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346 orders · Page 3 of 7
The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence filed by the assessee, finding it necessary for substantial justice and going to the root of the matter. The Tribunal noted that the assessee could not file documentary evidence during assessment proceedings due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders concerning the issue of agricultural income and restored them to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) for a fresh hearing on merits. The AO was directed to afford a proper opportunity of hearing to the assessee and to pass fresh assessments in accordance with the law after the assessee substantiates its case with all relevant material and documents. A cost of Rs. 5,000/- per case was imposed on the assessee, to be deposited with the Tamil Nadu State Legal Services Authority. Regarding the issue relating to Section 45(2), the Tribunal held that no interference was required with the CIT(A)'s order. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that depreciation on second-hand machinery is allowable on the actual cost incurred by the assessee, provided the conditions of ownership and use are met. The invocation of Explanation 3 to Section 43(1) was found unsustainable due to lack of recorded satisfaction and prior approval. The challenge to the notice under Section 143(2) was dismissed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the FAA, finding the assessee's reason for unawareness of the order to be reasonable. The Tribunal set aside the FAA's order and remitted the matter back to the AO for fresh adjudication, directing the AO to provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's failure to provide documentary evidence and their nonchalant attitude towards notices. However, to ensure justice and fair play, the matter was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was under judicial custody during the assessment and appellate proceedings, leading to non-appearance. The assessee has now provided documents to substantiate the source of investment in an immovable property. The Tribunal felt it was in the interest of justice to restore the matter to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence filed by the assessee, finding it necessary for substantial justice and going to the root of the matter. The Tribunal noted that the assessee could not file documentary evidence during assessment proceedings due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders concerning the issue of agricultural income and restored them to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) for a fresh hearing on merits. The AO was directed to afford a proper opportunity of hearing to the assessee and to pass fresh assessments in accordance with the law after the assessee substantiates its case with all relevant material and documents. A cost of Rs. 5,000/- per case was imposed on the assessee, to be deposited with the Tamil Nadu State Legal Services Authority. Regarding the issue relating to Section 45(2), the Tribunal held that no interference was required with the CIT(A)'s order. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the 63-day delay in filing the appeal before the FAA, citing the assessee's reasons as reasonable. Despite deprecating the assessee's nonchalant attitude, the Tribunal restored the matter for fresh adjudication to the AO in the interest of justice.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had raised a fresh claim for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) in its grounds of appeal, which was not claimed in the return of income. The Tribunal referred to its own decision in ITA No. 1512/Chny/2025, which, in turn, relied on the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court's decision in M/s. Perlo Communication [2022] 141 taxmann.com 387 (Mad), holding that there is no provision empowering the Tribunal or appellate authority to entertain a claim not made in the return of income. However, in this specific case, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to admit the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) after verification, assuming the net profit of ₹24,30,052 represented interest income from Tirupur District Central Co-operative Bank. The ground raised by the assessee was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that since the quantum addition was deleted in the assessee's appeal, the consequential penalty levied under Section 271AAC cannot survive. The penalty was directed to be deleted based on the principle that if the foundation is removed, the superstructure falls.
The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) to treat the bank credits as business turnover and estimate profit at 8%. The addition under Section 69A was modified and restricted to the estimated income.
The Tribunal held that the Uttarakhand unit was engaged in manufacture and constituted an expansion, not a split-up, of the existing business. Substantial value addition occurred at the unit, and inter-unit transfers were at arm's length.
