17-20 and an agreement to sell dated 12.01.2016 at pages 21-30 of the paper book, which were furnished before the CIT(A). The Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the matter to the AO for de novo assessment, directing the AO to consider the documents furnished by the assessee before the CIT(A) and afford a reasonable opportunity of making submissions. The Tribunal found the assessee's reliance on Jag Mohan vs. DCIT misplaced, as that case dealt with a different factual matrix concerning the charging section.

The Tribunal found that the documents placed on record and the additional evidence required factual verification by the AO. Regarding the sale of property (Rs. 5 lakhs), the Tribunal noted the assessee's plausible explanation for the unregistered sale deed and directed the AO to examine the buyer to verify the transaction's veracity. If found correct, the source of Rs. 5 lakhs would be accepted. For gifts (Rs. 1,96,000) and loans (Rs. 6 lakhs), the Tribunal admitted the additional evidence and directed the AO to examine its veracity and conduct necessary verification. The Tribunal decided to restore all four disputed issues (agricultural income, property sale, gifts, and loans) to the file of the AO for de novo adjudication. The assessee was granted liberty to furnish fresh evidence. The ratio is that when substantial documentary evidence is presented, even if some require verification or were submitted late, and the AO has made bald assertions without concrete material, the matter should be remanded for proper factual inquiry to ensure justice and fair play. The Tribunal expressly left undecided the chargeability of interest, stating it would be consequential.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had failed to follow the provisions of Section 250(6) of the Act by not adjudicating the appeal as per law, particularly by not deciding the jurisdictional grounds raised by the assessee. The CIT(A) observed that the assessee should get an opportunity to present their case and file evidence, indicating a failure to adjudicate the legal grounds alleging that the reopening of assessment was bad in law. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order restoring the matter to the AO without deciding these legal grounds was not in accordance with the law laid down by the jurisdictional High Court. Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's grounds related to the denial of effective appellate adjudication and set aside the impugned order. The matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for deciding the appeals afresh after affording the assessee an effective opportunity of hearing and deciding all grounds, including the jurisdictional ones, in accordance with law. The finding in the lead case was to apply mutatis mutandis to the other appeals. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 439 days in filing the appeals. The reasoning was that the ends of justice would be served by giving the assessee an opportunity to contest the matter on merits. The Tribunal noted the reasons cited for the delay, including the critical illness of the proprietor's brother, supported by medical evidence. It was also observed that the assessee had failed to appear before the NFAC, likely for the same reasons. The Tribunal directed that the appeals be allowed for statistical purposes, and the issues on merits and law be restored to the file of the NFAC. The NFAC was directed to provide a fresh opportunity of hearing to the assessee and to send notices to the email address provided in Form 35, which was similar to the one in Form 36. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were wholly without jurisdiction, illegal, and void ab initio. This was based on the fact that the notice initiating reassessment proceedings under Section 148 was issued by an ACIT who did not possess the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction over the appellant, as per CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011. The returned loss of the assessee was Rs. 11,07,875/-, and the instruction dictates that for corporate assessees in metro charges with returned income/loss less than Rs. 30,00,000/-, jurisdiction lies with the ITO, not ACIT/DCIT. The Tribunal relied on several precedents, including ITO v. Picheswar Gadde, to support this view, distinguishing between territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Consequently, Additional Ground No. 1 filed by the assessee was accepted, rendering other additional grounds academic. On the merits of the appeal, the Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(A) had correctly deleted the addition of Rs. 5,62,37,599/-. The CIT(A) had conducted an enquiry under Section 250(4) and found that the assessee had satisfactorily explained the nature and source of the unsecured loans with documentary evidence, establishing the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions. The Tribunal also noted that the remaining amount of Rs. 1,23,40,000/- pertained to credits from M/s Garvit Innovative Promoters Ltd., which had already been offered as revenue. Therefore, the grounds on merits were also found to have no substance. The appeal of the department was dismissed.

