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699 orders · Page 11 of 14
The Tribunal held that the notice for reassessment under Section 148 was issued beyond the permissible three-year period from the end of the relevant assessment year, and the escaped income was below Rs. 50 lakhs. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings were void ab initio.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had been enjoying approval under Section 80G since 2009 and was eligible for regular approval even when applying for provisional approval. The Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision on merits after giving the assessee an opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings are vitiated due to the defect in the notice. Citing the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Mohammed Farhan A Shaikh vs DCIT, the Tribunal emphasized that a penalty proceeding must stand on its own and the assessee must be informed of the grounds of the penalty proceedings solely through the statutory notice. An omnibus notice suffers from vagueness. The Court stated that a defect in the notice, such as not striking off the irrelevant matter, vitiates the penalty proceedings. The primary burden lies on the Revenue to clearly inform the assessee of the grounds. The Tribunal further noted that penal provisions, even with civil consequences, must be construed strictly, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the assessee. The judgment in Smt. Kaushalya was distinguished as not laying down the correct proposition of law on this aspect. Since the appeals were decided in favour of the assessee on legal grounds, the examination of the merits of the case was rendered academic.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to sufficient cause. The Tribunal remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication, granting the assessee one more opportunity to present their case, adhering to principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal held that a penalty notice suffering from vagueness is bad in law. Drawing from the case of Mohammed Farhan A Shaikh vs DCIT, it was decided that a penalty proceeding must stand on its own and the assessee must be informed of the grounds of penalty through a statutory notice. An omnibus notice is vague and vitiates the penalty proceedings. The Tribunal further found that the assessee had discharged its primary responsibility of explaining the nature and source of credits.
The Tribunal held that there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A). The Tribunal noted the extensive internal disputes within the society from 2011 to 2022, which led to administrative delays and non-cooperation in record handover. The resignation of the society manager and the accountant, coupled with the withholding of records by previous office bearers, further contributed to the delay. Crucially, the Tribunal considered the Supreme Court's direction in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020 to exclude the period from March 15, 2020, to February 28, 2022, for limitation purposes due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Tribunal found the assessee's explanation for the delay to be bonafide and genuine, supported by an affidavit that the revenue did not contradict. Citing the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Collector, Land Acquisition vs. MST. Katiji & Ors., the Tribunal emphasized that refusing to condone delay can lead to a meritorious matter being thrown out. Therefore, the Tribunal condoned the delay, set aside the CIT(A)'s orders, and restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits. The issue of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was noted as not being res integra, having been decided in favour of the assessee by coordinate benches. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had established sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A). The Tribunal noted the detailed explanation provided in the assessee's affidavit, including internal disputes, non-cooperation in record handover, the resignation of the society manager and accountant, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Tribunal also considered the Supreme Court's directive to exclude the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 for limitation purposes due to the pandemic. The revenue had not contradicted the assessee's affidavit. Citing Supreme Court judgments in Union of India vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeeboy and Collector, Land Acquisition vs. MST. Katiji & Ors., the Tribunal emphasized the need for a liberal approach to condone delay when sufficient cause is shown to do substantial justice. The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s refusal to condone the delay and dismissal of appeals in limini to be a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the Tribunal condoned the delay, set aside the CIT(A)'s orders, and restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A). The Tribunal noted the extensive internal disputes within the society from 2011 to 2022, the non-cooperation of previous office bearers in handing over records, the resignation of the society manager due to disputes, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic which stalled operations. The Tribunal also considered the Supreme Court's direction to exclude the period from March 15, 2020, to February 28, 2022, for limitation purposes due to the pandemic. The revenue had not contradicted the assessee's affidavit. Citing the Supreme Court's decisions in Union of India vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeeboy and Collector, Land Acquisition vs. MST. Katiji & Ors., the Tribunal emphasized the need for a liberal approach to condone delays to enable substantial justice. The Tribunal found that the refusal to condone the delay by the CIT(A) resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the Tribunal condoned the delay, set aside the CIT(A)'s order, and restored the appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits. The issue of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was also noted as not being res integra, having been decided in favor of the assessee by coordinate benches.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and, considering the assessee's argument that the deposits were on behalf of a partnership firm and not properly considered, remanded the issue back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the onus of proving the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the loan transactions. Regarding the undervaluation of imports, the Tribunal noted that the basis of the addition was a Note-Verbale from Italy, which was not conclusive and had been challenged by the assessee before the Customs authorities. Furthermore, the Customs Appellate Authority had deleted similar additions. The Tribunal found that the AO's addition lacked sufficient evidence and relied on an unsubstantiated source.
