Punjab & Haryana High Court Judgments — 2017

The High Court, upon being informed by the assessee's senior counsel that instructions had been received to withdraw the appeal, granted the permission. The Court ordered accordingly, allowing the withdrawal of the appeal. The Court also expressed no doubt that the TPO/Assessing Officer would adjudicate the matter expeditiously. The operative direction was the withdrawal of the appeal. No specific issue was decided on merits by the High Court, as the appeal was withdrawn. The ancillary applications (CM Nos.27874 and 27875-CII of 2017) were rendered infructuous in view of the order passed in the main appeal.

The High Court disposed of the writ petition as infructuous. The Court noted the submission by the revenue that the appeals for assessment years 2005-06 to 2013-14 had been decided by the Tribunal and the appeal effect had been given. Following this, an amount of ₹15 crore was still payable. In light of these developments, the petitioner's counsel submitted that the writ petition could be disposed of as infructuous, with liberty to challenge the appeal effect order and the communication dated December 20, 2017. The Court granted this liberty to the petitioner to take recourse to the remedies available to it in accordance with law. No specific finding was given on the merits of the original challenge to the demand notice or the stay order.

The High Court, while not expressing any opinion on the merits of the controversy, disposed of the writ petition by directing the respondent (Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax) to decide the objections filed by the petitioner before proceeding further. This direction was based on the Supreme Court's judgment in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. Income-Tax Officer, which mandates that in response to a notice for reassessment (or similar proceedings where objections are filed), the Assessing Officer must dispose of the objections by passing a speaking order after affording a proper opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The respondent was directed to pass this speaking order on or before January 31, 2018. The court clarified that its observations were not an expression of opinion on the merits of the controversy.

The High Court noted that the Income Tax Return for Assessment Year 2017-18 had not been filed by the petitioner. In view of this, the Court deemed it appropriate that the revenue shall take appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. The writ petition was accordingly disposed of. The Court did not make any specific finding on the entitlement to the release of cash or the framing of assessment, as the primary issue raised by the revenue was the non-filing of the return. The operative direction was for the revenue to proceed as per law, given the non-compliance with the notice for filing the return. No issue was expressly left undecided; the petition was disposed of based on the procedural non-compliance.

The High Court held that the matter was no longer res integra and stood concluded by its own prior decision in ITA No.5 of 2016 titled Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Gurgaon vs. M/s Carrier Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Limited, decided on 25.04.2016. In that precedent, identical questions as those raised in the present appeal had been held not to constitute substantial questions of law. Therefore, the High Court found no substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's order. The reasoning was based on the established legal position from the earlier judgment, which addressed the same issues concerning the provisos to Section 254(2A). The ratio decidendi is that appeals raising questions already decided by the High Court as not being substantial questions of law are liable to be dismissed. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal.

The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the Revenue liberty to file an application for revival of the appeal as prayed for. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the Revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the ITAT's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue claimed by the Revenue was explicitly left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. The judgment does not record any decision on the merits of the case.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose from the ITAT's order. The Court noted that the CIT(A) had categorically recorded that ₹10,65,345 was reimbursement of salary paid to field staff, which was evident from details obtained from Vodafone and the assessee's ledger. The CIT(A) also found that the incentive of ₹48,77,440 was paid directly to retailers by Vodafone and not routed through the assessee, thus not being due or received by the assessee. The addition of ₹13,09,267 on account of discount was deleted as it was reimbursement to Assistant Distributors. The Tribunal concurred with these findings. The Court also noted that the Revenue's counsel candidly admitted that no appeal was filed against a similar order by a coordinate bench, despite the tax effect being significant. Consequently, the High Court found no illegality or perversity in the ITAT's order and dismissed the appeal.

The High Court noted that the Revenue's appeal was filed under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, concerning Assessment Year 2006-07. The primary issue revolved around the method of calculating the distance of agricultural land from a municipality to determine its status as a capital asset. The Revenue's counsel submitted that the amendment to Section 2(14)(iii) by the Finance Act, 2013, which introduced aerial measurement for distance, is prospective and not applicable to the Assessment Year 2006-07. Citing Circular No. 17/2015 of the CBDT, the counsel stated they had instructions to withdraw the appeal. Based on this submission, the Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was rendered on the merits of the substantial questions of law raised.