The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal primarily on the ground that written submissions were not filed, despite notices being issued. The assessee's counsel requested one more opportunity to present its case before the CIT(A) by filing written submissions, stating the assessee had a strong case on merits. The Revenue opposed this. The Tribunal, deeming it fit to extend the assessee one more opportunity in the interest of justice and adhering to principles of natural justice, directed the assessee to strictly comply with the proceedings before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) was instructed to adjudicate all grounds raised by the assessee, both legal and on merits, considering all filed evidence, including additional evidence, in accordance with law. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed for statistical purposes as per the observations.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO were not justified. The Tribunal found that the AO relied heavily on digital and physical evidence like WhatsApp chats and retracted statements, rather than conducting independent inquiries. The 'Cash Books' relied upon contained both cash and bank transactions, and the AO failed to reconcile bank entries with regular books or bank statements. The Tribunal noted that for AY 2016-17, payments exceeded receipts, making the net profit addition uncalled for. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed inconsistencies in the AO's figures and the actual cash book totals. The Tribunal also emphasized that projections of later-year practices (from WhatsApp chats) backwards to earlier assessment years were not permissible without year-specific material. The Tribunal noted that the AO's estimation of 15% profit lacked a factual basis, and the CIT(A) correctly identified this lack of basis. Consequently, the Tribunal found that the Revenue failed to establish actual unaccounted sales or receipts attributable to the assessment years. The grounds raised by the assessee were sustained on merits, and the grounds raised by the revenue were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not yet adjudicated the additions made on a substantive basis. It was of the considered view that the CIT(A) should have adjudicated the case of substantive addition first, and then taken up the protective additions, or at best, decided both simultaneously. Since this was not done, the Tribunal remanded the cases back to the CIT(A) with a direction to decide the appeal on substantive addition first, and thereafter, the appeal on protective assessment should be taken up. The findings in ITA No. 499/Del/2026 were to apply mutatis mutandis to ITA No. 500/Del/2026. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the other grounds raised by the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the Prescribed Authority's approach of singling out one or two clauses from the assessee's numerous objectives to allege engagement in religious activity was not prudent. The Tribunal found that the assessee's broader objectives, such as running yoga and meditation centers, fighting social evils, and helping the downtrodden, were predominantly charitable. The financial statements did not reveal expenditures exclusively for religious purposes. The Tribunal relied on the principle that merely because a trust has one object of a religious nature does not mean it cannot be established for charitable purposes, especially when other objectives are charitable. The Tribunal also referred to a coordinate bench decision in Baba Banda Singh Bahadur, emphasizing that the predominant intention of the institution and the proportionality of expenditures on Essential Religious Practices (ERP) should be examined. Activities like running hospitals and educational institutions, even if serving a place of worship, are considered public utility activities. Therefore, the denial of approval under Section 80G and the grant of registration solely as a religious entity were not sustainable. The appeals were allowed, and the Prescribed Authority was directed to grant the registration and approval within four weeks.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not yet adjudicated the additions made on a substantive basis. It was of the considered view that the CIT(A) should have adjudicated the case of substantive addition first, and then taken up the protective additions, or at best, decided both simultaneously. Since this was not done, the Tribunal remanded the cases back to the CIT(A) with a direction to decide the appeal on substantive addition first, and thereafter, the appeal on protective assessment should be taken up. The findings in ITA No. 499/Del/2026 were to apply mutatis mutandis to ITA No. 500/Del/2026. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the other grounds raised by the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the Prescribed Authority's approach of singling out one or two clauses from the assessee's numerous objectives to allege engagement in religious activity was not prudent. The Tribunal found that the assessee's broader objectives, such as running yoga and meditation centers, fighting social evils, and helping the downtrodden, were predominantly charitable. The financial statements did not reveal expenditures exclusively for religious purposes. The Tribunal relied on the principle that merely because a trust has one object of a religious nature does not mean it cannot be established for charitable purposes, especially when other objectives are charitable. The Tribunal also referred to a coordinate bench decision in Baba Banda Singh Bahadur, emphasizing that the predominant intention of the institution and the proportionality of expenditures on Essential Religious Practices (ERP) should be examined. Activities like running hospitals and educational institutions, even if serving a place of worship, are considered public utility activities. Therefore, the denial of approval under Section 80G and the grant of registration solely as a religious entity were not sustainable. The appeals were allowed, and the Prescribed Authority was directed to grant the registration and approval within four weeks.

