Madhya Pradesh High Court Judgments — 2017

The High Court held that the appeals filed by the Revenue were not maintainable. The Court noted that the tax effect in all the appeals, including the one for ITA No. 119/2016 (Rs. 19,120/-) and others ranging up to Rs. 6,24,645/-, did not exceed the monetary limit of Rs. 20,00,000/- prescribed by the CBDT Circular dated 10/12/2015 for filing appeals before the High Court. The Court also observed that the present cases did not fall under the exceptions mentioned in paragraph 8 of the Circular, such as challenges to constitutional validity, illegality of Board's orders, or issues related to undisclosed foreign assets. Consequently, the Court disposed of the appeals in light of the Circular, without delving into the merits of the ITAT's orders. No order as to costs was made.

The High Court held that the appeals filed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Indore, were not maintainable and disposed of them accordingly. The Court noted that the tax effect in all the appeals did not exceed the monetary limit of Rs. 20,00,000/- prescribed by the CBDT Circular dated 10/12/2015 for filing appeals before the High Court. The Court also observed that the present cases did not fall under the exceptions mentioned in paragraph 8 of the Circular, which would warrant contesting appeals on merits despite a low tax effect. These exceptions included challenges to constitutional validity, Board's orders being held illegal, revenue audit objections accepted by the Department, or additions relating to undisclosed foreign assets/bank accounts. Since none of these exceptional circumstances were present, the appeals were disposed of in light of the Circular. No order as to costs was made.

The High Court held that the appeals filed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Indore, were not maintainable and disposed of them accordingly. The Court noted that the tax effect in all the appeals did not exceed the monetary limit of Rs. 20,00,000/- prescribed by the CBDT Circular dated 10/12/2015 for filing appeals before the High Court. The Court also observed that the present cases did not fall under the exceptions mentioned in paragraph 8 of the Circular, which would warrant contesting appeals on merits despite a low tax effect. These exceptions included challenges to constitutional validity, Board's orders being held illegal, revenue audit objections accepted by the Department, or additions relating to undisclosed foreign assets/bank accounts. Since none of these exceptional circumstances were present, the appeals were disposed of in light of the Circular. No order as to costs was made.

The High Court held that the appeals filed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Indore, were not maintainable and disposed of them accordingly. The Court noted that the tax effect in all the appeals did not exceed the monetary limit of Rs. 20,00,000/- prescribed by the CBDT Circular dated 10/12/2015 for filing appeals before the High Court. The Court also observed that the present cases did not fall under the exceptions mentioned in paragraph 8 of the Circular, which would warrant contesting appeals on merits despite a low tax effect. These exceptions included challenges to constitutional validity, Board's orders being held illegal, revenue audit objections accepted by the Department, or additions relating to undisclosed foreign assets/bank accounts. Since none of these exceptional circumstances were present, the appeals were disposed of in light of the Circular. No order as to costs was made.

The High Court held that the appeals filed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Indore, were not maintainable and disposed of them accordingly. The Court noted that the tax effect in all the appeals did not exceed the monetary limit of Rs. 20,00,000/- prescribed by the CBDT Circular dated 10/12/2015 for filing appeals before the High Court. The Court also observed that the present cases did not fall under the exceptions mentioned in paragraph 8 of the Circular, which would warrant contesting appeals on merits despite a low tax effect. These exceptions included challenges to constitutional validity, Board's orders being held illegal, revenue audit objections accepted by the Department, or additions relating to undisclosed foreign assets/bank accounts. Since none of these exceptional circumstances were present, the appeals were disposed of in light of the Circular. No order as to costs was made.

The High Court held that the appeals filed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Indore, were not maintainable and disposed of them accordingly. The Court noted that the tax effect in all the appeals did not exceed the monetary limit of Rs. 20,00,000/- prescribed by the CBDT Circular dated 10/12/2015 for filing appeals before the High Court. The Court also observed that the present cases did not fall under the exceptions mentioned in paragraph 8 of the Circular, which would warrant contesting appeals on merits despite a low tax effect. These exceptions included challenges to constitutional validity, Board's orders being held illegal, revenue audit objections accepted by the Department, or additions relating to undisclosed foreign assets/bank accounts. Since none of these exceptional circumstances were present, the appeals were disposed of in light of the Circular. No order as to costs was made.

