ITAT Pune Judgments — October 2026

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 234 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), finding that the assessee had provided a sufficient cause. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy and Collector, Land Acquisition v. MST Katiji & others, emphasizing a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach to condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that technical considerations should not be given undue emphasis when substantial justice is paramount. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the disputed issues were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for adjudication afresh. The assessee was to be provided with an adequate opportunity of hearing and was directed to cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 234 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), finding that the assessee had provided a sufficient cause. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy and Collector, Land Acquisition v. MST Katiji & others, emphasizing a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach to condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that technical considerations should not be given undue emphasis when substantial justice is paramount. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the disputed issues were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for adjudication afresh. The assessee was to be provided with an adequate opportunity of hearing and was directed to cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 234 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), finding that the assessee had provided a sufficient cause. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy and Collector, Land Acquisition v. MST Katiji & others, emphasizing a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach to condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that technical considerations should not be given undue emphasis when substantial justice is paramount. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the disputed issues were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for adjudication afresh. The assessee was to be provided with an adequate opportunity of hearing and was directed to cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 234 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), finding that the assessee had provided a sufficient cause. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy and Collector, Land Acquisition v. MST Katiji & others, emphasizing a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach to condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that technical considerations should not be given undue emphasis when substantial justice is paramount. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the disputed issues were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for adjudication afresh. The assessee was to be provided with an adequate opportunity of hearing and was directed to cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the rejection of the application for regular registration by the CIT(Exemption) was based on the assessee selecting the wrong sub-clause. The Tribunal found that this was an inadvertent mistake and that the assessee had explained the facts and prayed for correction. Citing a coordinate bench decision in Shree Swaminarayan Gadi Trust Vadtal (SVG) Vs. CIT (Exemptions), Ahmedabad, the Tribunal held that a mistake in filing an entry was not fatal and could be considered in the appropriate sub-clause. The Tribunal reasoned that in the interest of natural justice and fairness, the assessee should be given an opportunity to rectify the defect. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the CIT(Exemption) to grant an opportunity to the assessee to file the correct application and decide the case on merits denovo. Since the issue of regular registration was remitted, the issue of 80G approval was also remitted for necessary adjudication. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the application for registration or approval.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 234 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), finding that the assessee had provided a sufficient cause. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy and Collector, Land Acquisition v. MST Katiji & others, emphasizing a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach to condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that technical considerations should not be given undue emphasis when substantial justice is paramount. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the disputed issues were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for adjudication afresh. The assessee was to be provided with an adequate opportunity of hearing and was directed to cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 234 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), finding that the assessee had provided a sufficient cause. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy and Collector, Land Acquisition v. MST Katiji & others, emphasizing a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach to condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that technical considerations should not be given undue emphasis when substantial justice is paramount. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the disputed issues were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for adjudication afresh. The assessee was to be provided with an adequate opportunity of hearing and was directed to cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal noted the assessee's contention that out of total credit entries of Rs. 78,75,989/-, Rs. 50,44,766/- related to business turnover. The remaining Rs. 28,31,223/- pertained to commission income, down payments transferred to principals, unsecured loans from identifiable sources, credit card/EMI reversals, inter-bank transfers, LIC maturity, and car sale. However, the assessee could not produce concrete evidence for these claims, leading the CIT(A) to dismiss the appeal. Finding some force in the assessee's arguments and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh assessment, with a direction to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing and to pass an order as per facts and law. The assessee was directed to cooperate and produce necessary evidence without adjournment. The effective grounds were allowed for statistical purposes. Other grounds were rendered academic. The ratio decidendi is that where an assessee provides explanations for certain credit entries, even if not fully substantiated with concrete evidence at the appellate stage, and the revenue's assessment is based on a broad addition, remanding the matter for fresh consideration by the AO with an opportunity to the assessee to produce evidence is a just course of action, especially when jurisdictional issues are also raised.