The High Court allowed the Civil Miscellaneous Application (CMA) No. 16767 of 2017, thereby permitting the applicant-petitioner, Greater Mohali Area Development Authority (GMADA), to withdraw the main writ petition (CWP No. 25625 of 2017). The reasoning was based on the oral request of the learned counsel for the applicant-petitioner, supported by an affidavit, stating that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had already decided the appeal and the order was received on November 09, 2017. Furthermore, the matter was assailed before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, with an application for stay filed there. In view of the order passed in the CMA, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The High Court did not delve into the merits of the original writ petition.

The High Court did not decide the substantial questions of law on their merits. The counsel for the appellant (Revenue) submitted that the tax effect in the present appeal was ` 11,64,930, which was less than the monetary limit prescribed by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) for filing appeals in High Courts, as per Circular No. 21/2015 dated December 10, 2015. Consequently, the appellant sought permission to withdraw the present appeal. The High Court, in light of this submission, ordered accordingly. Therefore, no decision was reached on the interpretation of Section 153A, the scope of search assessments, the requirement of incriminating material, or the reliance on various judicial precedents. The appeal was disposed of based on the tax effect being below the prescribed limit for filing appeals.

The High Court held that the matter was no longer res integra, as it had been decided by this Court in C.S. Atwal's case (ITA No. 200 of 2013) and subsequently, the civil appeal filed by the revenue against that judgment was dismissed by the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Balbir Singh Maini and Others. The High Court noted that the substantial questions of law raised in the present appeal were identical to those decided in C.S. Atwal's case. In C.S. Atwal's case, the Court had concluded that parties had agreed for pro-rata transfer of land, no possession was given in part performance of the JDA to fall under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, possession delivered was as a licensee, and since the JDA was not registered (executed after 24.09.2001), Section 53A and consequently Section 2(47)(v) did not apply. The assessee in that case had paid capital gains tax on amounts received, and the JDA was cancelled for the remaining land. The High Court found that the revenue's counsel could not controvert the applicability of these decisions. Therefore, the substantial questions of law were answered accordingly, and the appeal was dismissed.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose in the present appeal. It noted that the issue involved had been concluded against the revenue in a previous case, ITA No. 270 of 2016 (The Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Patiala Vs. State Bank of Patiala), decided on 27.02.2017. In that case, the High Court had observed that the issue on merits was decided in favour of the assessee, with the disallowance under Section 14A being restricted to the amount of exempt income. The Court stated that once the issue on merits was settled in favour of the assessee, the scope of Section 263 became academic. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The Court also referred to a similar decision in ITA No. 193 of 2017, The Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Patiala Vs. State Bank of Patiala, decided on 22.05.2017. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.

The High Court, after hearing the learned counsel for the appellant-revenue, noted that the issue involved in the present appeal was covered against the revenue by previous judgments of the same Court in ITA No. 270 of 2016 and ITA No. 193 of 2017, both involving the same appellant and respondent, decided on 27.02.2017 and 22.05.2017 respectively. Consequently, the Court held that no substantial question of law arose from the ITAT's order. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. The Court did not delve into the merits of the Section 14A disallowance or the validity of the Section 263 order, as the appeal was disposed of on the ground that no substantial question of law was involved, based on prior precedents.

The High Court held that the question of whether there is a sufficient cause for condonation of delay is primarily a question of fact, to be considered based on the totality of events in each case. The Court found that no cogent and satisfactory explanation was furnished by the assessee for the inordinately long delay of 613 days in filing the appeal before the Tribunal. The explanation provided by the assessee, attributing the delay to the counsel's oversight, did not satisfy the test of sufficient ground as contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court noted that the Tribunal had categorically recorded that the assessee could not bring on record any evidence or reasons to demonstrate that she was prevented by inevitable circumstances or had a sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time. Therefore, the High Court found no ground to differ with the view taken by the Tribunal in dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay. The Court concluded that no substantial question of law arose and consequently dismissed the appeal.

The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the revenue the liberty to file an application for revival of the appeal as prayed for. The Court clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the Tribunal's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue, as claimed by the revenue, was expressly left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal with liberty to revive.

The High Court allowed the application for withdrawal of the appeal. The Court noted that the Revenue's application was supported by an affidavit and a relevant letter from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The Court granted the liberty to the Revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal as prayed for. It was further clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the Revenue would not be construed as an affirmation of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's order on merits. The legal issue claimed by the Revenue was explicitly left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate future case.

