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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, DELHI BENCH, ‘A’: NEW DELHI
Before: SHRI S RIFAUR RAHMAN & SHRI ANUBHAV SHARMA
ORDER PER ANUBHAV SHARMA, JM,
This appeal has been preferred by the assessee against order dated 17.03.2022 u/s 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) of the Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Ghaziabad, pertaining to Assessment Year 2013-14.
On hearing both the sides, we find at the outset that there is a delay in filing of the appeal to extent of 640 days for which an application has been filed for condonation of delay on the basis that due to incorrect professional advice from regular tax consultant that the order was not appealable, the assessee, who is suffering from physical disabilities failed to file the appeal. It can be observed that the appeal has been filed by the assessee who in affidavit deposed that he is autistic. In fact, Shri Sunil Kumar, Chartered Accountant has also filed an affidavit that in his opinion, the impugned order was not challengeable before the Tribunal. In the light of the aforesaid, we consider it appropriate case to condone the delay. Accordingly, the appeal is admitted for hearing.
The assessee in the appeal in his hand has not only challenged the impugned order u/s 263 of the Act dated 17.03.2022 but has also challenged the reopening proceedings itself on the assertion that there was no valid reason to believe and there was invalid sanction u/s 151 of the Act. As with regard to this aspect, whether while challenging the impugned order u/s 263 of the Act, the assessee can also raise the challenge to the original assessment order. We find that the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Shobhit Goel (HUF) vide order dated 27.02.2025 has taken note of the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of the Mumbai Tribunal Tribunal in the case of Westlife Development Ltd. reported in (2016) 49ITR (T) 406 (Mumbai) and held that while challenging the order u/s 263 of the Act, the assessee has locus to challenge the original assessment order also, where the validity of the order has been challenged. As for convenience, we reproduce para-7 of the order dated 27.02.2025 (supra):-
“7. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the materials available on record. At the outset, the issue raised by the AR in additional ground of appeal is with regard to the validity of the reassessment proceedings and legality of consequent order passed u/s 147 r.w.s 144B of the Act dated 28/03/2022 from which the present revision proceedings u/s 263 of the Act originated. It is true that before us, assessee has challenged the order passed by the ld. Pr. CIT u/s.263 of the Act, however, since the assessee has raised the issue of validity of reassessment order, we first answer the question as to whether or not such legality of the re-assessment framed could be examined in appellate proceedings challenging the order passed u/s.263 of the Act. The coordinate bench of Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Westlife Development Ltd. reported in (2016) 49ITR (T) 406 (Mumbai) held that during the course of appellate proceedings against the order passed u/s.263 of the Act, the validity of the assessment order from which such proceedings have been originated could be examined. The relevant observations as made in the above decision of the Tribunal are as under:-
8. Challenging the jurisdictional defects of assessment order for assailing the jurisdictional validity of the revision order passed under s. 263 : The first issue that arises for our consideration is - whether the assessee can challenge the jurisdictional validity of order passed under s. 143(3) in the appellate proceedings taken up for challenging the order passed under s. 263 ? If we analyse the nature of both of these proceedings, which are under consideration before us, we find that the original assessment proceedings can be classified in a way as 'primary proceedings'. These are, in effect, basic/foundational proceedings and akin to a platform upon which any subsequent proceedings connected therewith can rest upon. The proceedings initiated under s. 263 seeking to revise the original assessment order is off shoot of the primary proceedings and therefore, these may be termed as 'collateral proceedings' in the legal framework. The issue that arises here is whether any illegality/invalidity in the order passed in the 'primary proceedings' can be set up in the 'collateral proceedings' and if yes, then of what nature ? 8.1. We have analysed this issue carefully. There is no doubt that after passing of the original assessment order, the primary (i.e., original proceedings) had come to an end and attained finality and, therefore, outcome of the same cannot be disturbed, and therefore, the original assessment order framed to conclude the primary proceedings had also attained finality and it also cannot be disturbed at the instance of the assessee, except as permitted under the law and by following the due process of law. Under these circumstances, it can be said that effect of the original assessment order can not be erased or modified subsequently. In other words, whatever tax liability had been determined in the original assessment order that had already become final and that cannot be sought to be disturbed by the assessee. But, the issue that arises here is that if the original assessment order is illegal in terms of its jurisdiction or if the same is null & void in the eyes of law on any jurisdictional grounds, then, whether it can give rise to initiation of further proceedings and whether such subsequent proceedings would be valid under the law as contained in IT Act ? It has been vehemently argued before us that the subsequent proceedings (i.e. collateral proceedings) derive strength only from the order passed in the original proceedings (i.e. primary proceedings). Thus, if order passed in the original proceedings is itself illegal, then that cannot give rise to valid revision proceedings. Therefore, as per law, the validity of the order passed in the primary (original) proceedings should be allowed to be examined even at the subsequent stages, only for the limited purpose of examining whether the collateral (subsequent) proceedings have been initiated on a valid legal platform or not and for examining the validity of assumption of jurisdiction to initiate the collateral proceedings. If it is not so allowed, then, it may so happen that though order passed in the original proceedings was illegal and thus order passed in the subsequent proceedings in turn would also be illegal, but in absence of a remedy to contest the same, it may give rise to an 'enforceable' tax liability without authority of law. Therefore, the Courts have taken this view that jurisdictional aspects of the order passed in the primary proceedings can be examined in the collateral proceedings also. This issue is not res integra. This issue has been decided in many judgments by various courts, and some of them have been discussed by us in followings paragraphs. 8.2. In a matter that came up before Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Singh & Ors. vs. Chaman Paswan & Ors. [1955] 1 5CR 117 the facts were that the appellant in that case had undervalued the suit at Rs. 2,950 and laid it in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Monghyr for recovery of possession of the suit lands and mesne profits. The suit was dismissed and on appeal it was confirmed. In the second appeal in the High Court the Registry raised the objection as to valuation under s.
