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The Tribunal acknowledged that there was no compliance from the assessee before the Assessing Officer and the First Appellate Authority, leading to the dismissal of the appeal in limine. However, considering the assessee's prayer and in the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the appeal to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, as contemplated under Section 250(6) of the Act, after affording due opportunity to the assessee. The assessee was directed to provide updated contact details for receiving notices and to remain vigilant. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the effective grounds of appeal raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the disallowance of transfer expenses.
The Tribunal held that the issue of whether a cooperative society is entitled to avail the benefit under section 80P(2)(d) of the Act for interest income earned from investments held with cooperative banks is no longer res integra. The Tribunal noted that this issue has been decided in favour of the assessee by a catena of decisions. Specifically, the Tribunal referred to the case of Thorapadi Urban Co-op Credit Society Ltd & Others vs ITO, where the Hon'ble High Court of Madras, following a Division Bench decision in CIT vs The Salem Agricultural Producers Co-Operative Marketing Society Ltd, held that a cooperative society is entitled to the benefit under section 80P(2)(d). Consequently, the Tribunal ruled that the assessee society is entitled to a deduction of Rs. 14,69,611/- for the interest income earned from investments with Cooperative Banks. The finding of the learned CIT(A) was reversed, and the grounds of appeal raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's appeal was directed against the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC, which had dismissed the assessee's appeal concerning the penalty of Rs.1,41,910/-. The Tribunal noted that no one appeared for the assessee despite service of notices, and no adjournment application was filed. The Tribunal observed that on previous occasions also, no one had appeared for the assessee. After hearing the Learned DR and perusing the record, the Tribunal found that the AO had made an addition of Rs.2,28,562/- on account of bogus deductions and imposed a penalty of Rs.1,41,910/-. The CIT(A)/NFAC had dismissed the assessee's appeal. The Tribunal found the CIT(A)/NFAC's order to be well-reasoned and speaking. Since no material was brought to the Tribunal's notice to take a view contrary to that of the CIT(A)/NFAC, the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC was upheld. The appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed.
The ITAT, in the larger interest of justice and without delving into the merits of the case, decided to set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) dated 09.03.2026. The Tribunal remitted all the issues raised in the appeal back to the file of the CIT(A) for necessary adjudication. To ensure compliance, the assessee was directed to update their correct email and postal addresses on record with the CIT(A) and the ITBA Portal, remain vigilant in tracking appellate proceedings, file all relevant details and documents upon receiving hearing notices, and refrain from seeking adjournments unless for a reasonable cause. The CIT(A) was directed to adjudicate the appeal afresh after granting the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The effective grounds of appeal raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal dismissed the grounds of appeal raised by the Revenue. The Tribunal noted that Form 10B was filed belatedly, but the delay had been condoned. Furthermore, the assessee had made mistakes in furnishing the Income Tax Return, declaring expenses of Rs. 2,22,34,901/- as revenue expenses and Rs. 92,02,468/- as capital expenses. When these expenses were considered along with the gross receipts, the application of income exceeded the receipts for the year, indicating nil income. Therefore, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the finding of the Ld. Addl/JCIT(A), Gwalior, who had directed the Assessing Officer to grant exemption under section 11 of the Act. The ratio decidendi is that if the delay in filing Form 10B is condoned and the assessee demonstrates that application of income exceeds receipts, exemption under section 11 should be granted. The appeal of the Revenue was dismissed.