The High Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was justified in allowing registration to the assessee under Section 12A. Regarding the non-furnishing of audited financial statements, the Court noted that Rule 17A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, requires submission of accounts but does not specify "audited" accounts. The Court accepted the assessee's explanation that a dispute with auditors prevented them from obtaining audited statements, and this explanation was not controverted by the CIT. Therefore, non-furnishing of audited financials could not be a basis for refusing registration. Concerning the dual registration, the Court found that the assessee had provided an explanation, stating the society operates under the initial registration and the second registration was irrelevant. The Court also reiterated that the registration of a society is not a pre-condition for granting registration under Section 12AA. The Revenue failed to demonstrate that the ITAT's view was erroneous or legally unsustainable. Consequently, no substantial question of law arose, and the appeal was dismissed.

The High Court dismissed the appeal. It noted that the issue raised was no longer res integra and had been concluded by a previous decision of the same Court in ITA No.5 of 2016, titled 'Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gurgaon Vs. M/s Carrier Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Ltd.', decided on 25.04.2016. In that prior judgment, identical questions of law were held not to be substantial questions of law. Therefore, for the reasons recorded in that earlier decision, the present appeal was dismissed. The Court did not independently analyze the provisions of Section 254(2A) or the merits of the stay duration in this specific case, relying solely on the precedent. No issue was left undecided; the appeal was disposed of on the basis of prior ruling.

The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court noted that it was not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant-revenue that the matter in issue was no longer res integra and stood concluded by a previous decision of the same Court. In ITA No.5 of 2016, titled Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Gurgaon vs. M/s Carrier Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Limited, decided on 25.04.2016, identical questions of law as raised in the present appeal were held not to be substantial questions of law. Therefore, following its own precedent, the High Court found no substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's order and consequently dismissed the appeal. No specific finding was given on the merits of the ITAT's order regarding the stay, as the appeal was dismissed on the preliminary ground that no substantial question of law arose.

The High Court held that the matter was no longer res integra, referring to its own decision in C.S. Atwal's case (ITA No. 200 of 2013, decided on July 22, 2015). In C.S. Atwal's case, it was concluded that no capital gains tax was exigible on unrealized amounts. Specifically, the Court found that possession had not been given by the transferor to the transferee in part performance of the JDA so as to fall within Section 53A of the 1882 Act. Furthermore, since the JDA was not registered after 24.09.2001, Section 53A of the 1882 Act, and consequently Section 2(47)(v) of the Income Tax Act, did not apply. The Court also noted the assessee's submission that capital gains tax had been paid on amounts received, and they would pay tax on further amounts as and when received. Based on this, the High Court concluded that no capital gains on unrealized amounts would accrue or arise to the assessee. Consequently, no penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act would be exigible. The appeal was dismissed as no substantial question of law arose.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose and dismissed the appeal. Regarding bad debts (Question 1), the Court noted that the CIT(A) and Tribunal relied on CBDT Circular No. 551 dated January 23, 1990, which clarified that after amendments effective April 1, 1989, an assessee only needed to write off debts as irrecoverable in its accounts and was not required to prove they had become bad. This was supported by Delhi High Court decisions in CIT Vs. Global Capital Limited, CIT Vs. Autometers, and CIT Vs. Morgan Securities and Credits Private Limited. The revenue failed to demonstrate perversity in this concurrent finding. Regarding cessation of liabilities (Question 2), the Court upheld the Tribunal's view that Section 41(1) was not attracted merely because a debt became time-barred, as per the Apex Court in CIT Vs. Sugauli Sugar Works Private Limited. Since the liabilities were still standing in the assessee's balance sheet, they could not be considered ceased. Regarding VRS expenses (Question 3), the Court found the AO's interpretation of Section 35DDA to be fallacious. The deduction claimed for the financial year 2000-01 was to be considered for assessment year 2001-02, when Section 35DDA was effective. Furthermore, the AO had allowed VRS payments in an earlier year, and the current claim was a consequential relief. The Court agreed that Section 35DDA did not preclude considering VRS payments as revenue expenditure. The Tribunal rightly upheld the CIT(A)'s findings on all issues.

