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604 orders · Page 11 of 13
The Tribunal held that the protective assessment made in the hands of the appellant is invalid and therefore quashed. The reasoning was based on the established principle that a protective assessment cannot stand independently and must be preceded by a substantive assessment. The Tribunal noted that the AO's response confirmed that no substantive assessment had been made in the hands of Smt. Varsha Bhatia for AY 2019-20, and no further action could be taken against her due to the limitation period under Section 149 of the Act. Respectfully following the decisions of the co-ordinate benches of the Tribunal, which in turn relied on the Supreme Court's observations in Lalji Haridas v. ITO, it was concluded that a protective assessment without a substantive assessment is not sustainable in law. The appeal of the appellant was allowed, with the operative direction being the quashing of the protective assessment.
The Tribunal held that the loan from DN Energy Private Limited was sufficiently supported by bank statements, justifying the deletion of the addition. However, for the loan from Sparzana Aviation Pvt Ltd, further evidence was required to establish creditworthiness.
The Tribunal noted that the First Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal without addressing the specific issues raised by the assessee, indicating a non-application of mind. The Tribunal set aside the order and restored the issues for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the Revenue's explanation for the delay, based on internal misreading and change of opinion by supervisory authorities, did not constitute a "sufficient cause". The application for condonation of delay was rejected.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, following coordinate bench rulings that the assessee's process of preparing Ujala Supreme constituted manufacturing. The issue regarding Section 14A disallowance was partly allowed, directing re-computation based on actual exempt income. The issue of Section 50C addition was restored to the AO for reference to the DVO.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) upheld the decision of the CIT(A), finding no infirmity in reducing the disallowance of bogus purchases to a 2% GP addition. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had followed a precedent from the ITAT in the assessee's own case for the same assessment year, which had similarly restricted the addition to 2% of the bogus purchase to prevent revenue loss. Consequently, the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the appeal ought not to have been dismissed without considering the reasons for the delay and affording a reasonable opportunity. The assessee was denied adequate opportunity during assessment and appellate proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were not justified and that the order of the CIT(A) deleting these additions was correct. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had placed on record relevant contract notes, share certificates, detailed corroborative documentary evidence indicating purchase/sale of shares through registered brokers by banking channels, and Demat statements. The revenue's sole case was based on circumstantial evidence suggesting bogus LTCG accommodation entries, but the Tribunal found no cogent evidence to pinpoint the assessee's connivance with penny stocks. The Tribunal distinguished the cases relied upon by the AO, such as Mc. Dowell and Co. Vs. CTO and Sumati Vs. CIT, stating that the facts of the present case were different. The Tribunal emphasized that suspicion, however strong, cannot replace evidence, and the onus to prove a transaction as bogus lies on the party claiming it to be so, requiring strict legal evidence. Since the revenue failed to controvert the specific evidence produced by the assessee and did not provide an opportunity for cross-examination, the additions were made on general reports. Therefore, the sale of shares was treated as genuine, and the exemption under Section 10(38) was rightly allowed by the CIT(A). The grounds of appeal raised by the revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the issue of claiming CSR expenses as a deduction under Section 80G is highly debatable. The AO had already examined the issue during the assessment. A mere difference of opinion between the AO and the PCIT does not make the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue.
The Tribunal held that the AO had conducted a proper inquiry and applied his mind to the issue before allowing the Section 80G deduction. The PCIT's invocation of Section 263 was found to be incorrect as the AO's view was plausible and sustainable.
The Tribunal found that the assessee demonstrated reasonable cause for non-submission of documents and that sufficient opportunity was not granted during assessment proceedings. Although the assessee did not object to the short timeframe at the assessment stage, the Tribunal restored the matter to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication in the interest of justice.
The Tribunal held that the rights in the property were vested in the assessee only upon the execution of the agreement dated 04.04.2011, not merely by making substantial payments. Therefore, indexation from FY 2011-12 was correctly applied.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, following a coordinate bench's ruling that the assessee's process of preparing Ujala Supreme constituted manufacturing. The Tribunal also directed the AO to re-compute disallowance under Section 14A based on actual exempt income and restore the issue of Section 50C addition to the AO for reference to the DVO.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had genuine reasons for non-compliance before the CIT(A) and that the assessee could not effectively represent their case. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the matter back to the CIT(A) to provide one more opportunity for the assessee to present their case.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO was unsustainable as the assessee had provided documentary evidence to prove the genuineness of the share transactions. Relying on various judicial precedents, the Tribunal found that the transactions were not bogus and the assessee had complied with the necessary documentation.
The Tribunal considered the rival submissions and noted that both the Assessing Officer and CIT(A) passed ex-parte orders. In the interest of natural justice, the matter was restored back to the Assessing Officer to pass a fresh assessment order after providing a fair opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the exceptions mentioned in the CBDT circular regarding monetary limits for filing appeals were not applicable to the present case, as the issue pertained to Section 40(a)(ia) and not directly to TDS deduction proceedings under Sections 201 or 201(1A).
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, following a coordinate bench ruling that the assessee's process of preparing Ujala Supreme constituted manufacturing. The Tribunal also directed the AO to re-compute disallowance under Section 14A based on actual exempt income and restore a Section 50C issue to the AO for reference to the DVO.
