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604 orders · Page 12 of 13
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer was not justified in making a 100% disallowance without bringing adverse material, especially when the assessee had discharged their primary onus by providing evidence of purchases and banking transactions. The CIT(A)'s restriction to 12.5% was deemed reasonable.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme and that the Ld. DR had no objection. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that disallowing 100% of purchases was not justified, as the assessee had provided purchase bills, sales, and made payments through banking channels. It was decided that only the profit element embedded in such transactions should be taxed.
The Tribunal held that as per CBDT Circular dated 17.09.2024, no appeal shall be filed by the revenue before the Tribunal where the tax effect is below Rs. 60 lakhs, and this circular is applicable to pending cases. Therefore, the revenue's appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the AO's rejection of the books of account and revaluation of closing stock lacked justification, as the assessee consistently followed accepted accounting methods. The Tribunal also upheld the CIT(A)'s direction regarding Section 14A disallowance based on actual exempt income.
The Tribunal held that the issue of non-consideration of derivative losses did not emanate from the assessment order passed under section 143(3) of the Act, as the assessment was completed without any addition. Therefore, the grounds raised by the assessee were dismissed, and the order of the CIT(A) was upheld.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of the disallowance under Section 14A. It reasoned that the issue of disallowance under Section 14A being limited to exempt income earned was settled law, citing Supreme Court and High Court decisions. The Tribunal noted that the amendment by Finance Act, 2022, inserting an Explanation to Section 14A, was held to be prospective by various judicial pronouncements, including the ITAT Mumbai in Bajaj Capital Ventures (P) Ltd. and the Delhi High Court in Era Infrastructure (India) Ltd. Since the assessee had not earned any exempt income for the relevant assessment years, and the amendment was not applicable retrospectively, the disallowance made by the AO was rightly deleted by the CIT(A). The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's ground of appeal on this issue. Regarding the disallowance under Section 36(1)(iii), the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had rejected the assessee's claim without going into its merits, solely on the ground that it should have been made by way of a revised return. Citing the jurisdictional High Court decision in CIT vs. Pruthvi Brokers and Shareholders, the Tribunal held that appellate authorities have the jurisdiction to entertain new claims. Therefore, the CIT(A) was not justified in rejecting the claim on that basis. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order on this issue and remanded it back for deciding on merits after providing an adequate opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be levied on additions made purely on an estimation basis. Relying on various judicial precedents, the Tribunal found that the penalty in this case was unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in passing an ex-parte order without adjudicating the appeal on merits, which is contrary to the mandate of Section 250(6) of the Act. The appeal was delayed due to the demise of the assessee and lack of awareness among family members.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had conducted a thorough verification of the issues related to income from other sources and capital gains during the original assessment. The AO had taken a reasonable and possible view based on the information provided, which could not be considered erroneous.
The Tribunal held that the share of loss from a partnership firm, being a negative figure debited to the Profit and Loss Account, cannot be added back while computing book profits under Section 115JB. Adjustments to book profits must strictly follow the clauses in the Explanation to Section 115JB.
The Tribunal held that the notice for reassessment and the consequent assessment order were void ab initio. This was because the company had undergone CIRP, and the resolution plan was approved by the NCLT prior to the issuance of the reassessment notice, making such action invalid.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) failed to consider that the relevant provision, Section 80G(5)(iv)(B), was omitted from the statute effective 01.04.2024. Therefore, the condition cited for rejection was no longer in force. The matter was restored to the CIT(E) for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that the show cause notices issued under Section 274 of the Act were vague and did not specify the exact nature of the fault alleged against the assessee. Therefore, the consequent levy of penalty was unsustainable and void ab initio.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal after considering the explanation of the assessee and the principles of substantial justice. The Tribunal noted that the assessment order, which formed the basis of the penalty, had already been quashed by a coordinate bench.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act. Firstly, the Tribunal found that the AO had conducted adequate inquiries and investigations into the purchases from NTPL, as evidenced by the assessment order. The AO had issued query memos, received responses and supporting evidence from the assessee, and after due examination, drew an adverse conclusion, disallowing the purchase. The Tribunal distinguished between 'lack of inquiry' and 'inadequate inquiry', citing the Delhi High Court in CIT Vs. Sunbeam Auto, stating that an order cannot be set aside under Section 263 merely on the ground of inadequate inquiry if some inquiry was made. The Tribunal also referred to the Bombay High Court in Gabriel India Ltd., emphasizing that revision proceedings cannot be initiated for 'fishing and roving enquiries' and that there must be a point of finality. Secondly, the Tribunal noted that the issue of disallowance of purchases was already the subject matter of appellate proceedings before the CIT(A). It held that the same issue could not be subject to re-verification and re-adjudication from a different perspective by the PCIT under Section 263, as the appellate authority has plenary powers. The Tribunal also cited the Supreme Court in Principal Commissioner of Income-tax-2, Meerut v. Canara Bank Securities Ltd., which held Section 263 proceedings invalid when the AO had made inquiries and taken a plausible view. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the PCIT and quashed the same, allowing the grounds of appeal.
