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The High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the appellate authority to consider the stay application (Ext.P3) on its merits. This consideration must take into account Exhibits P5 to P7, which are Office Memorandums issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, and the decision of the Apex Court in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. LG Electronics India Private Limited. The Court did not decide the merits of the stay application itself but mandated that it be considered properly. The operative direction is to the appellate authority to reconsider the stay application. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the petitioner to make the required pre-deposit of the assessed tax within ten days from the date of the order. If the deposit is made, the ITAT is directed to hear and decide the petitioner's stay application (Exhibit P5) along with their appeal (Exhibit P4) on merits expeditiously, after giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing. For a period of 15 days from the date of the order, no coercive steps are to be taken against the petitioner pursuant to the assessment order (Exhibit P1). The issue of the merits of the appeal itself was not decided, nor was the validity of the original assessment or the NFAC's order.
The High Court of Kerala directed the appellate authority (3rd respondent) to consider the petitioner's application for condonation of delay expeditiously, preferably within a period of two months. If the delay is condoned, the appellate authority is further directed to take up the stay application filed by the petitioner and dispose of the same expeditiously. The writ petition is disposed of with these directions. The Court did not decide on the merits of the FTC claim or the validity of the demand, but rather focused on expediting the procedural steps before the appellate authority. The ratio is that procedural delays in appeals should be addressed promptly by appellate authorities, and High Courts can direct such expedition through writs.
The High Court held that there was a mistake apparent on the face of the record. The Assessing Officer had erroneously included the previous year's balance of Rs. 9,45,475.96 while computing the total receipts for Assessment Year 2016-17. Since this inclusion led to an incorrect determination of the aggregate annual receipts, the impugned orders (Exts.P5 and P6) were found to be incorrect. The Court reasoned that if this amount was excluded, the petitioner's receipts for AY 2016-17 would likely fall below the Rs. 1 crore threshold for exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiad). Therefore, the orders were set aside. The ratio decidendi is that previous year's closing balances should not be included as current year's receipts when calculating aggregate annual receipts for the purpose of exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiad). The Court set aside the impugned orders and allowed the writ petition.
The High Court directed the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to hear and dispose of the appeal filed by the petitioner expeditiously, and at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. Furthermore, the Court ordered that recovery proceedings shall be put on hold until the appeal is disposed of by the Tribunal. The Court found it sufficient to dispose of the writ petition with these directions, without delving into the merits of the appeal itself.
The High Court of Kerala disposed of the Writ Petition (Criminal) in light of its previous order dated 09.10.2023 in Crl.M.C.No.7793/2023. The Court noted that the earlier order had already modified the impugned order passed by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court – I, Kozhikode, after hearing the petitioner in the present case. Therefore, no further orders were deemed necessary in this specific writ petition. The reasoning for the modification in the prior order is not detailed in this judgment. The operative direction is that the writ petition is disposed of based on the previous order.
The High Court recorded the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri. Nagaraj Narayanan, stating that in view of the directions issued in W.P.(C).No. 18130/2020, the writ petition was not being pressed and that applications before the Income Tax Department would also not be pursued. Based on these submissions, the Court held that the writ petition is dismissed as not pressed. There was no decision on the merits of the underlying dispute, and no specific issues related to the Income Tax Act were decided. The operative direction was to dismiss the writ petition.