For AY 2015-16 to 2017-18, the Tribunal held that there was absolutely no material before it or in the impugned orders of the lower authorities to suggest that the AO had relied on any seized material or called for explanations based on incriminating material found during the search of the group. The Tribunal found no substance in the grounds raised by the department and agreed with the CIT(A)'s finding that in the absence of incriminating material found or seized during the search, the additions could not be sustained for these AYs. The Tribunal thus upheld the deletion of additions by the CIT(A). For AY 2018-19 to 2020-21, the Tribunal noted the admitted position that the assessee trust runs educational institutions. The AO alleged diversion of funds to other entities controlled by the chairman for personal benefit. Specifically, for AY 2018-19, an allegation of diversion of Rs. 100,00,00,000/- to M/s Tirupati Realbuild Pvt. Ltd. was made, with the AO observing that this entity and others were used as conduits for channeling funds. The judgment does not explicitly state the Tribunal's final decision on the denial of exemption and taxation of surplus for these years, but it details the allegations and the AO's observations regarding fund diversion. The operative part of the judgment for these years is not fully elaborated in the provided text, but the Tribunal's reasoning for AY 2015-16 to 2017-18 suggests a focus on the absence of incriminating material.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO were not justified. The Tribunal found that the AO relied heavily on digital and physical evidence like WhatsApp chats and retracted statements, rather than conducting independent inquiries. The 'Cash Books' relied upon contained both cash and bank transactions, and the AO failed to reconcile bank entries with regular books or bank statements. The Tribunal noted that for AY 2016-17, payments exceeded receipts, making the net profit addition uncalled for. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed inconsistencies in the AO's figures and the actual cash book totals. The Tribunal also emphasized that projections of later-year practices (from WhatsApp chats) backwards to earlier assessment years were not permissible without year-specific material. The Tribunal noted that the AO's estimation of 15% profit lacked a factual basis, and the CIT(A) correctly identified this lack of basis. Consequently, the Tribunal found that the Revenue failed to establish actual unaccounted sales or receipts attributable to the assessment years. The grounds raised by the assessee were sustained on merits, and the grounds raised by the revenue were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the Revenue's appeal is not maintainable. The reasoning was based on the concession made by the learned Departmental Representative that the total tax effect of Rs. 6,93,420/- is below the minimum monetary limit of Rs. 60 lakhs stipulated in CBDT Circular No. 9/2024, dated 17.09.2024. The Tribunal further noted that the Departmental Representative acknowledged the retrospective applicability of this circular to all pending appeals. Consequently, the Tribunal rejected the Revenue's appeal on this precise ground, subject to all just exceptions. No other issues were decided.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the onus of proving the source of funds for the investment in the immovable property. The assessee had provided bank statements, confirmations, and ITRs to substantiate the sources. The Tribunal noted that Unialmaz Jaipur is a partnership firm where the assessee is a partner, Dhaval Jain is the assessee's son, Subhash Chand & Sons HUF is the assessee's HUF, and Amit Jain is an unrelated third party. The Tribunal found that the documents furnished by the assessee in support of his contentions were not considered by the lower authorities, leading to the addition of Rs. 42,50,000/-. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the deletion of the addition of Rs. 42,50,000/-. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeal of the assessee.

The Tribunal dismissed all ten appeals filed by the Revenue. The Tribunal held that the mere pendency of a Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court against the decision in PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. is not a ground to adopt a different approach when a binding decision of the jurisdictional High Court exists. The Tribunal upheld the learned CIT(A)'s decision to quash the Section 153C assessments. The reasoning was based on recent judicial precedents, including CIT-7 vs. RRJ Securities Ltd. and PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare (P) Ltd., which established that the relevant date for calculating the block period under Section 153C(1), read with the first proviso, is the date of receiving the concerned seized material by the assessees' jurisdictional Assessing Officers. The Tribunal found no merit in the Revenue's contention that the block period should be calculated from the date of the search, as the CIT(A) had correctly determined that none of the assessment years involved fell within the specified period based on the date of receipt of seized material. All other pleadings on merits were rendered academic.

The Tribunal held that once a resolution plan is duly approved by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the claims as provided in the resolution plan become frozen and binding on all stakeholders, including the Central Government. Any claims not part of the resolution plan stand extinguished, and no person can initiate or continue proceedings for such claims. This principle applies to all dues, including statutory dues owed to the Central Government, if they are not part of the resolution plan. The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court's decisions in Ghanshyam Mishra and Essar Steel India Limited, and High Court decisions in TUF Metallurgical Pvt. Ltd. and Subhlabh Steels (P.) Ltd. to support this view. Consequently, the appeals filed by the Department were dismissed, as the tax claims pertaining to the assessment years involved were deemed to have been extinguished upon the approval of the resolution plan, as no such claims were part of the plan.

