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The High Court granted the petitioner's request for permission to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file a fresh writ petition. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The Court did not delve into the merits of the case or the underlying dispute that led to the filing of the writ petition. The operative direction was solely to dismiss the petition as withdrawn, with the specified liberty granted to the petitioner. No issues were decided on their merits.
The High Court of Kerala disposed of the writ petition with specific directions. Firstly, the National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC), Delhi, was directed to provide a link to the petitioner within two weeks, enabling them to upload their interim application for staying the demand notice dated September 23, 2022. Secondly, the petitioner was directed to upload the interim application on the same day the link was provided. Thirdly, the NFAC or the appellate authority was directed to decide the interim application in accordance with the law within two weeks thereafter. Finally, for a period of one month, the impugned demand notice dated September 23, 2022, and another notice dated July 20, 2023, were not to be enforced. The court did not decide the merits of the appeal or the stay application itself, but rather facilitated the process of filing and adjudication of the interim application.
The High Court directed the appellate authority (3rd respondent) to decide the appeal (Ext.P2) within a period of three months. Crucially, the Court ordered that the appeal be decided without insisting upon the pre-deposit of 20% of the assessed tax. The demand notice (Ext.P3) shall not be enforced until the appeal is decided. The petitioner was directed to cooperate in the expeditious disposal of the appeal. The Court did not record any finding on the substantive legal issue regarding the entitlement to deduction under Section 80P, leaving it for the appellate authority to decide. The ratio is that in cases where the petitioner's claim is strongly supported by a Supreme Court judgment, the appellate authority may be directed to decide the appeal expeditiously without insisting on a pre-deposit, especially when the recovery is stayed pending appeal.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the petitioner to deposit 20% of the assessed amount within one month. Upon this deposit, the appellate authority was directed to proceed expeditiously with the applications for condoning the delay and the appeals, deciding them in accordance with law. The Court ordered that the impugned demand notices and recovery cum garnishee orders shall be kept in abeyance until the disposal of the applications and appeals. It was clarified that if the petitioner fails to make the 20% deposit, the Department would be free to enforce the recovery orders. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter. The ratio decidendi is that in cases where appeals are filed with a significant delay and the assessee offers to deposit a portion of the demand, a balance can be struck by directing a partial deposit and staying recovery pending disposal of the appeal and delay condonation applications.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court held that the impugned order (Ext. P3) passed under Section 148A(d) and the subsequent notice (Ext. P4) were unsustainable. The primary reasoning was that the petitioner was not afforded an adequate opportunity of being heard, which is a mandatory requirement under Section 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found that the issuance of the order and notice without providing a proper hearing violated the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and notice. The matter was remanded back to the respondents to pass a fresh order after providing the petitioner with an opportunity of being heard. No specific finding was made on the maintainability of the notice under Section 149, as the matter was decided on procedural grounds.
The High Court allowed the writ petition, finding that the petitioner's grievance was covered by the Division Bench judgment in M/S. OLARI LITTLE FLOWER KURIES PVT. LTD. Vs. UNION OF INDIA. The Court held that late fees under Section 234E cannot be levied for periods prior to June 1, 2015. Consequently, the impugned orders (Ext. P1 to Ext.P6) levying late fees for the assessment year 2013-2014 were set aside. The ratio decidendi is that the statutory provision for levying late fees for delayed TDS return filing, as applied in this case, is not applicable to periods preceding June 1, 2015.
The High Court directed the 2nd respondent to consider and dispose of the petitioner's stay petition (Ext.P3) expeditiously and in accordance with law, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment, after affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. The Court clarified that if the 2nd respondent proposed to pass any conditional interim order of stay, reasons must be stated for it. Furthermore, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) and the notice (Ext.P4) were ordered to stand deferred until orders were passed on the stay petition. The primary reasoning was the pendency of the stay petition and the need for its timely adjudication to prevent potential prejudice to the petitioner.
