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283 orders · Page 3 of 6
The Tribunal held that the Transfer Pricing order passed under Section 92CA(3) of the Act was in the name of the amalgamating company, which was not an 'eligible assessee' as per Section 144C(15)(b)(i) of the Act. Consequently, the Assessing Officer lacked jurisdiction under Section 144C(1) to pass a draft assessment order. Furthermore, the draft assessment order was passed in the name of a non-existent entity on the date of its passing, rendering it illegal and bad in law. Therefore, the entire assessment proceedings based on such a draft assessment order were deemed illegal and quashed. The Tribunal relied on the decisions in FedEx Express Transportation and Supply Chain Services India Pvt Ltd and Boeing India Pvt Ltd. The Tribunal reasoned that the issuance of a valid draft assessment order is a jurisdictional requirement, and a mistake in complying with this requirement cannot be cured under Section 292B. Since the assessment was quashed on legal grounds, other issues on merits were dismissed as infructuous. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the department failed to furnish the intimations u/s.143(1) to the assessee, and the assessee's grievances were not addressed. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and the matter was remitted to the AO.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's plea of circumstances beyond control for non-compliance. Considering the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to remand the matters back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's plea of circumstances beyond control for non-compliance. Considering the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to remand the matters back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the deduction under Section 36(1)(viia) is allowable only to the extent of the actual provision made by the assessee for bad and doubtful debts in its books of account, subject to the ceiling prescribed by the section. It is not allowable to the extent of the maximum prescribed limit irrespective of the actual provision made.
The Tribunal held that the deduction under Section 36(1)(viia) is allowable only to the extent of the actual provision made by the assessee for bad and doubtful debts in its books of account, subject to the ceiling prescribed by the section. It is not allowable to the extent of the maximum prescribed limit irrespective of the actual provision made.
The Tribunal held that the deduction under Section 36(1)(viia) is allowable only to the extent of the actual provision made by the assessee for bad and doubtful debts in its books of account, subject to the ceiling prescribed by the section. It is not allowable to the extent of the maximum prescribed limit irrespective of the actual provision made.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer has no objection to the withdrawal of the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn for want of jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the department failed to furnish the intimations u/s.143(1) to the assessee, and the assessee's grievances were not addressed. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and the matter was remitted to the AO.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's plea of circumstances beyond control for non-compliance. Considering the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to remand the matters back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that both the AO and CIT(A) passed orders ex parte. To uphold the principles of natural justice, the assessee was granted another opportunity to present their case before the AO, subject to payment of costs.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order and the CIT(A)'s order were passed ex-parte without deciding the issue on merits. To adhere to the principles of natural justice, the assessee was granted another opportunity to present their case before the AO, subject to payment of costs.
The Tribunal held that the deduction under Section 36(1)(viia) is allowable only to the extent of the actual provision made by the assessee for bad and doubtful debts in its books of account, subject to the ceiling prescribed by the section. It is not allowable to the extent of the maximum prescribed limit irrespective of the actual provision made.
The Tribunal held that the deduction under Section 36(1)(viia) is limited to the actual provision made for bad and doubtful debts in the assessee's books, subject to the ceiling prescribed by the section. If the provision made is less than the prescribed limit, the deduction is restricted to the actual provision.
The Tribunal held that the cash sales reflected in the assessee's books of accounts and offered to tax should not be added again, as this would amount to double taxation. The assessee had discharged the burden of proving the source of deposits, and the AO failed to rebut the same.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned from deposits with another cooperative society (which includes a cooperative bank) is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal followed various High Court and Tribunal decisions supporting this view.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) confirmed the addition without properly considering the assessee's submissions, fresh evidence, and the remand report. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned from deposits with another cooperative society (which includes a cooperative bank) is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal followed various High Court and Tribunal decisions supporting this view.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in rejecting the condonation petition without proper adjudication. The Tribunal remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) to condone the delay and decide the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal found that the Power of Attorney of the assessee's representative was on record. In light of the prayer to withdraw the appeal, the Tribunal allowed the withdrawal.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in rejecting the condonation petition without proper adjudication. The Tribunal remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) to condone the delay and decide the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned from deposits with another cooperative society (which includes a cooperative bank) is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal followed various High Court and Tribunal decisions supporting this view.