The Tribunal held that the rejection of the application for regular registration by the CIT(Exemption) was based on the assessee selecting the wrong sub-clause. The Tribunal found that this was an inadvertent mistake and that the assessee had explained the facts and prayed for correction. Citing a coordinate bench decision in Shree Swaminarayan Gadi Trust Vadtal (SVG) Vs. CIT (Exemptions), Ahmedabad, the Tribunal held that a mistake in filing an entry was not fatal and could be considered in the appropriate sub-clause. The Tribunal reasoned that in the interest of natural justice and fairness, the assessee should be given an opportunity to rectify the defect. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the CIT(Exemption) to grant an opportunity to the assessee to file the correct application and decide the case on merits denovo. Since the issue of regular registration was remitted, the issue of 80G approval was also remitted for necessary adjudication. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the application for registration or approval.

The Tribunal held that the appeal should be dismissed as withdrawn. The reasoning was based on the assessee's submission that the present appeal was a duplicate filing, with a prior appeal already filed for the same assessment year and pending for hearing. The assessee's counsel explicitly stated that the filing was inadvertent and sought permission to withdraw the appeal. The revenue representative did not object to this request. Therefore, in light of the assessee's voluntary request for withdrawal due to duplication and the absence of any objection from the revenue, the Tribunal acceded to the request. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. No other issues were decided.

The Tribunal held that the notice issued under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2017-18 is bad in law on two grounds. Firstly, concerning section 149(1), the Tribunal noted that the alleged escapement of income was Rs. 20,79,463/-, which is less than Rs. 50 lakh. Since more than three years had elapsed from the end of the assessment year, and the escapement did not fall under the exceptions requiring Rs. 50 lakh or more, the notice could not be issued under section 148. Secondly, regarding section 151, the notice dated 20.07.2022 for AY 2017-18 was approved by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax on 14.07.2022. However, as more than three years had elapsed from the end of the assessment year, the approval should have been obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax or Chief Commissioner of Income Tax. The Tribunal found support from the ITAT, Pune's decision in Mahesh Gokuldas Fulwani Vs. ITO. Consequently, the reassessment order was held to be void-ab-initio. The legal ground raised by the assessee was allowed. The grounds related to additions were dismissed as academic. The appeal was partly allowed.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 234 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), finding that the assessee had provided a sufficient cause. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy and Collector, Land Acquisition v. MST Katiji & others, emphasizing a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach to condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that technical considerations should not be given undue emphasis when substantial justice is paramount. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the disputed issues were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for adjudication afresh. The assessee was to be provided with an adequate opportunity of hearing and was directed to cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 234 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), finding that the assessee had provided a sufficient cause. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy and Collector, Land Acquisition v. MST Katiji & others, emphasizing a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach to condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that technical considerations should not be given undue emphasis when substantial justice is paramount. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the disputed issues were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for adjudication afresh. The assessee was to be provided with an adequate opportunity of hearing and was directed to cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 234 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), finding that the assessee had provided a sufficient cause. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy and Collector, Land Acquisition v. MST Katiji & others, emphasizing a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach to condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that technical considerations should not be given undue emphasis when substantial justice is paramount. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the disputed issues were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for adjudication afresh. The assessee was to be provided with an adequate opportunity of hearing and was directed to cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 234 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), finding that the assessee had provided a sufficient cause. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy and Collector, Land Acquisition v. MST Katiji & others, emphasizing a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach to condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that technical considerations should not be given undue emphasis when substantial justice is paramount. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the disputed issues were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for adjudication afresh. The assessee was to be provided with an adequate opportunity of hearing and was directed to cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 234 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), finding that the assessee had provided a sufficient cause. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy and Collector, Land Acquisition v. MST Katiji & others, emphasizing a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach to condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that technical considerations should not be given undue emphasis when substantial justice is paramount. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the disputed issues were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for adjudication afresh. The assessee was to be provided with an adequate opportunity of hearing and was directed to cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 234 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), finding that the assessee had provided a sufficient cause. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy and Collector, Land Acquisition v. MST Katiji & others, emphasizing a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach to condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that technical considerations should not be given undue emphasis when substantial justice is paramount. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the disputed issues were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for adjudication afresh. The assessee was to be provided with an adequate opportunity of hearing and was directed to cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal, considering the submissions and the record, observed that the assessments were framed under Section 153C based on information found during a search. The assessee had partially complied with the notices issued by the CIT(A). The Tribunal, in the larger interest of justice and to be fair to both parties, decided to remit all the issues raised in the batch of appeals for assessment years 2014-15 to 2019-20 back to the file of the learned CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The assessee was also directed to remain vigilant and not seek adjournments unless for a reasonable cause. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The operative direction was to remand the matter to the CIT(A).