The High Court held that the 2nd proviso to Section 220(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, inserted by the Finance Act of 2014, has prospective operation and is applicable only with effect from 01.10.2014. The Court agreed with the petitioner's submission that this provision cannot be applied retrospectively to a tax demand that crystallized and was paid before the effective date. Citing the Supreme Court judgment in Vikrant Tyres Ltd v. First Income Tax Officer, the Court reasoned that Section 220(2) applies when an assessee defaults in payment of tax after the notice of demand and the subsequent 35-day period. Since the petitioner paid the tax within 35 days of the crystallization order dated 10.01.2011, no default occurred. Therefore, the Department was not empowered to levy interest under Section 220(2) on the tax already paid. The writ petition was allowed, and the impugned demand notice (Ext.P12) was set aside. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court allowed the Writ Appeal, setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and the assessment order (Ext.P3). The Court found that while the assessee did delay in submitting the reply, it was not disputed that the reply dated 23.09.2022 was received by the respondent's office before the assessment order was passed. The Court emphasized that in taxation matters, fairness to assessees is paramount. When an assessee's reply is received, the Assessing Authority is obliged to consider it and deal with the contentions therein. Since the assessment order did not reflect consideration of the reply and the assessee was not heard, the Court deemed it appropriate to set aside the order. The matter was remanded for a fresh assessment order after a personal hearing via video conference on 16.10.2023, with the respondent to consider the assessee's reply and pass a reasoned order within two weeks thereafter.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the petitioner to file a fresh stay application before the appellate authority within one week. The appellate authority was directed to consider this application on its merits. The consideration should take into account Ext.P5 to Ext.P7 Office Memorandums issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes and the Supreme Court's observation in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. LG Electronics India Private Limited (2018). The Supreme Court's observation in the cited case clarified that it is open to the authorities, on the facts of individual cases, to grant deposit orders of a lesser amount than 20%, pending appeal, even though an administrative circular may not operate as a fetter on a quasi-judicial authority. No specific issue was left undecided; the petition was disposed of with directions.
The High Court disposed of the writ petitions with a specific direction to the 2nd respondent, the National Faceless Appeal Centre, Delhi. The Court directed the 2nd respondent to consider the applications for condonation of delay and decide them within a period of two months from the date of the order. Furthermore, the Court stipulated that any recovery made from the petitioner concerning the assessment and penalty orders would be subject to the final outcome of the appeals pending before the 2nd respondent. The Court did not decide on the merits of the assessment or penalty, nor did it address the substantive grounds of appeal, as the matter was disposed of based on the submissions regarding the pending applications and the need for expeditious consideration. The issue of whether the writ petition was maintainable in light of alternative remedies was implicitly addressed by the Court's intervention to direct the appellate authority.
The High Court disposed of the writ petitions by directing the 2nd respondent (National Faceless Appeal Centre, Delhi) to consider the applications for condonation of delay and decide them within a period of two months. The Court further stipulated that any recovery made from the petitioner concerning the assessment and penalty orders would be subject to the final outcome of the appeals pending before the 2nd respondent. The Court did not decide on the merits of the assessment or penalty, nor did it decide the appeal itself. The primary focus was on expediting the procedural steps before the appellate authority.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the National Faceless Appeal Centre (respondent Nos. 1 and 2) to take up the petitioner's pending appeal for consideration at an early date and decide the same expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months, subject to the petitioner's co-operation. The Court also directed that recovery proceedings against the petitioner pursuant to the assessment order (Exhibit P1) shall stand stayed until the disposal of the appeal. The Court did not explicitly quash the assessment order or decide the merits of the appeal, but rather facilitated its timely adjudication. The operative direction was to expedite the appellate process and stay recovery.
The High Court held that it did not find any ground to keep the writ petition pending, given that the petitioner had already filed appeals before the competent appellate authority under the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court disposed of the writ petition, granting the petitioner liberty to file stay applications online in their pending appeals. If difficulties arose, they could file applications before the jurisdictional assessing officer, who would transmit them to the appellate authority. The petitioner was given seven days to file these applications. The interim order previously granted by the Court was to remain in operation for fifteen days from the date of the judgment.
The High Court held that it could not direct the refund of the tax amount since the tax had already been realized from the petitioner's bank account in the State Bank of India. The Court noted that the petitioner's appeals were pending before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT). Therefore, the writ petitions were disposed of with a specific direction to the ITAT to dispose of the pending appeals filed by the petitioner expeditiously. The preferred timeline for the ITAT to decide the appeals was within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the High Court's judgment. No specific finding was made on the merits of the assessment orders or the penalty proceedings, as the High Court's intervention was limited to the procedural aspect of the realization of tax and the pending appeals.
