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527 orders · Page 10 of 11
The High Court found that it was not certain whether the petitioner was granted a due opportunity before the penalty order was passed. Therefore, the court intervened on this limited ground.
The Court directed the petitioner to approach the jurisdictional Commissioner for waiver or reduction of the deposit. Recovery proceedings were deferred until the Commissioner disposes of the application.
The High Court held that the original judgment did not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity or error apparent on the face of the record. Therefore, the Court found no grounds to interfere with its previous decision in the exercise of its review jurisdiction.
The High Court held that the rights of a bona fide auction purchaser cannot be disturbed after confirmation of sale, especially when the challenge is based on a compromise decree that appears collusive. The appellants failed to satisfy the conditions for setting aside the sale under Section 176[1][a] of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act.
The High Court held that the assessment proceedings were vitiated due to the denial of complete opportunity to the petitioner and non-consideration of all submissions. Consequently, the impugned orders were quashed, and the proceedings were to be recommenced.
The High Court held that the cessation of liability under Section 41(1) cannot be presumed merely because a creditor could not be traced. The matter of 12 unserved creditors was remanded to the Assessing Officer for re-examination in light of a previous judgment.
The High Court held that the auction was conducted on an 'as is where is basis' and any issues regarding encumbrances should have been raised before the auction. The court also stated that the validity of the encumbrance cannot be adjudicated in a writ petition.
The appellants (Revenue) sought permission to withdraw the appeal with liberty to file it before the appropriate court. The Court granted the permission and disposed of the appeal as withdrawn.
The High Court upheld the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act's provisions allowing for property classification and subclassification for taxation. It found that the impugned compendium was based on reasonable criteria and had historical precedent.
The High Court held that an award of compensation rendered by an arbitrator under Section 3-G of the National Highways Act is not an arbitral award in terms of Article 11 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, and therefore, no stamp duty is liable to be paid on it.
The High Court held that the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976, specifically Section 108(3), empowers the corporation to classify and subclassify properties for taxation based on various criteria. The court found no illegality in the impugned compendium and notification.
The tribunal held that imposing such a condition via an executive order, without specific legislative backing or due process of law, violates Article 300-A of the Constitution. The doctrine of approbate and reprobate cannot override statutory provisions or constitutional rights.
The High Court allowed the Revenue's request to withdraw the appeal. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn due to the settlement under the 'Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme'.
The Court agreed that the assessment order was not in compliance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, the assessment order was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration.
The High Court noted that the substantial questions of law involved in the appeal had already been answered by a previous division bench judgment. Consequently, the court found no merit in the revenue's appeal.
The High Court, after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners (Revenue), found that the impugned judgment dated 10.09.2020 passed in ITA No. 12/2016 neither suffers from any infirmity nor any error apparent on the face of the record. Therefore, the Court held that there was no ground to interfere with the original judgment in the exercise of its review jurisdiction. Consequently, the Review Petition was dismissed. No specific issues from the original appeal were re-adjudicated; the focus was solely on whether grounds for review existed.
The High Court held that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court granting permanent injunction did not merge with the appellate court's decision on the declaration relief. Therefore, the respondents' appeal against the injunction decree was maintainable.
The High Court noted that the learned counsel for the revenue had filed a memo seeking leave to withdraw the appeal. The memo stated that the withdrawal was sought without prejudice to the right of the revenue to raise the issues involved in this appeal in other pending appeals. The Court took the aforesaid memo on record. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the liberty to the revenue as stated in the memo. No decision was made on the merits of the substantial questions of law.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose for consideration as the issue had already been decided by a previous bench of the court. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law raised in the appeal had already been answered by a previous judgment of the same court. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration in this appeal.
The High Court held that an order cannot be reviewed based on arguments that could have been advanced when the matter was initially disposed of, emphasizing that a review petition cannot function as an appeal in disguise. The Court found that the learned counsel for the review petitioner was unable to point out any error apparent on the face of the record in respect of the order passed on January 2, 2020. Consequently, the Court concluded that there were no grounds to entertain the review petition. The ratio decidendi is that review is a limited remedy for correcting apparent errors, not for re-arguing a case or introducing new arguments that were available earlier. The operative direction was to reject the review petition.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law raised in the appeal had already been answered by a previous bench of the court. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration in this appeal.
The High Court declared the explanation below Clause (A) in the relevant CBDT notifications as ultra vires. Consequently, the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Act was quashed.