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, noting that the assessee had explained a reasonable cause in its affidavit and the Ld. DR had no specific objections. Regarding the substantive appeal, the Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal ex-parte due to the assessee's non-compliance, despite providing ample opportunities. However, the Tribunal acknowledged that there could be various reasons for non-appearance or non-compliance and that principles of natural justice should be considered. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remit the disputed issues back to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication afresh. The assessee is to be provided with an adequate opportunity of hearing and is expected to cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal are allowed for statistical purposes. No specific finding was made on the merits of the Section 80JJAA deduction claim.

The Tribunal, considering the submissions and the record, observed that the assessments were framed under Section 153C based on information found during a search. The assessee had partially complied with the notices issued by the CIT(A). The Tribunal, in the larger interest of justice and to be fair to both parties, decided to remit all the issues raised in the batch of appeals for assessment years 2014-15 to 2019-20 back to the file of the learned CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The assessee was also directed to remain vigilant and not seek adjournments unless for a reasonable cause. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The operative direction was to remand the matter to the CIT(A).

The Tribunal, considering the submissions and the record, observed that the assessments were framed under Section 153C based on information found during a search. The assessee had partially complied with the notices issued by the CIT(A). The Tribunal, in the larger interest of justice and to be fair to both parties, decided to remit all the issues raised in the batch of appeals for assessment years 2014-15 to 2019-20 back to the file of the learned CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The assessee was also directed to remain vigilant and not seek adjournments unless for a reasonable cause. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The operative direction was to remand the matter to the CIT(A).

The Tribunal, considering the submissions and the record, observed that the assessments were framed under Section 153C based on information found during a search. The assessee had partially complied with the notices issued by the CIT(A). The Tribunal, in the larger interest of justice and to be fair to both parties, decided to remit all the issues raised in the batch of appeals for assessment years 2014-15 to 2019-20 back to the file of the learned CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The assessee was also directed to remain vigilant and not seek adjournments unless for a reasonable cause. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The operative direction was to remand the matter to the CIT(A).

The Tribunal, considering the submissions and the record, observed that the assessments were framed under Section 153C based on information found during a search. The assessee had partially complied with the notices issued by the CIT(A). The Tribunal, in the larger interest of justice and to be fair to both parties, decided to remit all the issues raised in the batch of appeals for assessment years 2014-15 to 2019-20 back to the file of the learned CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The assessee was also directed to remain vigilant and not seek adjournments unless for a reasonable cause. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The operative direction was to remand the matter to the CIT(A).

The Tribunal, considering the submissions and the record, observed that the assessments were framed under Section 153C based on information found during a search. The assessee had partially complied with the notices issued by the CIT(A). The Tribunal, in the larger interest of justice and to be fair to both parties, decided to remit all the issues raised in the batch of appeals for assessment years 2014-15 to 2019-20 back to the file of the learned CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The assessee was also directed to remain vigilant and not seek adjournments unless for a reasonable cause. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The operative direction was to remand the matter to the CIT(A).