The High Court held that the findings of the Tribunal were not perverse and did not give rise to a substantial question of law. Regarding the first issue, the Court noted that the Commissioner (Appeals) found that the AO had condoned the delay only up to June 30, 2011, and no request for further condonation was made by the assessee, nor was it granted. Therefore, the AO was justified in treating the return filed on November 9, 2011, as belated and not giving credit for the loss. On the second issue, the Court observed that the partner's statement during the survey, which included a voluntary surrender of stock, was supported by the accountant's statement regarding the non-maintenance of books. The retraction of the statement occurred about four months later and was not supported by any documentary evidence. The physical valuation of stock was not challenged at the time of the survey or in the retracted letter. Thus, the Tribunal's confirmation of the addition was based on cogent material evidence. The Court found no substantial question of law arising for consideration and consequently dismissed the appeal.

The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. Regarding the first issue concerning Rule 46A, the Court held that since this issue was not raised before the ITAT, it could not be raised for the first time in the High Court appeal, citing established legal precedents. The Court noted that the ITAT's order indicated the departmental representatives admitted the AO's addition was based on an estimate of attendees. For the second issue, the Court found that the ITAT's decision to restrict the addition was based on findings of fact, specifically the family's background in running a restaurant, which suggested lower catering expenses. The Court emphasized that the number of guests and the quantum of expenditure are questions of fact. The AO's addition was deemed to be based on guesswork without supporting material. The appellate authorities' concurrent findings of fact, which were in conformity with Supreme Court decisions on estimations based on no evidence or misread evidence, did not involve a substantial question of law. Therefore, the orders of the CIT(A) and ITAT were not interfered with.

The ITAT dismissed the Revenue's review petition. The Tribunal found no merit in the Revenue's argument that the appeal should be decided on merits due to a Revenue Audit objection. The ITAT reiterated the settled view that reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated solely on the basis of Revenue Audit objections, citing the Supreme Court's decision in M/s Larsen & Toubro Ltd. Versus State of Jharkhand. The Tribunal further noted that the plea of Revenue Audit Objection was not recorded in the reassessment order or in the appeals before the lower authorities. Therefore, the ITAT concluded that there was no error in its previous order which had rightly disposed of the appeal by leaving the questions of law open, given the tax effect was below the threshold and the reassessment was not permissible on audit objection.

The High Court held that no interference is warranted by the writ court against a provisional attachment order passed under Section 24 of the PBPT Act. The court reasoned that the amended provisions of the PBPT Act constitute a complete code, and the principles of natural justice are codified within these amendments, particularly in Section 26(3) and 26(6). The impugned order is provisional and subject to judicial review by the adjudicating authority, which is statutorily obliged to examine all relevant materials and provide an opportunity of being heard. The court noted that the adjudicating authority had already fixed a hearing date. The judgment in C.B. Gautam was distinguished as the present case involved a show cause notice and an opportunity to be heard, and the order was tentative. The court found that the petitioner has further forums of appeal available against the adjudicating authority's order. Therefore, the petition was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the appellant company did not receive share application money. Shares were allotted after five years, and the application to the Registrar of Companies was also made after five years, and only after the penalty proceedings under Section 271D were initiated for contravention of Section 269SS. The Tribunal noted that the amount was received in cash, clearly violating Section 269SS. The Tribunal relied on the Jharkhand High Court's decision in M/s. Bhalotia Engineering Works (P) Ltd. Vs. CIT, which held that amounts received as share application money, until allotment, partake the character of a deposit attracting the prohibition in Section 269SS. The Court reasoned that the purpose of Section 269SS is to prevent black money transactions and ensure traceability, and payments of Rs. 20,000/- or above as share application money should comply with Section 269SS. The Tribunal found that the order was based on findings of fact and did not warrant interference as no substantial question of law arose. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

The High Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable. The Court noted that the original order was passed by the ITAT on 28/2/2013, and the petitioner had the option to file a rectification application in 2013, but instead filed it in 2016. The Court found that the ITAT had considered the validity of the assessment framed under Section 153C in its order dated 28/2/2013, holding that incriminating material was found during the search, justifying the assessment under Section 153C. The ITAT confirmed the CIT(A)'s findings on this issue. Furthermore, in dismissing the rectification application, the ITAT explicitly stated in paragraph 8 that it had considered the legality of framing assessment under Section 153C and decided the same by dismissing the appeals. The ITAT concluded that there was no apparent mistake and that the assessee's contention amounted to revising a decided decision, which is not permissible under Section 254(2). The Court found no case for interference in writ jurisdiction and declined admission.

