ITAT Delhi Judgments — September 2025

The Tribunal allowed Ground of Appeal No. 13, quashing the assessment order for AY 2013-14. The reasoning was that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as evidenced by the approval memo being silent on the issues involved and granting omnibus approval without any discernible thoughtful process. A single approval was granted for seven assessment years without further material showing the superior authority's involvement. The Tribunal relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Shiv Kumar Nayyar (supra) and distinguished the case of Usha Satish Salvi (supra) relied upon by the Revenue. The Tribunal held that non-compliance with Section 153D is not a mere procedural irregularity and vitiates the assessment order. Consequently, since the assessment order was quashed on this legal ground, other grounds of appeal for AY 2013-14 were not adjudicated. For the subsequent assessment years (2014-15 to 2018-19), the appeals were also allowed on the same ground regarding the validity of approval under Section 153D, as the facts and approval were identical. For AY 2018-19, the penalty under Section 270A was also quashed as the assessment order, which formed the basis for the penalty, had been quashed.

The Tribunal allowed Ground of Appeal No. 13, quashing the assessment order for AY 2013-14. The reasoning was that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as evidenced by the approval memo being silent on the issues involved and granting omnibus approval without any discernible thoughtful process. A single approval was granted for seven assessment years without further material showing the superior authority's involvement. The Tribunal relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Shiv Kumar Nayyar (supra) and distinguished the case of Usha Satish Salvi (supra) relied upon by the Revenue. The Tribunal held that non-compliance with Section 153D is not a mere procedural irregularity and vitiates the assessment order. Consequently, since the assessment order was quashed on this legal ground, other grounds of appeal for AY 2013-14 were not adjudicated. For the subsequent assessment years (2014-15 to 2018-19), the appeals were also allowed on the same ground regarding the validity of approval under Section 153D, as the facts and approval were identical. For AY 2018-19, the penalty under Section 270A was also quashed as the assessment order, which formed the basis for the penalty, had been quashed.

The Tribunal held that the penalty notices were vague and bad in law because they did not specify the exact charge (concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars, or under-reporting vs. misreporting of income). Following various High Court and ITAT decisions, the Tribunal quashed the penalty orders.

The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) had correctly directed the AO to verify the transactions. Following the AO's subsequent verification and deletion of the additions, the Tribunal found no error in the CIT(A)'s order and dismissed the Revenue's appeal.

The Tribunal held that the penalty notices were vague and bad in law because they did not specify the exact charge (concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars, or under-reporting vs. misreporting of income). Following various High Court and ITAT decisions, the Tribunal quashed the penalty orders.

The Tribunal held that the penalty notices were vague and bad in law because they did not specify the exact charge (concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars, or under-reporting vs. misreporting of income). Following various High Court and ITAT decisions, the Tribunal quashed the penalty orders.

The Tribunal held that the penalty notices were vague and bad in law because they did not specify the exact charge (concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars, or under-reporting vs. misreporting of income). Following various High Court and ITAT decisions, the Tribunal quashed the penalty orders.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficiently explained the source of the transaction as a gift from her daughter. The daughter was financially capable of making the gift, and the source was not disputed by the Revenue.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the Supreme Court's liberal approach in cases with sufficient cause. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) passed an ex-parte order without providing an opportunity of being heard to the assessee and did not decide all grounds on merits, hence remanding the matter.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, holding that foreign exchange fluctuation gains are eligible for Section 10A exemption. It also ruled that Section 40(a)(ia) is not applicable to share buy-back payments as they are not claimed as expenditure, and even a lower TDS deduction satisfies the compliance requirement.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide clear details of receipts and purchases to substantiate its claims. Given the lack of documentary evidence and clarity from the assessee, the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

The Tribunal held that the assessee cannot escape income tax liability by claiming the capital gain was offered by her husband, as each assessee is a separate entity. The claim for deduction under Section 54 was unsubstantiated due to a lack of documentary evidence, including bills, payment proofs, and commencement/completion details of construction.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the assessee's circumstances and the affidavit from a Chartered Accountant. It also held that an assessee can challenge the original assessment order while appealing an order passed under section 263, citing previous tribunal decisions.

