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316 orders · Page 3 of 7
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 41,14,625/- for the Welkin Star project was made by the AO without rejecting the assessee's books of account and on surmises. The assessee was denied a reasonable opportunity to be heard as no details regarding the basis for computing expenses were furnished. The Tribunal noted that the AO computed the net profit suo motu. The addition of Rs. 20,00,000/- for parking plots was also made without evidence. Ground No. 3 regarding the valuation of closing stock was not pressed by the assessee. Regarding the interest expenditure of Rs. 79,42,978/- for AY 2018-19, the Tribunal, following the ratio in Ashish Land & Property Developers Pvt. Ltd. and Ceebros Hotels Pvt. Ltd., held that the acquisition of land for real estate development is a normal business activity and forms part of inventory. The concept of 'put to use' applies only to capital assets, not inventory. Therefore, the disallowance of interest is not sustainable. For AY 2019-20, the revenue conceded the allowability of interest. Consequently, Ground No. 4 for AY 2018-19 and Ground No. 1 for AY 2019-20 were allowed. The appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes for AY 2018-19 and allowed for AY 2019-20.
The Tribunal held that the addition for underreported profits was unsustainable as the AO computed it suo motu without rejecting books of account and without providing the assessee an opportunity to explain the basis of expenses. The disallowance of interest on land acquisition was also held unsustainable as it is part of business inventory, not a capital asset requiring 'put to use'.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's application to withdraw the appeal as the penalty has been paid and the assessee does not wish to press the appeal.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 14A was correctly deleted by the CIT(A) as the dividend income was taxable. However, the Tribunal reversed the CIT(A)'s deletion of the disallowance under Section 43B, finding that the interest paid to the cooperative bank was indeed disallowable as it was capitalized and not actually paid within the due date.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing Form 10-IC was a procedural lapse that did not invalidate the substantive exercise of the option under Section 115BAA, especially since the option was clearly indicated in the return of income and no prejudice was caused to the revenue. The AO was directed to recompute the tax liability at the concessional rate.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of disallowance for foreign travel expenses, finding no violation of Rule 46A and that the expenses were for business purposes. The appeal regarding remuneration paid to directors and relatives was also dismissed.
The Tribunal held that for Section 14A disallowance, the AO must consider investments that yielded exempt income and also compute disallowance under the second limb of Rule 8D(2). For depreciation on rented office premises, the issue was restored to the AO to verify if the letting constituted commercial exploitation of a business asset.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee raised grounds regarding denial of exemption under Section 11 and an additional ground claiming 'State' status under Article 289 of the Constitution. The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had not extensively dealt with these issues. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the appeal to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication on merits, to be decided along with earlier assessment year appeals for consistency.
The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence (co-ownership documents, payment schedules, bank statements) as it was crucial for a just decision. It restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for de novo verification and adjudication of legal grounds.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to provide documentary evidence to substantiate the claim of transfer in the earlier year during assessment and appellate proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal restored the matter to the AO for de novo verification.
The Tribunal held that the concept of 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay should be interpreted liberally, prioritizing substantial justice over technical lapses. The Tribunal condoned both the 114-day delay before the CIT(A) and the 202-day delay before the Tribunal.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee raised grounds regarding denial of exemption under Section 11 and an additional ground claiming 'State' status under Article 289 of the Constitution. The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had not extensively dealt with these issues. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the appeal to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication on merits, to be decided along with earlier assessment year appeals for consistency.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee raised grounds regarding denial of exemption under Section 11 and an additional ground claiming 'State' status under Article 289 of the Constitution. The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had not extensively dealt with these issues. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the appeal to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication on merits, to be decided along with earlier assessment year appeals for consistency.