The High Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable. The Court noted that the original order was passed by the ITAT on 28/2/2013, and the petitioner had the option to file a rectification application in 2013, but instead filed it in 2016. The Court found that the ITAT had considered the validity of the assessment framed under Section 153C in its order dated 28/2/2013, holding that incriminating material was found during the search, justifying the assessment under Section 153C. The ITAT confirmed the CIT(A)'s findings on this issue. Furthermore, in dismissing the rectification application, the ITAT explicitly stated in paragraph 8 that it had considered the legality of framing assessment under Section 153C and decided the same by dismissing the appeals. The ITAT concluded that there was no apparent mistake and that the assessee's contention amounted to revising a decided decision, which is not permissible under Section 254(2). The Court found no case for interference in writ jurisdiction and declined admission.

The High Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable. The Court noted that the original order was passed by the ITAT on 28/2/2013, and the petitioner had the option to file a rectification application in 2013, but instead filed it in 2016. The Court found that the ITAT had considered the validity of the assessment framed under Section 153C in its order dated 28/2/2013, holding that incriminating material was found during the search, justifying the assessment under Section 153C. The ITAT confirmed the CIT(A)'s findings on this issue. Furthermore, in dismissing the rectification application, the ITAT explicitly stated in paragraph 8 that it had considered the legality of framing assessment under Section 153C and decided the same by dismissing the appeals. The ITAT concluded that there was no apparent mistake and that the assessee's contention amounted to revising a decided decision, which is not permissible under Section 254(2). The Court found no case for interference in writ jurisdiction and declined admission.

The High Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable. The Court noted that the original order was passed by the ITAT on 28/2/2013, and the petitioner had the option to file a rectification application in 2013, but instead filed it in 2016. The Court found that the ITAT had considered the validity of the assessment framed under Section 153C in its order dated 28/2/2013, holding that incriminating material was found during the search, justifying the assessment under Section 153C. The ITAT confirmed the CIT(A)'s findings on this issue. Furthermore, in dismissing the rectification application, the ITAT explicitly stated in paragraph 8 that it had considered the legality of framing assessment under Section 153C and decided the same by dismissing the appeals. The ITAT concluded that there was no apparent mistake and that the assessee's contention amounted to revising a decided decision, which is not permissible under Section 254(2). The Court found no case for interference in writ jurisdiction and declined admission.

The High Court held that the order passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-II, Jabalpur, under Section 264 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was not infirm or illegal. The Court found that the Principal Commissioner had analyzed the facts in detail and provided well-reasoned grounds for dismissing the revision. The reliance placed by the assessee on the Supreme Court decision in Sajan Kumar Bhawsinka was distinguished as being factually different, particularly concerning the 'cryptic' nature of the orders in that case, which was not the situation here. The Court noted that the order under Section 264 was detailed and reasoned. It was observed that the petitioner failed to avail multiple opportunities to explain the deposit of Rs.16,31,700/- in his savings account, leading to an ex-parte assessment order. The assessee also failed to respond to penalty notices. The revision was filed only after the penalty order and recovery proceedings commenced. The Court stated that allowing such a revision would encourage assessees to let proceedings go ex-parte and then seek quashing after the appeal period expires, which is not the legislative intent of Section 264. The petition was dismissed as having no merit.

The Tribunal noted that the petitioner did not wish to press the prayer to quash the assessment order dated March 23, 2016, as a revision application against it was pending before the revisional authority, a course of action permitted by a previous order of the Court. Regarding the garnishee order dated March 7, 2017, the Tribunal observed that the respondent had filed a reply and placed on record an order dated March 23, 2017, by which the impugned garnishee order had been withdrawn. Consequently, the Tribunal found that nothing further survived for adjudication concerning the garnishee order. However, the petitioner highlighted that a substantial amount (over Rs. 7 Crores) was withdrawn from its account during the subsistence of the garnishee order. In light of the revenue's undertaking to decide the pending revision expeditiously (within two months) and consider the application for refund of the withdrawn amount, the writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the authorities to decide the revision and the refund application expeditiously. The issue of the credit for advance tax and TDS of amalgamated banks was not explicitly decided but would likely be addressed in the pending revision.