The Tribunal held that the documentary evidence provided by the assessee, including receipts and KYC documents of the donor, satisfactorily explained the identity, genuineness, and creditworthiness of the donation.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were invalid because the AO cited non-existent provisions of the Income Tax Act (Section 147(a)/147(b)) for reopening, indicating a non-application of mind and thus making the assessment void ab initio.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding no error in deleting the addition. The Tribunal noted that the AO did not place any new material before it and that the CIT(A) had considered the availability of stock and the audited books of account, which were not found defective.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee opted for settlement under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme and the appeal was consigned to records and treated as dismissed. However, liberty was granted to approach the Tribunal for reinstitution if the dispute is not resolved.

The Tribunal partly allowed the Revenue's appeal. Regarding the addition of INR 4.50 crores on account of share application money, the Tribunal noted the Revenue's contention that the Ld. CIT(A) erred in admitting additional evidence and that the source of funds for investors Shri Ramesh Chander and Shri Mahender Pal Khanna was not explained, with suspicious identical credit entries in their accounts prior to issuing cheques. The Tribunal also noted the Revenue's submission that the first proviso to Section 68 placed an additional burden on the assessee to prove the nature and source of funds, which was not satisfied. The Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(A) had not adequately addressed these critical aspects. The Tribunal did not provide a definitive finding on this issue in the provided excerpt, but the overall result indicates it was not fully upheld for the assessee. Regarding the addition of INR 1.50 crores on account of unsecured loans, the Tribunal analyzed the explanation for cash deposits in the lender companies' accounts. For INR 1.00 crore from M/s. Jas Logistics Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal found the explanation of land acquisition advances refunded due to deal cancellations, supported by agreements, plausible but noted that the AO was not given an opportunity to examine the villagers. Therefore, this part of the loan was remanded for re-examination by the AO. For INR 50.00 lakhs from M/s. Sabee Finanz Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal disagreed with the Ld. CIT(A), finding the explanation of cash withdrawn for projects and re-deposited upon project non-materialization, without cogent material or evidence, unacceptable. This amount was upheld as unexplained cash credit. For the remaining INR 50.00 lakhs from M/s. Sabee Finanz Pvt. Ltd., stated to be from mutual fund redemption, the Tribunal set aside the issue to the AO for re-examination. Thus, Ground of appeal No.2 was partly allowed.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D of the Act was mechanical and lacked application of mind, vitiating the assessment order. Therefore, the assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, as no objection was raised by the DR regarding the assessee's application for withdrawal.

The Tribunal held that the addition was made merely on the basis of doubt and suspicion without cogent evidence, rejecting the assessee's explanation of using agriculture income earned during the year. The source of payment was not disputed, and the addition was based on presumption.

The Tribunal held that the assessee's micro-finance activities, alongside other initiatives like education and relief, are charitable activities qualifying for exemption under Section 11 of the Act. Relying on judicial precedents, the Tribunal also clarified that specified grants are liabilities for specific activities, not voluntary contributions or income. Consequently, the orders of the AO and CIT(A) were set aside, allowing the assessee's appeal.

The tribunal held that the assessee, being a charitable trust operating as an Association of Persons, is not subject to the maximum marginal rate (MMR) or the surcharge of 37%. The tax should be computed at the normal slab rates applicable to an AOP.

The Tribunal found that the tax authorities erred in applying the maximum marginal rate and surcharge applicable to AOPs. Citing previous decisions, the Tribunal held that the assessee, being a charitable trust, should be taxed at slab rates applicable to individuals, and the surcharge should be applied at 15% as the total income did not exceed Rs. 5 crores.

The Tribunal held that the tax authorities erred in applying the maximum marginal rate (MMR) and a higher surcharge to the assessee, which is a charitable trust. The Tribunal relied on coordinate bench decisions that held such trusts are not subject to Section 167B of the Act.

The Tribunal held that the rectification application was not sustainable as the law regarding enhanced compensation and interest was settled against the assessee by the High Court and Supreme Court. Therefore, there was no error in the Tax Authorities' decision to deny the benefit.

The Tribunal held that the rectification application was not sustainable as the law regarding enhanced compensation and interest was settled against the assessee by the High Court and Supreme Court. Therefore, there was no error in the Tax Authorities' decision to deny the benefit.