The Tribunal noted that it is an admitted fact that the assessee had not filed a return of income under section 139(1) for AY 2016-17. A notice under section 148 was issued based on information regarding cash deposits. While the assessee did not file the return within 30 days of the section 148 notice, the Tribunal found that the assessee had indeed filed a return on March 9, 2022, and provided a copy along with a reply to the AO on March 10, 2022, as evidenced by the e-acknowledgement. These facts were not rebutted by the revenue. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed that the show cause notice was issued on March 29, 2022, and the assessment order was passed on March 30, 2022, indicating insufficient time for the assessee to respond. In light of these procedural irregularities, the Tribunal set aside the assessment order and remanded the matter to the AO for de-novo adjudication, directing the AO to provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee and for the assessee to furnish necessary documents. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were void ab initio and bad in law. Following the Bombay High Court's decision in Narendra Kumar Shah vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, the Tribunal quashed the notice under Section 148. The reasoning was that the reopening was based on incorrect information belonging to another assessee, and the entire transactions (cash and transfer) were considered for reopening, whereas transfer entries pertained to explained sources. The sources of cash deposits of Rs. 9,40,000/- were successfully explained before the CIT(A)/NFAC, who erred in not accepting them and instead restoring the matter to the AO. On merits, the addition of Rs. 9,40,000/- was also contested and explained. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)/NFAC's order, directed the AO to delete the addition of Rs. 9,40,000/-, and accept the income returned by the assessee. The grounds of appeal were allowed.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal by quashing the notice dated 28.07.2022 issued under Section 148 of the IT Act as being barred by limitation under Section 149(1)(b). The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in UOI vs. Rajeev Bansal and the Delhi High Court's decision in Ram Balram Buildhome (P.) Ltd. v. ITO, which held that the notice issued under Section 148 was time-barred. The Tribunal reasoned that the remaining period for the AO to issue the notice under Section 148, after considering the exclusions and the time taken for proceedings under Section 148A, had expired. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings and the assessment order dated 22.05.2023 were also quashed as void ab initio. The Tribunal noted that since the primary issue of the validity of the notice was decided in favour of the assessee, the remaining grounds became infructuous and were not adjudicated.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's arguments. It accepted that the assessee had an opening cash balance of Rs. 15,00,000. The Tribunal further held that Rs. 7,50,000 of this amount was deposited prior to the demonetization period, and the remaining Rs. 7,50,000 was deposited during the demonetization period. This latter amount was explained as being sourced from the current year's disclosed income, which included agricultural income. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that the assessee had successfully explained the sources of the Rs. 15 lakh deposit during the demonetization period. The Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the addition of Rs. 15 lakh made under Section 69A. The ratio decidendi is that prior agricultural income, even if not fully disclosed in earlier returns, can form a basis for explaining cash deposits made during demonetization, especially when supported by current year's disclosed income.
The Tribunal held that there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal before it, considering the affidavit filed by the assessee. The Tribunal condoned the delay of 52 days, stating that substantial justice is more important than procedural delay. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the assessee had provided a sufficient cause for the delay of 412 days before the Ld. CIT(A). Consequently, the Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(A) to condone this delay and decide the appeal on its merits. The impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the Ld. CIT(A) for de-novo adjudication on merits, with a direction to provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The ratio is that procedural delays, if sufficiently explained, should not bar substantive justice, and matters should be decided on merits where possible.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(Exemption) had rejected the assessee's application on hyper-technical reasons. It was noted that the assessee had been receiving approval for registration under Section 80G for years together, and copies of relevant certificates were filed in the paper book. The Tribunal found that the registration was rejected solely due to the selection of an incorrect sub-clause without going into the merits of the case. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(Exemption) and remanded the matter back to the Ld. CIT(Exemption) for de-novo adjudication. The Ld. CIT(Exemption) was directed to consider the application under the appropriate sub-clause, ignoring the typographical mistake. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the interest received on enhanced compensation is not taxable under section 56(2)(viii) of the Act. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decision of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court of Bombay in the case of Rupesh Rashmikant Shah (supra), which in turn relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Ghanshyam (HUF) (supra) and the Gujarat High Court's decision in Movaliya Bhikhubhai Balabhai (supra). The reasoning was that interest granted under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act on enhanced compensation is an accretion to the value of the land and forms part of the enhanced compensation itself, thus not falling under the definition of 'interest' as envisaged under section 145A(b) of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal further held that the amendments to section 145A by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, and section 56(2) by the Finance Act, 2009, had no applicability to the facts of the case. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition made on account of interest income. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(E) had rejected the assessee's application on hyper-technical grounds. It was noted that the assessee had been receiving approval for registration under Section 80G for years, and copies of relevant certificates were submitted. The Tribunal found that the registration was rejected solely due to the selection of an incorrect sub-clause without going into the merits of the case. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(E) and remanded the matter back to the Ld. CIT(E) for de-novo adjudication. The Ld. CIT(E) was directed to consider the application under the appropriate sub-clause, ignoring the typographical mistake. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found that the assessee, a State Government employee, could not appear before the AO due to his duties. Regarding the addition, the Tribunal noted the assessee's detailed explanation of the transaction. The assessee initially paid Rs. 2,50,000 in cash, which was returned by the builder's director, who then requested payment through cheque to secure the booking. The assessee subsequently made payments via cheque and NEFT. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's explanation for the source of the Rs. 2,50,000 cash, which was withdrawn from a joint bank account and from past savings. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that no on-money was paid by the assessee and the amount of Rs. 2,50,000 was paid from explained sources. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC and directed the AO to delete the addition of Rs. 2,50,000. The grounds of appeal raised by the assessee were allowed. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's arguments. It accepted that the assessee had an opening cash balance of Rs. 15,00,000. The Tribunal held that Rs. 7,50,000 of this amount was deposited prior to the demonetization period, and the remaining Rs. 7,50,000 was deposited during the demonetization period. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the balance of Rs. 7,50,000 deposited during the demonetization period was explained by the assessee's current year's disclosed income, which included agricultural income. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that the assessee had successfully explained the sources of the Rs. 15 lakh deposit. The ratio decidendi is that cash deposits during demonetization can be explained by a combination of opening cash balance and disclosed current year's income, including agricultural income, even if the entire opening balance is not fully substantiated. The Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the addition of Rs. 15 lakh made under section 69A.
