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118 orders · Page 3 of 3
The High Court held that the appeal filed by the revenue is not tenable. The Court referred to its previous decisions in the appeals of co-assessees Dr. Yogiraj Sharma (decided on March 29, 2016) and Shri Gaurav Sharma & Ors. (decided on August 2, 2016). In those cases, similar appeals filed by the revenue were rejected. The High Court found no reason to deviate from its earlier findings and reasoning. Consequently, the present appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed on the same grounds and for the same reasons as indicated in the prior orders. No specific issue was left undecided; the appeal was dismissed outright.
The Court held that there was no reason to make any further indulgence into the matter. It found that the question involved in this appeal had already been answered by this Court in previous appeals filed under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, concerning co-assessees Dr. Yogiraj Sharma and Shri Gaurav Sharma & Ors. These prior judgments, dated March 29, 2016, and August 2, 2016, had rejected similar appeals filed by the revenue. Therefore, for the grounds and reasons already indicated in those prior orders, the present appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court dismissed the revenue's appeal. The Court found no reason to grant further indulgence as the question involved in this appeal had already been answered by this Court in previous appeals filed under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act. Specifically, the Court referred to its orders dated March 29, 2016, in the case of co-assessee Dr. Yogiraj Sharma (ITA No.52/2015) and its common order dated August 2, 2016, in the cases of co-assessees Shri Gaurav Sharma & Ors. (ITA Nos.29-31-34-36-41-42/2015 & ITA No.43/2015). For the grounds and reasons already indicated in those prior orders, the present appeal filed by the revenue was deemed to fail and was consequently dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court observed that the question involved in the present appeal had already been answered by it in prior appeals filed under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. These prior appeals concerned co-assessees, Dr. Yogiraj Sharma and Shri Gaurav Sharma & Ors., and were dismissed on March 29, 2016, and August 2, 2016, respectively. Given the consistent stance taken in these earlier judgments, the High Court saw no reason for further indulgence and found no merit in the Revenue's appeal. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court held that the appeals filed by the Revenue were not tenable. The Court referred to its previous judgments in the cases of co-assessees Dr. Yogiraj Sharma (decided on March 29, 2016) and Shri Gaurav Sharma & Ors. (decided on August 2, 2016). In those cases, similar appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed. The High Court found no reason to deviate from its earlier decisions and concluded that the grounds and reasons stated in those prior orders were applicable to the present appeal. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed. No specific issue was left undecided; the appeal was dismissed based on precedent.
The High Court held that the appeal filed by the revenue under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act was not tenable. The Court found no reason to grant further indulgence as the question involved in this appeal had already been answered by the same Court in previous appeals filed by the revenue concerning co-assessees Dr. Yogiraj Sharma and Shri Gaurav Sharma & Ors. The reasoning for rejecting those appeals, as indicated in the orders dated March 29, 2016, and August 2, 2016, was applied to the present case. The principle is that consistent High Court decisions on identical issues, especially those involving the same revenue appeals and co-assessees, should be followed. The appeal filed by the revenue fails and is dismissed.
The High Court held that since the matters concerning the assessee for the same assessment years had been remanded back to the Assessing Officer for reconsideration on the same day, it was unnecessary for the competent authority to re-examine the question of imposing penalty and initiating proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) at that juncture. The Court found the Revenue's appeals to have been rendered infructuous. Liberty was granted to the Revenue to seek indulgence from the competent authority for initiating penalty proceedings if required, while finalizing the assessment order based on the remand. All legal questions involved were kept open to be considered at an appropriate stage. No specific finding was given on the legal question raised by the Revenue, as the appeals were disposed of on procedural grounds.
The High Court noted that it had, on the same day, remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for reconsideration in the appeals filed by the assessee. Consequently, the Court held that it was not necessary for the competent authority to re-examine the question of imposing penalty and initiating proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) at that juncture. The Court found the Revenue's appeals to be rendered infructuous. The appeals were disposed of with liberty granted to the Revenue to seek indulgence from the competent authority for initiating proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) while finalizing the assessment order based on the remand. All legal questions involved were kept open to be considered at an appropriate stage. No specific finding was given on the legal question of whether pending Section 260-A appeals preclude penalty proceedings.
The High Court noted that it had, on the same day, remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for reconsideration in the appeals filed by the assessee. Consequently, the Court held that it was not necessary for the competent authority to re-examine the question of imposing penalty and initiating proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) at that juncture. The Court found the Revenue's appeals to be rendered infructuous. The appeals were disposed of with liberty granted to the Revenue to seek indulgence from the competent authority for initiating proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) while finalizing the assessment order based on the remand. All legal questions involved were kept open to be considered at an appropriate stage. No specific finding was given on the legal question of whether pending Section 260-A appeals preclude penalty proceedings.
