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122 orders · Page 2 of 3
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments in a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Pr. CIT erred in exercising revisional jurisdiction to disallow this claim.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from its investments in cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Principal CIT erred in exercising revisional jurisdiction to disallow this claim.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was not justified in dismissing the appeal solely on delay without considering the merits. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) to admit the appeal after condoning the delay and adjudicate the grounds afresh.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not discussed the merits of the case and had confirmed the AO's order ex-parte without proper adjudication. Therefore, the matter was remanded for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that a cooperative bank is still a cooperative society, and interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments in a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). Therefore, the Principal CIT erred in revising the Assessing Officer's order.
The Tribunal set aside the NFAC's order and directed it to re-adjudicate the assessee's appeals on merits after condoning the delay. The assessee was directed to prove all relevant facts.
The Tribunal set aside the NFAC's order and directed it to re-adjudicate the assessee's appeals on merits after condoning the delay. The assessee was directed to prove all relevant facts.
The Tribunal set aside the NFAC's order and remanded the matter back for de novo adjudication. The NFAC is directed to consider the condonation of delay petition along with necessary affidavits and pass a speaking order.
The Tribunal held that while the bank's declaration suggested a mistake, the CIT(A) erred by accepting additional evidence without giving the AO an opportunity to report on it as required by Rule 46A(3).
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. However, it rejected the grounds challenging the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction and the absence of DIN. The Tribunal also found the status issue to be a clerical mistake and denied the Section 80P deduction due to non-compliance with Section 80A(5).
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in law and fact by not properly considering the delay, including the COVID-19 pandemic period which should have been excluded. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) failed to consider the assessee's averments regarding the delay and the transfer of jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that a cooperative bank is still a cooperative society, and interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments in a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). Therefore, the Principal CIT erred in revising the Assessing Officer's order.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. However, it rejected the grounds challenging the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction and the absence of DIN. The Tribunal also found the status issue to be a clerical mistake and denied the Section 80P deduction due to non-compliance with Section 80A(5).
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from its investments in cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act. The revisional order by the Principal CIT was set aside.
The Tribunal found that the lower authorities failed to determine if the transferred land was a 'capital asset' and did not ascertain the cost of acquisition. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that interest income derived by a cooperative society from its investments with any other cooperative society, including cooperative banks, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The amendment to Section 80P(4) does not preclude this deduction.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, following previous rulings by the Pune Bench and the Karnataka High Court. It held that interest income earned on surplus funds invested by the cooperative society is attributable to its primary business activity and eligible for deduction.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC's order did not decide the substantive grounds of appeal on merits. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments in cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The PCIT erred in exercising revisional jurisdiction to disallow this claim.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from its investments in a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The revisional order by the Principal CIT was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of the extended time limit provided by CBDT Circular No. 06/2023 for filing the application for regular registration. The rejection on grounds of limitation was therefore erroneous.
The ITAT held that the NFAC's direction to the AO to recompute income amounted to setting aside the original assessment, which is violative of Section 251(1)(a) read with Section 250(6) of the Act. The ITAT quashed the NFAC's order and remanded the matter back to the NFAC for de-novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that Section 249(4)(b) of the Act, which requires payment of advance tax on returned income for an appeal to be maintainable, was not applicable as the returned income was nominal and no tax was due. Therefore, the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal.
The Tribunal held that a cooperative bank is still a cooperative society, and interest earned by a cooperative society from its investments in a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Assessing Officer's order allowing the deduction was upheld.
The Tribunal found it appropriate to restore the appeal to the appellate authority for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to file and prove all relevant facts in the consequential proceedings.
The Tribunal held that while a penalty is leviable for delayed filing of the Tax Audit Report, no prejudice was caused to the Revenue due to the delay. Therefore, it was not a fit case for levying the penalty.
The Tribunal held that a cooperative bank is still a cooperative society, and interest earned by a cooperative society from its investments in a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Assessing Officer's order allowing the deduction was upheld.
The Tribunal upheld the addition under Section 68, stating that bank statements can be subject to such additions if the source of deposits is unexplained. However, it granted partial relief by excluding an entry of Rs. 5 lakhs which was not actually credited.
The Tribunal restored the appeal to the NFAC for fresh adjudication. The NFAC is directed to provide at least three effective opportunities for hearing and decide the case on merits.
The tribunal found that the NFAC's order did not decide the substantive grounds on merits as required. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the compensation received for termination of services is taxable as profit in lieu of salary under Section 17(3). Furthermore, the proviso to Section 89(1) explicitly bars relief for such termination compensation if exemption under Section 10(10C) was claimed.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to demonstrate that the assessee furnished inaccurate particulars of income. The mistake in claiming the deduction was considered an inadvertent error in calculation, not a deliberate misrepresentation.
The Tribunal restored the appeal to the CIT(Exemption) for fresh adjudication. The assessee was given three opportunities to present all relevant details and prove their case.
The Tribunal found no substance in the Revenue's stand supporting the penalty. It held that an estimated disallowance, especially when made on an ad-hoc basis without specifying parties, is not sustainable in law for attracting penalty under Section 271(1)(c).
The Tribunal restored the appeal to the lower appellate authority for fresh adjudication on merits. The assessee was directed to present all relevant facts and evidence in the consequential proceedings.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC's order did not decide the substantive grounds of appeal on merits as required by law. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal set aside the NFAC's order and remanded the matter back for de novo adjudication. The assessee was granted one final opportunity to present her case with all relevant documents and evidence.
The tribunal held that the NFAC order failed to decide the substantive grounds on merits and did not provide points for determination with detailed discussion. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC's order did not decide the substantive grounds of appeal on merits as required by Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) had not considered the entire trust deed and the actual charitable activities conducted. The Tribunal held that the genuineness of activities and compliance with laws are to be examined at the assessment stage, not solely at the registration stage.
The Tribunal restored the appeal to the NFAC for fresh adjudication. The NFAC was directed to provide opportunities for hearing and decide the substantive grounds on merits.
The Tribunal restored the appeal back to the NFAC for fresh adjudication. The NFAC is directed to provide at least three effective opportunities for hearing to the assessee.
The tribunal permitted the appellant to withdraw the appeal as requested. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that accepting metal deposits in physical form does not constitute a 'loan or deposit of money' as contemplated under Section 269SS. Therefore, the penalty under Section 271D was not leviable.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had a bonafide belief in claiming full exemption due to a portion of his service being with a government entity. The penalty was not warranted as the assessee's belief was not synthetic and all material facts were disclosed.
The Tribunal held that the issue is covered by previous decisions of the ITAT Pune Bench, which allowed deduction under Section 80P on interest income earned by co-operative societies. Following these precedents, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is not eligible for deduction under Section 80P as they did not file a return of income within the prescribed due date and did not claim the deduction in the return. The Tribunal followed the decisions of various High Courts on this matter.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of the Section 80P deduction was not sustainable in law. The amendment disallowing such deductions was effective from April 1, 2021, and had no retrospective effect, while the assessment year in question was 2018-2019.
The Tribunal held that the Income Tax Act is a welfare legislation and that the assessee should be given one final opportunity to present its case. The order of the CIT(E) was set aside.
The Tribunal held that cooperative banks, being registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, are indeed cooperative societies. Therefore, interest income derived by a cooperative society from its investments in a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Pr. CIT erred in revising the assessment order.