The Tribunal held that the tolerance band of 10% under Section 50C is applicable retrospectively, following the decision of the ITAT Mumbai in Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax Vs. Sunil B Dalal. Therefore, the actual sale consideration of Rs. 74,00,000/- should be considered, leading to a Long Term Capital Gain (LTCG) of Rs. 61,41,220/- after deducting the indexed cost of acquisition. Regarding the Section 54 deduction, the Tribunal respectfully followed the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Commissioner Of Income Tax vs Ravinder Kumar Arora. It was held that the inclusion of the father's name in the joint purchase of the new flat does not disentitle the assessee from claiming the full deduction under Section 54, as the objective of the section is to provide an impetus to house construction and should be interpreted liberally. The Tribunal found no contrary decision from the jurisdictional High Court. Consequently, the assessee is eligible for deduction under Section 54 on the entire amount of purchase.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed this was a unique business activity for the year, with no prior or subsequent similar engagements. Considering the totality of facts and the assessee's request to substantiate its grounds before the CIT(A)/NFAC, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC. The matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh decision. The CIT(A)/NFAC was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee, verify sales bills, relevant materials, and agreements. The assessee was directed to respond to notices and produce evidence to support its claim that the transaction was a normal business transaction covered under Section 44AD and not professional services under Section 44ADA, especially since TDS was deducted under Section 194J. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The issue of the Rs. 30,835 addition was implicitly part of the remand.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's counsel fairly admitted that some legal issues were raised for the first time before the Tribunal and some issues were not adjudicated by the CIT(A). The Revenue had no objection if these issues were admitted and restored to the file of the CIT(A). The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had summarily dismissed the assessee's appeal without dealing with crucial legal grounds related to the validity of the notice under section 148 and order under section 148A(d) being issued by the Jurisdictional AO instead of the Faceless Assessing Officer, and the alleged mechanical grant of approval under section 151. The Tribunal found that new legal issues were raised before it, which went to the root of the matter and did not require fresh investigation, thus admitting them in light of the Hon'ble Apex Court's judgment in National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had not adjudicated some legal issues raised before it. Citing the Delhi High Court's judgment in Divine Infracon Pvt. Ltd. Vs PCIT, the Tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction to decide grounds not arising from the impugned order of the first appellate authority. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and allowed the grounds of appeal for statistical purposes, remitting the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for necessary adjudication of all issues. The assessee was directed to provide updated contact details and remain vigilant. No specific finding was given on the additions made under sections 56(2)(vii)(b) and 69.
The Tribunal held that the order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) was incorrect in confirming the addition of Rs. 6,73,331/-. The Tribunal found that the total interest on the joint FDR was Rs. 10,96,489/-, as confirmed by a certificate from Janta Sahakari Bank Ltd. Of this, 50% pertaining to the assessee amounted to Rs. 5,48,245/-, which had already been disclosed by the assessee in his return of income. Additionally, other interest income of Rs. 1,25,088/- was also disclosed by the assessee. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee's son, Gopal Radhakishan Brijwasi, had disclosed an amount of Rs. 5,69,281/- in his return of income, which included the Rs. 5,48,245/- interest from the joint FDR. Therefore, the addition of Rs. 6,73,331/- was deemed inappropriate as the income was either disclosed by the assessee or his son. The Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition. The grounds of appeal raised by the assessee were allowed. The principle applied is that income should be taxed in the hands of the rightful owner, and mere procedural anomalies in TDS certificates cannot override substantive tax compliance and established ownership. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The Tribunal, considering the rival submissions and the material on record, noted that the CIT(A) had passed an ex-parte order due to the assessee's non-compliance with notices despite adequate opportunities. However, the Tribunal acknowledged that there could be various reasons for non-appearance or non-compliance, which should not be overruled. In the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to provide the assessee with one more opportunity to substantiate their case with evidence and information. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the disputed issue was remitted back to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication afresh. The assessee is to be provided with adequate opportunity of hearing and must cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal are allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessee fulfilled the conditions for claiming deduction under Section 54F of the Income Tax Act. The Joint Development Agreement clearly indicated that the assessee, as a co-owner, was to receive an area of 483 sq.ft. carpet area, establishing that no monetary consideration was received, but only a residential property in lieu thereof. The Tribunal also noted that the benefit of cost of acquisition/indexed cost of acquisition had not been given to the assessee, despite the property being acquired in 1984 and transferred in 2017. Considering these factual aspects, the Tribunal allowed the deduction under Section 54F and deleted the addition made by the Assessing Officer. The grounds of appeal raised by the assessee were allowed. The Tribunal did not explicitly address the issue of undisclosed salary income or the procedural ground regarding the opportunity of hearing, but the overall allowance of the appeal implies these were implicitly resolved in favor of the assessee or rendered moot by the allowance of the Section 54F claim.
