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603 orders · Page 5 of 13
The High Court held that the Revenue is liable to pay interest on the unpaid interest calculated under Section 244A. This decision was based on a prior judgment of the same court.
The High Court directed the formation of a committee to examine claims for deletion of acquired lands based on specific criteria, including prior conversion, layout formation, and construction. The BDA is to act on the committee's reports.
The High Court held that the Revenue is liable to pay interest on unpaid interest calculated under Section 244A. This decision was based on a previous judgment by the same court.
The High Court held that the Revenue is liable to pay interest on the unpaid interest calculated under Section 244A. This decision was based on a previous judgment by a bench of the same court.
The High Court held that the ITAT was incorrect in directing the bifurcation of composite payments made by the assessee. The order of the Tribunal to the extent it directed bifurcation of payments with reference to medical services was quashed.
The High Court held that the Tribunal was incorrect in directing the bifurcation of payments made by the assessee for medical services. The Court quashed the Tribunal's order to the extent it directed this bifurcation.
The High Court held that the ITAT was incorrect in directing the bifurcation of payments for medical services. The court quashed the ITAT's direction regarding bifurcation, implying that composite payments should not be split for the purpose of TDS under Section 194J.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law framed in the appeal were already answered in favor of the revenue by a previous bench. Consequently, the ITAT's order was quashed, and the Assessing Authority's order was restored.
The Tribunal's direction to bifurcate composite payments for applying Section 194J was quashed. The High Court held that the Tribunal was incorrect in directing such bifurcation of payments made by the assessee.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law were answered in favor of the revenue, referencing a previous judgment. Consequently, the ITAT order was quashed and the Assessing Authority's order was restored.
The High Court held that Section 194J should apply only to payments that are specifically professional fees and not to the entire composite payment. The tribunal's direction to bifurcate payments for medical services was quashed.
The Tribunal's direction to bifurcate composite payments for the purpose of Section 194J was quashed. The High Court found that the Tribunal was not right in directing such bifurcation of payments made by the assessee.
The High Court held that the reopening of assessment was valid as it was based on fresh material and the assessee's failure to disclose true and full facts. The Tribunal erred in holding that the reopening was barred by limitation and based on a change of opinion.
The Tribunal was incorrect in directing the bifurcation of composite payments for services rendered by the hospital. The High Court quashed this direction, stating that Section 194J does not provide for such bifurcation of composite payments.
The High Court held that the ITAT was not right in directing the bifurcation of composite payments for the purpose of Section 194J. The appeal was partly allowed, quashing the ITAT's direction for bifurcation.
The High Court disposed of the appeal with liberty granted to the revenue to revive it. This was based on the assessee's submission regarding the tax effect and the revenue's request for liberty.
The Tribunal held that payments made by TPAs to hospitals for medical services fall under Section 194J of the Income Tax Act, requiring tax deduction at source. The High Court agreed with this interpretation, upholding the decisions of the Bombay and Delhi High Courts.
The High Court held that the ITAT's decision was not perverse. The assessee, as the payer of the amounts to the hospitals, was liable for TDS under Section 194J.
The High Court held that an order for deposit of backwages under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, cannot be made in the absence of a reinstatement order. Since the Labour Court had rejected the reference, the interim order directing the deposit of backwages was not justified.
The High Court disposed of the appeal. Liberty was granted to the revenue to revive the appeal if the case falls under the exceptions mentioned in the relevant CBDT circular.
The High Court accepted the compromise petition filed by both parties. The impugned judgment and decree were confirmed, and the appeal was disposed of in terms of the compromise.
The Court directed respondents 4 to 6 to furnish the petitioner's service register and other relevant documents to the third respondent within one month. Subsequently, the third respondent was ordered to settle the petitioner's pensionary and leave encashment benefits, including applicable interest, within two months thereafter.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law were already answered in favour of the assessee by a previous judgment. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law regarding Section 80IA were covered by a previous judgment and answered them against the revenue. For Section 14A, the court found no perversity in the Tribunal's findings and did not interfere.
The High Court set aside the rejection order, finding it contrary to Supreme Court judgments. It directed the authorities to reconsider the petitioners' cases in light of the observations made in Nihal Singh, emphasizing the need to create posts based on rational assessment.
