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346 orders · Page 4 of 7
The Tribunal held that the addition made under Section 69A was unsustainable because Form 2, the statutory acknowledgement for the IDS, was not served on the assessee. Consequently, the time for payment of taxes under the scheme never commenced, and Section 197(b) of the Finance Act, 2016, could not be invoked.
The Tribunal held that the First Appellate Authority (FAA) erred in dismissing the second appeal as infructuous without adjudicating Ground No. 5, which raised the issue of whether the addition made as LTCG for the sale of the plot was correctly attributed to the assessee. The matter was restored to the FAA for adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 on 31.07.2022 was indeed barred by limitation as per Section 149, following the Supreme Court's decision in Rajeev Bansal. Consequently, all subsequent assessment proceedings were deemed invalid.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal in the interest of justice. However, since the appeal was filed before the wrong bench, it was dismissed as not maintainable.
The Tribunal noted that a separate appeal concerning the quantum assessment had resulted in the deletion of the addition made under section 69C. Since the penalty was imposed based on this addition, and the addition was subsequently deleted by the Tribunal, the penalty order could not survive.
The Tribunal held that the reopening notice under Section 148 was issued beyond four years without fulfilling the conditions of the first proviso to Section 147. The AO's action was based on a change of opinion as the depreciation claim was already disclosed and considered during the original assessment under Section 143(3), and no disallowance was made then.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, noting that the assessee demonstrated sufficient cause due to not being aware of the notices. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) to adjudicate afresh, providing an opportunity to the assessee to present their case.
The Tribunal condoned the 604-day delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the assessee's explanation regarding serious illness in the family and lack of knowledge of proceedings. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the matter back to the AO for de novo assessment, directing the AO to provide a reasonable opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had provided findings that the subsidiaries invested the borrowed amount for land banks, which had a direct nexus to the assessee's business. The Tribunal also observed that the AO did not examine documentary evidence supporting the disallowance. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in SA Builders Ltd., the Tribunal found that if advances are for commercial expediency, the interest on borrowed funds is deductible. However, the basis for the lower authorities' decisions was unclear, necessitating further factual examination.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's explanation for not filing the return on time due to suffering from Covid-19, along with the fact that substantial tax was paid through TDS and the assessment was accepted, constituted a bonafide explanation. Therefore, the penalty under section 270A was not to be imposed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution without adjudicating the issues on merits. The Tribunal found this approach to be unreasonable and unjustified.
The Tribunal held that belated remittance of employees' contribution to PF/ESI, even if disallowed as a deduction, does not fall under the clauses of 'misreporting of income' as defined in Section 270A(9). The penalty was considered unsustainable in law.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not appear before the CIT(A) despite numerous opportunities. However, considering the facts and circumstances, and to meet the ends of justice, the Tribunal decided to provide one more opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee cannot be blamed for the delay due to the auditor's illness, which constitutes a reasonable cause for condoning the delay. The Tribunal found the action of the CIT(A) in refusing to condone the delay to be incorrect.
The Tribunal noted that the delay in filing the appeal was due to system glitches preventing the assessee from being aware of the proceedings. The Tribunal condoned the delay subject to the assessee paying a cost and also set aside the ex parte order, restoring the appeal to the Ld.CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the AO conducted a due and proper inquiry, and the assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the revenue. Therefore, the conditions for invoking Section 263 were not satisfied.
The Tribunal held that the provisions for deemed house property income were not entirely applicable as the units were considered work-in-progress. The penalty was deleted as it was based on a deeming provision and not misreporting.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice issued under Section 148 was bad in law because the Assessing Officer (AO) failed to obtain prior approval from the specifically designated authority as required by Section 151 of the Act. The approval obtained was from a lower authority than mandated for cases where reassessment is initiated beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year.
The Tribunal noted that the appeal was filed with a significant delay of over 330 days and that the reasons provided for the delay, primarily the resignation of an officer, were not considered sufficient cause as other responsible personnel were available. The Tribunal found the explanation for the delay unsatisfactory and was not inclined to condone it.
The Tribunal held that the assessee did not get a proper opportunity before the AO and that the ex-parte order by the CIT(A) also violated principles of natural justice. Following the Supreme Court's decision in TIN Box Co. v. CIT, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order.