The Tribunal held that the UTK Unit of the assessee was engaged in production or manufacture, satisfying the condition laid down in Section 80-IC(2)(a) of the Act. The reasoning was based on the substantial value addition (35-40%) made at the UTK Unit, which included calibration, processing of locally procured components, fabrication, fitting, integration, quality testing, and delivery of ready products. The Tribunal found that the AO erred in concluding there was no increase in manufacturing capacity. Furthermore, the Tribunal held that the UTK Unit was not formed by splitting up or reconstruction of the business already in existence, thus meeting the condition precedent in Section 80-IC(4)(i). The Tribunal noted that the Legislature was aware of inter-unit arrangements and incorporated safeguards in Section 80-IA(8)/(10) for arm's length transfers, and the Revenue had not demonstrated that inter-unit transfers were not at arm's length. The Tribunal directed the AO to allow the deduction claimed under Section 80-IC and delete the impugned disallowances for all the assessment years under appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal found that the FAA erred in dismissing the appeal without proper adjudication and by incorrectly referencing a penalty order. The FAA's decision was based on a misapplication of facts and law.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's non-compliance with FAA notices and deprecated the nonchalant attitude. However, in the interest of justice and fair play, the matter was restored to the files of the FAA as a last opportunity for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the FAA dismissed the appeal solely on the grounds of delay without considering the merits. The Tribunal found the assessee's reasons for the delay to be reasonable and decided to condone the delay. The Tribunal set aside the order of the FAA and remitted the matter back for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the addition under Section 68 of the Act could not be sustained because the sales were recorded in regular books of account, accepted as part of turnover, supported by VAT returns, and the books were not rejected by the AO. The Tribunal also noted that the revenue failed to provide evidence to disprove the sales or demonstrate bogus purchases.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to properly examine the evidence, including the source of share application money and the cost of construction. The CIT(A) also relied on additional evidence without proper justification and in violation of rules. Therefore, the matters were restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal restored AY 2015-16 to the AO for fresh consideration, granting the assessee an opportunity to present their case. For AY 2018-19, the Tribunal held that the Section 148 notice was invalid due to the sanction being granted by an improper authority, thus quashing the assessment.
The Tribunal held that Section 56(2)(viib) applies to the conversion of loans into equity shares. It also found that the valuation report was invalid as it was not prepared by a merchant banker as required by the pre-amended Rule 11UA(2)(b). The Tribunal further noted that the projections in the valuation report were unrealistic when compared to actual financial performance.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's name had changed from M/s.Bizbarta Technologies India Pvt Ltd. to Secureinteli Technologies Pvt. Ltd. The CIT(A) rejected the valuation report based on a misunderstanding of the entity name. The Tribunal decided to give the assessee another opportunity to submit the valuation report.
The Tribunal noted that the AO did not examine the addition on merits and the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal for non-response. Considering the circumstances, the assessee was granted one more opportunity to substantiate the claim that the deposited amount was from Gold Loans.
The CIT(A) dismissed the assessee's appeal, holding it was not maintainable under Section 249(4) of the Act for non-payment of advance tax. The Tribunal held that Section 249(4) is triggered only when there's an obligation to pay advance tax, and in this case, the income assessed was not admitted income.
The Tribunal restored AY 2015-16 to the AO for fresh consideration, granting the assessee an opportunity to present their case. For AY 2018-19, the Tribunal held that the Section 148 notice was invalid due to the sanction being granted by an improper authority, thus quashing the assessment.
The Tribunal held that the reason cited by the assessee for the delay in filing the appeals before the FAA was reasonable. Therefore, the delay was condoned, and the matter was remitted back to the FAA for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that Section 80P(4) does not apply to the assessee's claim as it is not a cooperative bank functioning at par with commercial banks. The delay in filing returns was condoned. Therefore, the interest income earned from deposits with a cooperative bank qualifies for deduction under section 80P(2)(d).
The Tribunal held that the reason cited by the assessee for the delay in filing the appeals before the FAA was reasonable. Therefore, the delay was condoned, and the matter was remitted back to the FAA for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the reason cited by the assessee for the delay in filing the appeals before the FAA was reasonable. Therefore, the delay was condoned, and the matter was remitted back to the FAA for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to substantiate the sale consideration and acquisition cost of the shares. The CIT(A) also did not admit additional evidence due to non-compliance with Rule 46A. However, the Tribunal admitted additional evidence under Rule 29 to ensure substantial justice and restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the reason cited by the assessee for the delay in filing the appeals before the FAA was reasonable. Therefore, the delay was condoned, and the matter was remitted back to the FAA for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to properly examine the evidence, including the source of share application money and the cost of construction. The CIT(A) also relied on additional evidence without proper justification and in violation of rules. Therefore, the matters were restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal ruled that Section 80P(4) is not applicable as the assessee is a cooperative society, not a cooperative bank dealing with the general public. It also noted that the delay in filing the return was condoned. Consequently, the deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest income from cooperative banks was allowed.
The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal solely on the ground of low tax effect, as it was nil and below the monetary limit set by CBDT Circular No. 09/2024. The Tribunal noted that no tax demand arose from the assessment order.