The Tribunal held that the addition made under Section 69/68 of the Act was unsustainable. Relying on the Bombay High Court judgment in Ivan Singh, it was noted that a credit appearing in an earlier financial year cannot be brought to tax in a subsequent year. Since the loan was received in FY 2016-17, the addition in the relevant assessment year was unjustified.
The Tribunal noted that the grounds of appeal were intricately linked and required factual verification. The Tribunal found it appropriate to remand the issue back to the CIT(A) for a fresh examination after providing the assessee with an opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, following a coordinate bench's ruling that the assessee's process of preparing Ujala Supreme constituted manufacturing. The Tribunal also directed the AO to re-compute disallowance under Section 14A based on actual exempt income and restore the issue of Section 50C addition to the AO for reference to the DVO.
The Tribunal held that the transfer was completed in AY 2014-15 when full consideration was received and possession was handed over, as per Section 2(47)(v) read with Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The subsequent registration was a procedural formality and could not defer taxability.
The Tribunal held that the AO had consciously taken a view to allow the deduction and that a mere difference of opinion between the AO and PCIT does not make the assessment order erroneous. Relying on Supreme Court judgments, the Tribunal found that the issue of deduction of interest income from investments in cooperative banks has been consistently decided in favor of the assessee.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, following a coordinate bench's ruling that the assessee's process of preparing Ujala Supreme constituted manufacturing. The Tribunal also directed the AO to re-compute disallowance under Section 14A based on actual exempt income and restore the issue of Section 50C addition to the AO for reference to the DVO.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, following coordinate bench rulings that the assessee's process of preparing Ujala Supreme constituted manufacturing. For other issues, the Tribunal directed re-computation of disallowances and restoration of issues to the AO for verification.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the assessee's process of preparing Ujala Supreme constituted manufacturing as per the Act. The revenue's appeals regarding this issue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to claim the concessional rate of tax under Section 115BAA of the Act. The Tribunal relied on the decision of a co-ordinate bench in the case of Suminter India Organics Pvt Ltd. The reasoning was that while Section 115BAA(5) mandates filing the option on or before the due date under Section 139(1), the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxations and Amendments of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA) provided relaxations. Specifically, Section 3(1)(b) of TOLA extended the time limit for filing various documents, including returns and statements, to March 31, 2021, or a later date notified by the Central Government. Although a proviso to Section 3(1) carved out an exception for the furnishing of the income tax return itself, the filing of Form 10IC, which is a document for exercising the option under Section 115BAA, was covered by the general relaxation under Section 3(1)(b) of TOLA. The Tribunal emphasized that TOLA's relaxation provisions should be interpreted liberally to mitigate hardships caused by the pandemic. Therefore, the filing of Form 10IC by March 31, 2021, was considered within the permissible extended time. The CIT(A)'s order was upheld, directing the AO to recompute the tax liability at the concessional rate.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, following a coordinate bench's ruling that the assessee's process of preparing Ujala Supreme constituted manufacturing. The Tribunal also directed the AO to re-compute disallowances under Section 14A based on actual exempt income and to refer a property sale issue to the DVO.
The Tribunal held that the revision order passed by the PCIT under Section 263 was unsustainable in law. The Tribunal found that the AO had made necessary inquiries by calling for details of donations under Section 142(1) and had considered the assessee's claim for deduction under Section 80G. The AO's allowance of the claim was considered a plausible view. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Malabar Industries Ltd. v. CIT, the Tribunal reiterated that for Section 263 jurisdiction to be invoked, the AO's order must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. The Tribunal noted that if two views are possible and the AO adopts one, it cannot be treated as erroneous unless the view is unsustainable in law. The Tribunal also referred to the Delhi Tribunal's decision in Interglobe Technology Quotient (P.) Ltd., which held that the mandatory nature of CSR expenditure does not justify its disallowance under Section 80G if other conditions are fulfilled. The Tribunal concluded that the deduction of CSR expenditure under Section 80G is allowable, and the AO's order allowing it was not erroneous. Therefore, the revision order was quashed, and the assessee's ground of appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme and that the Ld. DR had no objection. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that as per CBDT Circular dated 17.09.2024, no appeal shall be filed by the revenue before the Tribunal where the tax effect is below Rs. 60 lakhs, and this circular is applicable to pending cases. Therefore, the revenue's appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was empowered to set aside the ex-parte assessment and remand the case to the AO for a fresh assessment. Any grievances regarding the notice or additions would be open for consideration before the AO during the de novo assessment.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 510 crores made by the AO under Section 28(iv) of the Act was not sustainable. The Tribunal noted that for Section 28(iv) to apply, the benefit or perquisite must arise from business or the exercise of a profession and should be in a form other than money. In this case, the alleged benefit was in the form of investments, which are essentially monetary transactions. Furthermore, the Tribunal emphasized that loan transactions between corporate entities are between distinct legal entities, and a shareholder does not have an interest in the company's property, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Mrs. Bacha F Guzdar v. CIT. The Tribunal concluded that the conditions for invoking Section 28(iv) were not met. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition of Rs. 510 crores. As the addition was deleted, other issues raised by the assessee were left open. The Tribunal did not decide on the validity of the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 or the powers of the CIT(A) under Section 251, as these became consequential to the deletion of the addition.