11. The value of the appeal was fixed at Rs. 9,980. A contention then was raised by the plaintiff in the High Court that on account of the valuation fixed by the High Court the appeal against the decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge did not lie to the District Court, but to the High Court and on that account the decree of the District Court was a nullity. Alternatively, it was contended that it caused prejudice to the appellant. In considering that contention at p. 121, a four Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court speaking through Vankatarama Ayyar, J. held that : "It is a fundamental principle well- established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties." 8.3. This judgment was subsequently followed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark case of Sushil Kumar Mehta vs. Gobind Ram Bohra, (1990) 1 SCC 193, wherein an issue arose whether a decree can be challenged at the stage of execution and whether a decree which remained uncontested operates as res-judicata qua the parties affected by it. Hon'ble apex court , taking support from aforesaid judgment, observed as under : "In the light of this position in law the quest ion for determination is whether the impugned decree of the Civil Court can be assailed by the appellant in execution. It is already held that it is the Controller under the Act that has exclusive jurisdiction to order ejectment of a tenant from a building in the urban area leased out by the landlord. Thereby the Civil Court inherently lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit and pass a decree of ejectment. Therefore, though the decree was passed and the jurisdiction of the Court was gone into in issue Nos. 4 and 5 at the ex-parte trial, the decree there-under is a nullity, and does not bind the appellant. Therefore, it does not operate as a res judicata. The Courts below have committed grave error of law in holding that the decree in the suit operated as res judicata and the appellant cannot raise the same point once again at the execution." 8.4. Similar view has been taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court by following aforesaid judgments recently in the case of Indian Bank vs. Manual Govindji Khona reported in 2015 (3) SCC 712. Further, similar view was emphasized by Hon'ble Bombay High Court (GOA Bench) in the case of Mavany Brothers vs. CIT (Tax Appeal No. 8 of 2007) [reported at (2015) 120 DTR (Bom) 286— Ed.] in its order dt. 17th April, 2015 wherein it was held that an issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time even in appeal or execution. 8.5. The aforesaid principles, enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of Kiran Singh & Ors. vs. Chaman Paswan & Ors, supra were reiterated by the apex Court in the cases of Superintendent of Taxes vs. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust (AIR 1975 SC 2065) and Dasa Muni Reddy vs. Appa Rao (AIR 1974 SC 2089). In the first of these decisions it was pointed out that revenue statutes protect the public on the one hand and confer power upon the State on the other, and the fetter on the jurisdiction is one meant to protect the public on the broader ground of public policy and, therefore, jurisdiction to assess or reassess a person can never be waived or created by consent. This decision shows that the basic principle recognized in Kiran Singh (supra) is applicable even to revenue statutes such as the IT Act. Dasa Muni Reddy (supra) is a judgment where the principle of 'coram non judice' was applied to rent control law. It was held that neither the rule of estoppel nor the principle of resdicata can confer the Court jurisdiction where none exists. Here also the principle that was put into operation was that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or agreement where it did not exist, nor can the lack of jurisdiction be waived. 8.6. These judgments were subsequently noticed by Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of P.V. Doshi vs. CIT (1978) 113 ITR 22 (Guj). This case arose under the IT Act with reference to the provisions of s. 147 dealing with re-assessment. The facts were that the assessment was sought to be reopened under s. 147 and notice under s. 148 was issued. Validity of reopening was not challenged upto Tribunal and additions were challenged on merits only. The Tribunal restored the matter to the AO with some directions to reexamine the issue on merits. When the matter came back to the AO the assessee specifically raised the point of jurisdiction to reopen the assessment, contending that the notice of reopening was prompted by a mere change of opinion. The AO rejected plea of the assessee but the AAC accepted this ground and also held the reassessment to be bad in law on jurisdictional ground. Against the order of the AAC the Revenue went in appeal before the Tribunal and specifically raised the plea that the question of jurisdiction to reopen the assessment having been expressly given up by the assessee in the appeal against the reassessment order