The Tribunal held that there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal before the Addl. CIT(A). The Tribunal noted that the assessee had provided the COVID-19 pandemic as the reason for the delay, and while the Addl. CIT(A) did not accept this explanation, the Tribunal was of the opinion that it constituted a sufficient cause. Therefore, the Tribunal directed the Addl. CIT(A) to condone the delay and adjudicate the appeal on merits. The assessee was also directed to appear before the Addl. CIT(A) on the date of hearing without fail and furnish complete details. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes only.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned from deposits with another cooperative society (which includes a cooperative bank) is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal followed various High Court and Tribunal decisions supporting this view.
The Tribunal held that there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal before the Addl. CIT(A). The Tribunal noted that the assessee had provided the COVID-19 pandemic as the reason for the delay, and while the Addl. CIT(A) did not accept this explanation, the Tribunal was of the opinion that it constituted a sufficient cause. Therefore, the Tribunal directed the Addl. CIT(A) to condone the delay and adjudicate the appeal on merits. The assessee was also directed to appear before the Addl. CIT(A) on the date of hearing without fail and furnish complete details. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes only.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned from deposits with another cooperative society (which includes a cooperative bank) is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal followed various High Court and Tribunal decisions supporting this view.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned from deposits with another cooperative society (which includes a cooperative bank) is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal followed various High Court and Tribunal decisions supporting this view.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause. It held that in the interest of justice, the assessee should be given another opportunity to present her case, and thus, remanded the issues back to the Assessing Officer. The assessee was directed to cooperate with the Revenue and avoid unnecessary adjournments.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to sufficient cause. In light of the assessee opting for the Vivad-se-Vishwas Scheme, the Tribunal permitted the withdrawal of the appeal and dismissed it as withdrawn. The Tribunal also clarified that the assessee reserves the right to approach it again if any prejudice arises from the settlement under the scheme.
The Tribunal held that reopening of assessment after four years requires the AO to demonstrate a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The AO's action based on the same material already considered during the original assessment amounts to a change of opinion and is not permissible.
The Tribunal is dealing with the issue of jurisdiction for reopening the assessment. The assessee contends that the reopening was time-barred and based on a change of opinion, while the Revenue disputes the relief granted by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the show-cause notice issued by the AO for levying penalty under Section 270A was vague and did not specify the exact clause of sub-section (9) that was attracted. Therefore, the penalty proceedings were deemed illegal and liable to be quashed.
The tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. For AY 2015-16, the issue of weighted deduction was set aside to the AO for re-examination based on new evidence. For AY 2016-17, the disallowance of weighted deduction was also set aside to the AO, and the disallowance of non-compete fees was partly upheld with depreciation allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the issue of reinsurance premium disallowance was covered in the assessee's favor by a previous ITAT order. Regarding payments to motor vehicle dealers, the Tribunal found that the basis for the AO's disallowance (Service Tax Directorate's report) was overturned by CESTAT, which confirmed services were rendered.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued u/s.148 on 30.06.2022 was bad in law. Since this date was after 30.06.2021, sanction should have been obtained from the authorities empowered under clause (ii) of Section 151 of the new regime (Principal Chief Commissioner or Director General), not from the Principal Commissioner as was done.
The Tribunal condoned a delay of 36 days in filing the appeal. Citing Supreme Court decisions on procedural irregularities, the Tribunal held that a substantive right should not be defeated by a technical error. The Ld.CIT(E) was directed to treat the application as if filed under the correct sub-clause and process it accordingly.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee had filed a condonation petition for the delay in filing the return, which was pending. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to remit the matter back to the CIT(A) for adjudication after the order on the condonation petition is received.
The Tribunal found that the CESTAT had previously ruled in favour of the assessee in a related service tax matter, establishing that services were indeed rendered by the motor vehicle dealers. Therefore, the AO's disallowance based on the Service Tax report was incorrect.
The Tribunal condoned the 36-day delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging sufficient cause. Citing Supreme Court pronouncements that curable procedural irregularities should not defeat substantive rights and that rules of procedure serve justice, the Tribunal ruled that the assessee's inadvertent error in selecting the wrong sub-clause should not result in the rejection of their renewal application. The CIT(E) was directed to deem the application as filed under the correct sub-clause (iii), process it lawfully after hearing the assessee, and allow for the submission of necessary documents.
The Tribunal noted that the CESTAT had previously held that motor vehicle dealers did render services to the assessee, overturning the basis of the Assessing Officer's disallowance. Therefore, the issue was set aside to the Assessing Officer to verify with reference to the CESTAT order.