The High Court considered the facts and noted that the ITAT had decided all appeals by a common order. The substantial questions of law involved in this appeal were the same as those in ITA No. 56/2013. Therefore, the present appeal was disposed of in terms of the judgment passed in ITA No. 56/2013. The appeal was dismissed accordingly. The High Court did not provide its own reasoning on the merits of the ITAT's decision but relied on a prior judgment in a related appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The High Court considered the facts in detail. It noted that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) had decided all the appeals by a common order and that the facts and questions of law involved in the present appeal were identical to those in ITA No. 56/2013. Consequently, the High Court disposed of the present appeal in terms of the judgment passed in ITA No. 56/2013. The appeal was dismissed accordingly, with no order as to costs. The operative direction was for the office to place a photocopy of the judgment in ITA No. 56/2013 in the file of the present appeal. The specific findings or reasoning of the ITAT on the issues of Section 2(22)(e) or Section 153A were not elaborated upon by the High Court in this judgment, as it relied on a previous common order.

The High Court considered the facts and noted that the ITAT had decided all appeals by a common order. The substantial questions of law in this appeal were the same as in ITA No. 56/2013. Consequently, the present appeal was disposed of in terms of the judgment passed in ITA No. 56/2013. The appeal was dismissed accordingly. The Court did not provide specific reasoning on the merits of the issues raised, as it relied on a previous decision in a related appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided, but the specific findings on the ITAT's directions regarding commercial exigency and search information were not elaborated upon in this judgment, as the appeal was dismissed based on the outcome of another case.

The High Court dismissed the appeal. It noted that the present appeal involved the same substantial questions of law as ITA No. 56/2013, which had been decided by a common order. The judgment in ITA No. 56/2013, which disposed of the present appeal, was not provided in full, but the operative direction was to dismiss the appeal. Therefore, the High Court found the ITAT's decision to set aside the additions and issue directions to the AO to be justified, implicitly upholding the ITAT's reasoning, though the specific reasoning of the High Court on the substantial questions of law is not detailed as the appeal was disposed of based on a prior common order.

The High Court considered the facts in detail and noted that the ITAT had decided all appeals by a common order. The substantial questions of law in this appeal were the same as those in ITA No. 56/2013. The Court stated that this appeal would be disposed of in terms of the judgment passed in ITA No. 56/2013. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. The reasoning for the dismissal, as per the judgment in ITA No. 56/2013, is not provided within this specific order. Therefore, the specific findings on the questions of law, the reasoning, and the ratio decidendi are not recorded in this judgment. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.

The High Court of Madhya Pradesh, by a Division Bench, considered the appeal and noted that the facts and substantial questions of law were identical to ITA No. 56/2013, which was disposed of by a common order. Consequently, the present appeal was also dismissed in terms of the judgment passed in ITA No. 56/2013. The judgment does not elaborate on the specific reasoning of the ITAT or the High Court's rationale for dismissing the appeal, other than its similarity to the other decided case. No specific findings on the merits of the additions or the applicability of Section 2(22)(e) or Section 153A were recorded by the High Court in this judgment. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal.

The High Court considered the facts in detail and noted that the ITAT had decided all appeals by a common order. The facts and questions of law involved in this appeal were the same as in ITA No. 56/2013. Therefore, the present appeal was disposed of in terms of the judgment passed in ITA No. 56/2013. The High Court dismissed the appeal. The reasoning for the dismissal is not elaborated in this specific judgment, but it is stated that the appeal is dismissed in terms of the decision in a related appeal.

The High Court held that the ITAT was justified in setting aside the addition under Section 2(22)(e) and remitting the matter back to the Assessing Officer. The Court noted that if a remand order has been passed, there is no substantial question of law involved for determination as all questions remain open before the authority after remand. Regarding the second substantial question of law, the Court referred to Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, which empowers the AO to reassess tax liability based on material received from a search operation. The Court stated that it is the AO's duty to verify information received from sources and ensure its correctness in accordance with the law. Therefore, the ITAT did not commit any error of law in remanding the matter to the Assessing Officer for verification. The Court found no merit in the revenue's appeal.