in the first round, the assessee was debarred from raising that point again before the AAC and the AAC was equally wrong in permitting the assessee to raise that point which had become final in the first round and in adjudicating upon the same. The plea of the Revenue impressed the Tribunal which took the view that after its earlier order in the first round of proceedings the matter attained finality with regard to the point of jurisdiction which was given up before the AAC and not agitated further and that in the remand proceedings what was open before the AO was only the question whether the addition was justified on merits and the point regarding the jurisdictional aspect was not open before the AO. According to the Tribunal, the assessee having raised the point in the first round and having given it up could not revive it in the second round of proceedings where the issue was limited to the merits of the additions. In this view, the Tribunal accepted the Revenues plea. The assessee thereafter carried order of the Tribunal in reference before the Gujarat High Court. The High Court after considering various judgments of the Supreme Court on the point of jurisdiction to reopen the assessment and also after specifically discussing the judgment of the Supreme Court in Onkarmal Nathmal Trust (supra) and Dasa Muni Reddy (supra) held that the Tribunal was in error in holding that the question of jurisdiction became final when it passed the earlier remand order. It was held that neither the question of res judicata nor the rule of estoppel could be invoked where the jurisdiction of an authority was under challenge. According to Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, the rule of res judicata cannot be invoked where the question involved is the competence of the Court to assume jurisdiction, either pecuniary or territorial or over the subject-matter of the dispute. Hon'ble High Court further held that since neither consent nor waiver can confer jurisdiction upon the AO where it did not exist, no importance could be attached to the fact that the assessee, in the first round of proceedings, expressly gave up the plea against the erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the assessing authority. According to the Hon'ble Court, the "finality or conclusiveness could only arise in respect of orders which are competent orders with jurisdiction and if the proceedings of reassessment are not validly initiated at all, the order would be a void order as per the settled legal position which could never have any finality or conclusiveness. If the original order is without jurisdiction, it would be only a nullity confirmed in further appeals". In this view of the matter, Hon'ble High Court finally answered the reference in favour of the assessee. 8.7. It is further noted that many of these judgments were discussed and followed by the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Indian Farmers Fertilizers Co-operative Ltd. vs. Jt. CIT (2007) 107 TTJ (Del) 98 : (2007) 105 ITD 33 (Del), wherein a similar issue had arisen. In this case, the issue raised before the bench was whether it is open to the assessee, not having appealed against the reassessment order, to set up or canvass its correctness in collateral proceedings taken for rectification thereof under s.154. The bench minutely analysed law in this regard and applying the principle of 'coram non judice' and following aforesaid judgments of the supreme court, it was held that if an assessee seeks to challenge the reassessment proceedings as being without jurisdiction, when action for rectification is sought to be taken on the assumption of the validity of the reassessment order, then the assessee has to step in and protect its interests and the liberty to quest ion even the validity of the reassessment proceedings ought to be given to it......." (emphasis, italicised in print, supplied). 8.8. Similar view was taken in another decision of the Tribunal in the case of Dhiraj Suri vs. Addl. CIT (2006) 99 TTJ (Del) 525 : (2006) 98 ITD 87 (Del). In the said case, appeal was filed by the assessee before the Tribunal against the levy of penalty. In the appeal challenging the penalty order, the assessee challenged the validity of block assessment order which had determined the tax liability of the assessee on the basis of which penalty was levied subsequently. The revenue objected with respect to the ground of the assessee raising jurisdictional issues of assessment proceedings in the appeal against the penalty order . After analysing the legal position, as clarified by Hon'ble Gujrat High Court in the case of P.V. Doshi, supra and Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Jainaravan Babulal vs. CIT (1988) 69 CTR (Bom) 201 : (1988) 170 ITR 399 (Bom) the bench held as that if the block assessment itself is without jurisdiction then there is no question of levy of any penalty under s. 158BFA(2) and therefore it is open to the assessee to set up the question of validity of the assessment in the appeal against the levy of penalty.