The High Court held that there was no violation of statutory prescriptions by the authorities in issuing the notices under Section 148A(d) and Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court reasoned that unless the petitioner files a return and it is accepted by the assessing authority, the claimed exemption cannot be granted. The petitioner's assertion of exemption for assessment year 2016-2017 was not supported by proof or details, and the admission of not filing a return for that year was a significant factor. The Court directed the petitioner to file its ITR within seven days from the date of the order, allowing it to claim exemption as permitted by law. The assessment proceedings are to be finalized expeditiously by the assessing authority in accordance with law.
The High Court held that it cannot direct the refund of the tax amount since the tax has already been realized from the petitioner's bank account in the State Bank of India, and the bank has remitted the amount to the Department. Therefore, the writ petitions are disposed of with a direction to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) to dispose of the pending appeals filed by the petitioner expeditiously, preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. The ITAT's decision on the merits of the appeals is not recorded, nor is any finding on the assessment orders or penalty proceedings. The operative direction is for the ITAT to expedite the disposal of the appeals.
The High Court held that the petitioner's submission regarding the closure of its office and business leading to non-receipt of emails is without substance. Communications have been sent electronically to the registered email since 2013, and the petitioner's business closure occurred after the due date for filing the return for AY 2017-18. The Court found no reasonable cause for the petitioner's failure to file the return within the stipulated time. The Court noted that the petitioner has an efficacious remedy to file an appeal before the National Faceless Appeal Centre. The Court directed that if the petitioner files an appeal against the assessment and penalty orders, along with applications for condonation of delay and stay, these applications shall be considered and decided expeditiously, preferably within two months. No coercive measures were to be taken for two months. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions.
The High Court held that given the Supreme Court's judgment in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra) was directly on the issue, it was appropriate to set aside the assessment order. The matter was remanded back to the assessing authority for a fresh assessment. The assessing authority was directed to consider the Supreme Court's judgment in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra) during the fresh assessment. The petitioner was to be afforded an opportunity of hearing before the finalization of the fresh assessment. The Court also noted that if the petitioner remained dissatisfied after the fresh assessment, it could avail the statutory remedy of appeal. No specific finding was made on the merits of the petitioner's claim for exemption under Section 80P.
The High Court held that Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act empowers the Board (or its delegate) to admit an application or claim after the expiry of the specified period and deal with it on merits. However, such delegated authority cannot exceed the powers granted to the Board. The Court found that the Ext.P10 circular, which allowed the PCIT to consider the merits of the refund claim, was illegal as it circumvented the mandate of the Act. Furthermore, the Court noted that the PCIT had not considered the principal question of whether there were justifiable reasons for the delay. The Court also found the PCIT's finding on the merits flawed, as a refund of TDS from the initial compensation for the same land had been granted in 2006. The Court concluded that the matter needed to be remitted to the PCIT for fresh consideration, strictly in accordance with Section 119(2)(b), solely to determine if justifiable reasons existed for condoning the delay. The PCIT was directed to pass fresh orders within two months after hearing the appellant.
The High Court directed the 2nd respondent (National Faceless Appeal Centre) to decide the petitioner's stay application within one month from the date of production of the order. For a period of one month, the assessment order (Exhibit P-1) and the recovery notice (Exhibit P-4) shall not be given effect to. The Court did not decide on the merits of the assessment or the appeal itself, focusing solely on expediting the decision on the stay application and providing a temporary reprieve from recovery. The ratio decidendi is that a taxpayer facing recovery proceedings should not be made to wait indefinitely for a decision on their stay application, and the appellate authority must act expeditiously.