The High Court held that the notice issued by the Income Tax Officer under Section 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid because it did not provide the mandatory seven clear days for the assessee to file a reply. The Court noted the concession made by the revenue's counsel, acknowledging the validity of the petitioner's contentions regarding the short notice period. Consequently, the Court quashed the impugned notices (Exts.P1, P2, P3) and the assessment order (Ext.P6). The Court directed the respondents to issue a fresh notice to the petitioner in accordance with the mandate of Section 148A(b) and in due course of law. The petitioner would then be required to submit its objections, which the respondents would consider and dispose of as per law. The issue of the validity of the show-cause notice under Section 144B(7)(ii) was implicitly addressed by quashing the entire assessment proceedings due to the initial defect in the Section 148A(b) notice.
The High Court of Kerala, on considering the pleadings and materials on record, and particularly noting the stand of the respondents, held that the notices and the assessment order were liable to be quashed. The Court found that the notice issued under Section 148A(b) dated March 18, 2022, required a reply by March 24, 2022, which was short of the statutory seven clear days mandated by Section 148A(b). This rendered the notice invalid, and consequently, the subsequent order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148 were also set aside. The Court also noted the petitioner's contention regarding non-compliance with Section 144B(7)(ii) in serving the show-cause notice and draft assessment order. The ratio decidendi is that non-compliance with mandatory procedural requirements, such as providing the statutory notice period or proper service of notices, renders the subsequent proceedings invalid. The Court quashed Exts.P1, P2, P3, and P6 (assessment order) and granted the respondents liberty to issue a fresh notice to the petitioner as per the mandate of Section 148A(b) and in accordance with law. The petitioner was directed to file objections to any fresh notice, which the respondents were to consider and dispose of in accordance with law.
The High Court, in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, directed the first respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) - 3) to consider and dispose of the stay petitions (Exts.P7 to P9) in accordance with law and as expeditiously as possible, within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. The Court clarified that this direction should be untrammelled by any observation made in Ext.P10 letter. The Court further directed that if the first respondent proposes to pass any conditional interim order of stay, reasons must be stated for the same. Additionally, all further coercive proceedings against the petitioner were deferred until orders were passed on the stay petitions. The issue of the third respondent's jurisdiction to pass Ext.P10 was implicitly addressed by deferring coercive proceedings and directing the first respondent to decide the stay petitions independently.
The High Court directed the second respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to consider and dispose of the petitioner's stay petition (Ext.P3) in accordance with law and as expeditiously as possible, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. The petitioner is to be afforded an opportunity of being heard. The court also stipulated that if a conditional order of stay is proposed, the reasons for it must be stated. Crucially, until orders are passed on the stay petition, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) are to stand deferred. The court did not decide on the merits of the assessment order or the appeal itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of the pending stay petition.
The High Court held that the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) was justified in remanding the matter to the assessing authority for determining the nature of income (business income vs. income from other sources). However, the PCIT erred in rendering findings on the merits of the claim for interest expenses, thereby precluding the assessing authority from enquiring into the causal link between the expenditure incurred and the interest income earned. The High Court set aside the PCIT's findings that decided the issue on merits and left no scope for enquiry. The Court also set aside the consequential order of the assessing authority and the ITAT's order to the extent it upheld the PCIT's findings on merits. The questions of law were not answered as the issue was remanded for fresh consideration by the assessing authority, untrammeled by the PCIT's premature findings on merits. The ratio is that while a revisionary authority can remand a matter for de novo consideration, it should not decide issues on merits that are to be examined by the assessing officer.
The High Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the impugned order Ext.P5. The Court found that the order Ext.P5 was passed without considering the petitioner's contentions raised in their application dated 06.06.2020. Consequently, the case was remanded back to the assessing authority to consider the petitioner's claim for interest in accordance with the law and pass a fresh reasoned and speaking order. The petitioner was directed to appear before the assessing authority on 21.09.2023 with all relevant records. The Court did not decide on the entitlement to interest under Section 68(4) but directed reconsideration of the claim. The amount of Rs. 1,64,122/- was noted as the excess payment, and Rs. 53,563/- as the balance tax demand raised.