The Tribunal dismissed all ten appeals filed by the Revenue. The Tribunal held that the mere pendency of a Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court against the decision in PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. is not a ground to adopt a different approach when a binding decision of the jurisdictional High Court exists. The Tribunal upheld the learned CIT(A)'s decision to quash the Section 153C assessments. The reasoning was based on recent judicial precedents, including CIT-7 vs. RRJ Securities Ltd. and PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare (P) Ltd., which established that the relevant date for calculating the block period under Section 153C(1), read with the first proviso, is the date of receiving the concerned seized material by the assessees' jurisdictional Assessing Officers. The Tribunal found no merit in the Revenue's contention that the block period should be calculated from the date of the search, as the CIT(A) had correctly determined that none of the assessment years involved fell within the specified period based on the date of receipt of seized material. All other pleadings on merits were rendered academic.

The Tribunal held that the offshore supply receipts were not taxable in India. Firstly, it found that the assessee had no business connection or dependent agent PE in India. The Indian Associate, GETDIL, was not employed by the assessee to represent it independently. The Tribunal noted that PGCIL treated GETDIL as an independent contractor. The Tribunal also found that GETDIL had its own separate business and was not legally or economically dependent on the assessee, thus not constituting a DAPE. Secondly, the Tribunal held that the assessee did not have a fixed place PE in India. The Tribunal also clarified that the acceptance test mandated by PGCIL did not determine the passing of the ownership title, citing the jurisdictional Delhi High Court's decision in Ericsson AB. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that Section 44BBB of the Act was not applicable as the assessee was only obligated to make offshore supplies, and the property in goods transferred outside India. The revenue derived was from offshore supplies, not from construction, erection, testing, or commissioning activities in India. The Tribunal concluded that the AO and DRP erred in holding offshore supplies as taxable in India, as the revenue earned was not taxable in India. The addition made by the AO was deleted, and the appeal was allowed.

The Tribunal held that the penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act was untenable in law and directed its deletion. The primary reasoning was based on the fact that the Hon'ble Delhi High Court had admitted substantial questions of law in appeals concerning the quantum additions for all the assessment years under consideration. The Tribunal relied on the High Court's own precedents, specifically CIT vs. Liquid Investment and Trading Co. and Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, (Central)-2 vs. Harsh International (P.) Ltd., which established that if the assessment itself is debatable, as evidenced by the admission of substantial questions of law by the High Court, then penalty proceedings cannot survive. The Tribunal noted that the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, in a related matter, had observed that if the assumption of jurisdiction by the AO is found to be unlawful, the assessment orders and any findings of concealment would be without basis. Therefore, the penalty was deleted as it had become debatable. The issue of violation of principles of natural justice and precise charge was not explicitly decided due to the focus on the debatable nature of the issue.

The Tribunal held that once a resolution plan is duly approved by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the claims as provided in the resolution plan become frozen and binding on all stakeholders, including the Central Government. Any claims not part of the resolution plan stand extinguished, and no person can initiate or continue proceedings for such claims. This principle applies to all dues, including statutory dues owed to the Central Government, if they are not part of the resolution plan. The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court's decisions in Ghanshyam Mishra and Essar Steel India Limited, and High Court decisions in TUF Metallurgical Pvt. Ltd. and Subhlabh Steels (P.) Ltd. to support this view. Consequently, the appeals filed by the Department were dismissed, as the tax claims pertaining to the assessment years involved were deemed to have been extinguished upon the approval of the resolution plan, as no such claims were part of the plan.

The Tribunal held that the penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act was untenable in law and directed its deletion. The primary reasoning was based on the fact that the Hon'ble Delhi High Court had admitted substantial questions of law in appeals concerning the quantum additions for all the assessment years under consideration. The Tribunal relied on the High Court's own precedents, specifically CIT vs. Liquid Investment and Trading Co. and Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, (Central)-2 vs. Harsh International (P.) Ltd., which established that if the assessment itself is debatable, as evidenced by the admission of substantial questions of law by the High Court, then penalty proceedings cannot survive. The Tribunal noted that the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, in a related matter, had observed that if the assumption of jurisdiction by the AO is found to be unlawful, the assessment orders and any findings of concealment would be without basis. Therefore, the penalty was deleted as it had become debatable. The issue of violation of principles of natural justice and precise charge was not explicitly decided due to the focus on the debatable nature of the issue.