The High Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds of territorial jurisdiction. It held that since the Assessing Officer was based in New Delhi, the CIT(A) adjudicated the first appeal in New Delhi, and the ITAT also passed its order in New Delhi, the High Court at Chandigarh lacked the territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal filed under Section 260A of the Act. The Court relied on its previous judgments in Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Gurgaon Vs. M/s Parabolic Drugs Limited and Commissioner of Income Tax Faridabad Vs. M/s Motorola India Limited, which established that the High Court has no territorial jurisdiction to hear appeals concerning orders passed by authorities located outside its territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was returned to the revenue for filing before the competent court of jurisdiction. The substantive issues regarding the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) were not decided on merits.

The High Court held that no substantial questions of law arose from the ITAT's order. Regarding the first issue, the Court found no illegality or perversity in the ITAT's approach. The ITAT, in its order dated May 20, 2015, had directed the CIT to grant registration but explicitly granted liberty to the Assessing Officer (AO) to examine the assessee's books of account during assessment proceedings and disallow exemption under Section 11 if any violation was found. This provision addressed the revenue's concern about potential violations. Concerning the second issue, the ITAT rightly dismissed the miscellaneous application, noting that the revenue was attempting to review the order, which is impermissible under Section 254 of the Act. The ITAT correctly observed that the revenue failed to point out any mistake apparent on the face of the record rectifiable under Section 254(2). The revenue's contentions in the MA required reappraisal of facts and elaborate discussion, which are beyond the scope of rectification proceedings. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the revenue. The Court noted that the issue raised in these appeals was concluded by its previous decisions in ITA No. 163 of 2017 (The Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Ludhiana v. Shri Satish Bala Malhotra) decided on 17.4.2017 and ITA No. 31 of 2017 (The Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Ludhiana v. M/s Malhotra Book Depot) decided on 23.2.2017. In those cases, appeals filed by the revenue on similar issues had also been dismissed. Therefore, following its own precedents, the High Court found no reason to interfere with the ITAT's order deleting the addition of interest expenditure. The ratio decidendi is that if similar issues have been decided by the High Court in favour of the assessee, subsequent appeals on identical grounds will also be dismissed.

The High Court noted that questions (i) and (ii), relating to the deletion of the addition of ₹1,22,51,965 on account of disallowance of interest expenditure, were concluded by this Court's earlier decision dated 17.4.2017 in ITA No.163 of 2017, which was decided against the revenue. Therefore, questions (i) and (ii) were decided against the revenue. For question (iii), concerning the disallowance of deduction under Section 80-IC, the Court referred to its decision dated 17.5.2017 in ITA No. 15 of 2017, where the matter was remanded to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties. Consequently, the High Court remanded the matter to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication on Question No. (iii) after providing an opportunity of hearing to both parties. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

The High Court noted that the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax-VII, New Delhi Vs. Punjab Stainless Steel Industries had held that proceeds from the sale of scrap would not be included in the total turnover, emphasizing the intention of Section 80HHC to encourage exports and earn foreign exchange. The Apex Court observed that revenue should encourage such traders. In light of this Supreme Court decision, the parties agreed that the issue regarding the inclusion of sale of scrap in the total turnover needed to be examined afresh by the Assessing Officer. Consequently, the High Court set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and the Tribunal in ITA No. 3 of 2010 and remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer for passing a fresh order after hearing the assessee. Similarly, for ITA No. 489 of 2010 concerning penalty, the High Court set aside the orders and remanded the issue to the Assessing Officer for fresh decision after the quantum proceedings are concluded. No issue was expressly left undecided, as both appeals were remanded.

The High Court held that the Tribunal's decision to delete the addition of ` 3,71,68,025/- on account of disallowance of interest expenditure was not illegal, perverse, or based on a misreading of evidence. The Tribunal had relied on the High Court's judgment in Bright Enterprises Private Limited (2016) 381 ITR 107, which held that commercial expediency in advancing loans does not solely depend on direct transactions between group companies, and that a group company can advance amounts to another if it benefits the former, even if the benefit is not tangible. The Tribunal also noted that the Supreme Court in Hero Cycles Vs. CIT (2015) 379 ITR 347 (SC) had overruled the 'Abhishek Industries' judgment, which was relied upon by the lower authorities. The Tribunal concluded that since the advance was made out of interest-free funds, there was no justification for disallowing interest under Section 36(1)(iii). The High Court found no substantial question of law arising from the Tribunal's order.