The Tribunal held that recoveries from bad debts written off are not taxable if the bad debts were not claimed as a deduction. It also found that the disallowance under section 14A made by the AO was unsustainable as the CIT(A) had rightly accepted the assessee's method of disallowance.
The Tribunal held that the order under Section 263 of the Act, which formed the basis of the impugned addition, had been quashed by the Tribunal itself. Therefore, until the Revenue succeeds in its challenge before the High Court, the Section 263 order is not in existence, and the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition is upheld.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice issued u/s 148 was time-barred by 46 days, as per the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajeev Bansal. Consequently, the assessment order was deemed bad in law.
The Tribunal noted that while the AO relied on an Investigation Wing report alleging AadiImpex provided accommodation entries, the assessee had prima facie discharged their onus by providing supporting documents. The AO made the addition based on an average gross profit ratio. Considering similar transactions in other cases where disallowances were restricted, and the AO's own addition was already limited, the Tribunal found no reason to further reduce the disallowance.
The CIT(A) deleted the addition, finding that the assessee provided sufficient documentary evidence to prove the services rendered and the receipt of the amount as revenue. The CIT(A) noted that the statement relied upon by the AO was retracted and the transaction was through banking channels.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. PCIT passed the impugned order in a hurried manner without providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The Tribunal restored the matter to the Ld. PCIT for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in revising the assessment order. The 80G deduction for CSR expenditure was allowable as per co-ordinate bench decisions, and the education cess withdrawal was duly documented. Therefore, the PCIT's revision order was quashed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee could not effectively represent their case before the CIT(A) and that additional evidence was sought. Considering these circumstances, the Tribunal decided to restore the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) passed an ex-parte order without deciding the merits, which is contrary to Section 250(6) of the Act. The Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) to provide the assessee with another opportunity to present his case.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's explanation regarding her lack of technical proficiency and her husband's overseas presence. However, it found a lack of diligence. While upholding the penalty, the Tribunal restricted its levy to Rs. 10,000.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s finding on the addition of recoveries from bad debts under section 41(1) was not explicitly detailed in the provided excerpt, but the assessee's appeal on this ground was ultimately considered as part of the overall outcome. Regarding the disallowance under section 14A, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restore the assessee's method of disallowance at 2% of exempt income. The Tribunal reasoned that the AO had not pointed out specific weaknesses in the assessee's accounts or established a nexus between the disallowed expenditure and the exempt income. It emphasized that even after the introduction of sub-sections (2) and (3) to section 14A and Rule 8D, the foundational requirement of a proximate connection between expenditure and earning of exempt income under section 14A(1) remains. The Tribunal also noted that investments held as stock-in-trade should be excluded from Rule 8D computation and only investments yielding exempt income should be considered, citing various judicial precedents. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal on this ground. For the addition under section 69C, the Tribunal noted it was identical to an issue decided in favour of the assessee in its own appeal and thus dismissed the Revenue's ground. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee's appeal was partly allowed and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed under the unamended Section 148 notice, following the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Court, has no legs to stand and is set aside. Other grounds of appeal were dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the issue regarding jurisdictional vs. faceless assessment notices is pending before the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) to complete the de novo assessment within one year.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had already offered the amount of Rs. 18,11,71,802/- to tax as part of its net profit, and the adjustment by the CPC was due to a mismatch in reporting on the IT portal. Therefore, the addition made u/s 41(1) was set aside. Regarding the TDS credit, the AO was directed to verify the TDS amount and allow credit as per law upon production of necessary evidence by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that TDS credit cannot be restricted to Form 26AS if actual evidence of deduction and deposit is provided. The AO was directed to verify the taxpayer receipt and allow the credit if found in order.
The Tribunal held that the learned PCIT erred in initiating revisionary proceedings under section 263 of the Act on the issue of deduction claimed under section 80G of the Act in respect of CSR expenses. The Tribunal noted that the allowability of CSR expenditure under section 80G has been decided in favour of the taxpayer in various decisions, making the issue debatable. Therefore, it falls outside the purview of revisionary powers under section 263. The Tribunal also referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in PCIT vs. Postal Gujarat Power Ltd., stating that if a legal issue can be answered based on existing material, there is no purpose in asking the AO to conduct the same exercise. The Tribunal found that the authorities below erred in denying the assessee's claim under section 80G and had not verified the nature of payments or eligibility quantum. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the impugned order passed by the PCIT under section 263 and allowed the grounds raised by the assessee. The issue of deduction under section 80G in respect of CSR expenses was not definitively decided on merits, but the revisionary order was set aside. The Tribunal remitted the issue back to the AO for verifying the conditions necessary to claim deduction under section 80G, directing the AO to grant deduction to the extent of eligibility after the assessee files requisite details.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient documentary evidence, including a remittance advice, Memorandum of Transfer, and Family Arrangement, to explain the source of funds. The CIT(A) had rightly deleted the addition.