8.9. We also derive support from another judgement of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Inventors Industrial Corporation Ltd vs. CIT (1991) 96 CTR (Bom) 206 : (1992) 194 ITR 548 (Bom) wherein it was held that assessee was entitled to challenge the jurisdiction of the AO to initiate re-assessment proceedings before the CIT(A) in the second round of proceedings, even though he had not raised it in earlier proceedings before the AO or in the earlier appeal. 8.10. Thus, on the basis of aforesaid discussion we can safely hold that as per law, the assessee should be permitted to challenge the validity of order passed under s. 263 on the ground that the impugned assessment order was nonest and we hold accordingly. Further, the coordinate bench of Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Aishwarya Rai Bachchan (Supra), has held as under:- 4.1. One more excruciating fact that needs to be addressed in the instant case is that the learned Principal CIT herein is only seeking to revise the order passed by the learned AO under s. 143(3) r/w s. 147 of the Act dt. 12th Dec., 2018. In the said reassessment proceedings, the learned AO had not even made any addition despite the fact that he had reason to believe that income of Rs. 11,55,330 had escaped assessment in the hands of the assessee which was sought to be taxed under s. 56 of the Act as per the reasons recorded. Hence, when the very basis of reasons recorded by the learned AO was ultimately not added by the learned AO in the reassessment proceedings, then the primary reason to believe that income of the assessee had escaped assessment fails and such re- assessment cannot be treated as a valid order in the eyes of law. The same is to be declared as void ab initio. Reliance in this regard was rightly placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Jet Airways (I) Ltd. (2011) 239 CTR (Bom) 183 : (2011) 52 DTR (Bom) 71 : (2011) 331 ITR 236 (Bom). When an assessment framed by the learned AO is unsustainable in the eyes of law, the said invalid and illegal order cannot be subject matter of s. 263 proceedings. On this count also, the revision order passed by the learned Principal CIT under s. 263 of the Act deserves to be quashed. The coordinate bench of Ahmedabad Tribunal in the case of Shri Jignesh Lilachand Shah (supra), had an occasion to deal with this issue where the Tribunal in para 6 has observed as under:- 6. The next issue for consideration before us is that once it is held that the assessment order itself is null and void, can such assessment order be the subject matter of revision under section 263 of the Act. In our view, it is a well-settled principle of law that once the assessment order passed itself is null and void, the same cannot be the subject matter revision under section 263 of the Act. In the case of Pioneer Distilleries Limited Vs Pr. CIT Pune) the ITAT held that revisionary jurisdiction cannot be exercised against Void order. In this case, the ITAT held that when the said order is void and did not stand in eyes of law, it cannot be held to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue by the Commissioner. Again in the case of Westlife Development Ltd. v. PCIT vide order dated 24.06.2016 (ITAT Mumbai), the ITAT held that when an Assessment order passed under section 147 of the Act was illegal the CIT cannot invoke the jurisdiction under section 263 of the Act against such void or non-est order. In the case of Inder Kumar Bachani (HUF) v. ITO (2006) 101 TTJ 450 (ITAT Lucknow), the ITAT held that as the order of the Assessing Officer passed under section 147 / 143(3) was itself void, the order of PCIT passed under section 263 for quashing this order was without jurisdiction. In view of the above observations, we are of the considered view that since the assessment order passed by ITO Ward 3(3)(2), Ahmedabad itself was null and void, the same could not be the subject matter of revision under section 263 of the Act. In the result, we are Shri Jignesh Lilachand Shah vs. Pr. CIT allowing the appeal of the assessee on the ground of jurisdiction itself. We are accordingly not separately adjudicating into the merits of the case. On careful reading of the observations made by the coordinate benches of the Tribunal in aforesaid cases, we are of the view that the validity of order passed u/s.263 of the Act on the ground that the re-assessment order from which the said proceedings emerged out was nonest, can be challenged in appellate proceedings against u/s.263 of the Act. Thus, respectfully following the above decisions of the coordinate benches of the Tribunal, we are of the considered view that in the present appellate proceedings against the order of the ld. Pr. CIT u/s.263 of the Act, the validity of the order passed u/s.147/143(3) of the Act can be examined.”
Now before us, on behalf of the assessee, the Ld. Counsel has submitted that sanction has been granted in mechanical manner and for that it is submitted that while granting sanction u/s 151 of the Act, reference has been made to deleted/omitted section 147(b) of the Act, which is no more in statute.
The ld. DR has submitted that it is merely an administrative approval and a technical mistake; otherwise the authority giving sanction was very well aware of the issues.