The Tribunal held that once a resolution plan is duly approved by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the claims as provided in the resolution plan become frozen and binding on all stakeholders, including the Central Government. Any claims not part of the resolution plan stand extinguished, and no person can initiate or continue proceedings for such claims. This principle applies to all dues, including statutory dues owed to the Central Government, if they are not part of the resolution plan. The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court's decisions in Ghanshyam Mishra and Essar Steel India Limited, and High Court decisions in TUF Metallurgical Pvt. Ltd. and Subhlabh Steels (P.) Ltd. to support this view. Consequently, the appeals filed by the Department were dismissed, as the tax claims pertaining to the assessment years involved were deemed to have been extinguished upon the approval of the resolution plan, as no such claims were part of the plan.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO were not justified. The Tribunal found that the AO relied heavily on digital and physical evidence like WhatsApp chats and retracted statements, rather than conducting independent inquiries. The 'Cash Books' relied upon contained both cash and bank transactions, and the AO failed to reconcile bank entries with regular books or bank statements. The Tribunal noted that for AY 2016-17, payments exceeded receipts, making the net profit addition uncalled for. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed inconsistencies in the AO's figures and the actual cash book totals. The Tribunal also emphasized that projections of later-year practices (from WhatsApp chats) backwards to earlier assessment years were not permissible without year-specific material. The Tribunal noted that the AO's estimation of 15% profit lacked a factual basis, and the CIT(A) correctly identified this lack of basis. Consequently, the Tribunal found that the Revenue failed to establish actual unaccounted sales or receipts attributable to the assessment years. The grounds raised by the assessee were sustained on merits, and the grounds raised by the revenue were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO were not justified. The Tribunal found that the AO relied heavily on digital and physical evidence like WhatsApp chats and retracted statements, rather than conducting independent inquiries. The 'Cash Books' relied upon contained both cash and bank transactions, and the AO failed to reconcile bank entries with regular books or bank statements. The Tribunal noted that for AY 2016-17, payments exceeded receipts, making the net profit addition uncalled for. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed inconsistencies in the AO's figures and the actual cash book totals. The Tribunal also emphasized that projections of later-year practices (from WhatsApp chats) backwards to earlier assessment years were not permissible without year-specific material. The Tribunal noted that the AO's estimation of 15% profit lacked a factual basis, and the CIT(A) correctly identified this lack of basis. Consequently, the Tribunal found that the Revenue failed to establish actual unaccounted sales or receipts attributable to the assessment years. The grounds raised by the assessee were sustained on merits, and the grounds raised by the revenue were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that while the assessee had provided a cash summary, it did not account for monthly drawings for household expenses, which would reduce the available cash balance. Therefore, the Tribunal made an ad-hoc and reasonable estimate of Rs. 2 lakhs per annum for household expenses for the year under consideration, deeming it to meet the ends of justice. Consequently, out of the sustained addition of Rs. 5,47,165, a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs was upheld, and the remaining Rs. 3,47,165 was deleted. The Tribunal found that the grounds raised by the assessee were partly allowed. The operative direction was to delete Rs. 3,47,165 from the addition.