The High Court held that the Tribunal was justified in its decision. The substantial questions of law were answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee.
The High Court held that the interest component partakes the character of amount due under Section 244A of the Act. If a refund does not include the interest due, the revenue is liable to pay interest on the shortfall, which is not considered interest on interest.
The Tribunal held that the cost of acquisition of shares upon conversion of FCCBs should be determined as per the provisions of the relevant scheme, which considered the market price of shares on the date of conversion. The High Court agreed with this interpretation.
The High Court held that interest under Section 234A can only be levied up to the date of the first assessment order, as per the Supreme Court's decision in Modi Industries. A subsequent modified assessment order does not attract further interest if there's no fault on the assessee's part.
The High Court noted that a previous appeal concerning the validity of the Section 263 order had already been decided by this Court. Consequently, the substantial questions of law in the present appeal became academic.
The High Court allowed the appeal, quashing the ITAT's order for the assessment year 2009-10. The court answered the substantial questions of law in favor of the assessee, referencing a previous order for Assessment Year 2005-06.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had applied his mind and considered all materials before allowing depreciation, thus the order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to revenue. Consequently, the Commissioner's invocation of Section 263 was unjustified.
The High Court disposed of the appeal. Liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the appeal if the case falls under the exceptions mentioned in the CBDT circular.
The Tribunal held that the leasehold rights were intangible assets and depreciation was allowable. It further held that the Commissioner's invocation of Section 263 was not justified as the Assessing Officer had made a reasonable inquiry and the order was not necessarily prejudicial to revenue.
The High Court held that the sale of carbon credits is a capital receipt, aligning with a previous judgment by the same court. The court found no merit in the Revenue's appeal.
The High Court held that the transfer of intangible assets to the company was a valid mode of transfer under Section 47(xiii) for which depreciation is allowable with reference to the actual cost. It also ruled that the 5th proviso to Section 32(1) and Explanation 3 to Section 43(1) were wrongly invoked.
The High Court held that since the ITAT's order was based on a previous decision of the same court, no substantial question of law arose. Therefore, the appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.
The High Court disposed of the appeal, granting the Revenue liberty to revive it if the matter falls within the exceptions of the relevant CBDT circular.
The Tribunal held that the payment was a voluntary payment and not an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the transfer of shares. The High Court agreed with the Tribunal's findings.
The High Court held that the Tribunal's findings of fact were not perverse and were based on a meticulous appreciation of evidence. The court found that the assessee failed to substantiate its claims and provide satisfactory explanations for the expenses.
The High Court reversed the trial court's decree for specific performance, finding it inappropriate. However, to avoid injustice, it directed the appellant to refund the advance amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- with interest, exercising powers under Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC.
The Tribunal held that the proviso to Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act is not applicable to KIADB, as its primary object is not profit-making but the orderly development of industries. The High Court agreed with the Tribunal's findings, stating they were based on a meticulous appreciation of the record.
The High Court modified the MACT's judgment, re-apportioning the liability between two insurance companies. The court determined that the insurer of the vehicle bearing registration number KA-22/N-6642 was liable for 65% of the compensation, and the insurer of the vehicle bearing registration number MH-11/A-9502 was liable for 35%.
The High Court held that disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D is permissible even if no exempt income is earned in a particular year. This is based on Supreme Court decisions and CBDT Circular No. 5/2014.
The High Court declared the Amendment Act and the subsequent notification implementing the reservation and concession as unconstitutional and illegal. The court held that the State Legislature lacked the power to direct the Law School to provide reservations, and the Law School's autonomy was encroached upon.
The High Court allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn by the Court.
The assessee's counsel filed a memo seeking leave to withdraw the appeal. The Court took the memo on record and proceeded to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The High Court took the memo on record and, for the reasons stated therein, dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
The High Court held that the first substantial question of law did not arise as the Tribunal examined the issue on merits. The second question was modified to direct the Assessing Officer to determine market risk adjustment afresh. The third and fourth questions were decided against the revenue.
The High Court modified the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. It recalculated the loss of dependency, future prospects, consortium, estate, and funeral expenses based on established legal precedents and the specific facts of each deceased's case.