In this context, we find that the assessee had sought for copy of documents in regard to the assessment and the assessee was provided the copy of the approval obtained u/s 151 of the Act for issuance of notice u/s 148 of the Act dated 29.03.2019 from ITO, Ward-2(2), Meerut and the relevant copy of the order sheet for the same. Considering the same, we find that it is a Performa, wherein, at Sr. No.7, under the column “whether the provisions of section 147(a) or 147(b) are applicable or both,” the Assessing Officer has mentioned that the provisions of section 147(b) are applicable and on that basis, the JCIT, Range-II and the competent authority PCIT, Meerut have granted sanction.
7. The Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Naveen Kumar Gupta vs ITO in , vide order dated 18.06.2025, wherein, there was a same combination of member, has taken note of the similar sanction granted u/s 151 of the Act referring to the applicability of section 147(b) and relying upon the decision of Mumbai Tribunal in the case of M/s Sukanya Properties Pvt. Ltd. vs in para no.13 has observed as follows:-
“13. It is specifically brought to our notice point no.7 wherein the provisions of section 147(b) was referred which was omitted and which is no longer applicable. It was submitted that this provision was mechanically applied by the Revenue. Further it is brought to our notice that the above sanction was granted without recording the date of sanction. We observed that no doubt, Pr.CIT has granted the approval and not mentioned any date. We observed that on the similar facts on record, the ITAT, Mumbai has considered the similar issue in (supra) and ITAT, Mumbai has considered the issue of undated sanction of approval and also the issue of reference to section 147(b) and held as under :- “7.1. As mentioned above, the notice was issued on 20/02/2015 and the approval was sought on 11/02/2015 but it can be seen that no date is mentioned for granting approval, therefore, we do not know whether it was before issuing the notice u/s 148 of the Act or after.
The ld. Counsel vehemently argued that the approval is not only mechanical but cryptic and full of errors inasmuch as, at point no. 7., the question is “Whether the provisions of Sec. 147(a) or 147(b) are applicable or both the sections are applicable” and the answer is “Only 147(b)”. We find that the provisions of Section 147(b) have been deleted long bank.
On identical set of facts, the Co-ordinate Bench in 94/Mum/2019, dated 28/10/2020, had the occasion to consider an identical approval and held as under:- “5.3. We find that the reopening in the instant case has been made beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year which requires sanction of approval from the ld. PCIT u/s.151(1) of the Act. We find from page 1 of the Case Law Paper book filed by the assessee before us containing proforma in the prescribed format seeking sanction of approval u/s.151(1) of the Act, that the said proforma was sent by the ld. AO to the ld. PCIT through proper channel i.e. Additional CIT on 08/01/2016. For the sake of convenience, the entire proforma is reproduced herein:- ……….. 5.4. From the aforesaid proforma, it could be seen that question No.7 specifically mandate the ld. AO to mention whether the provisions of Section 147(a) or 147 (b) or both the sections are applicable. In response thereto, the ld. AO had mentioned only 147(b). We find that the provisions of Section 147(b) has been omitted from the statute book long back and was certainly not in force for A.Y.2010-11. We find that the ld. CIT(A) without looking into these facts had accorded a mechanical approval without due application of mind. We find that reliance placed by the ld. AR on the decision of Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court squarely clinches the issue before us in this regard in the case of Smt. Kalpana Shantilal Haria vs. ACIT referred to supra, wherein it was held that:- “6. The grievance of the petitioner is that there is no proper sanction in view of non application of mind by the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax. The Assessing Officer has invoked a provision of law to sustain the impugned notice which is admittedly not in the statute and the Joint Commissioner has yet approved it.
Mr. Chanderpal, learned Counsel appearing for the Revenue tendered a copy of the letter dated 19th December, 2017 issued to the petitioner wherein the Assessing Officer has stated that the words “147(b)” were inadvertently filled in the prescribed form, instead of Section 147 of the Act while obtaining the sanction from the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax. It is further submitted on behalf of the Revenue that the same is a curable defect under section 292B of the Act. Therefore, the impugned notice cannot be held to be bad for mere incorrect mentioning of section on account of the mistake. (emphasis supplied by us) ………….. 5.12. Since the entire reopening of assessment had been quashed on the aforesaid aspect, we need not go into other grounds raised
by the assessee both on law as well as on merits and they are hereby left open. 9.1. In this common order, is of the assessee for AY 2010-11. On finding parity of facts, respectfully following the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench, we have no hesitation in quashing the impugned assessment order.”
8. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are inclined to sustain ground nos.10.1 and 10.2. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the impugned assessment order and consequential order u/s 263 of the Act, are both quashed. Order pronounced in the open court on 12th September, 2025.