The Tribunal held that there was no sufficient cause for the inordinate delay of 827 days in filing the appeal. Applying the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee, the Tribunal noted that inordinate delay warrants a strict approach. The assessee's conduct was consistently non-compliant, both before the AO and the CIT(A). The reason provided for the delay, the father's illness, was vague and unsupported by any evidence such as a medical certificate. The Tribunal found the explanation to be insufficient to condone the significant delay. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed on the grounds of delay, without delving into the merits of the assessment order. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, stating that substantial justice is more important than procedural delay. On the substantive issues, the Tribunal noted that the assessee is a Co-operative Credit Society engaged in providing credit facilities to its members. The AO had disallowed the deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) on interest income of Rs. 22,08,616/-. The Tribunal, after perusing various decisions, including the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Karnataka State Co-operative Apex Bank, the Andhra Pradesh and Telangana High Court in Vavveru Co-operative Rural Bank Ltd., and the Kerala High Court in Pr.CIT Vs. Sahyadri Co-operative Credit Society Ltd., held that interest earned by a Co-operative Credit Society registered under the state cooperative society Act, from funds deposited with a Cooperative Bank or Bank, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. The Tribunal also referred to similar views taken by ITAT Pune Bench. The Tribunal found the facts of the present case identical to the precedents. Therefore, the AO was directed to delete the addition. Ground No. 2 was allowed, making other grounds academic. The appeal was partly allowed.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obligated to decide an appeal on its merits and does not possess the power to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution. This conclusion is based on the Hon'ble Bombay High Court's decision in Pr.CIT(Central) Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF). The High Court's ruling emphasizes that Section 250(4) and 250(6) of the Act require the CIT(A) to make further inquiries if necessary and dispose of the appeal in writing after stating the points for determination and providing reasons. Section 251(1)(a) and (b) grant the CIT(A) broad powers to confirm, reduce, enhance, or annul an assessment. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) erred by dismissing the appeal solely due to the assessee's non-compliance without examining the substantive issues. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the case was remanded to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication, with a direction to provide the assessee with an opportunity of hearing.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(E)'s order was to be set aside and the matter restored to his file for fresh adjudication. Regarding the first issue, the Tribunal found that while the CIT(E) considered the Prerana Samajik Sanskrutik Bahuddeshiya Shikshan Sanstha decision, the facts of the present case were different. The assessee trust could not demonstrate the same compelling circumstances (like delay in government grants) that necessitated huge loans from the trustee without prior sanction. Furthermore, the assessee's financial statements showed an outstanding loan of Rs. 19,03,800/- for FY 2023-24, contradicting the claim of full repayment. The assessee also failed to clearly inform the Charity Commissioner for post-facto approval. Thus, the Tribunal found that the trust had not come with clean hands. The Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to verify if there was genuine urgency necessitating the loan without prior sanction and if the non-compliance was intentional, to decide afresh as per law. For the second issue, the Tribunal found that the claim of full repayment by 2023 was incorrect as per the balance sheet for FY 2023-24, and the assessee had not clearly sought post-facto approval. Therefore, this ground was dismissed. The appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the Learned CIT(A) erred in restricting the deduction under Section 54F. The Tribunal observed that Section 54F requires the purchase of a new asset within a specified period before or after the transfer of the original asset, which the assessee had complied with by purchasing the flat on 17.12.2020, prior to the sale of the original asset on 24.12.2020. Crucially, the Tribunal noted that the section does not stipulate that the amount received from the sale of the original asset must be exclusively invested in the new asset. Therefore, the AO was directed to allow the assessee the deduction under Section 54F for the entire amount of investment in the new asset, as it exceeded the capital gain. Regarding the addition of Rs. 4,00,000/- on account of cash deposits, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision. It was noted that the assessee failed to provide any documentary evidence to substantiate the source of these deposits and had made contradictory submissions. Since the assessee did not discharge her onus, the addition was confirmed. Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed.