The High Court held that it would not embark on deciding the disputed question of fact regarding the deductibility of interest income under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act while exercising writ jurisdiction. The Court stated that this is a matter that needs to be examined by the second appellate authority, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner has the responsibility to satisfy the ITAT with cogent and credible evidence. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the 4th respondent (Assistant Registrar, ITAT) to decide the pending appeals expeditiously, preferably within three months. If the appeals cannot be decided within this period, the stay applications must be decided within the same timeframe. For a period of three months, the impugned recovery notices are not to be given effect to.
The High Court held that the State had virtually attempted to tax the petitioner twice on the same turnover. The Court found that the notice issued under Section 25(1) of the KVAT Act referred to escaped turnover which was nothing other than the suppressed turnover already included in the assessment for the year 2005-06. The First Appellate Authority had rightly set aside the Assessing Authority's order. The Tribunal, however, appeared to have misunderstood the facts and failed to notice that the assessment on the turnover in question had already been completed. The Tribunal's order was found to be bereft of any reasons to support its conclusion. Therefore, the High Court set aside the Tribunal's order and allowed the revision petition, answering the questions of law in favour of the assessee. The operative direction was to allow the O.T.Revision.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition, finding no substance in the petitioner's submission. The Court noted that the only email ID registered on the assessee's e-filing portal was aalfp1004g@gmail.com. It was confirmed from the records that all communications, including statutory notices and show cause notices related to the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 2017-18, were served through this registered email ID. The assessment under Section 147 read with Sections 144 and 144B was completed by the order dated 26.04.2023. Therefore, the Court concluded that the notices were duly served on the registered email address, and the petitioner's claim of non-receipt was not substantiated. The principle applied is that notices sent to the registered email address are considered validly served.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court held that the notice dated March 19, 2022, issued under Section 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which granted only four days (until March 24, 2022) for the petitioner to respond, was in violation of the statutory requirement of providing a minimum of seven days. The Court found that this non-adherence to the mandatory procedural requirement vitiated the subsequent proceedings. The Court relied on its own previous judgment in Hosdurg Beedi Workers Industrial Service Type Co-operative Society Ltd v. The Income Tax Officer, Kasaragod, which dealt with a similar situation where insufficient time was granted. Consequently, the Court quashed the notice under Section 148A(b) (Ext.P1), the order under Section 148A(d) (Ext.P2), the notice under Section 148 (Ext.P3), and the assessment order (Ext.P4). The respondents were directed to issue a fresh notice under Section 148A(b), providing the petitioner with at least seven days but not more than thirty days for filing a reply and for hearing, after which they could proceed in accordance with the law.
The High Court directed the second respondent (National Faceless Appeal Centre) to consider and dispose of the appeal filed by the petitioner in accordance with the law, preferably within a period of three months from the date of the order. The Court further clarified that if the appeal was not taken up for final hearing within the stipulated three months, the second respondent should make every endeavor to decide the application for condonation of delay and the stay petition. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions. No specific finding was made on the merits of the assessment order or the appeal itself, as the primary focus was on directing the appellate authority to proceed with the case.
The High Court directed the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) to take up the petitioner's appeal expeditiously and decide it within a period of three months from the date of the order. If the appeal could not be decided within this timeframe, the Commissioner was directed to at least decide the petitioner's stay application in accordance with the law within the same three-month period. Furthermore, for a period of three months, revenue recovery proceedings were ordered to be kept in abeyance. The Court did not decide on the merits of the appeal itself, but rather on the procedural aspect of its timely disposal.
The High Court granted permission to the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to pursue any other remedies available to her under the law. No decision was made on the merits of any underlying tax dispute. The principle established is that a petitioner can withdraw their case, subject to court permission, and retain the right to seek alternative legal recourse.
The High Court held that the Writ Petition was not maintainable because the petitioner had already approached the appellate authority against the assessment order. The Court observed that the petitioner's appeal concerning the assessment orders should be considered by the appellate authority. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to file a stay application within two days from the date of the order. The appellate authority was directed to consider the appeal and the stay application expeditiously, in accordance with the law, and pass an appropriate order within one month. The Court did not decide on the merits of the assessment or the stay application itself, but rather on the procedural aspect of the writ petition's maintainability and directed the appellate process to proceed.