The High Court of Kerala, considering the submission that the issue was covered by a previous judgment in W.P.(C.) No.29840/2017, allowed the writ petition. The impugned order, Ext.P6, was set aside. The Court directed the concerned Income Tax authority to consider the petitioner's application for waiver of interest (Ext.P3) after hearing the petitioner and pass an appropriate order in accordance with law. The petitioner was also directed to appear before the appropriate authority, the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Ernakulam, within 15 days to make submissions in support of their application. The Court did not decide on the deemed allowance of the waiver application but remanded it for fresh consideration.
The High Court directed the second respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to consider and dispose of the stay petition (Ext.P3) expeditiously, at any rate within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment, after affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. The Court also stipulated that if a conditional order of stay is proposed, reasons must be provided. Furthermore, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) were ordered to be deferred until orders are passed on the stay petition. The Court did not decide on the merits of the appeal itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of expediting the stay petition.
The High Court of Kerala directed the second respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to consider and dispose of the delay petition filed along with the appeal (Ext.P2) and the stay petition (Ext.P3) in accordance with law and as expeditiously as possible, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. The petitioner was to be afforded an opportunity of being heard. The Court also stipulated that if a conditional order of stay was proposed, the reasons for it must be stated. Crucially, until orders were passed on the stay petition, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) were deferred. The Court did not decide on the merits of the appeal or the assessment order itself.
The High Court held that the assessment orders (Exts. P7 to P14) were passed by the assessing authority without considering the factual aspects and supporting documents. Specifically, the court noted that Ext. P15, a letter from the Geology Department, indicated that only a total of 600 'P Forms' were issued to the petitioner on December 21, 2012, and January 30, 2014. However, the assessment orders estimated local sales by calculating 600 'P Forms' for each year from 2005-06 to 2012-13. The respondent failed to produce any supporting documents to substantiate the claim of 600 'P Forms' being issued annually. The court found this estimation to be factually incorrect. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the court set aside the assessment orders and directed the Assessing Authority to reconsider the entire issue, taking into account Ext. P15 and affording the petitioner an opportunity to be heard and present all supporting documents, including contentions on limitation. The ratio is that assessments based on unsubstantiated and factually incorrect estimations, without considering crucial documentary evidence, are liable to be set aside.
The High Court directed the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (second respondent) to consider and dispose of the stay petition (Ext P4) expeditiously and in accordance with law. The court specified that this should be done within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment, after affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. The court also stipulated that if the ITAT proposed to pass any conditional interim order of stay, it must state the reasons for the same. Furthermore, until orders were passed on the stay petition, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext P1) and the recovery order (Ext P5) were deferred. The court did not decide on the merits of the appeal itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of disposing of the stay petition.
The High Court directed the third respondent (DCIT) to consider and dispose of the petitioner's stay petition (Ext P5) expeditiously, in accordance with law. The disposal is to be completed within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment, after providing the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. The Court also stipulated that if the DCIT proposed to pass a conditional order of stay, reasons must be provided. Crucially, until an order is passed on the stay petition, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext P1) and the subsequent letter (Ext P4) were deferred. The Court did not decide on the merits of the appeal or the stay petition itself, but rather on the procedural aspect of ensuring the stay petition's timely consideration.
The High Court held that the first respondent (CBDT) had indeed violated the directions in Ext P1 judgment by rejecting the petitioner's application (Ext P2) without affording an opportunity of being heard. The Court noted that Ext P1 explicitly mandated an opportunity of hearing for the assessee. The revenue's submission regarding Circular No. 13/2023 was considered, and the Court found it appropriate to direct the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (second respondent) or their duly authorized officer to re-consider Ext P2 application. The reasoning was that the original rejection (Ext P9) was flawed due to the lack of a hearing, and the new circular provides a mechanism for such applications to be considered by a competent authority. The ratio decidendi is that statutory directions for affording an opportunity of hearing must be strictly followed, and if an order is passed in violation thereof, it is liable to be set aside and the matter remanded for fresh consideration with due process. The Court quashed Ext P9 and directed the second respondent to consider Ext P2 application afresh in accordance with law and Ext P1 judgment, after affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. Further proceedings pursuant to Ext P4 intimation were deferred until orders are passed on Ext P2.