The High Court held that the matter was no longer res integra, referring to its own decision in CIT vs. M/s Vardhman Acrylics Limited and the Delhi High Court's decision in CIT vs. Nalwa Sons Investments Limited. The Court agreed with the principle that if the income is assessed under Section 115JB of the Act, and the tax payable under normal provisions is less than the tax on book profits, then any concealment or wrong claim of expenses under the normal provisions would not lead to tax evasion. The penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be levied on additions and disallowances made in the regular income computation when the assessment is ultimately based on book profits under Section 115JB. The Tribunal's finding that the ratio of M/s Vardhman Acrylics Limited was applicable was upheld. The Court found no illegality or perversity in the ITAT's findings warranting interference. Therefore, all the substantial questions of law raised by the revenue were answered against the revenue. The appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose from the order of the ITAT. The Court noted that the CIT(A) and the Tribunal had concurrently found that the omission to add back the sundry balances written off was an inadvertent mistake. The assessee had disclosed complete facts in the return and before the Assessing Officer, and upon realizing the mistake, requested the addition. The Tribunal relied on the Apex Court's decision in Price Waterhouse Coopers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, which held that penalty is not justified for inadvertent bonafide errors not intended to conceal income or furnish inaccurate particulars. The Tribunal also referred to Gujarat High Court in CIT vs. Union Electric Corporation and Madras High Court in CIT vs. Nellai Trading Automobile Agency, which supported the deletion of penalty for mistakes in accounts or under-valuation due to error. Therefore, the High Court found no error or perversity in the concurrent findings of the lower authorities and dismissed the appeal.

The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue. The Court noted that the issue raised was no longer res integra and had been concluded by a previous decision of the same Court in ITA No.5 of 2016 titled as Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Gurgaon V/s M/s Carrier Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Limited, decided on 25.04.2016. In that prior judgment, an identical question was held not to constitute a substantial question of law. Therefore, following its own precedent, the High Court found no substantial question of law in the present appeal and dismissed it. No specific findings were made on the merits of the stay period or the void ab initio argument, as the appeal was disposed of on the preliminary ground of it not raising a substantial question of law.

The High Court held that the appeals did not raise any substantial question of law and dismissed them. The Court interpreted Explanation (ii) to Section 80IB(10)(a) of the Act, considering whether the word 'shall' was mandatory or directory. It concluded that the intent of the legislature was to safeguard revenue where construction was not completed within the stipulated period, but not to disentitle an assessee who had completed construction within time and applied for the certificate within the prescribed period. The Court found that the assessee had completed construction before the due date (31.3.2010) and applied for the completion certificate on 29.3.2010. The delay in issuance was beyond the assessee's control and the Municipal Corporation had granted the approval later without objection. Therefore, the assessee could not be denied the benefit of Section 80IB(10)(a). The CIT(A) and the Tribunal had rightly adjudicated the issue in favour of the assessee. The Court found no illegality or perversity in their findings. The judgment in CIT vs. Punjab Financial Corporation was distinguished as not advancing the revenue's case.

The High Court held that the matter in issue was no longer res integra and had been concluded by its own prior decision in ITA No.5 of 2016, titled 'Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gurgaon Vs. M/s Carrier Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Ltd.', decided on 25.04.2016. In that precedent, an identical question as raised in the present appeal was held not to constitute a substantial question of law. Consequently, for the reasons recorded in the aforementioned appeal, the present appeal was dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal. No issues were expressly left undecided.

The High Court found that the assessment was made ex-parte under Section 144. The assessee had filed additional evidence before the CIT(A) which was not examined by the Assessing Officer. Although the CIT(A) called for comments from the Assessing Officer, the revenue contended that the remand report was submitted after the CIT(A) passed its order. The High Court observed that the matter required to be remanded to the Assessing Officer for a fresh decision after considering the additional evidence produced by the assessee. Consequently, the orders of the CIT(A) and the ITAT were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for deciding it afresh in accordance with law after hearing the parties. The High Court did not decide the substantial questions of law raised by the revenue.