The Tribunal noted the delay and the assessee's failure to respond to the deficiency letter, but in the interest of justice and equity, decided to restore the matter. The assessee is directed to file a proper condonation application with specific reasons for the delay.
The Tribunal found the AO's addition of deemed income debatable but quantified it by estimating ALV at 4% of the estimated cost of unsold units. It also ruled that the penalty under Section 270A was not sustainable as the addition was based on a deeming provision, not actual misreporting.
The Tribunal held that there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeals before the Ld.CIT(A) for both AYs 2018-19 and 2020-21. The assessee's omission to file within time was not deliberate, and the assessee did not gain any advantage from the delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the Ld.CIT(A) on the condition that the assessee deposits a cost of ₹5,000/- for each case (total ₹10,000/-) in the State Legal Aid Authority, Hon'ble Madras High Court, within three months of receiving the order, and produces proof of deposit. The Tribunal noted that the Ld.CIT(A) had not decided the penalty appeals on merits. Considering that the quantum appeals were restored to the Ld.CIT(A) for AYs 2018-19 and 2020-21, the Tribunal restored the penalty appeals also to the Ld.CIT(A) with a direction to decide the quantum appeal first, and thereafter decide the penalty appeal on merits after hearing the assessee. The assessee was directed to diligently appear and present documents, and the Ld.CIT(A) was to decide in accordance with law.
The Tribunal noted that the assessment order lacked clarity on the bifurcation of cash deposits and that the AO may have travelled beyond the scope of the CASS issue. Given the lack of proper opportunity for the assessee and to ensure a thorough examination, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order.
The Tribunal noted that the previous appeal filed by the assessee, ITA No.2801/Chny/2025, assailing the same order of the Ld.CIT(A) dated 06.08.2025, was already allowed by the Tribunal on 20.01.2026. Therefore, the present appeal was deemed to be a duplicate.
The Tribunal noted that the rejection was ex-parte, violating natural justice. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the application was restored to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision after hearing the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed technical glitches prevented timely submission of documents to the AO, and the CIT(A) also passed an ex parte order without considering the merits. Following the Supreme Court's decision in TIN Box Co. v. CIT, the Tribunal restored the case to the AO for de novo assessment.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, finding sufficient cause. The key issue was whether the CPC was empowered to disallow the Section 80P deduction based on a delayed return filing, given that the relevant amendment to Section 143(1)(a) came into effect prospectively from April 1, 2021, and the intimation order was passed before this amendment. The Tribunal held that the CPC's adjustment was not empowered at the time.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned from the savings bank account is incidental to and attributable to the main activity of the society, which is the collective disposal of labour. Therefore, it is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(vi).
The Tribunal held that the delay was not intentional and the assessee should not be penalized for pursuing an alternate legal course. It was decided to condone the delay for the interest of justice and fair play.
The Tribunal noted that both the AO and the Ld.CIT(A) passed ex parte orders. Citing the Supreme Court decision in TIN Box Co. v. CIT, the Tribunal found that the assessee was not given a proper opportunity of being heard due to issues like non-service of notices. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the Ld.CIT(A) and restored the assessment back to the AO for de-novo assessment.
The Tribunal noted that both the AO and CIT(A) passed ex-parte orders without giving the assessee a proper opportunity to be heard. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in TIN Box Co. v. CIT, the Tribunal held that a reasonable opportunity must be given to the assessee before passing an assessment order.