The High Court of Kerala, after hearing some arguments, granted the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file afresh. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The Court did not decide on the merits of the case or any specific legal or factual issues that might have been raised. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn, with the liberty granted to the petitioner to initiate fresh proceedings if so advised. No other issues were expressly left undecided as the matter was disposed of on the petitioner's request for withdrawal.
The High Court held that the petitioner's case did not fall within the exceptions carved out for entertaining a writ petition despite the availability of an alternative efficacious remedy. The Court noted that the petitioner had been granted time until August 18, 2023, to file submissions and documents, but failed to do so and instead sought further time. The Court reasoned that the question of violation of principles of natural justice arises when an authority proceeds without an opportunity of hearing or time for producing evidence, which was not the case here, as opportunities were provided. The Court referred to paragraph 27 of the M/s Radha Krishan Industries judgment, outlining the principles for exercising writ jurisdiction. It further stated that the ITAT can examine all evidence and submissions, making it an efficacious forum. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the petitioner to file an appeal before the ITAT within one month, where all grounds and evidence could be considered. The ITAT was also directed to consider any stay application expeditiously, especially if 20% of the assessed tax is deposited.
The High Court disposed of the writ appeal by modifying the interim directions of the writ court. Recognizing the appellant's inability to operate their bank accounts while awaiting the deadline for the 20% deposit, the Court accepted an alternative security arrangement. The appellant was directed to provide an intimation, countersigned by its partner, Sri. K.N. Gopalakrishnan, to the 5th respondent bank (with copies to the 4th respondent bank and the 3rd respondent Assistant Commissioner). This intimation would state that three fixed deposit accounts in the partner's name with Punjab National Bank, totaling ₹28,25,000, would not be operated pending disposal of the appellant's appeals. The Court held that these fixed deposits would serve as the security for the 20% assessed tax amount. Upon compliance, the appellant would be free to operate other bank accounts. The 2nd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals) was directed to condone the delay of 433 days in filing the appeals and decide them expeditiously on merits. The fate of the garnishee orders would be determined by the outcome of these appeals.
The High Court did not decide the merits of the appeal concerning the tax exemption under Section 80P. Instead, acknowledging that the petitioner was facing recovery proceedings and that the appeal was pending, the Court directed the third respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to decide the appeal expeditiously within a period of two months. If the appeal could not be decided within that timeframe, the stay petition (Exhibit P5) was to be considered within the same period. The Court explicitly stated it did not want to go into the merits of the matter. The ratio decidendi is that in cases of pending appeals and recovery proceedings, the appellate authority should be directed to decide the appeal expeditiously.
The High Court directed the 2nd respondent, the National Faceless Appeal Centre, Delhi, to consider and decide the stay application (Ext.P3) expeditiously within a period of two months. For a period of two months from the date of the order, recovery proceedings in pursuance to the assessment order (Ext.P1) shall not be carried out against the petitioner. The Court did not decide on the merits of the appeal or the validity of the assessment order itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of the stay application. The ratio decidendi is that appellate authorities should address stay applications promptly, and interim protection can be granted pending such decision.
The High Court of Kerala, considering the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, directed the petitioner to file a physical copy of his rectification application before the 1st respondent within ten days from the date of the order. The Court further directed that this application shall be considered and an order in accordance with law shall be passed by the 1st respondent expeditiously. Pending the decision on the rectification application by the 1st respondent, all proceedings pursuant to the demand notice (Exhibit P-3) were ordered to be kept in abeyance. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions. No specific issue regarding the merits of the rectification itself was decided, as the focus was on procedural compliance and ensuring consideration of the application.
