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132 orders · Page 2 of 3
The Tribunal found that the lower authorities passed ex-parte orders without adjudicating the issues on merits and without complying with Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal restored the appeal back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to plead and prove the cost of acquisition at their own risk and responsibility.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to provide plausible responses and substantiate its activities. However, in the interest of justice, the assessee was granted one more opportunity to rectify the defects.
The Tribunal restored the appeal to the NFAC for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee three effective opportunities to present their case. The onus remains on the taxpayer to prove all relevant facts.
The tribunal found that the NFAC passed an ex-parte order without adjudicating the issue on merits, failing to comply with Section 250(6) of the Act. The appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC's order did not discuss the merits of the issues as it proceeded to decide the appeal based on the assessee's non-appearance. Therefore, the Tribunal remanded the case back to the NFAC for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission that an ex-parte order was passed without providing an opportunity of being heard. Therefore, the matter was restored back to the NFAC for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to provide plausible responses and substantiate its activities. However, in the interest of justice, the assessee was granted one more opportunity to rectify the defects.
The ITAT found that the CIT(A) had not discussed the merits of the case before dismissing the appeal. Therefore, the ITAT directed the CIT(A) to re-adjudicate the appeal afresh.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC order was not technically ex-parte but lacked substantive adjudication of the assessee's submissions and facts. Therefore, the matter was set aside for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC order did not deal with the merits of the case. Therefore, the appeals were restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC order did not deal with the merits of the case. Therefore, the appeals were restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not properly adjudicate the evidence filed by the assessee, failing to comply with Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The assessee is responsible for filing and proving all relevant facts in the consequential proceedings.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) order did not comply with Section 250(6) of the Act by failing to provide points for determination and detailed adjudication. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's revision under section 263 was not justified. Since there were two possible views on the allowability of deduction for standard assets, and the AO had adopted one of them, the assessment order could not be considered erroneous.
The Tribunal noted that the lower authorities did not establish the asset as a 'capital asset' nor did they refer the matter to the DVO as required. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had confirmed the AO's order without providing points for determination and detailed adjudication as required by Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that interest income derived by a cooperative society from its investments held with a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal found that the Pr. CIT erred in exercising revisional jurisdiction to disallow this claim.
The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the issue back to the NFAC for adjudication de novo. This was done to provide the assessee with effective opportunities to present their case and evidence.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It held that the CIT(E) failed to verify the charitable nature of the objects and activities despite the trust deed and financials being on record.
The Tribunal held that the support and maintenance services did not 'make available' technical knowledge to the customers, as required by Article 12(4)(b) of the DTAA. Therefore, the income was not taxable as fees for technical services in India.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) passed the order without waiting for the assessee's reply to a notice regarding the remand report, rendering the order arbitrary. Therefore, the matter was set aside for denovo adjudication by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal, convinced by the assessee's explanation for non-compliance, decided to provide one final opportunity. The matter was remanded back to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication, ensuring compliance with principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC should adopt a justice-oriented approach rather than a hyper-technical one. The failure to file a condonation petition was considered a curable defect, and the assessee deserved an opportunity to present their case on merits.
The Tribunal held that the assessee should be given an opportunity to present its case on merits before the Pr. CIT. The matter was remanded for fresh adjudication, allowing the assessee to raise jurisdictional and merit-based issues.
The ITAT rejected the adjournment application but, considering the assessee's health and lack of documentary evidence, remanded the matter to the AO for fresh consideration. The assessee is permitted to file evidence in support of their claim.
The tribunal has not yet provided a decision in the provided text. The facts of the case are being presented, and the appeal is filed under Section 253(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act.
The Tribunal held that a mistake apparent from the record is required for rectification under section 154. Since Form 67 was not available when the initial order was passed, its subsequent filing cannot be considered a mistake apparent from the record.
The Tribunal decided to remand the matter to the CIT(A) to condone the delay and admit the appeal for adjudication. The assessee was given liberty to file evidence in support of its claims.
The Tribunal, noting the lack of substantiation, decided to give the assessee one final opportunity to explain the source of the cash deposit. The matter was remanded back to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a credit co-operative society from investments in other co-operative banks qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act. The theory of surplus funds is not applicable to credit co-operative societies.
The Tribunal held that the AO lacked jurisdiction to make an addition of Rs. 72,47,912 because the reassessment proceedings were initiated based on an alleged escaped income of Rs. 15,884, and the AO did not make any addition on that specific ground. The AO cannot make additions on other grounds not forming the basis of the original reassessment notice.
The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be levied on additions made on an estimation basis. Since the addition was restricted to 10% of alleged hawala purchases, the penalty was not justified.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a credit co-operative society from investments in other co-operative banks qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act. The theory of surplus funds is not applicable to credit co-operative societies.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the NFAC and remanded the matter back for de novo adjudication. The assessee was granted a final opportunity to substantiate the purchase of the vehicle.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeals should have been condoned by the CIT(A) considering the Supreme Court's directions regarding the COVID-19 period. The matter was remanded back to the NFAC for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals for non-prosecution due to the assessee's consistent non-compliance. Furthermore, even on merits, the Tribunal found no infirmity in upholding the penalty for concealment of income.
The Tribunal held that the issue was identical to previous assessment years where the ITAT had ruled in favour of the assessee. Following the rule of consistency, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, stating the services did not satisfy the 'make available' condition of the India-USA DTAA and were therefore not taxable in India.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obligated to decide appeals on merits and does not have the power to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution, citing a Bombay High Court judgment. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order was set aside for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals for non-prosecution due to the assessee's consistent non-compliance. Furthermore, even on merits, the Tribunal found no infirmity in upholding the penalty for concealment of income.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obligated to decide appeals on merits and does not have the power to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution, citing a Bombay High Court judgment. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order was set aside for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeals should have been condoned by the CIT(A) considering the Supreme Court's directions regarding the COVID-19 period. The matter was remanded back to the NFAC for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that interest and dividend income earned by a cooperative society from investments in another cooperative bank (RDCC) qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The lower authorities' denial of deduction was found to be contrary to legal position and binding judicial precedents.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obligated to decide appeals on merits and does not have the power to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution, citing a Bombay High Court judgment. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order was set aside for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that interest and dividend income earned by a cooperative society from investments in another cooperative bank (RDCC) qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The lower authorities' denial of deduction was found to be contrary to legal position and binding judicial precedents.
The Tribunal, considering the assessee's health and inability to represent herself, decided to remand the case. The issue of whether the cash deposit originated from the sale of property by her deceased husband needs verification.
The Tribunal held that the revised application was filed within a reasonable period after the rejection of the first application and in light of subsequent CBDT circulars extending the time limit. The rejection on limitation grounds was considered erroneous.
The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings were not legally initiated as the notices failed to specify the charge and lacked application of mind by the AO. The penalty order was consequently quashed.
The Tribunal held that a letter from the ITO for recovery of outstanding demand is not an appealable order under Section 246A of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, the CIT(A) was correct in dismissing the appeals as not maintainable.