The High Court directed the second respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to consider and dispose of the petitioner's stay petition (Ext.P8) in accordance with law and as expeditiously as possible, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. The Court further stipulated that if the second respondent proposes to pass any conditional interim order of stay, it must state the reasons for the same. Crucially, until orders are passed on the stay petition, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) and the garnishee notices (Exts.P3 to P7) are to be deferred. The judgment does not record any decision on the merits of the assessment order or the appeal itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of the pending stay petition.
The High Court directed the second respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to consider and dispose of the stay petition (Ext.P3) expeditiously, at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. The court also stipulated that if any conditional interim order of stay is proposed, the Commissioner must state the reasons for it. Furthermore, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) were deferred until orders were passed on the stay petition. The court did not decide on the merits of the appeal itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of disposing of the stay petition.
The High Court directed the second respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to consider and dispose of the stay petition (Ext.P8) expeditiously, at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. The court also stipulated that if any conditional interim order of stay was proposed, reasons for it must be stated. Furthermore, until orders were passed on the stay petition, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) and the garnishee notices (Exts.P3 to P7) were to stand deferred. The court did not decide on the merits of the appeal itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of the pending stay petition.
The High Court directed the second respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-III) to consider and dispose of the stay petition (Ext.P8) expeditiously, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. The Court further stipulated that if any conditional interim order of stay is proposed, the second respondent must provide reasons for it. Crucially, until orders are passed on the stay petition, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) and the garnishee notices (Exts.P3 to P7) were ordered to be deferred. This decision was based on the fact that the stay petition had been pending since July 31, 2023.
The High Court of Kerala directed the second respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-III, to consider and dispose of the stay petition (Ext.P8) expeditiously, at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. The court further stipulated that if the second respondent proposed to pass any conditional interim order of stay, reasons for the same must be stated. Crucially, until orders were passed on the stay petition, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) and the garnishee notices (Exts.P3 to P7) were ordered to be deferred. The court dispensed with notice to respondents 4, 6, and 7 due to the limited relief granted.
The High Court directed the second respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to consider and dispose of the stay petition (Ext.P8) expeditiously, in accordance with law, and at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. The Court further stipulated that if the second respondent proposed to pass any conditional interim order of stay, reasons for the same must be stated. Crucially, until orders were passed on the stay petition, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) and the garnishee notices (Exts.P3 to P7) were ordered to be deferred. The primary principle established is that urgent matters concerning stay petitions should be addressed promptly by appellate authorities to prevent prejudice to the assessee.
The High Court directed the second respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to consider and dispose of the petitioner's stay petition (Ext.P3) expeditiously, at any rate, within three months from the date of receiving a certified copy of the judgment. The petitioner is to be afforded an opportunity of being heard. The court also stipulated that if the second respondent proposes to pass any conditional order of stay, reasons must be provided. Crucially, until an order is passed on the stay petition, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) are deferred. The court did not decide on the merits of the appeal itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of the pending stay petition.
The High Court directed the second respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to consider and dispose of the stay petition (Ext.P3) expeditiously, at any rate, within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment, after affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. The Court also stipulated that if a conditional order of stay is proposed, reasons must be provided. Furthermore, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) were deferred until an order was passed on the stay petition. The Court did not decide on the merits of the appeal itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of the pending stay application.
The High Court held that the order of the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax was unsustainable and arbitrary. While the authorities noted a discrepancy in the date of the TDS certificate, the Court found that the circular dated 09.06.2015 (Ext.P7), specifically clause 4, was applicable. This clause states that when a refund claim arises from a court order, the period during which proceedings were pending before a court shall be ignored when calculating the six-year period for filing a refund claim. The Court observed that the impugned order relied on a circular from 2003, which was not permissible in light of the later circular. The Court concluded that the six-year period should be considered from the date of the TDS certificate (July 18, 2013), not related back to the assessment year 2008-2009. Consequently, the order Ext.P8 was set aside, the delay in filing the return and claiming the refund was condoned, and the respondents were directed to pay the refund within one month.