The Tribunal held that the filing of Form 10B, while procedural, must be obtained before the prescribed statutory date. Since the Form 10B in this case was obtained and filed on 20.11.2024, far beyond the due date of 10.01.2021, the assessee's ground regarding the disallowance of exemption u/s 11 for belated filing (Ground 1(a)) was dismissed. However, the Tribunal found merit in the alternative ground (Ground 1(b)) to restrict the addition to net commercial income. Following the decision in Dr. Sukumar J. Magdum Foundation vs. ITO, the Tribunal held that charging tax on gross receipts is not permissible. The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to decide the issue of taxability of net commercial income after verifying expenditure claims and providing an opportunity of hearing. The AO was also directed to verify the claim for exemption u/s 10(23C)(iiiad) and allow whichever claim is more beneficial. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the filing of Form 10B, while procedural, must be obtained before the prescribed statutory date. Since the Form 10B in this case was obtained and filed on 20.11.2024, far beyond the due date of 10.01.2021, the assessee's ground regarding the disallowance of exemption u/s 11 for belated filing (Ground 1(a)) was dismissed. However, the Tribunal found merit in the alternative ground (Ground 1(b)) to restrict the addition to net commercial income. Following the decision in Dr. Sukumar J. Magdum Foundation vs. ITO, the Tribunal held that charging tax on gross receipts is not permissible. The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to decide the issue of taxability of net commercial income after verifying expenditure claims and providing an opportunity of hearing. The AO was also directed to verify the claim for exemption u/s 10(23C)(iiiad) and allow whichever claim is more beneficial. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal, respectfully following the decision of a coordinate bench in *Vir Savarkar Swimmers Club vs. ITO* (ITA No.1462/PUN/2025), found merit in the assessee's arguments. The Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and remanded the matter to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (AO). The AO is directed to examine the assessee's claim regarding the eligibility for revenue expenses incurred out of its receipts, if allowable under the Income Tax Act. Based on this examination, the AO is to determine the taxable income, if any, and pass an order accordingly after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The assessee is also directed to comply with the notices and produce necessary information without seeking adjournments. The Tribunal noted that if the assessee is not eligible for exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiad), the AO should verify the claim of expenditure against gross receipts and modify the assessment. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the filing of Form 10B, while procedural, must be obtained before the prescribed statutory date. Since the Form 10B in this case was obtained and filed on 20.11.2024, far beyond the due date of 10.01.2021, the assessee's ground regarding the disallowance of exemption u/s 11 for belated filing (Ground 1(a)) was dismissed. However, the Tribunal found merit in the alternative ground (Ground 1(b)) to restrict the addition to net commercial income. Following the decision in Dr. Sukumar J. Magdum Foundation vs. ITO, the Tribunal held that charging tax on gross receipts is not permissible. The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to decide the issue of taxability of net commercial income after verifying expenditure claims and providing an opportunity of hearing. The AO was also directed to verify the claim for exemption u/s 10(23C)(iiiad) and allow whichever claim is more beneficial. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal, considering the facts, circumstances, submissions, and the ratio of the judicial decision in the case of Shri Ramtirth Godavari Seva Samiti (ITA No. 2602/PUN/2025), set aside the order of the CIT (Exemption). The Tribunal noted that a proviso was inserted in Section 12A(1)(ac) which empowers the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner to condone delay if there is a reasonable cause. Following this, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the CIT (Exemption) with a direction to condone the delay and decide the application afresh on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The assessee was also directed to respond to notices and furnish documents without seeking adjournments. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated for Assessment Year 2017-18 were invalid. The notices under sections 148A(d) and 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were issued on 26.07.2022, which is more than three years after the end of the assessment year. As per Section 151 of the Act, for issuing notices under Section 148 after three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the approval of the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax or Chief Commissioner of Income Tax is mandatory. In this case, the approval was obtained from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Nashik, which is not the competent authority for cases beyond three years. The Tribunal relied on the decisions of the Coordinate Bench in Siddharth Raikumar Nahar Vs. DCIT, the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in Agnello Oswin Dias Vs. ACIT and Holiday Developers (P.) Ltd, Vs. ITO, and the Hon'ble Madras High Court in Core Logistic Company vs. ACIT. The Tribunal found that the approval obtained was not proper, rendering the notice under section 148A(d) invalid. Consequently, the subsequent assessment proceedings were held to be null and void and without jurisdiction. The Tribunal quashed the consequential reassessment proceedings and set aside the impugned order. Ground No. 3 raised by the assessee was allowed. The remaining grounds were considered academic.

