ITAT Pune Judgments — March 2024

The Tribunal held that the time limit for filing the application under Section 80G(5) should be interpreted harmoniously to avoid absurdity. It was decided that the assessee had applied within the allowed time, making the application valid.

The Tribunal held that the NFAC's order was cryptic and did not address the merits as required. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the lower appeal, noting the lack of clarity on hearing notices and the absence of adjudication on merits by the NFAC. The NFAC was directed to hear the appeal afresh.

The Tribunal held that while admissions during search can be retracted, they cannot be dismissed without evidence. However, the Assessing Officer cannot adopt a pick-and-choose method with seized documents. A cash flow statement showed no deficit, indicating no unclaimed investments.

The Tribunal found the additional evidence submitted by the assessee to be relevant. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, with the onus on the taxpayer to prove the facts.

The Tribunal found that the National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC) did not address the merits of the deemed dividend addition as required. Therefore, the appeal is restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal found that the 15% estimation by lower authorities lacked clarity and was not based on any specific business line or comparables. Therefore, a lumpsum Gross Profit estimation of 11% was deemed just and proper.

The Tribunal held that additions cannot be made merely on the basis of a retracted statement under Section 132(4) if the assessee provides evidence to show the correct state of affairs. However, mere retraction does not invalidate the statement, especially if made after a long lapse of time. The Tribunal found that the AO adopted a 'pick and choose' method by relying on certain entries in a seized diary while ignoring others. It is a settled principle that seized documents must be read in their entirety, and the revenue cannot selectively use beneficial parts. The Tribunal noted that the assessee, when confronted with diary entries, admitted to dabba trading and on-money payments. However, the AO's approach was flawed by not considering the entire diary entries and by not accounting for the cash flow. Based on a cash flow statement prepared by the assessee, which showed no cash deficit in any relevant year, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete all additions made. The appeals were partly allowed.

The Tribunal held that the AO's reasons for reopening the assessment amounted to a 'reason to suspect' rather than a 'reason to believe' that income had escaped assessment. Reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated for mere verification or fishing inquiries.

The Tribunal held that while admissions during search can be retracted, they cannot be dismissed without evidence. However, the Assessing Officer cannot adopt a pick-and-choose method with seized documents. A cash flow statement showed no deficit, indicating no unclaimed investments.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obliged to decide appeals on merits and cannot dismiss them for non-prosecution. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside for de novo adjudication, with an opportunity for the assessee to be heard.

The ITAT noted that the NFAC passed an ex parte order without framing points of determination as required by Section 250(6). The appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.

The ITAT held that the assessment order was framed without territorial jurisdiction by the Pune Bench. Therefore, the appeal was rejected as returned.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, stating that since the quantum appeal was decided in favour of the assessee, the penalty under Section 270A becomes infructuous and is not maintainable.

The Tribunal held that late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, are bad in law, following favorable High Court decisions. However, the ground related to interest under Section 220(2) was not argued and was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, are bad in law, following favorable High Court decisions. However, the ground related to interest under Section 220(2) was not argued and was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that each windmill should be treated as a separate undertaking for Section 80IA deduction. It also ruled that previously set-off losses cannot be notionally carried forward to reduce profits of eligible undertakings.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) incorrectly recorded that no response was received for a personal hearing, despite the assessee requesting a virtual conference. This denial of an opportunity for hearing was considered a violation of natural justice.

The Tribunal held that Section 270A(9)(e) pertains to failure to record receipts, which was not the case here. The penalty was levied under an incorrect section, making it not maintainable.

The Tribunal noted that the lower appellate authority failed to frame points of determination and provide a detailed adjudication as required by law. Considering potential issues with notice service in the new faceless system, the appeals were restored for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that Section 270A(9)(e) pertains to failure to record receipts, which was not the case here. The penalty was levied under an incorrect section, making it not maintainable.

The Tribunal found that the NFAC order, though passed ex parte, did not follow the mandatory procedure of framing points of determination and discussing them. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the addition was not sustainable as it was solely based on the vendor's statement, which was not produced for cross-examination. The Tribunal also referred to a CBDT circular which stated that such statements alone are not sufficient for additions.

The Tribunal condoned the significant delay in filing the appeal before the NFAC, considering the reasons provided and the Supreme Court's directions regarding the COVID-19 period. The appeal has been restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, are bad in law, following favorable High Court decisions. However, the ground related to interest under Section 220(2) was not argued and was dismissed.

The tribunal restored the appeal back to the NFAC for fresh adjudication. The NFAC was directed to decide the appeal on merits after providing the assessee with opportunities to present their case and evidence.

The Tribunal held that interest earned from deposits with scheduled banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) for co-operative credit societies. This decision followed various High Court and ITAT rulings.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had confirmed additions without considering the elaborate submissions and voluminous documents filed by the assessee. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal noted that the lower appellate authority failed to comply with the requirements of section 250(6) by not framing points of determination and providing detailed adjudication. Considering potential issues with notice service in the new faceless system, the appeals were restored for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that it is premature to levy penalty before the decision on the quantum of additions. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside for fresh adjudication after considering the decision on additions and the legal ground regarding penalty.

The Tribunal held that late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, are bad in law, following favorable High Court decisions. However, the ground related to interest under Section 220(2) was not argued and was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obligated to decide an appeal on merits and cannot dismiss it for non-prosecution, citing a Bombay High Court judgment. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside.

The Tribunal held that the reopening under section 147 was incorrect as a comprehensive provision for assessment of such third-party material exists under section 153C of the Act. Consequently, the impugned reopening was quashed.

The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from its investments in cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Assessing Officer's view was considered plausible, and the revisional order by the Pr. CIT was set aside.

The Tribunal held that the penalty for AY 2016-17 was unsustainable due to a deviation in the grounds for imposing the penalty. For AYs 2017-18 and 2018-19, the penalties were deleted as the lower authorities failed to specify the limb of 'under-reporting of income in consequence of any mis-reporting' as required by law.

The Tribunal held that the penalty for AY 2016-17 was unsustainable due to a deviation in the grounds for imposing the penalty. For AYs 2017-18 and 2018-19, the penalties were deleted as the lower authorities failed to specify the limb of 'under-reporting of income in consequence of any mis-reporting' as required by law.

The Tribunal found that the NFAC's order did not decide the substantive grounds on merits and was passed ex-parte due to the assessee's non-appearance. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the penalty for AY 2016-17 was unsustainable due to a deviation in the grounds for imposing the penalty. For AYs 2017-18 and 2018-19, the penalties were deleted as the lower authorities failed to specify the limb of 'under-reporting of income in consequence of any mis-reporting' as required by law.

The Tribunal held that the impugned order suffered from non-consideration of enclosures submitted by the appellant. Therefore, the matter was set aside and remitted back to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration.

The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments in cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The PCIT erred in exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 to disallow this claim.

The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments in cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The PCIT erred in exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 to disallow this claim.

The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments in a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). This is because a cooperative bank remains a cooperative society, and the intention of Section 80P(4) was to disallow deductions for cooperative banks themselves, not for other cooperative societies investing in them.

The tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s order was not in accordance with Section 250(6) of the Act as it lacked proper discussion and reasoning. Therefore, the issue was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments in a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Pr. CIT erred in exercising revisional jurisdiction to disallow this claim.

The Tribunal held that a cooperative bank, being a cooperative society registered under the relevant acts, continues to be eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) on interest income earned from its investments with other cooperative banks. The Pr. CIT erred in exercising revisional jurisdiction to disallow this claim.

The Tribunal found the assessee's reasons for non-compliance to be bonafide due to a matrimonial dispute. Considering the additional evidence filed and the interest of justice, the matter was remanded to the AO for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal found that the NFAC's order was cryptic and lacked independent application of mind, failing to address the assessee's submissions and relevant case laws. Therefore, the NFAC's order was set aside.

The Tribunal noted the assessee's willingness to prosecute the case with supporting evidence before the CIT(A). Therefore, the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for fresh consideration.

The Tribunal held that for vacant properties, the AO must determine the Annual Letting Value (ALV) under Section 23(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, considering comparable properties if municipal valuation is not representative of fair rent. For other properties, where the AO's estimation lacked proper evidence, the matter was remanded.

The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments in a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Pr. CIT erred in exercising revisional jurisdiction to disallow this claim.