The High Court, while acknowledging that Exts.P2 and P6 were pending before the 3rd respondent, deemed it appropriate to direct the petitioner to file a fresh stay petition before the 1st respondent within one week of receiving a certified copy of the judgment. The Court ordered that if the petitioner complied with this direction, the 1st respondent would transmit the stay petition to the 3rd respondent. Subsequently, the 3rd respondent was directed to consider the stay petition in accordance with law and expeditiously, at least within three months of receiving a certified copy of the judgment. The Court also stipulated that if the 3rd respondent proposed to pass any conditional interim order of stay, reasons must be provided. Crucially, until orders were passed on the stay petition, and provided the petitioner complied with the directions, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment orders and Ext.P5 were to stand deferred. The Court did not decide on the merits of the appeal itself but facilitated the process for consideration of the stay application.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition by issuing specific directions. It held that the petitioner should file stay petitions before the 3rd respondent within one week of receiving a certified copy of the judgment. If filed within this period, the 3rd respondent was directed to transmit these stay petitions to the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent was then mandated to consider the stay petitions expeditiously, within three months of receiving a certified copy of the judgment. The court also stipulated that if the 2nd respondent intended to pass a conditional interim order of stay, reasons must be provided. Crucially, until orders were passed on the stay petitions, and provided the petitioner complied with the directions, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment orders and the demand notice (Ext.P19) were to stand deferred. The court did not decide the merits of the appeals themselves.
The High Court allowed the Original Petitions, setting aside the impugned common order of the Tribunal. The Court held that the logic and dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.P. Mundinamani (supra) are applicable to the present case. The Court found that an annual increment is earned for rendering service with good conduct, and an employee is entitled to it upon completing the specified period. Retirement a day before the accrual date should not lead to deprivation of this earned benefit, as doing so would be arbitrary and unreasonable. The Court found no significant distinction between the Karnataka Regulations considered by the Supreme Court and the Fundamental Rules and Rule 10 of the CCS (Pension) Rules in question. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument based on the proviso to Note 1 of Rule 33 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, finding it to be in the teeth of the arbitrariness and unreasonableness identified by the Supreme Court. The Court directed the respondents to grant one notional increment to each petitioner and revise their retiral benefits accordingly within two months.
The High Court of Kerala, in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, set aside Ext.P7 order and Annexure A show cause notice. The Court noted the respondent's concession that no personal hearing was granted. The Court directed the respondent to reconsider the matter afresh after affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard through video conferencing, as requested in Ext.P3(a). The respondent was further directed to send a notice via e-mail and the online portal to fix the hearing date and to finalize the proceedings expeditiously after hearing the petitioner. The ratio decidendi is that failure to grant a requested personal hearing, especially when it is a statutory or procedural right, violates natural justice and warrants setting aside the order.
The High Court directed the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (second respondent) to consider and dispose of the stay petitions (Exts P11 to P15) expeditiously, in accordance with law, and within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. The petitioner was to be afforded an opportunity of being heard. The court further stipulated that if any conditional interim order of stay was proposed, the appellate authority must state reasons for it. Crucially, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment orders (Exts P1 to P5) and the garnishee notice (Ext P16) were ordered to be deferred until orders were passed on the stay petitions. The principle established is that appellate authorities should dispose of stay applications promptly, especially when there is a risk of coercive action, and such proceedings should be deferred pending the decision on stay.
The High Court held that the Ext P4 order, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal for non-prosecution without considering the merits, is unsustainable in law. The Court referred to the Division Bench decision in Uzhuva Service Co-operative Bank (supra), which, in turn, relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Balaji Steel Re-Rolling Mills (supra). This precedent clearly states that an Appellate Tribunal should not dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution but must decide the matter on its merits. The Court found that the Ext P4 order was passed against these established principles. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and directed the third respondent to re-consider the appeal on its merits after affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. The third respondent was also directed to send notice via email to the petitioner's registered email address for fixing the hearing date. The Court cautioned the petitioner to be vigilant in verifying its email and taking note of hearing dates. Further proceedings pursuant to Ext P5 notice were deferred until orders were passed on the appeal.