The Tribunal held that the show cause notices issued under Section 274 of the Act were vague and did not specify the exact nature of the fault alleged against the assessee. Therefore, the consequent levy of penalty was unsustainable and void ab initio.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, emphasizing the principle of advancing substantial justice. It restored the matter to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, providing the assessee one more opportunity to present its case, and imposed a nominal cost of Rs. 2,000/- for non-cooperation during prior proceedings. Both appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, emphasizing the principle of advancing substantial justice. It restored the matter to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, providing the assessee one more opportunity to present its case, and imposed a nominal cost of Rs. 2,000/- for non-cooperation during prior proceedings. Both appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that cooperative banks are primarily cooperative societies and interest earned from them is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d), citing various High Court and Tribunal decisions. The AO was directed to verify the interest component and allow relief.
The Tribunal held that since no exempt income was earned by the assessee, Section 14A read with Rule 8D was not applicable. Furthermore, the AO's reliance on a specific ITAT decision was reversed by the Delhi High Court, and amendments to Section 14A were prospective.
The Tribunal held that Section 68 additions cannot be made if the assessee has not maintained books of account and opted for presumptive taxation under Section 44AD. Therefore, the additions made under Section 68 were deleted. The assessee's alternate prayer to treat deposits as business sales with a presumptive profit was accepted.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The assessee was granted an opportunity to present its case with evidence, adhering to the principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee's books were audited u/s 44AB and all supporting documents were verified and found satisfactory by the AO during remand, the estimation of profit by rejecting the books of accounts was not justifiable. The additions sustained by the CIT(A) were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO under Section 69C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were unsustainable both on facts and in law. The Tribunal noted that the assessee was engaged in the business of financing short-term mortgage loans against gold ornaments. His business model involved sourcing funds through gold-backed bank loans and deploying them to customers at a higher interest rate to earn a spread. The Tribunal found that the assessee had maintained proper documentation, including borrower ledgers, bank statements, and gold loan account statements, which clearly showed that the income generated was solely from the net interest margin. The cash withdrawals from the assessee's sole bank account, amounting to approximately Rs. 89,12,916/-, were identified as withdrawals of sanctioned gold loans from the bank, intended to be advanced to customers against gold mortgages. The Tribunal observed that the lower authorities had not adequately considered these documents and had disregarded the accounting trail. It was further noted that the AO had not brought any contrary material to disprove the genuineness of the gold loan transactions or the income pattern disclosed. The Tribunal emphasized that cash withdrawals from a disclosed bank account, which are recorded in the books of account and sourced from sanctioned loans, do not constitute income unless proven to be unexplained expenditure under Section 69C or unrecorded receipts under Sections 68 or 69. The Tribunal concluded that the AO had erroneously treated all bank withdrawals as unexplained expenses without correlating them to the actual business cycle. Therefore, the addition under Section 69C was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the additions. Regarding the assessment under Section 153A for unabated years, the Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that such assessments must be based on incriminating material found during the search. Since the CIT(A) found no incriminating material relevant to the assessment year 2014-15, the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) were not sustainable. Consequently, the deletion of the addition of Rs. 10,00,000/- on account of slump sale, the disallowance of Rs. 64,95,363/- under Section 36(1)(iii), and the disallowance of Rs. 1,77,98,925/- for set-off of brought forward loss were affirmed. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s reasoning that for unabated assessments, the AO cannot make additions without unearthing incriminating material. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal upheld the deletion of disallowance under Section 14A. It noted that the issue is no longer res integra, and no disallowance can be made in excess of exempt income earned. Since the assessee had not earned any exempt income, the deletion by the CIT(A) was correct. The amendment to Section 14A by the Finance Act, 2022, was held to be not applicable to the relevant assessment years, citing judicial decisions like Bajaj Capital Ventures (P) Ltd. and Era Infrastructure (India) Ltd. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's ground of appeal on this issue. Regarding the disallowance under Section 36(1)(iii), the Tribunal, respectfully following the jurisdictional High Court's decision in CIT vs. Pruthvi Brokers and Shareholders, held that the CIT(A) was not justified in rejecting the assessee's claim without going into its merits, merely on the ground that it should have been made by way of a revised return. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order on this issue and remanded it back for deciding on merits after providing an adequate opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The Revenue's appeals were dismissed, and the assessee's appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 13 days in filing the appeal by liberally interpreting the expression 'Sufficient Cause'. Following the precedent of quantum additions being restored, the present appeal was also restored to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 14A can only be made to the extent of exempt income earned. Since the assessee had not earned any exempt income during the relevant assessment year, the disallowance made by the AO was rightly deleted by the CIT(A). The Tribunal further noted that the amendment to Section 14A by the Finance Act, 2022, inserting an Explanation, was held to be prospective in nature by various judicial decisions, including the ITAT Mumbai in Bajaj Capital Ventures (P) Ltd. and the Delhi High Court in Era Infrastructure (India) Ltd. Therefore, the amendment was not applicable to the assessment years in question. Regarding the disallowance under Section 36(1)(iii), the Tribunal, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision in CIT vs. Pruthvi Brokers and Shareholders, held that the CIT(A) was not justified in rejecting the assessee's claim merely on the ground that it should have been made by way of a revised return. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order on this issue and remanded it back for deciding on merits after providing an adequate opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to appear and provide evidence to substantiate the source of the funds, even after opportunities. The CIT(A)'s findings upholding the addition were found to be reasonable and without interference.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice was issued beyond the time limit prescribed under the unamended provisions of Section 149(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as per the Supreme Court's decision in Ashish Agarwal. The assessee's defenses under Section 149 were preserved.
The Tribunal decided to allow one more opportunity to the assessee to represent their case before the CIT(A), restoring the matter to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the approval obtained from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) was not valid for issuing a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal and the provisions of Section 151 of the new regime. It noted that for reassessment notices issued after three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the approval of the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner is required. In this case, the notice was issued on 30.07.2022 for AY 2016-17, which was beyond three years. Although the period of three years from the end of AY 2017-18 fell within the TOLA period (20.03.2020 to 31.03.2021), extending the sanction deadline to 30.06.2021, the approval obtained was from the PCIT, whereas Section 151(ii) of the new regime mandates approval from the PCCIT or CCIT when more than three years have elapsed. The Tribunal concluded that non-compliance with Section 151(ii) affects the AO's jurisdiction. Consequently, the order passed under Section 148A(d), the reassessment proceedings, and the consequential assessment order were quashed as bad in law. The assessee's ground of appeal was allowed, rendering other grounds academic.
The Tribunal held that the AO wrongly made additions under Section 68 as the assessee had successfully proved the repayment of the loans. The Tribunal noted that the AO relied on third-party information without providing an opportunity for cross-examination, which is illegal and against the principles of natural justice. Previous decisions of coordinate benches on similar lenders also supported deletion of additions.
The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's grounds related to embezzlement, finding the CIT(A)'s decision justified. However, it restored the Section 14A disallowance issue to the AO for de novo adjudication due to incorrect financial data being used.
The Tribunal held that while the disallowance of unpaid leave encashment under Section 43B(f) was justified due to the Supreme Court's interim order directing tax payment as if the provision was in force, the levy of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was not sustainable. The Tribunal reasoned that the assessment and penalty proceedings are distinct. The assessee had disclosed the amount in its books and the TAR, and had made a claim based on the Calcutta High Court's judgment, which was later reversed by the Supreme Court's interim order. The Tribunal considered this a bona fide mistake, not a deliberate concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court's decisions in Price Waterhouse Coopers (P.) Ltd. v. CIT and CIT vs. Reliance Petroproducts (P) Ltd., which held that a claim not sustainable in law, by itself, does not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars if made bona fide. Therefore, the penalty was deleted. The grounds of appeal related to the penalty were allowed.