The High Court considered the facts in detail and noted that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) had decided all appeals by a common order. The High Court also observed that the facts and questions of law involved in the present appeal were the same as those in ITA No. 56/2013. Consequently, the present appeal was disposed of in terms of the judgment passed in ITA No. 56/2013. The High Court dismissed the appeal. The reasoning for the dismissal was based on the commonality of issues with another appeal (ITA No. 56/2013) which was decided by the same bench. No specific findings were given on the substantial questions of law as the appeal was dismissed based on the outcome of the other connected appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The High Court considered the substantial questions of law admitted for appeal. It noted that the ITAT had decided all appeals by a common order and that the facts and questions of law in the present appeal were the same as in ITA No. 56/2013. Consequently, the present appeal was disposed of in terms of the judgment passed in ITA No. 56/2013. The High Court dismissed the appeal. No specific reasoning on the merits of the ITAT's decision regarding Section 2(22)(e) or Section 153A was provided in this judgment, as it was disposed of based on a common order in another appeal. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.

The High Court considered the facts and the substantial questions of law. It noted that the present appeal (ITA No. 54/2013) involved identical facts and questions of law as ITA No. 56/2013, which had been decided by a common order. Consequently, the High Court disposed of the present appeal in terms of the judgment passed in ITA No. 56/2013. The operative direction was that the appeal is dismissed accordingly. No specific finding was recorded on the merits of the substantial questions of law in this judgment, as it was disposed of based on the decision in a connected appeal. The ratio decidendi would be that if an appeal is identical to another appeal decided by a common order, it will be disposed of in the same terms.

The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Bhopal. The Court noted that the appeal involved the same substantial questions of law as another appeal, ITA No. 56/2013, which had been disposed of by a common order. Consequently, the present appeal was also disposed of in terms of the judgment passed in ITA No. 56/2013. The operative direction was that the appeal is dismissed. The Court did not provide specific reasoning for dismissing this particular appeal, other than its consolidation with ITA No. 56/2013. The specific findings of the ITAT on the issues of Section 2(22)(e) and Section 153A are not detailed in this High Court judgment, as the High Court's decision is based on the disposal of a related appeal.

The High Court considered the facts in detail and noted that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) had decided all appeals by a common order. The questions of law involved in the present appeal were the same as those in ITA No. 56/2013. Consequently, the High Court disposed of the present appeal in terms of the judgment passed in ITA No. 56/2013. The appeal was dismissed accordingly. No specific findings were recorded by the High Court on the merits of the questions of law. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.

The High Court held that the Settlement Commission failed to provide adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before passing its final order. The Court noted that the petitioner was given only one day to respond to the TPO's report proposing a significant addition, and their subsequent detailed reply was filed on 22/2/2016, with the order being completed and released on 23/2/2016. The Settlement Commission's own observation that considering the petitioner's last letter dated 23/2/2016 would require giving an opportunity to the department further supported the petitioner's claim of not being heard. The Court found that the Settlement Commission's decision to reject the rectification application, stating that the order was completed before the letter was received, also highlighted the lack of consideration for the petitioner's submissions. Therefore, the Court concluded that the principles of natural justice were violated. The Court quashed the impugned orders and remanded the matter back to the Settlement Commission to hear the petitioner afresh, consider their submissions, and pass a fresh order. The Court explicitly stated it was not opining on the merits of the case.

The High Court considered the facts and noted that the ITAT had decided all appeals by a common order. The present appeal involved the same facts and questions of law as ITA No. 56/2013. Therefore, the present appeal was disposed of in terms of the judgment passed in ITA No. 56/2013. The High Court dismissed the appeal. The reasoning for the dismissal is that the present appeal is being disposed of in line with another appeal (ITA No. 56/2013) which was decided on the same day. The specific findings or reasoning of the ITAT on the two substantial questions of law, as well as the reasoning of the High Court for dismissing the appeal, are not detailed in this judgment, other than stating it follows the decision in ITA No. 56/2013. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The High Court quashed the order dated 17/02/2017 passed by the Settlement Commission under Section 245D(4) and also quashed the Volumetric Report dated 24/07/2012. The Court found that the Settlement Commission erred in several aspects. It wrongly declared the settlement application abated based on the flawed Volumetric Report, which was prepared by an unqualified architect and contained significant inaccuracies and impossibilities. The Commission also failed to consider the report prepared by the State Government at the Court's direction and the statutory mining plan. The finding regarding the signatures on the survey report was also deemed perverse. The Court held that the withdrawal of a previous writ petition was misinterpreted by the Commission as an admission, overlooking the liberty granted to raise objections before the Settlement Commission. The ratio decidendi is that a settlement application cannot be declared abated based on a procedurally flawed and factually inaccurate report, especially when the assessee was denied a proper opportunity to present their case and relevant counter-evidence was disregarded. The matter was remanded back to the Settlement Commission to process the petitioner's application afresh, ignoring the impugned Volumetric Report, and to consider all other relevant documents and materials.