The Tribunal held that the one-day delay in depositing ESIC and PF contributions was due to a technical glitch beyond the assessee's control and that there was no malafide intention. Therefore, the disallowance and addition made were not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the onus of proving the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the loan transactions. Regarding the undervaluation of imports, the Tribunal noted that the basis of the addition was a Note-Verbale from Italy, which was not conclusive and had been challenged by the assessee before the Customs authorities. Furthermore, the Customs Appellate Authority had deleted similar additions. The Tribunal found that the AO's addition lacked sufficient evidence and relied on an unsubstantiated source.
The authorized representative moved an application for withdrawal of the appeals. The appeals were dismissed as withdrawn on the concession made by the assessee.
The authorized representative moved an application for withdrawal of the appeals. The appeals were dismissed as withdrawn on the concession made by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings are vitiated due to a defect in the notice issued under Section 271(1)(c) read with Section 274 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Citing the Hon'ble Bombay High Court (Panaji Bench) in Mohammed Farhan A Shaikh vs DCIT, the Tribunal found that a penalty proceeding is a corollary to assessment proceedings but must stand on its own. The statutory notice must clearly inform the assessee of the grounds for penalty. An omnibus notice suffers from vagueness, and penal provisions must be construed strictly, with ambiguity resolved in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal answered the first question in the affirmative, holding that a defect in the notice vitiates the penalty proceedings. Consequently, the examination of the merits of the case, including the explanation of unsecured loans, was rendered academic. The appeals were allowed on legal grounds.
The Tribunal held that the issue of excess DDT paid under Section 115-O is independent of the assessment of total income and must be adjudicated in a separate appeal under Section 246A. The Tribunal restored the issues to the file of the First Appellate Authority for adjudication on merits after condoning the delay.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had settled the quantum appeal under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme. Consequently, no penalty can be levied, and the present appeal becomes infructuous.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding that the assessee was not properly served with notices. On merits, the Tribunal held that retention money, which is received only upon completion of contractual obligations and has not yet been received by the assessee, cannot be taxed in the current year.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had indeed written off the debt in its books by debiting the profit and loss account and crediting the debtor's account, even though the nomenclature used was 'provision for doubtful debts'. The Tribunal found that the statutory requirements for claiming bad debt under Section 36(1)(vii) were met.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed a rectification application under Section 154, which was allowed by the CPC. Subsequently, the return was selected for scrutiny, and the AO accepted the returned income. Therefore, the Tribunal found no merit in the revenue's appeal.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) should have waited for a remand report from the AO, especially since the assessment was ex-parte and the assessee had not furnished details. The matter was remitted to the AO for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient opening cash balance and had explained the source of the cash deposit through her rental income and for medical treatment. The addition made by the AO was not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that since a part of the consideration was paid via account payee cheque prior to the agreement date, the stamp duty value as on the date of the agreement in Financial Year 2013-14 should be taken into account. Consequently, the addition made by the Assessing Officer is liable to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the reimbursements were purely on a cost-to-cost basis without any mark-up and did not represent income taxable in the hands of the assessee. The Tribunal followed its own previous decisions and the Bombay High Court ruling in CIT vs. Siemens Aktiongeselschaft.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was not sustainable as the AO had adequately verified the depreciation claim on goodwill. The claim was based on the written down value brought forward and supported by judicial precedents.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was not sustainable as the AO had adequately verified the depreciation claim on goodwill. The claim was based on the written down value brought forward and supported by judicial precedents.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was not sustainable as the AO had adequately verified the depreciation claim on goodwill. The claim was based on the written down value brought forward and supported by judicial precedents.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was not sustainable as the AO had adequately verified the depreciation claim on goodwill. The claim was based on the written down value brought forward and supported by judicial precedents.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC erred in dismissing the appeal ex-parte without granting a fair and proper opportunity of hearing. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) to adjudicate on the grounds of appeal on merit.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's case is covered by specific provisions of section 194A(3)(i) and 194A(3)(viia), rather than the general provision of section 194A(3)(v). The Tribunal referred to the ratio in CIT vs. Yeshwanthpur Credit Co-operative Society Limited and Bhagani Nivedita Sahakari Bank Ltd. vs. ACIT, which distinguish between a co-operative bank and a co-operative society, interpreting section 194A(3)(v) to mean co-operative societies other than co-operative banks. The Tribunal noted that the amendment to section 194A was prospective, applicable from 01.06.2015. It concluded that the assessee, being a co-operative bank engaged in banking business, was liable to deduct TDS on interest payments exceeding Rs. 10,000, as the exemption under section 194A(3)(v) did not apply to it in this context. The Tribunal found that the recipients were housing co-operative societies, which are neither co-operative banks nor co-operative societies engaged in banking business, making the assessee liable for TDS. Therefore, the Tribunal upheld the orders of the CIT(A) and dismissed all grounds of appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's case is covered by the specific provisions of section 194A(3)(i) and 194A(3)(viia)(b) rather than the general provision of section 194A(3)(v). The reasoning was based on judicial interpretations from cases like CIT vs. Yeshwanthpur Credit Co-operative Society Limited (Karnataka High Court) and Bhagani Nivedita Sahakari Bank Ltd. vs. ACIT (ITAT Pune Bench), which distinguish between a cooperative bank and a cooperative society. These judgments indicate that a cooperative bank, exclusively carrying on banking business, is subject to specific TDS provisions, and the exemption under section 194A(3)(v) should be interpreted as applying to cooperative societies other than cooperative banks. The Tribunal noted that the amendment to section 194A(3)(v) w.e.f. 01.06.2015 made cooperative banks liable to deduct tax at source on interest paid to their members. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee, being a cooperative bank, was liable to deduct TDS for payments of interest above the threshold of Rs. 10,000, and the amendment was applicable to the years under appeal. Therefore, the orders of the CIT(A) were upheld. The Tribunal expressly left undecided the argument regarding the proviso to S. 194A being inserted w.e.f. 1.4.2020, focusing instead on the applicability of specific clauses of S. 194A(3).