The High Court noted that the substantial question of law was already answered in favour of the assessee in a previous, similar case. The Revenue's counsel could not dispute this.
The High Court, following its previous judgment in a similar case, held that the substantial question of law was answered against the revenue. The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The Court noted the respondent's submission that assessment proceedings would be handled under the Faceless Assessment Scheme and disposed of expeditiously. For the stay of demand, the petitioner was advised to approach the appropriate authority.
The High Court noted that both parties jointly submitted that nothing survives for consideration in the appeal. Therefore, the appeal was disposed of based on a previous order of the court in a similar case.
The High Court directed that the appeal be disposed of as per seniority, subject to the petitioner depositing 20% of the disputed demand. The amount already deposited was to be considered towards this 20%.
The tribunal rightly modified the order of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner instead of remitting it back, as the original order was cryptic and lacked application of mind. The reduction in damages was justified given the circumstances.
The High Court noted that the learned counsel for the revenue submitted that the assessee has applied under the Vivad se Vishwas scheme. Based on this submission, the revenue filed a memo seeking leave to withdraw the appeal with liberty to revive it. The memo was taken on record. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty granted to the revenue to revive the same. No decision on the merits of the case was made.
The High Court held that the material on record, including specific transactions and discrepancies in declared income, provided sufficient 'reasons to believe' for invoking Section 132. The court found no grounds for interference with the action taken under Section 132.
The High Court held that the petitioner should avail the substantive remedy of appeal under Section 246-A of the Income Tax Act. The court found no grounds to invoke writ jurisdiction.
The High Court held that the mutation entry and consequent mutation reference were illegal as the original order under which the land was forfeited had been set aside by the Tribunal. The petitioners are entitled to have their names continued in the revenue records.
The Tribunal found the respondent guilty of other misconduct as defined under Section 22 read with Section 21 of the Chartered Accountants Act. The recommended penalty of removal from the register for one month was deemed just and proper.
The High Court found that the Appellate Authority's order lacked proper reasoning and calculation regarding the payment due to the lecturers. The court quashed the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the Appellate Authority for reconsideration.
The High Court set aside the intimation issued under Section 245 and remanded the matter back to the respondent authorities. The authorities are to reconsider the adjustment after considering the petitioner's objections.
The tribunal held that passing an assessment order without considering the assessee's reply to a show cause notice violates the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the assessment order was set aside.
The tribunal held that adjusting a refund against a disputed demand without prior notice under Section 245 is bad in law. The order making the adjustment was set aside.
The High Court set aside the intimation under Section 143(1) because no notice regarding adjustments was issued to the assessee. The matter was remitted to the respondent to redo the proceedings concerning adjustments.
The Court permitted the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition. It was clarified that the petitioner is free to pursue other legal remedies regarding the reassessment notice.
The High Court allowed the writ petitions in part, granting the assessees an opportunity to compound the offense within six weeks. If compounding is not accepted by the department, the assessees can pursue other legal remedies.
The High Court found it unnecessary to answer the substantial questions of law. It set aside the orders of the ITAT, CIT(A), and the order giving effect to a Section 263 order.
The High Court allowed the writ petitions in part, granting the assessees an opportunity to compound the offense within six weeks. If compounding is not accepted by the department, the assessees can pursue other legal remedies.
The High Court noted that the revenue's appeals concerning the same ITAT order were dismissed. Therefore, the substantial questions of law in the assessee's appeal were rendered academic.
The High Court found the orders of the Commissioner and Tribunal to be cryptic and lacking application of mind. While acknowledging the delay and repeated defaults, the court considered the petitioner's financial difficulties, the period of delay, and the delay in initiating proceedings as mitigating factors.
The High Court took the memo of withdrawal on record. The appeal was disposed of as withdrawn.
The High Court held that the first substantial question of law did not arise for consideration. The second and third substantial questions of law were answered in favor of the assessee and against the revenue.
The High Court held that the first substantial question of law did not arise. The second and third substantial questions of law were answered in favor of the assessee, finding that the orders under Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) were indeed barred by limitation.
The High Court allowed the revenue's request to withdraw the appeal. The withdrawal was granted without prejudice to the revenue's rights in other related appeals.
The High Court allowed the Revenue's request to withdraw the appeal. The dismissal was granted with liberty to the Revenue to raise all contentions in other pending appeals.