The High Court held that the matter was no longer res integra, as the issue stood decided by its own decision in C.S. Atwal's case (supra). In that case, it was concluded that no possession had been given by the transferor to the transferee of the entire land in part performance of the JDA so as to fall within Section 53A of the 1882 Act. The possession delivered, if any, was as a licensee for development, not as a transferee. Furthermore, since the JDA was executed after 24.09.2001 and was not registered, it did not fall under Section 53A of the 1882 Act, and consequently, Section 2(47)(v) of the Act did not apply. The Court also noted the assessee's submission that capital gains tax had been paid on amounts received, and as and when further amounts are received, tax would be discharged. The Court observed that the assessee would be bound by this stand. Crucially, the Court held that the Tribunal and authorities below were not right in holding the assessee liable to capital gains tax in respect of remaining land for which no consideration had been received and which stood cancelled. Therefore, the issue of exigibility to capital gains tax was decided in favour of the assessee. Consequently, no penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act would be exigible. The substantial questions of law were answered accordingly, and the appeal was dismissed.

The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court noted that the issue raised was no longer res integra and had been concluded by a previous decision of the same Court in ITA No. 5 of 2016, titled 'Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gurgaon Vs. M/s Carrier Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Ltd.', decided on 25.04.2016. In that prior judgment, identical questions of law had been held not to be substantial questions of law. Therefore, following its own precedent, the High Court found no substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's order and dismissed the present appeal. The specific reasoning from the cited precedent would have addressed the interpretation of Section 254(2A) regarding the duration of stay and its consequences.

The High Court held that the findings of fact recorded by the CIT(Appeals) and affirmed by the Tribunal were not illegal, perverse, or based on misreading of evidence. The Court noted that the CIT(Appeals) had found the creditors to be genuine agriculturists and their cash transactions to be genuine, with confirmation of deposits and repayments. It was concluded that the transactions were not aimed at tax evasion and that there was reasonable cause for entering into them. The Tribunal had also found reasonable cause for the transactions, holding the creditors to be genuine and that confirmations were obtained, with no intent to evade tax. The High Court distinguished the cases relied upon by the revenue (M/s Charan Dass Ashok Kumar and Auto Pistion Mfg. CO. Pvt. Ltd) by stating that in those cases, the explanation tendered was not found to be reasonable, whereas in the present case, reasonable cause was established. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose, and the appeal was dismissed.

The High Court held that the ITAT was justified in upholding the CIT(A)'s order. Regarding issue (i), the Court noted that the CIT(A) and ITAT found that the assessee had been granted approval under Section 10(23C)(iv) and that the exemption was valid until withdrawn, as clarified by Circular No. 7/2010. The ITAT had also found that the amounts spent by the assessee were clearly application of income in nature, spent to achieve the assessee's objects. Therefore, there was no justification for disallowing such amounts. Regarding issue (ii), the judgment does not explicitly address the argument about the provisional balance sheet, but the overall decision implies acceptance of the assessee's financial presentation in light of the granted exemption. Regarding issue (iii), the ITAT had held that since the assessee had been granted approval under Section 10(23C)(iv) and the exemption was available, there was no question of disallowing amounts spent towards the objects. The Court found no error in the ITAT's order and dismissed the appeal, stating no substantial question of law arose. The operative direction was dismissal of the appeal.

The High Court held that the matter in issue was no longer res integra and had been concluded by a previous decision of the same Court in ITA No. 5 of 2016 titled as The Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gurgaon Versus M/s Carrier Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Limited, decided on 25.04.2016. In that precedent, an identical question had been held not to be a substantial question of law. Consequently, for the reasons recorded in the aforementioned appeal, the present appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed. The Court did not provide a separate finding or reasoning for each of the two questions raised, as it relied on the binding precedent. The ratio decidendi is that appeals raising questions concerning the interpretation of provisos to Section 254(2A) regarding stay periods, when identical issues have already been decided by the High Court as not constituting substantial questions of law, are liable to be dismissed.

The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The court granted the liberty to the revenue to file an application for revival of the appeal as prayed for. It was clarified that the withdrawal of the appeal by the revenue would not be considered an affirmation of the Tribunal's order on merits. Furthermore, the legal issue, as claimed by the revenue, was left open to be adjudicated in an appropriate case. No specific finding was given on the merits of the case.