The High Court decided that the Settlement Commissioner should be directed to decide the petitioner's application dated May 28, 2015. The reasoning was based on the agreement between the parties, where the revenue did not object to such a direction. The court explicitly stated that it was not averting to the merits of the case. The operative direction was to the respondent No.1 (Income Tax Settlement Commission) to decide the petitioner's application within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order. No issue was left undecided, as the court's focus was solely on directing the Settlement Commissioner to act on the pending application.

The Tribunal held that the subsequent orders dated March 25, 2017, issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, demanding 15% of the outstanding demand from the assessees (Madhya Pradesh Audyogik Kendra Vikas Nigam Ltd. and SEZ Indore Ltd.), indicated a modification of the original demand. The Tribunal considered the CBDT Circular dated February 29, 2016, and the judgments of the Supreme Court and various High Courts, including Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd., UCO Bank, Jindal Steel and Power Ltd., and Sesa Resources Ltd. These authorities established that CBDT circulars have the force of law and can mitigate the rigors of the law for the benefit of the assessee. The Tribunal concluded that once the department itself passed an order permitting the deposit of 15% of the demand, the previous order deserved modification. Therefore, the petitioners were permitted to deposit 15% of the outstanding demand, and their appeals would be heard on merits. The review petitions were allowed.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The Assessing Officer's grounds for penalty included an 'invalid project approval certificate' and possession being given to allottees before obtaining the 'completion certificate', which were considered gross violations. However, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) found that a mere non-satisfaction of a condition for deduction under Section 80IB(10) does not automatically imply that the assessee furnished incorrect particulars or concealed income. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal had concurrently found that there was no incorrect declaration filed by the assessee. This finding of fact, that the assessee did not make an incorrect declaration, was not amenable to challenge as a substantial question of law. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The Assessing Officer's grounds for penalty included an 'invalid project approval certificate' and possession being given to allottees before obtaining the 'completion certificate', which were considered gross violations. However, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) found that a mere non-satisfaction of a condition for deduction under Section 80IB(10) does not automatically imply that the assessee furnished incorrect particulars or concealed income. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal had concurrently found that there was no incorrect declaration filed by the assessee. This finding of fact, that the assessee did not make an incorrect declaration, was not amenable to challenge as a substantial question of law. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had not considered the effect, impact, and import of Section 171 of the Income Tax Act, nor the effect of previous orders passed under Section 171 concerning the appellant. The Tribunal also failed to apply its mind to the impact of these provisions on the finding regarding the assessee's status. Consequently, the Court found it impossible to exercise its power of judicial review without the Tribunal having considered these crucial aspects. The Court set aside the impugned order of the ITAT and remitted the matter back to the ITAT to re-examine the case in light of Section 171 of the Income Tax Act and other relevant provisions, considering their import and impact on the facts of the case. The Court explicitly stated it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.

The High Court held that the ITAT had allowed the appeal by deleting the additions made by the Assessing Officer, and that these deletions were based on material available on record and supported by specific reasons provided in the ITAT's order from paragraph 6 onwards. The Court found that the ITAT's findings were based on a due appreciation of the documents and material on record, and that the Revenue's counsel was unable to point out any substantial question of law in the appeal. Therefore, the High Court found no substantial question of law warranting interference and dismissed the appeal. The specific findings of the ITAT on each issue, as summarized in the Revenue's grounds of appeal, were implicitly upheld by the High Court's dismissal of the appeal. No issue was left undecided.

The Tribunal held that recording of satisfaction by the assessing officer is absolutely necessary before issuing a notice under Section 153-BD of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal found that the provisions of Section 153-C are 'para material' with Section 158-BD, implying that the requirement of satisfaction applicable to Section 153-C would also apply to Section 158-BD. Since the satisfaction was not recorded before issuing the notice under Section 153-BD, the issuance of the notice was deemed unjustified. Consequently, interference in the matter was not called for. The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed. The ratio decidendi is that a notice under Section 153-BD cannot be issued without the assessing officer recording their satisfaction, as this is a mandatory prerequisite.