The Tribunal held that the assessee's case is covered by specific provisions of section 194A(3)(i)(b) and section 194A(3)(viia)(b), rather than the general provision of section 194A(3)(v). The reasoning was based on judicial precedents, including the Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. Yeshwanthpur Credit Co-operative Society Limited and the ITAT Pune Bench in Bhagani Nivedita Sahakari Bank Ltd. vs. ACIT, which distinguish between a co-operative bank and a co-operative society. These rulings indicate that a co-operative bank engaged exclusively in banking business is subject to specific tax deduction provisions. The Tribunal also referred to the Moolamattom Electricity Board Employees Co-operative Bank Ltd. case, which differentiates between primary credit societies and co-operative societies engaged in banking. The Tribunal found that the recipients of interest were housing co-operative societies, which are neither co-operative banks nor co-operative societies engaged in banking business, making them liable for TDS. The amendment to section 194A, making co-operative banks liable for TDS on interest paid to members, was considered prospective and applicable from June 1, 2015. Since the assessee is a co-operative society engaged in banking business and the exemption for interest payments is limited to Rs. 10,000, the assessee was liable to deduct TDS on interest payments exceeding this threshold. The Tribunal upheld the orders of the CIT(A) and dismissed all grounds of appeal.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's case is covered by the specific provisions of section 194A(3)(i) and 194A(3)(viia) rather than the general provision of section 194A(3)(v). The Tribunal noted that the assessee is a co-operative bank engaged in banking business and is subject to specific TDS provisions. It referred to the Karnataka High Court's decision in CIT vs. Yeshwanthpur Credit Co-operative Society Limited and the ITAT Pune Bench's decision in Bhagani Nivedita Sahakari Bank Ltd. vs. ACIT, which interpreted "Co-operative Society" in Section 194A(3)(v) to mean a co-operative society other than a co-operative bank. The Tribunal also cited the Kerala High Court's distinction between primary credit societies and co-operative societies engaged in banking. The Tribunal concluded that the amendment to section 194A was prospective and applicable from 01.06.2015. Since the assessee is a co-operative bank and the exemption for interest payment was only up to Rs. 10,000, the assessee was liable to deduct TDS for interest payments above this threshold. Therefore, the action of the AO and the order of the CIT(A) were upheld. All grounds of appeal were dismissed.
The Tribunal noted that the loan was initially taken through banking channels, and the repayment was also made through banking channels to a sister concern as directed by the original creditor. The Tribunal found that the assessee was denied a reasonable opportunity to prove the transaction.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's case is covered by specific provisions of Section 194A(3)(i)(b) and Section 194A(3)(viia)(b), rather than the general provision of Section 194A(3)(v). The Tribunal relied on judicial pronouncements from the Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. Yeshwanthpur Credit Co-operative Society Limited and the ITAT Pune Bench in Bhagani Nivedita Sahakari Bank Ltd. vs. ACIT, which interpreted "Co-operative Society" in Section 194A(3)(v) to mean a cooperative society other than a cooperative bank. The Tribunal also noted the distinction made by the Kerala High Court between primary credit societies and cooperative societies engaged in banking business. It was concluded that the assessee, being a cooperative bank engaged in banking business, was liable to deduct TDS on interest payments exceeding Rs. 10,000, as the specific provisions applicable to it override the general exemption. The amendment to Section 194A w.e.f. 01.06.2015 was considered applicable to the year under appeal. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the action of the CIT(A) and dismissed all grounds of appeal.