The Tribunal held that the issue regarding the allowability of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest earned from a Cooperative Bank is well-settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court, in cases like PCIT Vs Annasaheb Patil Mathadi Kamgar Sahakari Pathpedi Limited and Kerala State Co-Operative Agricultural And Rural Development Bank Ltd. vs. Assessing Officer, has categorically stated that a cooperative bank is a cooperative society and does not act as a bank under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The Tribunal also acknowledged that its Coordinate Bench in Kumkum Kavita Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. had taken the same view in favor of the assessee. Therefore, the interest earned from investment in a cooperative bank is an allowable deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The addition of Rs. 1,41,392/- was quashed. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from producing documents before the lower authorities. The order of the lower authorities was set aside and the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal after considering the submissions of both parties and the relevant case law. The Tribunal found that the assessee had made out a reasonable cause for the delay and that there was no malafide intention. The matter was restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that agricultural land, as defined in Section 2(14) of the Income Tax Act, is excluded from the definition of 'capital asset' and therefore Section 56(2)(vii)(b) is not applicable. The addition made by the AO was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the interest earned from investment in a cooperative bank is an allowable deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that the issue is well-settled by the Supreme Court. While the revenue argued for restriction based on Section 80P(4), the Tribunal found that the Supreme Court, in cases like PCIT Vs Annasaheb Patil Mathadi Kamgar Sahakari Pathpedi Limited and Kerala State Co-Operative Agricultural And Rural Development Bank Ltd. KSCARDB, has categorically stated that a cooperative bank is a cooperative society and not acting as a bank under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The Tribunal also observed that a Coordinate Bench of the ITAT Mumbai in the case of Kumkum Kavita Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. had taken the same view in favor of the assessee. Therefore, the addition amounting to Rs. 1,41,392/- was quashed. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal, having considered the assessee's application and the no-objection from the Departmental Representative, allowed the assessee to withdraw the appeal.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's application to withdraw the appeal. The learned Departmental Representative had no objection to the prayer.
The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to provide complete documentary evidence to establish the genuineness of the gift transaction, including details of the mode of payment and the donor's financial capacity. The AO also lacked sufficient opportunity for inquiry due to the late submission of information.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A)'s order was passed ex-parte and that crucial aspects, such as the DVO's valuation report, may not have been properly considered. In the interest of natural justice, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal without dealing with the merits of the case, which is contrary to Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order and restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that a notice for penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) must clearly specify the limb or charge under which the proceedings are initiated. Using 'OR' renders the notice defective.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 4,00,000/- was not sustainable as it was based solely on third-party documents and statements without independent corroboration. The assessee was also denied the opportunity to cross-examine the key witness.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263 jurisdiction without examining the mandatory approval obtained under Section 153D. The assessment orders, having been passed with prior approval, could not be revised under Section 263 without first invalidating such approval.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263 as the assessment orders were passed after obtaining mandatory approval under Section 153D. The PCIT failed to examine the validity of this approval, which is a prerequisite for revision.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 4,00,000/- made under Section 69C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is not sustainable in law. The Tribunal found that the addition was based on Excel sheets seized from a third party (Shri Imran Ansari) and statements recorded from third parties. Crucially, the revenue failed to produce any direct or independent evidence, such as receipts, diaries, or acknowledgments, to demonstrate that the assessee had actually paid any cash on-money over and above the registered agreement value. The Tribunal noted that the assessee was denied an opportunity to cross-examine Shri Imran Ansari, whose statement was relied upon, which constitutes a breach of natural justice. The Tribunal followed the decisions of its Coordinate Benches in similar cases arising from the Rubberwala Group search, which held that mere reliance on third-party statements and documents without independent corroboration and an opportunity for cross-examination cannot justify an addition in the hands of the purchaser. The disclosure made by the developer group regarding receipt of cash, while explaining their financial position, cannot automatically fasten liability upon the purchaser without independent material. Therefore, the addition was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest income earned by a cooperative society from its investments with another cooperative bank is allowable, as Section 80P(4) only excludes cooperative banks functioning like commercial banks from claiming deduction under Section 80P, not other cooperative societies investing in them.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263 as the assessment orders were passed after obtaining mandatory approval under Section 153D. The PCIT failed to examine the validity of this approval, which is a prerequisite for revision.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to a reduction in interest under Section 220(2) as the assessed income was reduced. However, it disagreed with computing the interest from the date of the rectification order. The issue of recomputation of interest was restored to the AO for fresh assessment.
The Tribunal considered the rival submissions and the fact that the assessee did not comply with the notices issued by the CIT(A). However, in the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263 as the assessment orders were passed after obtaining mandatory approval under Section 153D. The PCIT failed to examine the validity of this approval, which is a prerequisite for revision.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 4,00,000/- was not sustainable as it was based solely on third-party documents and statements without independent corroboration. The assessee was also denied the opportunity to cross-examine the key witness.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had filed its return within the extended due date, as per the CBDT circulars and press releases. Consequently, the denial of deduction based on the return being filed late was incorrect.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had provided loan confirmations, PAN, addresses, bank statements, and ITRs to prove the identity, genuineness, and creditworthiness of the lenders. The Tribunal also observed that the AO failed to provide evidence regarding cash withdrawals or deposits by lenders and that the assessee had submitted proof of repayment.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal. It held that the appeal was not maintainable due to low tax effect below the CBDT's monetary limit and also found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s finding that the AO lacked concrete evidence to substantiate the addition.