The Tribunal held that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid. The reasoning was based on the principle that for Section 153C proceedings to be valid, the AO must be satisfied that the seized or requisitioned material pertains to the assessee and has a bearing on the determination of their total income. The Tribunal noted that the satisfaction notes recorded by the AO were mechanical and lacked specific reasons as to how the discovered material was likely to have a bearing on the determination of the total income of the assessee for the relevant assessment years. Reliance was placed on the jurisdictional Delhi High Court's decision in the case of Saksham Commodities, which clearly held that seized books of accounts, documents, or assets must pertain to the assessee and have a bearing on the determination of their total income. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the proceedings initiated under Section 153C and the consequent assessment orders. The grounds of appeal related to the invalid initiation of proceedings were allowed. As the legal grounds were allowed, other grounds became academic and were not adjudicated. The appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO were not justified. The Tribunal found that the AO relied heavily on digital and physical evidence like WhatsApp chats and retracted statements, rather than conducting independent inquiries. The 'Cash Books' relied upon contained both cash and bank transactions, and the AO failed to reconcile bank entries with regular books or bank statements. The Tribunal noted that for AY 2016-17, payments exceeded receipts, making the net profit addition uncalled for. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed inconsistencies in the AO's figures and the actual cash book totals. The Tribunal also emphasized that projections of later-year practices (from WhatsApp chats) backwards to earlier assessment years were not permissible without year-specific material. The Tribunal noted that the AO's estimation of 15% profit lacked a factual basis, and the CIT(A) correctly identified this lack of basis. Consequently, the Tribunal found that the Revenue failed to establish actual unaccounted sales or receipts attributable to the assessment years. The grounds raised by the assessee were sustained on merits, and the grounds raised by the revenue were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that once a resolution plan is duly approved by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the claims as provided in the resolution plan become frozen and binding on all stakeholders, including the Central Government. Any claims not part of the resolution plan stand extinguished, and no person can initiate or continue proceedings for such claims. This principle applies to all dues, including statutory dues owed to the Central Government, if they are not part of the resolution plan. The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court's decisions in Ghanshyam Mishra and Essar Steel India Limited, and High Court decisions in TUF Metallurgical Pvt. Ltd. and Subhlabh Steels (P.) Ltd. to support this view. Consequently, the appeals filed by the Department were dismissed, as the tax claims pertaining to the assessment years involved were deemed to have been extinguished upon the approval of the resolution plan, as no such claims were part of the plan.

The Tribunal held that the Foreign Tax Credit is allowable. The undisputed fact is that the assessee filed Form 67 electronically on 31.08.2022. The Tribunal noted that Rule 128(9) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, initially required filing Form 67 on or before the due date of filing the return of income under Section 139(1). However, the Tribunal referred to CBDT Notification No.100/22 dated 18.08.2022, which amended Rule 128(9). This amendment, effective from 01.04.2022 and applicable to AY 2022-23 onwards, extended the period for filing Form 67 to on or before the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which such income was offered for tax. Since the assessment year under appeal is 2022-23, and the amendment extended the due date to 31.03.2023, the assessee's filing on 31.08.2022 was within the prescribed time limit. The lower authorities failed to consider this amendment. Therefore, the Tribunal directed the AO to allow the foreign tax credit after verifying other conditions. All grounds of appeal were allowed.

For AY 2015-16 to 2017-18, the Tribunal held that there was absolutely no material before it or in the impugned orders of the lower authorities to suggest that the AO had relied on any seized material or called for explanations based on incriminating material found during the search of the group. The Tribunal found no substance in the grounds raised by the department and agreed with the CIT(A)'s finding that in the absence of incriminating material found or seized during the search, the additions could not be sustained for these AYs. The Tribunal thus upheld the deletion of additions by the CIT(A). For AY 2018-19 to 2020-21, the Tribunal noted the admitted position that the assessee trust runs educational institutions. The AO alleged diversion of funds to other entities controlled by the chairman for personal benefit. Specifically, for AY 2018-19, an allegation of diversion of Rs. 100,00,00,000/- to M/s Tirupati Realbuild Pvt. Ltd. was made, with the AO observing that this entity and others were used as conduits for channeling funds. The judgment does not explicitly state the Tribunal's final decision on the denial of exemption and taxation of surplus for these years, but it details the allegations and the AO's observations regarding fund diversion. The operative part of the judgment for these years is not fully elaborated in the provided text, but the Tribunal's reasoning for AY 2015-16 to 2017-18 suggests a focus on the absence of incriminating material.

The Tribunal held that the notice under section 153C dated 30.12.2022 was invalid and liable to be quashed. The reasoning was based on the fact that the assessee's case was centralized with the AO on or after 22.12.2022, vide order under section 127. Consequently, it was presumed that the condition of handing over of seized material before 1st April 2021, as required for initiating proceedings under section 153C, was not satisfied. The Tribunal noted that the revenue could not provide documentary evidence to controvert this factual position or prove that the date of deemed search was prior to 1st April 2021. In light of the above facts, circumstances, and judicial pronouncements in Ojjus Medicare and Harigovind, the Tribunal quashed the notice under section 153C. As the proceedings under section 153C were quashed, all other legal and factual grounds were rendered academic and not adjudicated upon. The operative direction was to quash the assessment proceedings.