The Tribunal, after considering the submissions, found that the appeal was indeed a duplicate and an earlier, similar appeal had already been decided. Therefore, the present appeal was rendered infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 and the consequent reassessment order are invalid because the prior approval was not obtained from the specified authority under Section 151(ii) of the Act, as the notice was issued beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year. This decision was based on pronouncements from the Jurisdictional High Court and a Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal held that the condition of filing the audit report in Form 10B within the prescribed time limit is directory, not mandatory. The belated filing of the audit report, which was made available to the CPC before the intimation order was passed, should not lead to the denial of exemption under Section 11.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee could not produce documentary evidence for expenses as they were believed to be destroyed, but were later found. Given the peculiar circumstances, the Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to properly examine the evidence, including the source of share application money and the cost of construction. The CIT(A) also relied on additional evidence without proper justification and in violation of rules. Therefore, the matters were restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the realignment of profit-sharing ratios upon the admission of a new partner does not constitute a transfer of capital assets. Therefore, no capital gains arise from such an arrangement.
The Tribunal held that the reopening was not valid as the information relied upon was already considered during the original assessment proceedings. Furthermore, the matter of alleged bogus share capital was concluded under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, providing protection against reopening.
The Tribunal held that the addition under Section 69A was not justified as the cash deposits represented sale proceeds duly recorded in the assessee's books of account. The AO had not rejected the books of account or the declared turnover.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's segmental analysis should not have been rejected without cogent reasons and that the classification of CCDs as equity under Ind-AS was for disclosure purposes and did not change their nature as debt until actual conversion. The appeal was allowed in principle, subject to verification of non-conversion of CCDs.
The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: Regarding the timeliness of the assessment order (Ground 2.1), the judgment does not record any specific finding or decision on this ground. It appears to have been implicitly not pressed or decided. On Corporate Guarantee (Grounds 3.1-3.7), the Tribunal held that while corporate guarantee is an international transaction, the TPO's adoption of Indian bank guarantee rates was incorrect, especially as the guarantee was in SGD. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had not benchmarked the transaction. Therefore, the issue of determining the Arm's Length Price (ALP) for corporate guarantee was remitted back to the TPO for de novo examination, requiring proper benchmarking and consideration of all relevant aspects like currency and period. The assessee was to be given an opportunity of being heard. Concerning Management Consultancy Service Income (Grounds 4.1-4.4), the judgment indicates that the TPO rejected the assessee's segmental analysis and computed the ALP at the entity level. However, the detailed reasoning and the Tribunal's decision on this specific issue are omitted in the provided text. The Tribunal's final order mentions allowing the appeal for statistical purposes, suggesting some relief was granted, but the specifics for this ground are not detailed. Regarding Trade Receivables (Grounds 5.1-5.4), the Tribunal held that interest on receivables is an international transaction to be benchmarked separately. However, it followed the precedent set in its own case (Temenos India (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT) and the decision in Bechtel India Pvt. Ltd., which stated that no transfer pricing adjustment is required for imputing interest on outstanding trade receivables from AEs when the assessee is a debt-free company. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the TPO to delete the transfer pricing adjustment on account of notional interest pertaining to overdue receivables. Operative Directions: The issue of corporate guarantee was remitted to the TPO. The adjustment for interest on trade receivables was directed to be deleted. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed the deduction under Section 54F, not 54, and that the expenditure on interiors forms part of the residential property. The Tribunal also considered that the assessee might not have been granted sufficient time by the AO to submit evidence. Therefore, the issue of the disallowed deduction was remitted back to the AO for verification.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was not given proper opportunity by the lower authorities. The Tribunal decided to give one more opportunity to the assessee to represent their case and accordingly remitted the appeal back to the AO.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee has filed a petition under section 119(2) for condonation of delay, which is pending. The Tribunal held that the allowability of the deduction under section 80P should be decided based on the outcome of the condonation petition.
The Tribunal held that the First Appellate Authority (FAA) erred in dismissing the second appeal as infructuous without adjudicating Ground No. 5, which raised the issue of whether the addition made as LTCG for the sale of the plot was correctly attributed to the assessee. The matter was restored to the FAA for adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had not considered the documents filed by the assessee during the assessment proceedings. Therefore, adhering to the principles of natural justice, the matter was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for de-novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the addition made under Section 69A was unsustainable because Form 2, the statutory acknowledgement for the IDS, was not served on the assessee. Consequently, the time for payment of taxes under the scheme never commenced, and Section 197(b) of the Finance Act, 2016, could not be invoked.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal in the interest of justice. However, since the appeal was filed before the wrong bench, it was dismissed as not maintainable.
The Tribunal noted that a separate appeal concerning the quantum assessment had resulted in the deletion of the addition made under section 69C. Since the penalty was imposed based on this addition, and the addition was subsequently deleted by the Tribunal, the penalty order could not survive.