The Tribunal held that the AO did not bring any adverse material against the assessee's categorical stand and evidences. The assessee had discharged his primary onus by showing a long holding period and sale through a recognized stock exchange. The onus shifted to the AO to bring contrary evidence, which was not done. The CIT(A) was justified in allowing relief.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s reduction of the WIP addition to 10% was arbitrary and lacked a rational basis, dismissing the revenue's ground. The Tribunal also found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s deletion of the interest addition, as the AO failed to produce comparable data.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 11(3) by the Finance Act, 2022, is prospective and does not affect the utilization period for accumulations made in earlier years. The assessee had utilized the funds within the permissible time frame as per the law existing at the time of accumulation.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's case is covered by specific provisions of section 194A(3)(i) and 194A(3)(viia)(b), which are specific in nature, rather than the general provision of section 194A(3)(v). The reasoning was based on the principle that specific provisions override general provisions, citing Supreme Court's decision in South Indian Corporation (P) Ltd. vs. Secretary, Board of Revenue. The Tribunal also referred to interpretations by the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. Yeshwanthpur Credit Co-operative Society Limited and the Hon'ble ITAT Pune Bench in Bhagani Nivedita Sahakari Bank Ltd. vs. ACIT, which interpreted "Co-operative Society" in section 194A(3)(v) to mean a cooperative society other than a cooperative bank. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee, as a cooperative bank, was liable to deduct tax at source on interest paid to other cooperative societies, as specific clauses mandating TDS deduction applied. The amendment to section 194A w.e.f. 01.06.2015 was considered prospective. Therefore, the assessee was liable to deduct TDS for payments above the Rs. 10,000 threshold. The Tribunal upheld the orders of the CIT(A).
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had settled the matter under the Vivad se Viswas Scheme and paid the tax liability. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty granted to revive it if the settlement is not finalized.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) and the Tribunal, noting the sufficient cause explained by the assessee due to personal difficulties. The Tribunal restored the matter back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment, providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal noted that the disallowance under Section 14A cannot exceed the exempt income. The AO's disallowance of Rs. 9.78 crore swallowed the entire exempt income, and the AO disregarded the proviso to Rule 8D(2). The Tribunal relied on previous consistent decisions of the Tribunal and the High Court in similar cases.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's case is covered by specific provisions of section 194A(3)(i) and (viia) rather than the general provision of section 194A(3)(v). The Tribunal relied on judicial pronouncements, including the Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. Yeshwanthpur Credit Co-operative Society Limited and the ITAT Pune Bench in Bhagani Nivedita Sahakari Bank Ltd. vs. ACIT, which interpret that 'Co-operative Society' in section 194A(3)(v) should be interpreted as a cooperative society other than a cooperative bank. The Tribunal noted that cooperative banks are distinct from cooperative societies due to their banking functions regulated by the RBI. The amendment to section 194A(3)(v) w.e.f. 01.06.2015, which mandates cooperative banks to deduct tax at source on interest paid to their members, was considered prospective and applicable to the assessment year under appeal. Therefore, the assessee, being a cooperative bank, was liable to deduct TDS on interest payments exceeding Rs. 10,000. The Tribunal upheld the orders of the CIT(A) and dismissed all grounds of appeal.
The Tribunal held that for private discretionary trusts, the surcharge should be computed based on the slab rates prescribed under the 'surcharge on income tax' heading in the Finance Act, not at the highest rate. This decision followed a Special Bench ruling on similar facts.
The Tribunal held that for private discretionary trusts, the surcharge should be computed based on the slab rates prescribed under the 'surcharge on income tax' heading in the Finance Act, not at the highest rate. This decision followed a Special Bench ruling on similar facts.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a cooperative bank, was specifically covered by provisions requiring TDS on interest payments to other cooperative societies, and the general exemption under Section 194A(3)(v) was not applicable. The amendment to Section 194A was prospective and applicable to the assessment year in question.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s reduction of the WIP addition to 10% was arbitrary and lacked a rational basis, dismissing the revenue's ground. The Tribunal also found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s deletion of the interest addition, as the AO failed to produce comparable data.
The Tribunal held that the utilization of funds outside India, as per the objects clause, does not constitute a "specified violation" under Section 12AB(4) of the Act. The CIT(E)'s reasoning was not a core ground for rejection and should be examined during assessment proceedings.
The assessee's authorized representative requested to withdraw the appeal as the relief was already granted by the CIT(A). The revenue did not oppose the withdrawal.
The Tribunal held that the assessee deserves a second opportunity to furnish the necessary documents. Therefore, the issue is restored to the file of the CIT(Exemptions), who is directed to decide the matter afresh after affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee.