ITAT Pune Judgments — February 2024

The Tribunal held that the Pune benches of the ITAT do not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain these appeals. According to the Standing Order, the Nagpur Bench has the exclusive jurisdiction for cases originating from Nagpur.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable if the enabling provision, Section 200A(1)(c), was not in force at the time of the default. For defaults occurring before June 1, 2015, the levy is impermissible, but for defaults after this date, it is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, due to the absence of an enabling provision. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that the levy of fees under Section 234E was impermissible for defaults occurring before June 1, 2015, due to the absence of an enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)). For defaults after this date, fees are leviable from June 1, 2015, onwards.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that the Pune benches of the ITAT do not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain these appeals. According to the Standing Order, the Nagpur Bench has the exclusive jurisdiction for cases originating from Nagpur.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that the levy of fees under Section 234E was impermissible for defaults occurring before June 1, 2015, due to the absence of an enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)). For defaults after this date, fees could be levied from June 1, 2015, onwards.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal held that Section 234E levy is unsustainable for defaults prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) was not in force. For defaults after this date, the levy is permissible.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not properly consider the facts or the legal position. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order was set aside and remanded for fresh adjudication.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) held that an appeal against an order passed under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act does not lie before the ITAT. Therefore, the appeals filed by the assessee were not maintainable.

The Tribunal held that Income Tax laws are welfare legislations and not penal. Therefore, a final opportunity should be granted to the assessee to present its case with supporting evidence before the CIT(E).

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) held that an appeal against an order passed under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act does not lie before the ITAT. Therefore, the appeals filed by the assessee were not maintainable.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) held that an appeal against an order passed under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act does not lie before the ITAT. Therefore, the appeals filed by the assessee were not maintainable.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) held that an appeal against an order passed under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act does not lie before the ITAT. Therefore, the appeals filed by the assessee were not maintainable.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) held that an appeal against an order passed under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act does not lie before the ITAT. Therefore, the appeals filed by the assessee were not maintainable.

The Tribunal held that Section 154 rectification is meant for apparent mistakes, not for detailed re-computation or debatable issues. The CIT(A) had already termed the rectification debatable.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) held that an appeal against an order passed under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act does not lie before the ITAT. Therefore, the appeals filed by the assessee were not maintainable.

The Tribunal held that since the addition of long-term capital gains, on which the penalty was based, had already been deleted in the assessee's earlier appeal, the penalty had no basis to stand. Therefore, the Revenue's appeal was rejected.

The Revenue sought permission to withdraw its appeal. The Tribunal granted this permission and dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as academic because the assessee had already filed a regular appeal before the CIT(A) which was pending. The dismissal was to allow the assessee to pursue the pending regular appeal.

The Tribunal held that interest earned on investments in other cooperative societies/banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). It also held that commission earned from MSEDCL bill collection is a business activity eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i).

The Tribunal held that Income Tax laws are welfare legislation and not penal. Therefore, a final opportunity should be granted to the assessee to present its case with supporting evidence before the CIT(E).

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not adjudicated the appeal on its merits, having failed to consider the assessee's submissions due to communication issues. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal found that the lower authorities, particularly the NFAC, had passed ex-parte orders without affording proper opportunity and without complying with Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the intimation of pending demand is not an appealable order under Section 246(1A) of the Act. Therefore, the CIT(A) was correct in dismissing the appeal.

The Tribunal held that the exemption under the 4th Proviso Clause-(b) to Section 56(2)(vii) applies only to gifts received 'on the occasion of the marriage of the individual'. Since the cash was received before the marriage date of December 17, 2014, it did not qualify for the exemption.

The tribunal found the CIT(A)'s approach unreasonable for not adjudicating the appeal on merits. The CIT(A) committed a serious error by not deciding the issues based on the material on record.

The Tribunal found that neither the assessee provided sufficient evidence for booking dates to satisfy the 'agreement' criteria under Section 43CA(3) and (4), nor did the Revenue refer the matter to the DVO as required by Section 43CA(2). Therefore, the case was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) decided the appeal ex-parte without considering the assessee's submissions and without proper adjudication on merits. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter for fresh decision.

The tribunal held that the NFAC confirmed the addition without affording proper opportunity to the assessee and without complying with the provisions of Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) passed an ex-parte order without any finding on merit. Since the CIT(A) did not consider the assessee's submissions, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.

The Tribunal found that the lower authorities made the addition without properly considering the assessee's explanation and without complying with the requirements of Section 250(6). Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.