1,346 orders · Page 3 of 27
The Tribunal held that the guidance value of the land or building is the appropriate mode to determine the full value of consideration in cases where the consideration is not ascertainable. The High Court found no substantial question of law and did not interfere with the Tribunal's order.
The High Court directed the concerned respondents to ensure no illegal slaughtering of animals occurs in the state and to take immediate remedial measures. It also mandated the completion of investigations and submission of police reports in criminal cases against the implicated individual.
The High Court held that the Charitable Religious Trust Act, 1920, was not applicable to the trust and that its registration as a society was proper. Consequently, certain orders that quashed the society's registration were set aside, while others were upheld.
The High Court held that the assessment order was vitiated due to a violation of the principles of natural justice, as it was passed without hearing the petitioner, despite a prior direction from the Joint Commissioner.
The High Court held that the ITAT's order was not perverse. It found that the provisos to Section 12A(2) of the Income Tax Act, read with Circular No. 1/2015, protected the assessee from re-assessment solely for non-registration in preceding years, especially when registration was granted later.
The High Court observed that the purpose of the writ petitions had been fulfilled as the investigating agencies had completed their investigations and submitted reports to the competent court. The court also noted that the competent authority under the relevant Act would take appropriate legal steps.
The Tribunal rightly held that the provisos to Section 12A(2) of the Act are applicable, preventing reassessment solely for non-registration in preceding years. The High Court found no substantial question of law and upheld the Tribunal's decision.
The Tribunal correctly applied the provisos to Section 12A(2) of the Act and Circular No. 1/2015. Re-assessment was barred solely for non-registration when registration was granted later and assessment proceedings were pending.
The Tribunal rightly quashed the re-assessment order, holding it bad in law for violating the provisos to Section 12A(2) of the Act. The court found no perversity in the Tribunal's findings, considering the factual aspects and the legal provisions.
The High Court held that the ITAT's order was not perverse. It found that the provisos to Section 12A(2) of the Income Tax Act, read with Circular No. 1/2015, protected the assessee from re-assessment solely for non-registration in preceding years.
The High Court held that the assessment order was vitiated due to a violation of the principles of natural justice, as it was passed without hearing the petitioner, despite a prior direction from the Joint Commissioner.
The High Court observed that the purpose of the writ petitions had been fulfilled as the investigating agencies had completed their investigations and submitted reports to the competent court. The court also noted that the competent authority under the relevant Act would take appropriate legal steps.
The High Court observed that the purpose of the writ petitions had been fulfilled as the investigating agencies had completed their investigations and submitted reports to the competent court. The court also noted that the competent authority under the relevant Act would take appropriate legal steps.
The High Court held that the impugned notification was not in conformity with the mandatory requirements of Section 127 of the Income Tax Act. It was found to be a non-speaking, cryptic, and unreasoned order, lacking valid or cogent reasons.
The court directed the respondents to consider the petitioner's representation and pass appropriate orders in accordance with the law. This was to be done within two months, taking into account previous court decisions.
The High Court held that the petitioner's inability to respond was due to technical issues attributable to the respondents and constituted a bonafide reason. The ex-parte assessment orders were quashed for violating principles of natural justice.
The assessee has filed a declaration and paid the disputed tax under the Vivad Se Vishwas Act. Consequently, the appeal filed by the Revenue has become infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment was invalid as it was based on a change of opinion by the Assessing Officer, not on any new material. The Assessing Officer had previously accepted the assessee's claim.
The High Court directed the ITAT to re-consider the issue of the validity of proceedings under Section 153A in light of a previous ruling. The Tribunal was also instructed to adjudicate other issues if Section 153A proceedings were found to be invalid.
The High Court held that the income generated from unutilized project funds invested as per government directives should be capitalized and treated as part of the project's equity, not as revenue income of the assessee. The Tribunal's decision was upheld.
The High Court held that the income generated from unutilized project funds invested as per government directives should be capitalized and treated as part of the project's equity, not as revenue income of the assessee. The Tribunal's decision was upheld.
The Court granted the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The petition was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty granted to the petitioner to file a fresh petition.
The Tribunal was not justified in disallowing the entire interest expenditure. The assessee is entitled to claim deduction under Section 57(iii) of the Act as the expenditure was incurred for the purpose of earning income.
The High Court found that the respondent had not properly considered the petitioner's objections and documents. The assessment order was deemed unreasoned, non-speaking, and violative of natural justice principles.
The High Court held that the issue involved the applicability of Section 80-IB(10) and that a previous decision by the same court on similar facts for the same residential complex warranted a similar approach. The court decided to set aside the impugned assessment order and remit the matter back for reconsideration.
The High Court directed the respondents to consider the petitioner's grievances and pass appropriate orders or take action on her representations and advocate's notice within three months. The court did not express any opinion on the merits of the case.
The High Court found that the petitioner was unable to attend the video conference due to technical issues on the respondent's part and that their submissions were not considered. Therefore, the assessment order was set aside.