The High Court of Kerala, considering the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, held that the writ petition has become infructuous. Consequently, the Court dismissed the writ petition as such. Any interim order that might have been in place was also vacated. The reasoning is solely based on the petitioner's submission regarding the efflux of time rendering the petition infructuous, and no adjudication on the merits of the case occurred.
The High Court held that it should not entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, considering that the petitioner had already availed the alternative statutory remedy of appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals. The Court directed the Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals to decide the pending appeal expeditiously and in accordance with law. The petitioner was granted liberty to urge all issues on facts and law before the appellate authority. No specific findings were made on the merits of the assessment order itself, as the writ petition was not entertained.
The Tribunal erred in allowing the appeal by merely applying the ratio of the Vijaya Bank judgment without verifying the factual situation. The High Court found that the assessee's balance sheet did not clearly show a reduction in assets corresponding to the bad debts written off.
The High Court directed the second respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to consider and dispose of the pending stay petitions (Exts.P3 and P6) in accordance with the law and as expeditiously as possible, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. The petitioner must be afforded an opportunity of being heard. If the Commissioner proposes to pass a conditional order of stay, reasons for the same must be stated. Until orders are passed on the stay petitions, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1), intimation (Ext.P4), and demand notice (Ext.P7) shall be deferred. The High Court did not decide the merits of the appeals or the stay petitions themselves, but rather directed their timely adjudication.
The High Court held that the Commissioner rightly rejected the applications for revision as time-barred. While acknowledging the petitioner's argument regarding the change in law and the precedent from *Vijaya Gupta v. Commissioner of Income Tax*, the Court found that the explanation provided by the petitioner for the delay in filing the applications was not satisfactory. The Court noted that the applications were submitted on June 12, 2014, which was beyond the one-year period prescribed by Section 264(3). The Court found no sufficient cause for condoning the delay, viewing the attempt as an afterthought, especially since the petitioner had incurred capital losses for AYs 2007-08 and 2009-10. Therefore, the dismissal of the revision applications by the Commissioner was considered perfectly correct and not subject to interference. The writ petition was dismissed as bereft of merit.
The High Court held that the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax did not commit an error of law or jurisdiction in issuing his opinion under Section 144A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court reasoned that Section 144A grants discretion to the Joint Commissioner to issue directions for the guidance of the Assessing Officer, and such directions are binding. The Act does not mandate the Joint Commissioner to seek opinions from third parties before forming his opinion. The Court noted that the petitioners had already filed appeals against the finalized assessment orders and could raise all available grounds before the appellate authority. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed as lacking substance.
The High Court noted that the learned counsel for the respondents submitted, on instructions, that the refunds as per Exts P4 and P6 orders had been effected to the petitioner on 25.7.2023, subsequent to the filing of the writ petition. This submission was recorded by the Court. In light of this submission, the Court was of the view that the writ petition had become infructuous. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as infructuous. No specific provision of the Income Tax Act was directly interpreted or applied to decide the merits of the refund claim itself; the decision was based on the subsequent action of the revenue rendering the petition moot.
The High Court directed the 3rd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to consider and dispose of the petitioner's appeal (Ext.P3) in accordance with law and as expeditiously as possible, at any rate within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. The Court specifically instructed the 3rd respondent to keep in mind the principles laid down in Ext.P5 judgment. Furthermore, all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P2) and demand notice (Ext.P4) were ordered to be deferred until orders are passed on Ext.P3 appeal. The Court did not decide the merits of the Section 80P deduction claim itself, but rather focused on the procedural aspect of expediting the appeal and applying relevant precedent.