The Tribunal condoned the delay and set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A). The Assessee was granted another opportunity to represent their case, and the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication after considering additional evidence.
The Tribunal held that the Additional/Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) erred in dismissing the assessee's appeal. The Tribunal found that the assessee had attempted to file Form 10B on January 11, 2022, along with the return of income, which was within the extended due date. The delay in its reflection on the portal was attributed to technical issues with the new income tax portal, a fact recognized by CBDT Circular No. 1/2022 which relaxed timelines. The Tribunal noted that the CPC Assessing Officer initially accepted the assessee's explanation and processed the return allowing the exemption under Section 11 vide an intimation order dated August 10, 2022. Subsequently, the CPC-Assessing Officer invoked Section 154 to rectify this intimation, disallowing the exemption. The Tribunal held that this rectification was without jurisdiction as it sought to adjudicate a disputed question of fact and review a prior decision, especially without affording the assessee an opportunity of being heard as required by Section 154(3). Therefore, the rectification order was set aside, and the initial intimation order was restored. Grounds 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 were allowed, and Ground 4 was dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal partly allowed the assessee's appeal for AY 2016-17, allowing deduction for scientific research expenditure under Section 37(1) but not the weighted deduction. The Revenue's appeal for AY 2016-17 was dismissed. The assessee's appeal for AY 2018-19 was dismissed.
The Tribunal partly allowed the assessee's appeal for AY 2016-17, allowing deduction for scientific research expenditure under Section 37(1) but not the weighted deduction. The Revenue's appeal for AY 2016-17 was dismissed. The assessee's appeal for AY 2018-19 was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263 as the assessment orders were passed after obtaining mandatory approval under Section 153D. The PCIT failed to examine the validity of this approval, which is a prerequisite for revision.
The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: 1. Regarding the disallowance of notional interest under Section 36(1)(iii) for AY 2016-17, the Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal. The CIT(A) had deleted the disallowance, relying on the assessee having sufficient own funds for investment. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with this deletion. 2. Concerning the deduction for payment to M/s. Ashapura Minchem Ltd. for scientific reports for AY 2016-17, the Tribunal held that while the weighted deduction under Section 35(1)(ii) was not allowable as the approval was under Section 35(2AB), the expenditure of Rs. 2,00,00,000 was incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes. The Tribunal refined the CIT(A)'s order to allow the deduction under Section 37(1) instead of Section 35(1)(i), dismissing the Revenue's ground of appeal and allowing the assessee's additional ground. 3. On the disallowance under Section 14A r.w. Rule 8D for AY 2016-17, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had deleted the disallowance for indirect interest expenditure, finding sufficient own funds for investment, but sustained the disallowance for administrative expenses at 0.5% of average investment. The Tribunal's final order for AY 2016-17 stated the assessee's appeal was partly allowed and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed, implying a partial upholding of the Section 14A disallowance. For AY 2018-19, the Tribunal decided the Section 14A issue mutatis mutandis to AY 2016-17, dismissing the assessee's appeal.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, noting that substantial justice should be preferred over technicalities. The Tribunal also decided to set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restore the matter for fresh adjudication, giving the assessee another opportunity to represent their case.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal regarding the deletion of disallowance under Section 14A, following Supreme Court precedents. It also granted relief on excise duty exemption but remanded the issue of FMS and MEIS incentives for further adjudication.
The Tribunal held that additions made solely on the basis of statements recorded during a search, without corroborative material and without providing the assessee an opportunity to cross-examine deponents or access the material, are unsustainable in law.
The Tribunal held that additions made solely on the basis of statements recorded during a search, without corroborative material and without providing the assessee an opportunity to cross-examine deponents or access the material, are unsustainable in law.
The Tribunal held that additions made solely on the basis of statements recorded during a search, without corroborative material and without providing the assessee an opportunity to cross-examine deponents or access the material, are unsustainable in law.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263 as the assessment orders were passed after obtaining mandatory approval under Section 153D. The PCIT failed to examine the validity of this approval, which is a prerequisite for revision.