The Tribunal held that the rectification application was not sustainable as the law regarding enhanced compensation and interest was settled against the assessee by the High Court and Supreme Court. Therefore, there was no error in the Tax Authorities' decision to deny the benefit.

The Tribunal held that the rectification application was not sustainable as the law regarding enhanced compensation and interest was settled against the assessee by the High Court and Supreme Court. Therefore, there was no error in the Tax Authorities' decision to deny the benefit.

The Tribunal held that the rectification application was not sustainable as the law regarding enhanced compensation and interest was settled against the assessee by the High Court and Supreme Court. Therefore, there was no error in the Tax Authorities' decision to deny the benefit.

The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D was granted mechanically without application of mind, which vitiates the assessment orders. The Tribunal admitted the additional ground of appeal challenging the maintainability of the proceedings.

The Tribunal held that the AO did not conduct independent enquiry and the assessee provided sufficient documentation including ledger, PAN, and bank statements for the transaction. It also noted that the CIT(A) had deleted the addition.

The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D must be granted with application of mind and not mechanically. The assessment orders were found to be silent on the approval process, violating procedural requirements.

The Tribunal admitted the additional ground of appeal, finding that the approval under Section 153D was granted mechanically without proper application of mind. This vitiated the assessment orders.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as evidenced by the same-day approval and collective sanction for multiple years. This vitiated the assessment orders.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, thus vitiating the assessment orders. The appeals were allowed based on this finding.

The Tribunal admitted the additional ground of appeal, finding the delay in filing to be genuine. It held that the approval under Section 153D was granted mechanically without proper application of mind, thus vitiating the assessment orders.

The Tribunal observed that the ITAT's remand order was dated 31/08/2012. As per Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act, a fresh assessment order should have been passed by 31/03/2014 (within one year from the end of the financial year of the ITAT order). Since the final assessment order was passed on 26/05/2014, it was beyond the statutory time limit and was therefore quashed.

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) passed the order ex-parte without providing the assessee an opportunity of being heard and did not decide all grounds on merits. Therefore, in the interest of natural justice, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A).

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not specifically addressed Ground No. 4 of the assessee's appeal, which pertained to the denial of indexation benefit on the cost of acquisition for industrial property. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication on merits.

The Tribunal admitted additional evidence filed by the assessee regarding the deposits in the bank account. However, since this evidence requires verification, the case was restored to the AO for a fresh examination.

The Tribunal held that the assessee's delay of 228 days in filing the first appeal before the CIT(A) was due to suffering from chronic anxiety and psychosis, and was supported by a medical certificate. Therefore, the delay was condoned.

The Tribunal admitted additional evidence filed by the assessee regarding the deposits in the bank account. However, since this evidence requires verification, the case was restored to the AO for a fresh examination.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had decided the appeal ex parte without deciding on merits and set aside the order of the CIT(A). The matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for a decision on merits.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not decide the issue on merit and affirmed an ex-parte order without proper adjudication. The Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for a fresh decision on merit after providing the assessee an opportunity of being heard.

The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence filed before the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer to decide the issues on merits after considering the additional evidence and providing an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

The Tribunal observed that the assessee was not given an opportunity to be heard on merit. Therefore, the matter was restored to the file of the ld. CIT (A) to provide an opportunity for hearing and decide the issue on merit.

The Tribunal held that the marketing and sales services rendered by the assessee did not involve the 'making available' of technical knowledge or skill, nor did they involve the transfer of technical plans or designs. Therefore, these services did not fall under the 'Fee for Included Services' clause of the India-USA DTAA.

The Tribunal held that the marketing and sales services rendered by the assessee did not involve the 'making available' of technical knowledge or skill, nor did they involve the transfer of technical plans or designs. Therefore, these services did not fall under the 'Fee for Included Services' clause of the India-USA DTAA.

The Tribunal held that the marketing and sales services rendered by the assessee did not involve the 'making available' of technical knowledge or skill, nor did they involve the transfer of technical plans or designs. Therefore, these services did not fall under the 'Fee for Included Services' clause of the India-USA DTAA.