The High Court held that the impugned order dated March 11, 2022, passed by the PCIT under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was wholly without jurisdiction and illegal. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the Vivad se Vishwas Act is to reduce litigation, and it provides a special scheme where an order passed under Section 5(1) is conclusive regarding the matters stated therein, and no matter covered by such order can be reopened in any other proceeding under the Income-tax Act or any other law. The Explanation to Section 5, which the Revenue relied upon, clarifies that making a declaration does not amount to conceding the tax position or acquiescing in the decision in pending proceedings like appeals or writ petitions. It does not empower the Revenue authorities to reopen an assessment that has attained finality under Section 5(1) of the Vivad se Vishwas Act. Therefore, the PCIT had no power to reopen the assessment order passed under Section 5(1) by recourse to Section 263. The writ petition was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside.
The High Court held that there is an equally efficacious alternate remedy available to the assessee under the Income Tax Act itself. Therefore, the Court would not entertain a writ petition against an assessment order or an order passed on an application for rectification under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act. The writ petition was dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to approach the appellate authority under the Income Tax Act against the assessment order and the order passed on the application under Section 154. If the petitioner files an appeal within 30 days from the date of the order, the appeal shall be decided on merit in accordance with law. The constitutional validity of Section 144B and the Faceless Assessment Scheme was not decided on merits.
The High Court of Kerala directed the 2nd respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to consider and dispose of the stay petitions (Exts.P15 to P21) expeditiously, at any rate within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. The disposal must be in accordance with law and after affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. The Court further clarified that if the 2nd respondent proposes to pass any conditional interim order of stay, reasons for the same must be stated. Until orders are passed on the stay petitions, all further recovery proceedings pertaining to the penalty orders (Exts.P1 to P7) were deferred. The Court did not decide on the merits of the appeals or the penalty orders themselves, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of disposing of the stay applications.
The High Court directed the second respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to consider and dispose of the stay petitions (Exts.P15 to P21) expeditiously and in accordance with law. The court specified that this disposal should occur within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment, after affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. Furthermore, if the second respondent intended to pass a conditional order of stay, they were directed to provide reasons for the same. Until orders were passed on the stay petitions, all further proceedings pursuant to the notice (Ext.P22) concerning the penalty orders (Exts.P1 to P7) were deferred. The court did not decide on the merits of the appeals or the penalty orders themselves.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court held that Section 127(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003, which mandates the deposit of half of the assessed amount as a condition precedent for filing an appeal, does not suffer from any constitutional invalidity. The Court relied on the Division Bench judgment in *Syrian Kurian v. Union of India*, which in turn relied on the Supreme Court's decision in *Executive Engineer & Anr v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill*. The reasoning was that appeal is a statutory remedy, and Parliament can impose conditions for availing it, provided these conditions are reasonable and non-arbitrary. The Court noted that similar pre-deposit requirements exist in other statutes and have been upheld by courts. The petitioner's attempt to distinguish *Syrian Kurian* was rejected, and the Court found no reason to deviate from the Division Bench's decision. The petitioner was granted 30 days from the date of the order to make the required pre-deposit for the 6th respondent to entertain the appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition by issuing directions. The petitioner was directed to file the stay petitions before the third respondent within two weeks of receiving a certified copy of the judgment. Upon receipt, the third respondent was to transmit these petitions to the second respondent as per procedure. The second respondent was then directed to consider and dispose of the stay petitions expeditiously, within three months of their receipt. If a conditional order of stay was proposed, the second respondent was required to provide reasons. Crucially, until orders were passed on the stay petitions, and provided the petitioner completed the filing exercise as directed, the respondents were directed to defer further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order, penalty order, and demand notice.
The High Court held that the issue was covered by its Full Bench decision in Income Tax Appeal No. 201/2013. The Full Bench had answered the question in the affirmative. It held that under Rule 7A of the Rules, 1962, an assessee is entitled to an allowance for the cost of replacement of dead and useless rubber trees in an area not abandoned, subject to Section 10(31) of the Act, 1961. Furthermore, upkeep and maintenance expenses incurred by the assessee until the maturity of rubber trees are revenue expenditures eligible for deduction under Section 37 of the Act, 1961. Consequently, the impugned orders disallowing these claims were set aside. The matters were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration and to pass assessment orders in light of the Full Bench judgment.