The Tribunal held that the issue of exclusion of comparables on the ground of functional dissimilarity needed to be examined afresh. The Tribunal noted that while the assessee's TPSR indicated a wider range of functions beyond just software development, the DRP had not considered the assessee's submissions substantiating its claim of income from software development services. The Tribunal also observed that the TPO had applied an ITeS filter, and while the TPO mentioned software development services as a function of the assessee, it did not accept the function when rejecting exclusion claims. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission that exclusion cannot be rejected solely because the assessee included the comparables in its TPSR. Consequently, the Tribunal remitted the issue of exclusion of comparables on functional dissimilarity back to the TPO for a fresh examination, directing the TPO to consider the exclusions sought by the assessee by calling for relevant details and deciding in accordance with law. The assessee was directed to furnish necessary details and cooperate. The legal grounds were rendered academic and left open. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeals before the Ld.CIT(A) for both AYs 2018-19 and 2020-21. The assessee's omission to file within time was not deliberate, and the assessee did not gain any advantage from the delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the Ld.CIT(A) on the condition that the assessee deposits a cost of ₹5,000/- for each case (total ₹10,000/-) in the State Legal Aid Authority, Hon'ble Madras High Court, within three months of receiving the order, and produces proof of deposit. The Tribunal noted that the Ld.CIT(A) had not decided the penalty appeals on merits. Considering that the quantum appeals were restored to the Ld.CIT(A) for AYs 2018-19 and 2020-21, the Tribunal restored the penalty appeals also to the Ld.CIT(A) with a direction to decide the quantum appeal first, and thereafter decide the penalty appeal on merits after hearing the assessee. The assessee was directed to diligently appear and present documents, and the Ld.CIT(A) was to decide in accordance with law.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 for AY 2015-16 on 29.07.2022 is barred by limitation as it was issued beyond the six-year period from the end of the relevant assessment year. The reassessment proceedings and order were deemed bad in law.
A notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act in the name of a deceased person is unenforceable in law, as it constitutes a jurisdictional defect. The subsequent assessment order framed in the name of the deceased is a nullity.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee cannot be blamed for the delay due to the auditor's illness, which constitutes a reasonable cause for condoning the delay. The Tribunal found the action of the CIT(A) in refusing to condone the delay to be incorrect.
The Tribunal held that the AO issued the notice under section 148 after the specified time limit of 30.06.2021, and therefore, approval should have been obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General as per clause (ii) of section 151. Since the approval was obtained from the Principal Commissioner (clause (i)), it was not valid. The assumption of jurisdiction by the AO to issue the re-assessment notice under section 148 was deemed bad in law.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee cannot be blamed for the delay due to the auditor's illness, which constitutes a reasonable cause for condoning the delay. The Tribunal found the action of the CIT(A) in refusing to condone the delay to be incorrect.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not given a proper opportunity of being heard by the AO and CIT(A). Following the Supreme Court decision in TIN Box Co. v. CIT, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the assessment back to the AO for de novo assessment.
The Tribunal held that the payment was compensatory in nature, arising from contractual obligations due to shortage of goods during transit, and not a penalty for violation of law. The payment was incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business and did not fall under the Explanation to Section 37(1) of the Act.
The Tribunal found that the lower authorities had relied solely on the gaming portal's account statement without properly examining the assessee's alleged losses or the specific nature of online gaming. In the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to provide the assessee with another opportunity.
The Tribunal held that the assessee should be granted an opportunity of being heard, as she did not get a proper opportunity before the AO and CIT(A). Following the Supreme Court's decision in TIN Box Co. v. CIT, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were null and void because the Assessing Officer (AO) failed to obtain the necessary approval from the specified authority under Section 151(ii) of the Act before issuing the notice under Section 148. The period since the end of the assessment year was more than three years, requiring approval from a higher authority than what was obtained.
The Tribunal held that statements recorded during survey proceedings lack evidentiary value unless corroborated by independent material. Since the transactions were recorded in the company's books and disclosed in returns prior to the search, the addition made by the AO was unjustified.
The Tribunal held that since the books of accounts were unavailable and the AO was not satisfied, the income should be estimated. It directed the AO to estimate the transport business income using Section 44AE as a guiding principle, and to re-examine the addition on sale of land.
The Tribunal noted that the lower authorities had not properly appreciated the documentary evidence submitted by the assessee. Considering the facts and circumstances and in the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to give the assessee another opportunity to submit proper documentary evidence before the AO.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not granted the appellant a personal hearing through video conferencing, despite the request. This violated the principles of natural justice and the prescribed procedure for faceless hearings.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) and AO were incorrect in denying the Section 54F deduction. It was determined that the assessee did not own more than one 'residential house' other than the new asset, and income from a tannery, even if treated as income from house property, does not disqualify for the exemption.
The Tribunal held that the addition under Section 69C was due to a clerical error in Form-3CD, as there was no actual transaction with JP Jewellery. Regarding the addition under Section 68, the Tribunal found that the A.O. had incorrectly classified trade creditors as unsecured loans and that the assessee had provided documentary evidence to substantiate the nature of these amounts.