The High Court of Kerala disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the 3rd respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption), to decide the petitioner's application (Ext.P6) for condoning the delay in filing Form 10B expeditiously. The Court further directed that until a decision is taken on the condonation application, the demand of arrears of tax arising from Ext.P7 order shall not be given effect to. The judgment did not decide on the merits of the petitioner's claim for Section 11 benefits, but rather focused on the procedural aspect of the pending condonation application. The principle established is that pending applications for condonation of delay, especially when supported by a CBDT circular, should be considered promptly, and coercive recovery should be stayed until a decision is reached.
The High Court held that the assessing officer had proceeded in a hurried manner, which was in violation of the principles of natural justice. The Court noted that the petitioner had sought an extension of time until May 22, 2023, to file a reply to the show cause notice, but no decision was taken on this request. Subsequently, the assessment order was passed without any reply from the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned assessment order dated May 23, 2023, was set aside. The respondents were directed to open the window for uploading the petitioner's objections to the show cause notice. No further time would be granted to the petitioner. The assessment proceedings were to be finalized with a fresh assessment order passed in accordance with the law, and the petitioner was to be intimated a fresh date for filing the reply. The ratio decidendi is that tax liability, being a civil liability, requires adherence to principles of natural justice, including a decision on requests for time extension before finalizing assessment.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with specific directions to the 3rd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)). The Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to an order as prayed for, particularly an interim order without depositing any amount, especially considering the significant delays in filing the appeals. The Court acknowledged the Supreme Court's clarification in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. that administrative circulars do not fetter the appellate authority's discretion to grant interim orders, and that such orders can be made for depositing less than 20% of the tax amount depending on the facts. However, the Court emphasized that the Supreme Court did not state that no amount would be liable to be deposited for granting an interim order. Therefore, the Court directed the 3rd respondent to first take up the application for condonation of delay. If the delay is condoned, then the 3rd respondent is to decide the application for staying the demand arising from the assessment order. The 3rd respondent was granted one month's time to decide both the condonation of delay and the stay application. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the writ petition is not maintainable against the assessment order. The court found that the petitioner's submission that he was not given an opportunity to represent his case was unfounded, as the assessment order clearly stated that several opportunities were afforded to the petitioner, but he failed to respond to the notices. The court observed that the assessment order did not suffer from any jurisdictional or legal error on the face of the record, considering the facts narrated therein and the petitioner's non-cooperation. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed. However, the petitioner was granted liberty to pursue any other remedy available to him under the law against the assessment order.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court found that the grounds raised by the petitioner were not covered by the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961, specifically concerning waiver of interest under Sections 234B and 234C. The Principal Chief Commissioner's finding that the petitioner had not shown circumstances beyond his control preventing the payment of advance tax was upheld. The Court reiterated that interest levied for non-payment of advance tax is compensatory, not penal. It was noted that the petitioner's grounds did not fall within the clauses (a) to (e) of the CBDT notification dated 26.06.2006. Specifically, the claim for immunity from advance tax under Section 207(2) was found not tenable as its provisions were applicable from AY 2012-13 onwards, not AY 2011-12. Furthermore, the tax on capital gains was not paid by March 31st of the financial year, disqualifying the petitioner from exemption under the proviso to Section 234C. No ground for interference was made out.
The High Court directed the appellate authority, the National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC), Delhi, to decide the petitioner's appeal (Ext.P3) against the assessment order dated December 19, 2019, as expeditiously as possible, and at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of the judgment. The Court also directed that no coercive steps for recovery of the demand shall be taken against the petitioner during this period. The judgment was to be communicated to the NFAC for compliance. The writ petition was finally disposed of with these directions. No specific issue was left undecided, as the court's primary action was to direct the appellate authority to proceed with the pending appeal.
The High Court held that the petitioner's contention that their reply was not considered was not supported by the record, as admissible deductions had been allowed during the assessment proceedings. The Court found that the petitioner had been given an opportunity to reply and had done so, thus not violating the principles of natural justice. The Court further held that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not the appropriate forum to challenge an assessment order when a statutory alternate remedy of appeal under Section 246 of the Income Tax Act exists. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed. However, the Court granted liberty to the petitioner to approach the appellate authority with an application for condonation of delay, suggesting that the appellate authority may condone the delay given the pendency of the writ petition. If the delay is condoned, the appellate authority was directed to decide the appeal on merits expeditiously.