The Tribunal held that the benefit of the proviso to Section 12A(2) of the IT Act can be granted to the assessee if an appeal is pending for any assessment year preceding the year for which registration has been granted under Section 12A. Following the decision in Chhattisgarh Rajya Open School Madhyamik Siksha Mandal, the Tribunal held that an appeal pending before the Tribunal against an order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is a continuation of the original assessment proceedings. Therefore, the registration granted to the assessee operated retrospectively for the relevant years, including AY 2019-20, for which the appeal was pending before the Ld. CIT(A). The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's first ground of appeal. Regarding the second ground, the Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Jute Corpn. of India Ltd. v. CIT, which held that the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) is coterminous with that of the Income Tax Officer (ITO). Thus, the pendency of an appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) can be considered as pendency of assessment proceedings. The Tribunal also cited a coordinate bench decision in Calvary Mennonite Brethren Chruch vs. Income-tax Officer, Exemption, which treated proceedings under Section 143(1) pending before CPC as pendency of assessment proceedings. Consequently, the Tribunal found no error in the Ld. CIT(A)'s order and dismissed the Revenue's second ground of appeal.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, a credit cooperative society, is entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in respect of interest income earned from its investments with other cooperative banks. The Tribunal respectfully followed its previous decisions, including in the assessee's own case for AY 2013-14 and the case of Armed Forces Ex-Officers Multi Services Co-Operative Society, which had distinguished the applicability of Section 80P(4) and the judgment in Totgar's Cooperative Sales Society Ltd. The Tribunal noted that while cooperative banks might not be eligible for deduction under Section 80P due to Section 80P(4), interest income derived by a cooperative society from its investments held with a cooperative bank (which is a cooperative society) is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). Consequently, the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC was set aside, and the Assessing Officer was directed to allow the deduction of Rs. 43,70,081/-. The Tribunal did not specifically address the second and third grounds regarding income calculation and interest under Sections 234A and 234B, implicitly allowing them by allowing the primary deduction which resulted in Nil income.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal. The Tribunal held that the reliance of the Assessing Officer on the case law of Totgar's Co-operative Sales Society Ltd. was not correct. The Tribunal noted that the facts in Totgar's case were different as that assessee was also engaged in the sale of agricultural produce, whereas the present assessee is a credit cooperative society engaged in banking business. The Tribunal followed various decisions, including the jurisdictional Pune ITAT's decision in ITO vs. Shree Ravalnath Cooperative Housing Finance Society Ltd. [2026] 184 taxmann.com 242 (Pune - Trib.), which distinguished Totgar's case. The Tribunal also referred to Supreme Court and High Court judgments (CIT v. Karnataka State Co-operative Apex Bank, Pr. CIT v. Annasaheb Patil Mathadi Kamgar Sahakari Pathpedhi Ltd., Vavveru Co-operative Rural Bank Ltd. vs. Chief CIT, Pr. CIT vs. Sahyadri Co-operative Credit Society Ltd.) that held interest earned by cooperative credit societies from investments with banks is business income and eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC and directed the AO to allow the assessee's claim of deduction of Rs. 27,58,575/- under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) regarding interest income earned from its investments with nationalised and other banks.