The High Court found that the issue involved the applicability of Section 80-IB(10) and that a similar matter for the same assessee in a different year had been remitted back. To avoid conflicting decisions, the court decided to set aside the assessment order and remit the matter for fresh consideration.
The High Court held that the DRAT did not fail to consider previous court observations as the prior writ petitions were dismissed without specific directions. The court also found no violation of the bank's undertaking and that the petitioners' conduct had stalled recovery proceedings.
The High Court held that the provision for privilege leave encashment is not a deductible liability in the year of provision. Deduction is allowed only in the year of payment.
The High Court held that the deduction for amortization of premium on government securities is allowable, relying on a previous judgment. However, the provision for privilege leave encashment was held to be a contingent liability and not allowable.
The High Court held that the issue is covered by previous judgments, including the case of Karnataka Vikas Grameen Bank. Therefore, the deduction for amortization of premium on government securities is allowable.
The High Court held that the issue is covered by previous judgments, including the case of Karnataka Vikas Grameen Bank. Therefore, the deduction for amortization of premium paid on government securities is allowable.
The High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the issue is covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. M/s. Exide Industries Limited. The deduction for privilege leave encashment is to be allowed in the year of payment.
The Tribunal confirmed the disallowance of the provision for employee leave encashment. The High Court noted that the issue is covered by the Supreme Court decision in Union of India vs. M/s. Exide Industries Limited, which was in favor of the Revenue.
The High Court permitted the appellant to withdraw the appeal. The withdrawal was based on the appellant opting for the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020, to settle the disputed income.
The High Court noted that the Revenue did not dispute that the appeal had become academic due to the annulment of the assessment order. The appeal was disposed of with liberty to the Revenue to revive it if necessary.
The High Court, in view of the joint submission by both counsels, directed the Appellate Authority to consider the application filed by the petitioner for grant of interim relief in respect of the assessment orders. Until such consideration, the Revenue was restrained from enforcing the orders of assessment. The writ petition was disposed of accordingly. The court did not decide the merits of the assessment order itself but provided a procedural direction for interim relief. No specific issue was left undecided, as the petition was disposed of based on the joint submission and the interim directions.
The High Court noted that a Coordinate Bench had previously quashed the ITAT order and remanded the matter. Subsequently, the ITAT annulled the original assessment order.
The High Court directed the Appellate Authority to consider the petitioner's application for interim relief concerning the assessment orders. Until such consideration, the Revenue was restrained from enforcing the assessment orders. The writ petition was disposed of in view of this joint submission. The court did not decide the merits of the assessment order or the demand notice, but rather focused on the procedural aspect of granting interim relief pending appeal. The ratio is that where an appeal and an interim relief application are pending, and the revenue does not object, the appellate authority should be directed to consider the interim relief application expeditiously, and enforcement of the assessment order should be stayed until then.
The High Court considered the memo filed by the appellant's counsel. The memo stated that the appellant had opted for the VSVS Scheme-2020 and paid the taxes under it, enclosing FORM-3. The appellant requested permission to withdraw the appeal to avail the benefits of this scheme. In light of this submission and the enclosed documentation, the Court found no impediment to allowing the withdrawal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The specific order or action of the ITAT that was under challenge was not adjudicated upon merits due to the withdrawal.
The Court directed the Appellate Authority to consider the petitioner's application for interim relief. Until then, the Revenue was restrained from enforcing the assessment order.
The High Court acknowledged that the Revenue did not dispute that the appeal had become academic due to the annulment of the assessment order. The appeal was disposed of with liberty to the Revenue to revive it if they challenged the subsequent order.
The High Court disposed of the appeal, granting the Revenue liberty to revive it if it falls within exceptions to CBDT circulars regarding tax effect. The substantial questions of law were kept open.
The High Court held that the first substantial question of law regarding DTAA overriding the Income Tax Act is covered by a previous decision in favour of the assessee. The second question concerning the interpretation of the CBDT circular was also covered by a prior ruling in favour of the assessee.
The High Court noted the appellant's submission of declarations under the Vivad Se Vishwas Act and the issuance of a Form-3 certificate. Consequently, the court permitted the withdrawal of the appeal.
The Tribunal correctly analyzed that since the software project was abandoned due to technological obsolescence, the expenditure incurred did not result in any enduring benefit and should be treated as revenue expenditure.
The High Court allowed the petition, quashing the assessment order and demand notices. The court found it necessary to provide the petitioner with another opportunity to contest the proceedings due to his advanced age, ailments, and hospitalization.
The High Court held that the petitioner's repeated filing of writ petitions on the same subject matter amounted to an abuse of the process of law. The court noted that previous petitions concerning the same admission were dismissed by the High Court and the Supreme Court.
The High Court allowed the appellant to withdraw the appeal. The withdrawal was granted with liberty to revive the appeal if the dispute is not settled under the Vivad Se Vishwas scheme.