The High Court held that the application filed by the Department seeking rectification of the ITAT's order dated 14.03.2017 was not maintainable. The Court found that the application was filed significantly beyond the six months' period of limitation prescribed under Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, and the impugned order of the ITAT dated 16.09.2022, which allowed the rectification application, was set aside. The Court did not decide on the merits of the original appeal or the applicability of Section 80P(2) deduction, focusing solely on the procedural defect of limitation in the rectification proceedings.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the National Faceless Appeal Centre (2nd respondent) and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (4th respondent) to hear and dispose of the appeals (Ext.P2 and Ext.P3) expeditiously within a period of two months. This disposal is contingent upon the cooperation of the assessee (petitioner). Furthermore, for a period of two months from the date of the order, no coercive measures are to be taken against the petitioner for the realization of the tax assessed in the writ petition. The Court considered the submissions and the precedent cited by the petitioner, and the lack of dispute from the Revenue.
The High Court found substance in the rectification application. It directed the Income Tax Officer (1st respondent) to decide the rectification application (Exhibit P-7) within a period of three months. The decision should consider that the compensation awarded was for land jointly owned by four persons, not solely by the petitioner. The petitioner is to be afforded an opportunity of hearing. The Court did not explicitly decide on the maintainability of the rectification application on merits but ordered its disposal, implying that the substantive issue of the petitioner's share in the compensation should be examined. The previous rejection of the revision petition on limitation grounds was noted but did not preclude the consideration of the rectification application.
The High Court held that the petitioners' submission that they are not liable to file returns of income as they are not assessees under the Income Tax Act and that no income tax is payable on the compensation awarded by the MACT is valid. The Court found no substance in the revenue's submission that the refund application cannot be processed without filing returns. Since the petitioners are neither assessees nor have income for which a return is required, the refund of TDS deducted and deposited by the Insurance Company must be processed upon a simple application. The Court directed the petitioners to file an application before the 1st respondent within ten days, and the 1st respondent was ordered to process the application and refund the TDS amount within one month of filing. The operative direction is to process the refund.
The High Court disposed of the writ petitions with liberty to the petitioners to file their income tax returns within one month from the date of the order. The Court directed that upon filing of the returns within the stipulated period, the assessing authority would examine the returns in accordance with the law and pass final assessment orders expeditiously. The Court did not decide on the merits of the Section 80P claim or the validity of the notices themselves, but rather facilitated the process for the petitioners to regularize their filing and have their claims adjudicated.
The High Court granted the petitioner's request for permission to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file a fresh writ petition. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The Court did not delve into the merits of the case or the underlying dispute that led to the filing of the writ petition. The operative direction was solely to dismiss the petition as withdrawn, with the specified liberty granted to the petitioner. No issues were decided on their merits.
The High Court disposed of the writ petitions with liberty to the petitioners to file their income tax returns within one month from the date of the order. The Court directed the assessing authority to examine these returns in accordance with the law and pass final assessment orders expeditiously. The Court did not decide on the merits of the exemption claim under Section 80P or the validity of the notices, as the petitioners sought to file returns and pursue their claims through the assessment process. The operative direction was to allow the petitioners to regularize their filing and have their claims adjudicated.
The Court disposed of the writ petitions with liberty to the petitioners to file their income tax returns within one month from the date of the order. If the returns are filed within the stipulated period, the assessing authority is directed to examine the returns in accordance with the law and pass final assessment orders expeditiously. The Court did not decide on the validity of the Section 148A notices or the Section 148 proceedings on merits, as the parties agreed to this course of action. The core issue of Section 80P exemption was implicitly left for determination during the assessment proceedings.