The Tribunal held that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid. The reasoning was based on the principle that for Section 153C proceedings to be valid, the AO must be satisfied that the seized or requisitioned material pertains to the assessee and has a bearing on the determination of their total income. The Tribunal noted that the satisfaction notes recorded by the AO were mechanical and lacked specific reasons as to how the discovered material was likely to have a bearing on the determination of the total income of the assessee for the relevant assessment years. Reliance was placed on the jurisdictional Delhi High Court's decision in the case of Saksham Commodities, which clearly held that seized books of accounts, documents, or assets must pertain to the assessee and have a bearing on the determination of their total income. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the proceedings initiated under Section 153C and the consequent assessment orders. The grounds of appeal related to the invalid initiation of proceedings were allowed. As the legal grounds were allowed, other grounds became academic and were not adjudicated. The appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO were not justified. The Tribunal found that the AO relied heavily on digital and physical evidence like WhatsApp chats and retracted statements, rather than conducting independent inquiries. The 'Cash Books' relied upon contained both cash and bank transactions, and the AO failed to reconcile bank entries with regular books or bank statements. The Tribunal noted that for AY 2016-17, payments exceeded receipts, making the net profit addition uncalled for. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed inconsistencies in the AO's figures and the actual cash book totals. The Tribunal also emphasized that projections of later-year practices (from WhatsApp chats) backwards to earlier assessment years were not permissible without year-specific material. The Tribunal noted that the AO's estimation of 15% profit lacked a factual basis, and the CIT(A) correctly identified this lack of basis. Consequently, the Tribunal found that the Revenue failed to establish actual unaccounted sales or receipts attributable to the assessment years. The grounds raised by the assessee were sustained on merits, and the grounds raised by the revenue were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid. The reasoning was based on the principle that for Section 153C proceedings to be valid, the AO must be satisfied that the seized or requisitioned material pertains to the assessee and has a bearing on the determination of their total income. The Tribunal noted that the satisfaction notes recorded by the AO were mechanical and lacked specific reasons as to how the discovered material was likely to have a bearing on the determination of the total income of the assessee for the relevant assessment years. Reliance was placed on the jurisdictional Delhi High Court's decision in the case of Saksham Commodities, which clearly held that seized books of accounts, documents, or assets must pertain to the assessee and have a bearing on the determination of their total income. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the proceedings initiated under Section 153C and the consequent assessment orders. The grounds of appeal related to the invalid initiation of proceedings were allowed. As the legal grounds were allowed, other grounds became academic and were not adjudicated. The appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act was untenable in law and directed its deletion. The primary reasoning was based on the fact that the Hon'ble Delhi High Court had admitted substantial questions of law in appeals concerning the quantum additions for all the assessment years under consideration. The Tribunal relied on the High Court's own precedents, specifically CIT vs. Liquid Investment and Trading Co. and Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, (Central)-2 vs. Harsh International (P.) Ltd., which established that if the assessment itself is debatable, as evidenced by the admission of substantial questions of law by the High Court, then penalty proceedings cannot survive. The Tribunal noted that the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, in a related matter, had observed that if the assumption of jurisdiction by the AO is found to be unlawful, the assessment orders and any findings of concealment would be without basis. Therefore, the penalty was deleted as it had become debatable. The issue of violation of principles of natural justice and precise charge was not explicitly decided due to the focus on the debatable nature of the issue.

The Tribunal held that the services provided by the assessee to Jet Airways do not fall under the category of FTS under Article 12(5) of the India-Netherlands DTAA or Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that the assessee provides a software system on a subscription basis, and the revenue is earned per passenger. The assessee's assertion of no human intervention and the use of a standard facility for services, with servers located outside India, was not rebutted by the Revenue. The Tribunal relied on judicial precedents, including *Bharti Cellular Ltd. v CIT*, *Skycell Communications Ltd.*, and *Kotak Securities Ltd.*, which emphasize the necessity of human interface or direct and constant involvement of human endeavor for services to be classified as technical services. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the 'make available' clause was not fulfilled, as Jet Airways does not apply the technology independently, is not privy to it, and the assessee retains intellectual property rights. Training and support services were limited to system usage and did not transfer technology. Therefore, the consideration received does not qualify as FTS. Grounds 1 to 5 were allowed. Ground 6 (interest under Section 234B) and Ground 7 (penalty under Section 270A) were noted as consequential and premature, respectively.