The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be levied on additions made purely on an estimation basis. Relying on various judicial precedents, the Tribunal found that the penalty in this case was unsustainable.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the additions. Regarding the assessment under Section 153A for unabated years, the Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that such assessments must be based on incriminating material found during the search. Since the CIT(A) found no incriminating material relevant to the assessment year 2014-15, the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) were not sustainable. Consequently, the deletion of the addition of Rs. 10,00,000/- on account of slump sale, the disallowance of Rs. 64,95,363/- under Section 36(1)(iii), and the disallowance of Rs. 1,77,98,925/- for set-off of brought forward loss were affirmed. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s reasoning that for unabated assessments, the AO cannot make additions without unearthing incriminating material. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal decided to restore the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision, providing the assessee with one more opportunity for effective representation since they were ex-parte in the prior proceedings. This restoration was clarified not to reflect on the merits of the dispute.
The Tribunal noted that the delay in filing the appeal was minimal (6 days) and the assessee's case had merits, thus condoning the delay. Relying on coordinate bench decisions, the Tribunal held that no addition could be made if the difference between the stamp duty value and the actual sale consideration is less than 10%.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was due to a bonafide mistake and that substantial justice should be preferred over technicalities. The expression 'sufficient cause' was construed liberally, and the delay was condoned.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer (AO) failed to conduct proper verification or issue summons to the broker to ascertain the genuineness of the documents. The AO, acting as an investigator, should have dug deeper before making additions solely based on the documents not being authenticated. The AO was directed to delete the addition.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, finding sufficient cause. It held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal ex-parte without deciding on merits, which is contrary to Section 250(6) of the Act. The appellate order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal solely for non-prosecution. The impugned order was set aside, and the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication on merits, with a direction to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the application due to filing an incorrect form was a technical breach that could be rectified. They allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the CIT(E) to permit the assessee to file the correct form and reconsider the application.
The Tribunal held that the action of the AO in adding back the assessee's share of loss from the partnership firm to the book profits under section 115JB of the Act is not in accordance with law, and the CIT(A) erred in upholding the same. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission that the share of loss from a partnership firm, being a negative figure debited to the Profit and Loss Account, cannot be equated with ‘expenditure relatable to exempt income' for the purposes of clause (f) of Explanation 1 to section 115JB(2). The Tribunal also noted that clause (ii) of the Explanation pertains to amounts of income credited to the Profit and Loss Account, and a debit on account of loss cannot be covered under this provision. The Tribunal distinguished the revenue's reliance on Harprasad & Co. and Fixit (P.) Ltd., stating that the issue pertains to the specific computation of book profit under section 115JB, a special code, and adjustments must strictly follow the clauses in the Explanation. There is no express provision permitting the addition of share of loss from a partnership firm unless it falls under specified heads. The levy of interest under sections 234C and 234D was held to be consequential, and the AO was directed to recompute it after giving effect to the order. Ground III was general and did not require adjudication.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the notice issued u/s 148 of the Act dated 28.07.2022 was barred by limitation as per Section 149 of the Act, following the Supreme Court judgments in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal.
The Tribunal held that the return of income, though filed belatedly under Section 139(1), was filed within the time limit prescribed under Section 139(4) of the Act, which constitutes sufficient compliance. As the assessee had made substantial compliance by filing the tax audit report and Form-DA before the return, the denial of the deduction under Section 80JJAA was unwarranted. The AO was directed to grant the deduction.
The Tribunal held that the AO had made detailed inquiries regarding the allowability of the deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) and had passed a reasonable and possible view, which could not be termed as erroneous. Therefore, the PCIT was not justified in exercising the revisionary jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that catalyst expenses are allowable as revenue expenditure, and accounting treatment does not determine their nature. It also held that no disallowance under Section 14A can be made in the absence of exempt income. The PCIT's order under Section 263 was set aside as the AO had made proper inquiries and applied their mind.