The Tribunal considered the rival submissions and the material on record. The assessee had filed an application for approval under Section 80G and complied with notices issued by the CIT (Exemption). The assessee admitted to having mistakenly mentioned the incorrect code (Section 80G(5)(vi)(iv)) instead of the correct one (Section 80G(5)(vi)(i) or (iii)). The assessee also emphasized that its activities are charitable and argued that the CIT (Exemption) rejected the application mechanically without examining the genuineness and substantive merits. The Tribunal, considering the principle of natural justice, decided to provide the assessee with one more opportunity to substantiate its case with evidence and information. Accordingly, the order of the CIT (Exemption) was set aside, and the application was to be considered de novo. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the appeal filed by the Revenue is not maintainable. The Tribunal noted that while the Revenue argued the appeal fell under exceptions 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) of CBDT Circular No. 5/2024 due to challenges to Section 147A, the issue before the CIT(A) was primarily related to Section 151A and the validity of the Section 148 notice. The CIT(A) had allowed the appeal on both legal grounds (jurisdiction to issue notice u/s 148) and on merits (deletion of additions under Section 69A, allowing telescoping benefit, and deleting interest income). Since the CIT(A) decided the appeal on merits, and the tax effect was admittedly below the monetary limit, the Revenue's contention regarding exceptions to the circular was not accepted. The Tribunal found no merit in the Revenue's argument that the appeal fell under any exceptions of the CBDT Circular. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should have adopted a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach while considering the assessee's application for condonation of delay. Citing the Supreme Court judgments in B. Madhuri Goud and MST Katiji, the Tribunal emphasized that technical considerations should not be given undue weight when substantial justice is paramount. The Tribunal found that the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was supported by sufficient cause, considering the assessee's explanation of lack of knowledge and guidance. Consequently, the Tribunal condoned the delay. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the disputed issues were remitted back to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication afresh. The assessee was to be provided with an adequate opportunity of hearing and was directed to cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The decision in ITA No. 3127/PUN/2026 was applied mutatis mutandis to ITA Nos. 3129 & 3130/PUN/2026.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. While acknowledging that the assessee had mistakenly filed the application under the wrong section (u/sec12A(1)(ac)(vi)(A) instead of u/sec12A(1)(ac)(ii)(B)), the Tribunal noted that the CIT (Exemption) rejected the application without examining the genuineness of activities and substantive merits. Adhering to the principles of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to provide the assessee with one more opportunity to substantiate its case. Consequently, the order of the CIT (Exemption) was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the CIT (Exemption) for de novo consideration of the applications as per the law. The ground of appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the failure to provide a personal hearing through video conferencing, when requested by the assessee, constitutes a violation of the principles of natural justice. This was based on the Hon'ble Madras High Court's decision in C. Chellamuthu Vs. Principal Commissioner[NFAC] and the Hon'ble Bombay High Court's decision in Pico Capital Private Limited Vs. Dy. CIT, which held that providing a hearing through video conferencing upon an assessee's request is mandatory. For AY 2018-19, the assessment order was set aside to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication after providing an opportunity of hearing to the assessee. For AY 2022-23, the order of the Ld. CIT(A) was set aside to the Ld. CIT(A) for de novo adjudication after providing an opportunity of hearing. The ratio decidendi is that a denial of a requested video conference hearing is a breach of natural justice, requiring a fresh adjudication. Both appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's arguments. It noted that the total additions to fixed assets as per the books of account (Rs. 1,13,16,720/-) exceeded the amount found in the impounded documents (Rs. 36,52,638/-). Furthermore, the assessee's counsel substantiated that all entries from the seized material had already been incorporated into the regular books of account. Consequently, the Tribunal held that no addition was warranted solely based on the partner's statement during the survey proceedings, in the absence of any other evidence demonstrating that renovation expenses were incurred but not recorded. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the AO was directed to delete the addition. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's arguments. It noted that the profit of Rs.28,35,750 on account of the sale of the flat was declared by the partner, Shri Kumarpal Roopchand Bora, in his return, instead of in the firm's name. While the addition was rightly taxed in the hands of the firm as per the Tribunal's earlier order, it was an admitted fact that the tax rates for the partner and the firm were the same. Since the partner inadvertently paid the tax in his hands instead of the firm's, there was no loss to the revenue. Citing the Supreme Court decision in CIT vs. Reliance Petroproducts (P) Ltd., the Tribunal held that a mere claim not sustainable in law does not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that this was not a fit case for levying penalty under Section 271(1)(c). The order of the CIT(A)/NFAC was set aside, and the AO was directed to cancel the penalty. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal considered the rival submissions, the material on record, and the principle of natural justice. It noted that the assessee had filed an application for approval under Section 80G and had complied with the notices issued by the CIT (Exemption). The assessee admitted to mistakenly mentioning the incorrect code (80G(5)(vi)(iv) instead of 80G(5)(vi)(i) or (iii)) in the application and emphasized that its activities were charitable. The assessee requested an opportunity to substantiate its claim. The Tribunal, in the interest of natural justice, decided to grant the assessee one more opportunity to present its case with evidence and information. Accordingly, the order of the CIT (Exemption) was set aside, and the application was to be considered de novo. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal partially allowed the Revenue's appeal for statistical purposes. Regarding the additions under sections 69 and 69A (grounds 1, 2, 3, and 4), the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion. It found that the investments were made out of the sale proceeds of Eternus Solutions Pvt. Ltd. shares (Rs. 58,52,72,304/-) and salary income, which were reflected in the bank statements and offered to tax as long-term capital gains. Therefore, the AO's additions were unjustified. For the deduction under section 54F (grounds 5 to 8), the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had deleted the addition based on a bank confirmation letter not produced before the AO, violating Rule 46A(3). Consequently, the issue was restored to the AO for verification and decision after providing the assessee an opportunity to be heard. For the disallowance of exemption under section 10(5) (grounds 9 and 10), the Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s order cryptic and restored the issue to the AO to allow the assessee an opportunity to substantiate the claim for Leave Travel Allowance and decide accordingly. The Tribunal dismissed the general ground.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) erred in confirming the additions without referring to the remand report submitted by the AO. Regarding the unsecured loan of Rs. 30,00,000/- from Shri Shirish A Hivale, the Tribunal noted that the AO, in the remand report, accepted that the genuineness of the loan was proven, citing the retirement-cum-admission deed and bank statements. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete this addition. Similarly, for the current liability of Rs. 30,00,000/- towards Mr. Ramchandra Dagdu More, the Tribunal observed that the AO had verified the details and was satisfied, as stated in the remand report. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete this addition. Concerning the TDR purchases of Rs. 51,86,760/-, the Tribunal found that the AO had factually verified all the facts and was satisfied with the expenditure in the remand report, noting the submission of the TDR agreement and its utilization for a specific project. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete this addition as well. The ratio decidendi is that appellate authorities must consider and give due weight to remand reports where the Assessing Officer has verified and accepted the assessee's contentions.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, upholding the order of the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC. The Tribunal held that the primary purpose of maintaining separate books of account is to enable the AO to verify the correct computation of deduction. In the present era of technological evolution, where entities maintain records on Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems like SAP, old notions of physically separate ledgers are outdated. If separate accounts relatable to a particular unit or undertaking are discernible and can be generated from the system, it constitutes sufficient compliance. The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided overwhelming evidence, including profit and loss accounts and balance sheets, which demonstrated that correct profits could be deduced at any time for the eligible undertaking. This view was supported by decisions in SMR Builders and the High Courts of Patna, Karnataka, Calcutta, and Bombay, which held that common management or maintenance of common books of account does not per se deny deduction if the investment or profit can be reasonably determined from available material. Therefore, the Tribunal rejected the AO's contention that separate books were not maintained and held that the assessee had maintained separate books from which correct profit could be deduced. The Ld. CIT(A)'s order was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the denial of exemption under Section 11 of the Act was not justified. The Tribunal noted that Form 10B was filed on 30.03.2021, which was prior to the processing of the return under Section 143(1) on 24.12.2021. Furthermore, the assessee had obtained an order for condonation of delay in filing Form 10B under Section 119(2)(b) dated 21.08.2026, which was fairly accepted by the Revenue. The Tribunal followed the ratio of various judicial precedents, including decisions of the Gujarat High Court, which held that the delay in filing Form 10B is a procedural default and should not disentitle the assessee from claiming exemption under Section 11, provided other conditions are met and the form is available during assessment proceedings. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to grant the benefit of exemption under Section 11. The issue of the merits of the claim for exemption under Section 11 was expressly left undecided, with the appeal being allowed solely on the legal principle regarding the delay in filing Form 10B.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was duly registered under Section 12AA of the Act. For AY 2021-22, the provisions of Section 12AB were not applicable. Therefore, the Centralized Processing Center (CPC) erred in rejecting the exemption solely on the basis of not having new registration details under Section 12AB. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the CBDT had condoned the delay in filing Form 10B vide its order dated 23.09.2026. In light of these facts, the Tribunal directed the AO to allow the exemption to the assessee as claimed in the return of income. The grounds of appeal raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal allowed Ground No. 1, holding that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act dated 26.07.2022 for AY 2015-16 is bad in law and deserves to be quashed. This decision was based on the concession made by the Revenue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal, wherein it was stated that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA). The Tribunal also relied on decisions of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Cherian Nallathu Abraham Annamma and other coordinate benches of the ITAT. Consequently, the reassessment order was deemed void-ab-initio. Since the appeal was allowed on this legal ground, the other grounds (Ground No. 2 and Ground No. 3) were dismissed as un-adjudicated and academic in nature. The operative direction was to quash the notice and the consequential reassessment order.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 61 days in filing the appeal, finding that the assessee had explained the reasonable cause for the delay and the Revenue did not have specific objections. The appeal was admitted. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal noted that the assessee had challenged the ex-parte order of the CIT(A)/NFAC. However, the provided text of the judgment is incomplete and cuts off before the Tribunal's decision on the merits of the appeal or the validity of the ex-parte order. Therefore, the finding on the substantive issue and the operative directions are not recorded in the provided excerpt. The Tribunal's decision on the validity of the assessment and the additions made by the A.O. remains undecided in this portion of the judgment.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's arguments. It acknowledged that the assessee's object was education, its receipts were applied for educational purposes, and it was substantially financed by the government. The Tribunal noted that the denial of exemption was based solely on a technical mistake in mentioning the wrong sub-section of Section 10(23C) in the return of income, despite the substantive conditions for exemption being fulfilled. The Tribunal also considered that the assessee had been allowed exemption under Section 10(23C) in AY 2015-16 and subsequent years. Furthermore, all necessary details supporting the exemption claim were available with the Revenue. Citing the decision in M/s. D. Banumaiah's Educational Institutions vs. ITO, the Tribunal held that the exemption claim should not be denied on technical grounds when substantive conditions are met. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the ADDL/JCIT(A) and directed the AO to grant exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Act to the assessee.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's arguments. It was acknowledged that the assessee maintained proper books of account, audited under Section 44AB, with no defects pointed out by the auditors. The AO had not rejected the book results but made ad-hoc disallowances. A comparative analysis showed an increase in aggregate expenses as a percentage of turnover from 14.66% in AY 2021-22 to 20.90% in AY 2022-23. Concurrently, there was a substantial increase in the average prices of petrol, diesel, and LPG during the financial year 2021-22 compared to 2020-21. Therefore, the Tribunal considered the ad-hoc disallowance of 5% of fuel and transportation expenses unjustified. However, acknowledging the possibility of leakage in expenses due to lack of details to the AO's satisfaction, the Tribunal modified the disallowance. An ad-hoc disallowance of Rs. 5,00,000/- was deemed to meet the ends of justice, as against the total disallowance of Rs. 13,37,308/- for fuel expenses and Rs. 2,31,21,960/- for transportation expenses. The order of the CIT(A)/NFAC was modified accordingly.