The Tribunal held that the assessee credit co-operative society is entitled to claim deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for interest income earned on its investments with other co-operative banks, which are also co-operative societies. The Tribunal relied on various decisions of coordinate benches, including the case of Armed Forces Ex-Officers Multi Services Co-Operative Soc. The reasoning was that while co-operative banks might not be eligible for deduction under Section 80P due to Section 80P(4), interest income derived by a co-operative society from its investments held with a co-operative bank (which is a co-operative society) is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal also found that the language of Section 80P(2)(d) is unambiguous and covers dividend income earned by a credit co-operative society from other co-operative societies. Therefore, the dividend income of Rs. 32,30,002/- earned from mandatory investment in shares of PDCCB Ltd., a co-operative society, is also deductible. The Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A)/NFAC and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the total deduction of Rs. 83,75,071/-.

The Tribunal held that the assessee credit co-operative society is entitled to claim deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for interest income earned on its investments with other co-operative banks, which are also co-operative societies. The Tribunal relied on various decisions of coordinate benches, including the case of Armed Forces Ex-Officers Multi Services Co-Operative Soc. The reasoning was that while co-operative banks might not be eligible for deduction under Section 80P due to Section 80P(4), interest income derived by a co-operative society from its investments held with a co-operative bank (which is a co-operative society) is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal also found that the language of Section 80P(2)(d) is unambiguous and covers dividend income earned by a credit co-operative society from other co-operative societies. Therefore, the dividend income of Rs. 32,30,002/- earned from mandatory investment in shares of PDCCB Ltd., a co-operative society, is also deductible. The Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A)/NFAC and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the total deduction of Rs. 83,75,071/-.

The Tribunal held that the assessee credit co-operative society is entitled to claim deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for interest income earned on its investments with other co-operative banks, which are also co-operative societies. The Tribunal relied on various decisions of coordinate benches, including the case of Armed Forces Ex-Officers Multi Services Co-Operative Soc. The reasoning was that while co-operative banks might not be eligible for deduction under Section 80P due to Section 80P(4), interest income derived by a co-operative society from its investments held with a co-operative bank (which is a co-operative society) is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal also found that the language of Section 80P(2)(d) is unambiguous and covers dividend income earned by a credit co-operative society from other co-operative societies. Therefore, the dividend income of Rs. 32,30,002/- earned from mandatory investment in shares of PDCCB Ltd., a co-operative society, is also deductible. The Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A)/NFAC and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the total deduction of Rs. 83,75,071/-.

The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was not disputed by the assessee in the present appeal. Regarding the taxability of the amounts, the Tribunal followed the decision of a coordinate bench in Ashok Raghunathrao Kulkarni vs. ITO (ITA No.117/PUN/2024) and other similar cases. It found that the ex-gratia compensation received by the assessee was voluntary and paid without any obligation on the part of the employer. Therefore, it would not amount to compensation in terms of Section 17(3) of the Act. The Tribunal also noted that in similar cases of other employees of Pfizer Healthcare India Pvt. Ltd., the Assessing Officers had accepted such compensation as capital in nature, and these decisions had attained finality. The Tribunal relied on the principles of consistency and binding precedence. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC was set aside, and the Assessing Officer was directed to delete the addition of Rs. 23,92,487/- (Rs. 23,73,947/- + Rs. 18,540/-). The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.

The Tribunal, considering the totality of the facts and in the interest of justice, and with the consent of both parties, set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC. The matter was restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC with a direction to decide the appeal afresh on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The assessee was directed to respond to notices and produce relevant documents without seeking adjournments. The Tribunal allowed Ground No. 4 (regarding the dismissal by CIT(A)/NFAC) for statistical purposes. Since the matter was restored to the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC, the other grounds (1, 2, and 3) were considered academic and not adjudicated by the Tribunal. The operative direction is to re-adjudicate the appeal by the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC.