The High Court noted the revenue's submission that a refund of interest is not ipso facto granted upon refund of TDS. The revenue argued that statutory provisions must be followed, and it needs to be examined whether the interest is fully refundable or if it's payable due to delayed deposit. Since the competent authority (Respondent No. 2) had not yet made a decision on the refund of interest, the Court deemed it appropriate to remand the matter back to Respondent No. 2. The Court directed Respondent No. 2 to consider the petitioner's claim for refund of interest on TDS, hear the petitioner and Respondent No. 3 (National Highways Authority), and pass an appropriate order in accordance with the law within 60 days of receiving a certified copy of the order. The issue of whether the interest was non-refundable due to delay in deposit was not decided on merits but was left for Respondent No. 2 to determine.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal in part, quashed the impugned order passed by the appellate authority, and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for reconsideration of the two questions. The reasoning was that specific grounds were raised before the Assessing Officer, and it was incumbent upon the authorities to consider them. Since this was not done, the assessment order suffered from material illegality. The Tribunal found it a fit case for remand for reconsideration of these two aspects. The revenue would be at liberty to raise its objections based on the judgments it referred to. Regarding the argument that notice under Section 143(2) is not required while framing issues under Section 153A, the Tribunal left this question open to be considered by the Assessing Officer during the reconsideration. The operative direction is to remand the matter to the Assessing Officer for a fresh decision after hearing all concerned.
The High Court allowed the appeal in part and quashed the impugned order passed by the appellate authority, remanding the matter back to the Assessing Officer for reconsideration. Regarding the first issue, the Court found that since a specific ground regarding the assessment status (AOP vs. individual) was raised before the Assessing Officer, it was incumbent upon the authorities to consider it. As this was not done, the order of assessment suffered from material illegality, justifying a remand. The Court noted that the revenue could raise its objections to these grounds based on the judgments referred to during the arguments. Regarding the second issue concerning the notice under Section 143(2), the Court left this question open to be considered by the Assessing Officer during the reconsideration, after hearing all concerned parties. The ratio decidendi is that where specific grounds are raised before lower authorities and not considered, the matter should be remanded for proper adjudication. The operative direction is to quash the impugned order and remand the matter to the Assessing Officer.
The High Court held that the substantial question of law was answered by holding that the appellant, having not raised the claim under Section 32AB before the reassessing authority or the Appellate Authority and having not filed the relevant documents, namely, the audited report, the same cannot be considered now. The Court found that the assessment order after reopening under Section 147 was silent about any audited report being filed. The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the additional ground of appeal, noting that the issue was not raised in assessment proceedings and thus the claim was never made. The Tribunal also noted that the audited report was filed much later after the proceedings were closed and upheld the finding of the appellate authority, which was a pure finding of fact. The Court distinguished the judgments relied upon by the assessee, stating they pertained to filing reports at any stage of pending proceedings, whereas in this case, the report was never filed. The Court relied on the judgment of CIT vs. Sun Engineering Works Private Limited.
The High Court held that since a show cause notice was issued and an assessment order was passed after considering the petitioner's objections, there was no reason to interfere in the writ proceedings under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. The Court found that a statutory remedy of appeal was available to the petitioner before the appellate authority and subsequently before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, the Court declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction. The petitioner was granted liberty to pursue the available statutory remedies. The writ petition was disposed of on this basis.
The High Court held that the view taken by the Tribunal, that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) could not be imposed when an appeal involving a substantial question of law was pending before the High Court, was correct. The Tribunal reasoned that the pendency of an appeal before the High Court, admitting a substantial question of law, indicated that the issue of deduction was debatable. This debatable nature of the addition, coupled with the admission of the appeal, supported the assessee's bona fide claim for the deduction, suggesting no deliberate concealment. Therefore, the Tribunal and the Commissioner (Appeals) were correct in canceling the penalty. The High Court found no error in the concurrent findings of the appellate authorities and concluded that no substantial question of law arose warranting interference. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed, and the orders of the Commissioner (Income Tax Appeal) were upheld.
The High Court found no substantial question of law warranting consideration. The Tribunal had previously determined that remunerations paid to directors, claimed as deductions, were disallowed in an illegal manner, and it interfered with the assessment orders. Furthermore, the Appellate Tribunal had allowed cross-objections filed by the assessee concerning expenses incurred towards various entertainment and other claims. Given the detailed reasoning in the ITAT's order, the High Court concluded that the appeal filed by the Revenue did not present any substantial question of law. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the findings of the CIT(A) and the Tribunal were concurrent findings of fact based on the evidence on record. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order allowing the assessee's claim for deduction under Section 80-IB(10). The reasoning was that the assessee had acted as a builder and developer, not just a contractor. The project was approved before the stipulated date, construction commenced within the timeframe, and the project was completed before the deadline. The completion certificate was found to be valid, and the built-up area, as measured by the DVO, was within the permissible limit of 1500 sq.ft. The Tribunal concluded that no substantial question of law arose for reconsideration, upholding the concurrent findings of the appellate authorities. The operative direction was that the appeal stands disposed of, implying the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the ITAT's order was reasonable and that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The Tribunal had found that the assessee claimed the deduction under Section 80IA based on the wrong advice of a Chartered Accountant, believing they were entitled to it. While the Assessment Officer and appellate authority imposed a penalty, the ITAT interfered. The Tribunal reasoned that if an omission is bonafide and the mistake is bonafide, the necessary ingredients for imposing a penalty are not met. The Tribunal relied on Supreme Court judgments, including Dharmendra Textiles, to hold that merely seeking a benefit not sustainable under law, even if due to a mistake or wrong advice, does not automatically constitute furnishing incorrect particulars or a case for penalty. The assessee had disclosed all facts, and the act was bonafide, negating the mens rea for penalty. Therefore, the ITAT's interference with the penalty was upheld.