The Tribunal held that the CIT (Exemption) had rejected the assessee's application without providing a proper opportunity of hearing on the specific issue of the incorrect code mentioned. Considering the facts, circumstances, and the principle of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to provide one more opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its case with evidence and information. Consequently, the order of the CIT (Exemption) was set aside, and the application was to be considered de novo (afresh) as per the law. The ground of appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the application itself, but rather on the procedural fairness of the rejection.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 85 days in filing the appeals, finding sufficient cause based on the assessee's explanation and relying on the Supreme Court judgments in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. Regarding the quantum of Net Profit, the Tribunal noted that the assessee's own submissions before the NFAC and in the remand report indicated a gross profit rate of 8% to 10% after considering logistics and other expenses. However, the Tribunal found that the Net Profit rate was not 8% as held by the NFAC, nor 1% as claimed by the assessee. To meet the ends of justice, the Tribunal applied a Net Profit rate of 4% on the alleged cash deposits, granting part relief to the assessee. For AY 2010-11, the income was computed at Rs. 3,63,300/- (4% of cash deposits), and for AY 2012-13, it was Rs. 3,02,700/-. Consequently, the grounds of appeal on quantum were partly allowed. Concerning the penalty under section 271(1)(c) for AY 2012-13, the Tribunal distinguished the present case from situations where penalty is not leviable on estimated profits. It held that since the assessee did not file regular returns or maintain books of account, and had huge cash deposits, penalty was leviable. However, the penalty was to be calculated only on the income sustained by the Tribunal, i.e., 4% of the alleged cash deposits. The penalty was thus restricted to the tax payable on Rs. 3,02,700/-, and the remaining penalty was deleted. The grounds of appeal on penalty were also partly allowed.
The Tribunal decided both issues in favour of the assessee. On the first issue, concerning the addition under Section 68, the Tribunal noted that the assessee is a Co-operative Credit Society and had filed the list of members along with their addresses and PAN who deposited the cash. The AO's only contention was that the assessee accepted de-monetized currency, which was not a specific ground for addition under Section 68. The Tribunal found that the assessee had fulfilled its onus by providing the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the depositors. The Tribunal followed the decision in Gangagiri Maharaj Betsarala Mahila Nagari Patsanstha Ltd. Vs. ITO (ITA No. 1418/PUN/2025) where similar additions were deleted. On the second issue, regarding the deduction under Section 80P, the Tribunal referred to various High Court decisions, including the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, Kerala High Court in Pr.CIT Vs. Sahyadri Co-operative Credit Society Ltd., and Telangana High Court in Ismailia Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. Vs. ACIT. These judgments held that interest income earned by a Co-operative Credit Society from deposits made with banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) as it is attributable to its principal business of providing credit facilities. The Tribunal also noted similar views from ITAT Pune Bench. The revenue's relied-upon decisions were distinguished. Consequently, the addition of Rs. 3,80,340/- was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal allowed the grounds of appeal related to the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) and the consequent confirmation by the CIT(A). The Tribunal noted that similar grounds in ITA No. 3423/PUN/2026 had already been decided in favour of the assessee. Following the same reasoning, the grounds of appeal No. 1 to 9 (for ITA No. 3423/PUN/2026) and grounds No. 1 to 8 (for ITA No. 3424/PUN/2026) were allowed. This implies the Tribunal found that the assessee's contention regarding the applicability of Section 194IA over 194IC, or that it was a case of short deduction, was accepted, and thus the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) was not warranted. The specific reasoning for allowing these grounds is not detailed in the provided extract, but it is stated that the decision in ITA No. 3423/PUN/2026 was followed. The general grounds of appeal were dismissed. The judgment indicates that the appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes and fully allowed in other cases.
The Tribunal allowed the grounds of appeal related to the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) and the consequent confirmation by the CIT(A). The Tribunal noted that similar grounds in ITA No. 3423/PUN/2026 had already been decided in favour of the assessee. Following the same reasoning, the grounds of appeal No. 1 to 9 (for ITA No. 3423/PUN/2026) and grounds No. 1 to 8 (for ITA No. 3424/PUN/2026) were allowed. This implies the Tribunal found that the assessee's contention regarding the applicability of Section 194IA over 194IC, or that it was a case of short deduction, was accepted, and thus the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) was not warranted. The specific reasoning for allowing these grounds is not detailed in the provided extract, but it is stated that the decision in ITA No. 3423/PUN/2026 was followed. The general grounds of appeal were dismissed. The judgment indicates that the appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes and fully allowed in other cases.
