DHARMARAJ KASHINATH MHATRE,URAN vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER, PANVEL

There was a delay of 50 days in filing of the appeal before this Tribunal. The assessee filed an affidavit explaining the reasons for delay. We have perused the affidavit and convinced that there was sufficient cause for delay. Substantial justice is more important than procedural delay. No assessee is going to gain by filing the appeal belatedly. Accordingly, delay condoned.

None appeared on behalf of the assessee. We have heard Ld. DR and perused the records. In this case, the original return of income for AY 2016-17 was filed by the assessee on 14.08.2016 declaring total income at Rs.34,78,550/-. The said return was revised on 31.12.2017 revising total income at Rs.35,01,130/-. The assessee’s case was selected for scrutiny. The assessee filed reply in response to notice. In the assessment order, it is noted by the Assessing Officer (AO) at page 2 that the agricultural land of the assessee and two others was compulsorily acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1873. The assessee filed petition before the Court against the compensation received. The Hon’ble Court enhanced the compensation. Accordingly, the assessee received enhanced compensation during the year and interest. The assessee’s share in the agricultural land was 1/3rd. The relevant paragraph of the assessment order is scanned and reproduced here as under :

The only issue before us is as to whether the interest received on enhanced compensation is exempt or taxable. In this context, the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in the case of Movaliya Bhikhubhai Balabhaiv.Income-tax Officer-TDS-1- Surat [2016] 388 ITR 343 (Gujarat) held as under : Quote,“ 8. The above referred decision in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) (supra) came to be followed by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Govindbhai Mamaiya [2014] 52 taxmann.com 270/367 ITR 498/[2015] 229 Taxman 138, wherein the court after referring to the above decision in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) (supra) held that it is clear that whereas interest under section 34 of the Act of 1894 is not treated as a part of income subject to tax, the interest earned under section 28, which is on enhanced compensation, is treated as an accretion to the value and, therefore, part of the enhanced compensation or consideration making it exigible to tax under section 45(5) of the Income Tax Act. 9. Thus, the Supreme Court in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) (supra) has held that the interest under section 28 of the Act of 1894 unlike interest under section 34 is an accretion to the value and hence, it is a part of the enhanced compensation or consideration which is not the case with interest under section 34 of the 1894 Act. Therefore, interest under section 28 of the Act of 1894 would form part of the enhanced compensation and would be exigible to capital gains under section 45(5) of the I.T. Act. In other words, in case of a transaction which is otherwise exigible to capital gains tax under section 45 of the I.T. Act, the interest received under section 28 of the Act of 1894 being an accretion to the value, would form part of the compensation and would be exigible to tax under section 45(5) of the I.T. Act, whereas the interest received under section 34 of the Act of 1894 would be "interest" within the meaning of such expression as envisaged under section 145A of the I.T. Act and would be deemed to be the income of the year under consideration, chargeable to tax as income from other sources under section 56 of the I.T. Act.

In the facts of the present case, it is an admitted position……………………...Thus, it is clear that the Supreme Court after considering the scheme of section 45(5) of the I.T. Act has categorically held that payment made under section 28 of the Act of 1894 is enhanced compensation, as a necessary corollary, therefore, the contention that payment made under section 28 of the Act of 1894 is interest as envisaged under section 145A of the I.T. Act and has to be treated as income from other sources, deserves to be rejected.

It has been vehemently contended on behalf of the first respondent that the above decision has been rendered prior to the substitution of section 145A of the I.T. Act by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 with effect from 1st April, 2010, and hence, would have no applicability to the facts of the present case. The scope and effect of the substitution (with effect from 1st April, 2010) of section 145A, as also amendment made in section 56(2) by Act 33 of 2009 have been elaborated in the following portion of the departmental circular No. 5/2010, dated 3.6.2010, as follows:

On behalf of the first respondent, reliance has been placed upon decisions of different High Courts taking a different view. This court is not in agreement with the view adopted by the other High Courts which are not consistent with the law laid down in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) (supra). In Manjet Singh (HUF) Karta Manjeet Singh's case (supra), the Punjab and Haryana High Court has chosen to place reliance upon various decisions of the Supreme Court rendered during the period 1964 to 1997 and has chosen to brush aside the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Ghanshyam (HUF)'s case (supra) which is directly on the issue by observing that the assessee cannot derive any benefit from the observations made by the Supreme Court as quoted therein. In Hari Kishan's case (supra), the Punjab and Haryana High Court has placed reliance upon its earlier decision in the case of Manjet Singh (HUF) Karta Manjeet Singh (supra). In Bir Singh (HUF)'s case (supra), the Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that under the scheme of the 1894 Act, interest under section 34 is part of compensation while interest under section 28 is not the interest which partakes the character of compensation and is treated differently. In the opinion of this court, the above view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court is contrary to what has been held in the decision of the Supreme Court in Ghanshyam (HUF)'s case (supra) wherein it has been held that interest under section 28 unlike interest under section 34 is an accretion to the value, hence it is a part of enhanced compensation or consideration which is not the case with interest under section 34 of the 1894 Act. This court is in agreement with the view adopted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jagmal Singh's case (supra), which has been extensively referred to in paragraph 4.1 above. The decision of the Delhi High Court in Sharda Kochhar's case (supra), having been rendered in the context of a different controversy would have no applicability to the facts of the present case.

The upshot of the above discussion is that since interest under section 28 of the Act of 1894, partakes the character of compensation, it does not fall within the ambit of the expression "interest" as contemplated in section 145A of the I.T. Act………” Unquote.

The Ld. DR pleaded that after amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 2009, the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court is not applicable. However, the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court (supra) has discussed the amendment and held that even after the amendment decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) is applicable. Hence, arguments of the Ld. DR are rejected.

Similar view has been taken by the Pune Tribunal in the case of Sanjay Bhimrao Patil Vs. ITO, 200 ITD 575 (Pune-Trib.). The relevant paragraphs of the said are reproduced here as under : Quote, “20. Having referred to the various case laws placed reliance by the Id.AR and ld. DR, as discussed by us in the above referred paragraphs of this order, we find the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court of Bombay in the case of Rupesh Rashmikant Shah (supra) discussed the issue in detail with reference to effect of substitution of section 145A with effect from 1-04-2010 read with amendment by inserting clause (viii) in section 56(2) of the Act, as the AO in the present case proceeded to allow 50% deduction u/s. 57(iv) and brought to tax remaining 50% u/s. 56(2)(viii) of the Act which is evident from the computation made in para 3.10 of the assessment order. The Hon'ble High Court was pleased to agree with the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in the case of Movaliya Bhikhubhai Balabhai (supra), where, it held, the ratio of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) (supra) would continue to apply post amendment in section 145A by virtue of Finance Act, 2009. We note that the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in the case of Movaliya

In the present case, the AO simply proceeded on the premise that the amendments to provisions u/s. 145A which bears the heading method of accounting in certain cases, section 145A(b) provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 145, interest received by an assessee on compensation or on enhanced compensation shall be deemed to be the income of the year in which it is received read with section 56(2)(viii) of the Act which provides income by way of interest on compensation or on enhanced compensation referred to in sub-section (1) of section 145B of the Act shall be chargeable to income tax under the head "Income from other sources". Therefore, we hold that the interest granted by the reference Court u/s. 28 of the Land Acquisition Act from the date of possession

No contrary decision of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court has been brought to our notice. Respectfully following the above referred decisions (supra), we hold that the interest on enhanced compensation is not taxable u/s 56(2)(viii) of the Act. Accordingly, we direct the AO to delete the addition. Thus, the grounds raised by the assessee are allowed.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.