The High Court held that the primary issue was the applicability of the RTE Act to the assessee's school, which only offers education from Playgroup to KG. The Court examined the definitions of 'elementary education' (Class 1 to 8) and 'school' under the RTE Act, along with Section 12 concerning the extent of a school's responsibility for free and compulsory education. The Tribunal had correctly concluded that the RTE Act, specifically its provisions regarding elementary education and compulsory admissions, did not apply to schools that do not impart education from Class 1 to 8. The Court found that the assessee's school fell outside the scope of the RTE Act. The revenue's counsel failed to demonstrate the applicability of the RTE Act or that the Tribunal's findings were illegal or perverse. Consequently, no substantial question of law arose. The Tribunal's direction to grant approval was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose from the ITAT's order. The Court noted that Section 10(23C)(vi) requires an educational institution to exist solely for educational purposes and not for profit, and to be approved by the prescribed authority. The ITAT had observed that the only reason for denial of exemption could be dissatisfaction with the genuineness of the activities. Since the Pr. CCIT had not doubted the genuineness of the assessee's activities, the Tribunal directed the Pr. CCIT to grant registration. The Court found that the Revenue's reliance on the judgment in 'Amrawati Welfare Society vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Others' was misplaced as the facts were different. Consequently, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed for want of merit.

The High Court held that the Tribunal's view was plausible and based on appreciation of material on record, thus not warranting interference. The Court noted that the assessee claimed gifts received on his daughter's marriage fell under the exception in Section 56(2)(vi). However, the Tribunal found that the assessee did not offer any explanation to prove the genuineness of the gifts, nor did he prove the identity, credit-worthiness, and genuineness of the transactions. The Tribunal concluded that Explanation 1 to Section 271(1)(c) was attracted due to deemed concealment. The Court distinguished the Reliance Petroproducts case, stating that it was factually different as the assessee in the present case did not provide satisfactory evidence or explanations. The ratio of CIT Vs. Zoom Communication Private Limited was found applicable, as it involved furnishing inaccurate particulars with a malafide intention, which the Court considered to be the case here due to the appellant's failure to prove the genuineness of gifts. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose, and the appeal was dismissed.

The High Court held that the Assessing Officer was not justified in invoking the power under Section 154 of the Act to rectify an order on an issue that was already a subject matter of appeal before the CIT(A), even if the rectification was sought due to a retrospective amendment. The Court noted that the ITAT had relied on sub-section (1A) of Section 154, which restricts the AO's power to rectify orders already decided by appellate authorities. Consequently, the primary issue regarding the addition to book profit was decided in favour of the assessee. Further, the Court held that interest under Sections 234B and 234D of the Act could not be charged. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Star India (P) Limited vs. CCE, the Court reasoned that while retrospective legislation is permissible, it cannot create an offence or a quasi-punishment like interest retrospectively. The liability to pay interest arises on default, and the assessee cannot be deemed a defaulter for not anticipating a tax liability arising from a retrospective amendment. Therefore, no interest was chargeable under Section 234B on the tax liability arising from the retrospective amendment to Section 115JB.

The High Court held that the findings recorded by the ITAT were not illegal, perverse, or based on a misreading of material on record, thus warranting no interference. The ITAT had correctly observed that Section 68 of the Act was not attracted to amounts representing purchases made on credit. The Tribunal's finding that trade creditors in earlier assessment years (2007-08 and 2008-09) were accepted in scrutiny assessments was noted, leading to the conclusion that the genuineness of the expenses under consideration could not be doubted. The Court found that the revenue had not been able to demonstrate any substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's order. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The specific issue of whether the ITAT followed its own decision in Shiv Rice & General Mills was implicitly decided against the revenue by the finding that the ITAT's order was not perverse or illegal.

The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue. The Court found no merit in the revenue's appeal and held that the Tribunal's order was not perverse. The Court noted that the revenue had not placed any material to show that the fees charged by the assessee from students were used for purposes other than running the educational institution. It was also observed that there was nothing on record to suggest that the objects and activities of the assessee-trust were not of a charitable character. The fact that the Assessing Officer accepted the assessee's income at Nil for AY 2012-13 further supported the application of income for the trust's aims and objects. The Tribunal had rightly held that the trust was eligible for registration. The reasoning of the Tribunal, which relied on the Karnataka High Court's decision in Sanjeevamma Hanumathe Gowda Charitable Trust, emphasizing that satisfaction regarding the genuineness of activities and application of income to charitable purposes is key, rather than the nature of income derivation, was upheld. The CIT's reliance on the case of Kale Khan Mohammad Hanif v. CIT was considered distinguishable for registration purposes. Therefore, the Tribunal's direction to the CIT to grant registration was affirmed.