The Tribunal held that the delay of 727 days in filing the appeal before it was inordinate and warranted a strict approach. Applying the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, the Tribunal noted that an inordinate delay requires a strict approach, and the conduct of the petitioner should be analyzed. The reasons provided by the assessee in their affidavit were considered vague and did not establish any sufficient cause for the substantial delay. The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay, and the reasons were not convincing. Consequently, the delay was not condoned, and the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed as not maintainable. No decision was made on the merits of the case.

The Tribunal held that since the assessee had received registration under Section 12A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2023-24, but the copy of this certificate was not available before the Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings, the order of the Assessing Officer was set aside. The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for de-novo adjudication. The Assessing Officer was directed to provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee for statistical purposes. The ratio decidendi is that if an assessee has obtained the necessary registration for claiming exemption, and this fact is later established, the assessment proceedings should be reopened to grant the benefit, ensuring a fair hearing.

The ITAT held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution. Citing the Hon'ble Bombay High Court's decision in Pr.CIT(Central) Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF), the Tribunal emphasized that Section 250(6) of the Act obliges the CIT(A) to dispose of an appeal in writing after stating the points for determination and rendering a decision on each point with reasons. The CIT(A) has the power to confirm, reduce, enhance, or annul an assessment and is obliged to dispose of the appeal on merits. The ITAT found that the CIT(A) failed to adjudicate the grounds of appeal, which is mandatory. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the case was remanded to the CIT(A) for de-novo adjudication, with a direction to provide the assessee with an opportunity of hearing.

The Tribunal held that the interest income of Rs. 1,04,662/- earned by the assessee, a cooperative credit society engaged in providing credit facilities to its members, from deposits with a bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal relied on decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in CIT vs. Karnataka State Co-operative Apex Bank and the Hon'ble High Courts of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana in Vavveru Co-operative Rural Bank Ltd., Kerala in Pr.CIT Vs. Sahyadri Co-operative Credit Society Ltd., and Telangana in Ismailia Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. These judgments establish that interest earned by cooperative credit societies from funds deposited with banks, when such deposits are made out of surplus funds generated from their primary business of providing credit facilities, is considered business income attributable to their core activities and thus eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). The Tribunal found the facts of the present case to be identical to those in the cited precedents. Consequently, the addition made by the Assessing Officer was directed to be deleted. The issue regarding proportionate deduction for interest paid on deposits and the jurisdiction for reopening were implicitly decided in favour of the assessee by allowing the deduction and directing deletion of the addition.

The Tribunal, respectfully following the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B. Madhuri Goud vs. B. Damodar Reddy and Collector, Land Acquisition vs. MST Katiji & Others, held that a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach should be adopted when considering applications for condonation of delay. The Tribunal found that the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was supported by sufficient cause. It opined that the CIT(A) should have adopted a pragmatic approach and condoned the delay. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remitted the disputed issues back to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication afresh. The assessee is to be provided with one more opportunity of hearing to substantiate the case with evidence, subject to payment of costs of Rs. 5,000/- to the Maharashtra State Legal Services Authority within one month. The assessee is also directed to cooperate in submitting information for early disposal. The grounds of appeal are allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs.17,00,436/- for unexplained investment in immovable property was uncalled for. The Tribunal observed that the assessee's husband had paid Rs.3.50 lakh and Rs.1,45,000/- on 18.12.2014, and Rs.12,26,886/- and Rs.1,000/- on 17.01.2015 from his declared bank accounts (HDFC Bank and Indian Overseas Bank), totaling Rs.17,22,886/-. It was also established that the assessee's husband regularly filed Income Tax Returns, was employed, and had declared a gross income of Rs.14,11,153/- for A.Y. 2015-16. Since these facts remained uncontroverted and the source of the investment was verifiable from the bank accounts, the investment was explained satisfactorily. The finding of the CIT(A) was reversed, and the addition was deleted. The grounds of appeal on merits were allowed.