The Tribunal found that both the AO and CIT(A) orders were passed ex-parte due to non-compliance by the assessee. In the interest of natural justice, the assessee was granted another opportunity to present their case before the AO, subject to payment of costs.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding sufficient cause for the belated filing. While deprecating the assessee's nonchalant attitude, the Tribunal restored the issues to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication in the interest of justice and equity.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's explanation regarding the auditor's condition but deprecated the non-response. However, in the interest of justice, the assessee was granted one more opportunity to represent its case before the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's explanation regarding the auditor's condition but deprecated the non-response. However, in the interest of justice, the assessee was granted one more opportunity to represent its case before the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's explanation regarding the auditor's condition but deprecated the non-response. However, in the interest of justice, the assessee was granted one more opportunity to represent its case before the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment was not validly initiated as the conditions for reopening after four years were not met. It also ruled that Section 115JB (MAT provisions) is not applicable to insurance companies, and payments to Third Party Administrators were allowable. Depreciation on software was allowed at 60%.
The Tribunal decided on several issues. Regarding the validity of reassessment (Issue 1), the judgment does not explicitly record the Tribunal's finding on this specific ground as presented by the assessee, though it mentions the assessee challenged jurisdiction. On the allowability of URR for IMTPIP (Issue 2), the judgment does not explicitly record a finding. On the applicability of Section 115JB (Issue 3), the Tribunal held that Section 115JB is not applicable to insurance companies, following favorable decisions in the assessee's own case, including the Madras High Court's ruling. Regarding disallowance for payments to TPAs (Issue 4), the Tribunal upheld the deletion of disallowance by the CIT(A), relying on CBDT Circular No. 8/2009 and a previous Tribunal order in the assessee's own case, finding no change in facts or law. On depreciation for software (Issue 5), the Tribunal held that computer software is a tangible asset under the head 'plant' and directed the Assessing Officer to grant 60% depreciation, following precedents like M/s. Royal Sundaram General Insurance Company Limited. The operative directions were to allow the assessee's appeals on these grounds and dismiss the Revenue's appeals where it upheld the CIT(A)'s relief.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of reinsurance premium paid to Non-Resident Reinsurers (NRRIs) under Section 40(a)(i) was unwarranted. It reasoned that Section 195 of the Act applies only when income is chargeable to tax in India. The Tribunal found that reinsurance premium paid to NRRIs is not chargeable to tax in India as it is not received or deemed to be received, nor does it accrue or is deemed to accrue in India. The Tribunal further held that foreign reinsurers do not have a Permanent Establishment (PE) or business connection in India under the relevant DTAAs or the Income Tax Act, 1961. It noted that reinsurance brokers act as facilitators and not agents of NRRI, and the concept of service PE was not applicable. Consequently, the disallowance made by the AO was deleted, and the decision of the Ld.CIT(A) was upheld. The Tribunal also held that UPS should be treated as part of computers, allowing depreciation at 60%, following its own prior decisions and High Court rulings. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's grounds related to reinsurance premium and depreciation on UPS, stating that the Ld.CIT(A) had rightly deleted the additions made by the AO on these issues. The judgment explicitly followed the Tribunal's decision in the assessee's own case for AY 2014-15.
The Tribunal noted that the appeals were filed against the order of the CIT(A) for AY 2008-09 and 2011-12, and an appeal by the assessee for AY 2009-10. The Tribunal addressed the cross-appeals for AY 2008-09 first. Regarding the reopening of assessment (Issue 1), the assessee argued it was without jurisdiction and time-barred, based on a change of opinion. The Revenue's grounds of appeal included challenging relief granted on IBNR/IBNER claims and disallowances under Section 40(a)(ia), and the applicability of Section 115JB. The judgment excerpt provided details on the assessee's grounds concerning jurisdiction and the disallowance of URR for Third Party Motor Pool. It also outlined the Revenue's grounds, specifically mentioning the disallowance of IBNR/IBNER claims amounting to Rs. 8,78,92,000/- and the applicability of Section 115JB. The Tribunal's decision on these specific issues and the reasoning are not fully detailed in the provided excerpt, but it is clear that the Tribunal was considering these points. The operative directions and final outcome for each issue are not fully discernible from the provided text.
The Tribunal noted that the present appeal was inadvertently filed electronically after a physical appeal was already filed. Therefore, the duplicate appeal was not maintainable.