The Tribunal held that the services provided by the assessee to Jet Airways do not fall under the category of FTS under Article 12(5) of the India-Netherlands DTAA or Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that the assessee provides a software system on a subscription basis, and the revenue is earned per passenger. The assessee's assertion of no human intervention and the use of a standard facility for services, with servers located outside India, was not rebutted by the Revenue. The Tribunal relied on judicial precedents, including *Bharti Cellular Ltd. v CIT*, *Skycell Communications Ltd.*, and *Kotak Securities Ltd.*, which emphasize the necessity of human interface or direct and constant involvement of human endeavor for services to be classified as technical services. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the 'make available' clause was not fulfilled, as Jet Airways does not apply the technology independently, is not privy to it, and the assessee retains intellectual property rights. Training and support services were limited to system usage and did not transfer technology. Therefore, the consideration received does not qualify as FTS. Grounds 1 to 5 were allowed. Ground 6 (interest under Section 234B) and Ground 7 (penalty under Section 270A) were noted as consequential and premature, respectively.

The Tribunal held that once a resolution plan is duly approved by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the claims as provided in the resolution plan become frozen and binding on all stakeholders, including the Central Government. Any claims not part of the resolution plan stand extinguished, and no person can initiate or continue proceedings for such claims. This principle applies to all dues, including statutory dues owed to the Central Government, if they are not part of the resolution plan. The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court's decisions in Ghanshyam Mishra and Essar Steel India Limited, and High Court decisions in TUF Metallurgical Pvt. Ltd. and Subhlabh Steels (P.) Ltd. to support this view. Consequently, the appeals filed by the Department were dismissed, as the tax claims pertaining to the assessment years involved were deemed to have been extinguished upon the approval of the resolution plan, as no such claims were part of the plan.

The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 21 lakhs on account of cash found during the search was not sustainable. The Tribunal observed that the assessee, along with his family, had withdrawn a significant amount of cash during the period under consideration, and the cash found during the search (Rs. 21 lakhs) was explained by these withdrawals. Therefore, the grounds raised by the assessee on this issue were allowed. Regarding the addition of Rs. 1.56 crores on account of gold jewelry, the Tribunal noted that the AO rejected the assessee's contention that the ornaments were acquired by way of gifts and that the assessee had not provided sufficient evidence. However, the Tribunal referred to various decisions of the ITAT and High Courts, including the jurisdictional High Court in Ashok Chhadha (supra), which held that in cases where the assessee and family members have a high income and wealthy status, gifting of jewelry is customary. The Tribunal found potency in the assessee's plea and set aside the order of the CIT(A), directing the deletion of additions made under Section 69A of the Act on account of gold ornaments, as they were at odds with established precedents. The Tribunal also noted that the quantity of jewelry found was within reasonable limits considering the social and financial status of the family and the guidelines of the CBDT circulars.

The Tribunal held that the penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act was untenable in law and directed its deletion. The primary reasoning was based on the fact that the Hon'ble Delhi High Court had admitted substantial questions of law in appeals concerning the quantum additions for all the assessment years under consideration. The Tribunal relied on the High Court's own precedents, specifically CIT vs. Liquid Investment and Trading Co. and Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, (Central)-2 vs. Harsh International (P.) Ltd., which established that if the assessment itself is debatable, as evidenced by the admission of substantial questions of law by the High Court, then penalty proceedings cannot survive. The Tribunal noted that the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, in a related matter, had observed that if the assumption of jurisdiction by the AO is found to be unlawful, the assessment orders and any findings of concealment would be without basis. Therefore, the penalty was deleted as it had become debatable. The issue of violation of principles of natural justice and precise charge was not explicitly decided due to the focus on the debatable nature of the issue.

The Tribunal held that the sole issue concerned the taxation of cash deposits in a bank account, which the AO attributed to the assessee as unexplained income due to the non-filing of a return. The assessee contended that the deposits belonged to Chaudhary Meer Singh Memorial Society, which had recorded them in its books, and that the society's receipts were below the exemption limit under Section 10(23C)(iiiad). The Tribunal noted that the society filed returns for Assessment Year 2019-20 onwards, incorporating deposits from the same bank account, which were accepted by the Department. Consequently, the Tribunal ruled that solely for the reason of not filing a return in the current year, no addition could be made in the assessee's hands. The additions were deleted, and grounds of appeal Nos. 2 to 5 were allowed. As a result, the legal issue raised in ground of appeal No. 1 was not adjudicated.