The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the ITAT's order dated 24.9.2012. The matter was remanded to the ITAT for adjudication on merits after affording an opportunity of hearing to both parties. The Court noted that a previous appeal filed by the assessee (ITA No. 17 of 2015) against the same ITAT order had been allowed by the High Court, setting aside the ITAT's order and remitting the matter to the ITAT for a fresh decision on merits. The Court's decision to revive the Revenue's appeal was based on the liberty granted earlier. The specific issues raised by the Revenue were not decided on merits by the High Court in this order; instead, the entire matter was sent back to the ITAT for a fresh determination.

The High Court held that the writ petition lacked merit and was dismissed. The Court reasoned that the petitioner had made a declaration under the KVSS, 1998, for assessment years 1988-89 to 1995-96. While the scheme initially excluded cases where the department had filed an appeal, it was later modified to include such cases, provided the original demand was determined on or before 31.03.1998. In cases where the department was in appeal, the tax arrears were to be calculated based on the amount that was the subject matter of the appeal. The Court found that the petitioner could not retain the interest granted under Section 244A of the Act when opting for the KVSS to settle the disputed income. The entire income under dispute in the appeal constituted disputed income for the purpose of the scheme. Therefore, the withdrawal of interest of ₹61,319/-, which had been allowed as a refund pursuant to the CIT(A)'s order, was justified and correctly included in the KVSS demand. The Court noted that no separate order under Section 244A(3) was required as no tax arrear was pending against the petitioner on the declaration date.

The High Court held that the attachment of the petitioner's pension account was not covered by Section 11 of the Pensions Act, 1871. The court reasoned that Section 11 applies to pensions granted on political considerations, past services, infirmities, or as compassionate allowances, and such pensions are protected from seizure or attachment by creditors or in satisfaction of court decrees. The attachment in this case was for sovereign dues, which did not fall into any of the enumerated categories. Furthermore, the court noted that the attachment was neither by a creditor nor founded upon a decree or order of a court, distinguishing it from the situations contemplated by Section 11. The court also observed that the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner of Income Tax had already stayed the demand relatable to additions made on a protective basis, directing recovery only of 15% of the amount due on substantive additions. Since the petitioner could not demonstrate how his case was covered by Section 11 of the Pensions Act and no error was pointed out in the impugned orders regarding the stay application, the petition was dismissed.

The High Court held that the assessee failed to establish a sufficient cause for the inordinate delay of 1050 days in filing the appeal before the ITAT. The Tribunal had rightly noted that the marriage of the assessee's daughter occurred on November 29, 2010, prior to the filing of the appeal before the CIT(Appeals) on January 24, 2012. Therefore, the matrimonial discord, which allegedly started soon after the marriage, was also present when the earlier appeal was filed. The Tribunal found no correlation between the delay and the stated reasons, especially since the assessee successfully prosecuted the appeal before the CIT(Appeals) during the same period. The court also noted a contradictory stand in the assessee's condonation application regarding his counsel's role. Citing Supreme Court judgments in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. and R.B. Ramlingam, the court emphasized that while a liberal approach is adopted for short delays, a stricter approach is required for inordinate delays, and the explanation must demonstrate due diligence and circumstances beyond the assessee's control. The High Court found no error in the Tribunal's findings and concluded that no substantial question of law arose, dismissing the appeal.

The High Court held that the issue was concluded against the assessee by its own prior decision in Jai Narayan's case. In Jai Narayan's case, the Court had held that Section 54B of the Act nowhere suggests that the legislature intended to extend its benefit to an assessee who purchases agricultural land even in the name of a third person. The term "assessee" is qualified by the expression "purchased any other land for being used for agricultural purposes," which necessarily means the new asset must be in the name of the assessee. Therefore, the purchase of agricultural land by the assessee in his wife's name does not qualify for exemption under Section 54B. The Court found the decisions in V. Natarajan, Kamal Wahal, and Mrs. Jennifer Bhide to be contrary to its binding precedents in Jai Narayan and Dinesh Verma, and thus not applicable. The principle from Vegetable Products Limited was acknowledged but deemed inapplicable due to the distinct facts. The Tribunal had correctly followed the binding precedent of Jai Narayan's case. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.