The Tribunal allowed the grounds of appeal related to the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) and the consequent confirmation by the CIT(A). The Tribunal noted that similar grounds in ITA No. 3423/PUN/2026 had already been decided in favour of the assessee. Following the same reasoning, the grounds of appeal No. 1 to 9 (for ITA No. 3423/PUN/2026) and grounds No. 1 to 8 (for ITA No. 3424/PUN/2026) were allowed. This implies the Tribunal found that the assessee's contention regarding the applicability of Section 194IA over 194IC, or that it was a case of short deduction, was accepted, and thus the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) was not warranted. The specific reasoning for allowing these grounds is not detailed in the provided extract, but it is stated that the decision in ITA No. 3423/PUN/2026 was followed. The general grounds of appeal were dismissed. The judgment indicates that the appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes and fully allowed in other cases.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 70 days in filing the appeal, relying on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. The Tribunal noted that the assessee is a senior citizen and a retired government employee and found the delay to be for a 'reasonable cause', neither deliberate nor intentional. Furthermore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the impugned ex-parte order dated 12.01.2026 and restored the issues to the file of the CIT(A) for necessary adjudication as contemplated under Section 250(6) of the Act, after affording a reasonable opportunity to the assessee. The assessee was directed to provide updated contact details and remain vigilant. The effective grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The ITAT held that while the assessee made partial compliance, it failed to effectively pursue the matter before the lower authorities. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) did not accept the additional evidence submitted by the assessee under Rule 46A. Considering the assessee's prayer, the principles of natural justice, and to ensure fairness, the ITAT decided to set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A) and remit all issues back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication under section 250(6) of the Act. The assessee was granted liberty to adduce all supporting documents for cash deposits, withdrawals, and interest income. The CIT(A) was directed to call for a remand report from the AO for admitting additional evidence. The assessee was also directed to provide updated contact details and remain vigilant. The impugned order was set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The ITAT held that there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal before the Tribunal, citing the assessee's affidavit detailing genuine and unavoidable circumstances, including his son's medical condition and family hardships. The Tribunal condoned the delay, prioritizing substantial justice over procedural delay. Regarding the Ld. CIT(A)'s order, the ITAT held that the Ld. CIT(A) was obligated to decide the appeal on merits as per Section 250(6) of the Act. Citing the Bombay High Court's decision in Pr.CIT(Central) Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF), the Tribunal ruled that the Ld. CIT(A) does not have the power to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution. The Ld. CIT(A) must dispose of the appeal by stating points for determination and rendering a decision on each point with reasons. Consequently, the order of the Ld. CIT(A) was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Ld. CIT(A) for de novo adjudication, with a direction to provide the assessee with an opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal allowed the grounds of appeal related to the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) and the consequent confirmation by the CIT(A). The Tribunal noted that similar grounds in ITA No. 3423/PUN/2026 had already been decided in favour of the assessee. Following the same reasoning, the grounds of appeal No. 1 to 9 (for ITA No. 3423/PUN/2026) and grounds No. 1 to 8 (for ITA No. 3424/PUN/2026) were allowed. This implies the Tribunal found that the assessee's contention regarding the applicability of Section 194IA over 194IC, or that it was a case of short deduction, was accepted, and thus the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) was not warranted. The specific reasoning for allowing these grounds is not detailed in the provided extract, but it is stated that the decision in ITA No. 3423/PUN/2026 was followed. The general grounds of appeal were dismissed. The judgment indicates that the appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes and fully allowed in other cases.
The Tribunal held that the Learned CIT(A) had failed to adjudicate the specific legal grounds raised by the assessee. These grounds included the non-applicability of Section 56(2) of the Act due to an earlier sale agreement and the alternative plea for a reference to the DVO. The Tribunal found that the Learned CIT(A) had merely set aside the assessment order to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication without addressing these crucial legal arguments. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Learned CIT(A) and remanded the matter back to the Learned CIT(A) for de-novo adjudication. The Learned CIT(A) was directed to provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee and adjudicate the legal grounds raised. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the facts of the present case are identical to the case of the assessee's brother, Shri Rahul Janardhan Bodke, for the same assessment year, where a similar addition was made. In that case, the Tribunal had restored the issue to the file of the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer with specific directions. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submissions that the land might be rural agricultural land and that the sale consideration could be considered in the hands of Mr. Janardhan Eknath Bodke. The Tribunal also observed that the CIT(A)/NFAC's order was silent on crucial aspects and that the assessee had not filed all requisite documents. Considering the totality of facts and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the AO with a direction to give the assessee one opportunity to substantiate his case by filing requisite details. The AO was directed to decide the issue afresh based on facts and law. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.