The High Court held that the findings recorded by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal were findings of fact, approving the limited interference made by the Commissioner (Appeals). The Court found no substantial question of law that would warrant interference with the concurrent findings of the lower appellate authorities. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed. The ratio decidendi is that concurrent findings of fact by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, which do not involve a substantial question of law, are not appealable under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal noted that Section 142A(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, mandates an opportunity of hearing for the assessee. While the impugned order mentioned notices were issued and no objections were filed by January 5, 2017, the petitioner relied on Annexure P/7 dated January 4, 2017. However, upon perusal, the Tribunal found serious doubt regarding this document. It was a four-page objection signed by the petitioner, but there was no proof of service on the AVO, no departmental stamp, and it was unclear how and to whom it was submitted. The petitioner stated it was given to an orderly, raising questions about why it wasn't presented to the AVO directly. Consequently, the Tribunal found it not an appropriate case to accept the petitioner's contention regarding the denial of opportunity. Furthermore, the Tribunal pointed out that under Section 142A(7), the Assessing Officer must provide another opportunity of hearing before acting on the Valuation Report. Therefore, the petitioner was granted liberty to raise objections before the Assessing Officer when assessment proceedings commence, making the writ petition disposed of.

The Tribunal held that the Commissioner Appeals had recorded a conclusive finding after considering the evidence before him. The assessee's stand was supported by a reconciliation statement that was duly noted by the Commissioner Appeals. The Tribunal also noted that the AO did not examine the additional evidence submitted by the assessee during the first appellate proceedings, even when given an opportunity for a remand report. Furthermore, the Department failed to bring any new facts on record before the Tribunal to disprove the findings of the Commissioner Appeals. Consequently, the Tribunal found no reason to disturb the findings of the Commissioner Appeals and confirmed his orders. The Tribunal concluded that there was no substantial question of law involved, as the concurrent findings were based on a due appreciation of the record and evidence. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The Tribunal disposed of the writ petition with a specific direction. The Assessing Officer was directed to take into account Form 26AS, generated by the Income Tax Department, while passing the final order in the matter. This direction was issued based on the fair statement made by the learned counsel for the Income Tax Department. The Tribunal's decision implicitly acknowledges the potential for the discrepancy to be resolved by considering Form 26AS, thereby addressing the petitioner's concern about a clerical error. The core issue of the validity of reassessment proceedings was not definitively decided on merits but was to be addressed by the Assessing Officer in light of the directive to consider Form 26AS. No issue was expressly left undecided, but the final determination of the reassessment's validity was deferred to the Assessing Officer's order.

The High Court held that the findings of fact arrived at by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal were purely findings of fact and no substantial question of law arose in the present case. Therefore, the High Court dismissed the appeal. Regarding the Keyman Insurance Policy, the Tribunal had upheld the CIT(A)'s view that the policy was taken to protect the business against financial loss due to the death of key persons who played a vital role in the company's affairs. The Tribunal noted that while the policy was not available before the AO, it was produced before the CIT(A). The Tribunal relied on CBDT Circular No. 762 and the decision in DelT vs. M/s Navinchandra Securities Pvt. Ltd. to hold that the premium paid on a Keyman insurance policy is allowable as business expenditure, provided the 'keyman' is an employee or director whose services significantly affect profitability. The Tribunal reasoned that the withdrawal/redemption amount would be income of the company, and disallowing the premium would lead to double taxation. Thus, the Tribunal found no interference was required. Regarding the commission disallowance under Section 40A(2)(a) and 40A(2)(b), the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition. The Tribunal agreed that the AO had not given sufficient emphasis on the nature and scope of work and services rendered. It reiterated that Section 40A(2) requires consideration of 'fair market value' and 'legitimate needs of the business', which the assessee had satisfied. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down in Hive Communication (P.) Ltd. v. CIT and CIT v. Edward Keventer (P.) Ltd., emphasizing that business needs should be judged from the viewpoint of a prudent businessman and that the benefit derived by the company should also be considered from that perspective. The Tribunal concluded that the addition was not warranted.

The Tribunal held that the appeal filed by the Revenue challenging the order dated March 27, 2012, stands disposed of. This is because the said order has been recalled by the ITAT through a subsequent order passed on June 14, 2016, in proceedings under Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal noted that the subsequent order has reconsidered and decided certain questions afresh. Consequently, the Revenue is now required to challenge the order dated June 14, 2016, by filing a fresh appeal. The department has been granted liberty to file a fresh appeal in accordance with law, incorporating the subsequent developments and reframing the questions of law. No specific issue was left undecided, as the appeal was disposed of on procedural grounds.