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699 orders · Page 12 of 14
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by not adjudicating the legal ground raised by the assessee regarding the validity of the reassessment notice under Section 148 due to limitation. The CIT(A) failed to provide a speaking order on this issue.
The Tribunal, considering the facts and in the interest of justice, decided to restore the matter back to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. This restoration provides the assessee with due opportunity to present their case, and the assessee is directed to ensure requisite compliance before the Ld. CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the difference between the declared sale price and the Stamp Valuation Authority's value was within the 10% tolerance limit. The amendment to Section 56(2)(x) regarding the tolerance range was considered clarificatory and curative with retrospective effect. Therefore, no addition was liable to be made.
The Tribunal restored the issue of cash deposits made during demonetization to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication due to non-consideration of evidence. The issue of unsecured loans was also restored to CIT(A) for fresh consideration after the assessee provided supporting documents.
The Tribunal held that the misplacement of figures in the return was a rectifiable mistake, not a hyper-technical one, and that the assessee was eligible for the deduction.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, as a partner in a firm required to file a report under Section 92E, was entitled to the benefit of Explanation 2(aa) to Section 139(1) of the Act, making their due date November 30th. Consequently, the carry forward of loss was allowed, and the penalty under Section 234F was deleted.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the AO's additions were based on guesswork and conjecture without cogent evidence. The AO incorrectly rejected the assessee's books of account and failed to provide independent evidence for bogus purchases.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing sufficient cause based on the assessee's affidavit and reliance on Supreme Court judgments. The Tribunal deleted the addition made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A), stating it was based on surmises and conjectures without legal basis.
The Tribunal held that the valuation report considered intrinsic and prospective value, satisfying the statutory requirement. It also noted that similar shares were issued at Rs. 200 in earlier years and accepted. Additionally, a portion of the share money was received before Section 56(2)(viib) became effective.
The Tribunal held that the adjustment of Rs.19,44,032 made by the CPC lacked legal sustainability. The Tribunal found that while Section 143(1)(a)(ii) allows adjustments for incorrect claims apparent from information in the return, this principle does not apply when the income in question has been disclosed correctly under appropriate heads elsewhere in the return, and the omission is limited to a technical misreporting in a secondary schedule like Clause 5 of 'Other Information'. The records showed that the amount of Rs.19,44,032 was indeed disclosed, partly as taxable income and partly as exempt income. The CPC had proceeded mechanically without correlating disclosures across schedules, leading to a duplication of income. The Tribunal also found the CIT(A)'s reasoning regarding the merger of the Section 143(1) intimation with rectification orders to be legally untenable, as rectification proceedings are independent and do not affect the right of appeal against the original intimation. Consequently, the Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer to verify if the sum of Rs.19,44,032 was duly offered to tax or disclosed as exempt income under appropriate heads in the original return. If confirmed, the impugned adjustment was to be deleted. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the application, following precedent that procedural lapses should not defeat substantive rights. The CIT(E) was directed to consider the application on merits.
The Tribunal held that the difference between the stamp duty value and the consideration paid for the properties was within the permissible limit, making the addition under Section 56(2)(x)(b) unwarranted. The Tribunal also found that the addition under Section 50C was not warranted as the variation was within the tolerance band.
The Tribunal held that for the unabated assessment years (2014-15 to 2018-19), additions under Section 153A of the Act are unsustainable in the absence of incriminating material found during the search from the assessee's premises. The Tribunal reasoned that statements of third parties or material found from other premises, not relatable to the assessee's premises, cannot form the basis for additions in a Section 153A proceeding for completed assessments, unless other provisions are separately initiated, which was not the case here. Consequently, all additions made in respect of unsecured loans and disallowances of interest for these years were deemed unsustainable. The Tribunal relied on the settled position of law laid down in Abhisar Buildwell (supra). For assessment year 2019-20, the Tribunal held that since the additions for unsecured loans in earlier years were deleted, the consequential addition of interest in respect of those loans also cannot survive and is therefore deleted. The Tribunal expressly left undecided any other grounds raised by the assessee for AYs 2014-15 to 2018-19 as they became academic.
The Tribunal held that for the unabated assessment years (2014-15 to 2018-19), additions under Section 153A of the Act are unsustainable in the absence of incriminating material found during the search from the assessee's premises. The Tribunal reasoned that statements of third parties or material found from other premises, not relatable to the assessee's premises, cannot form the basis for additions in a Section 153A proceeding for completed assessments, unless other provisions are separately initiated, which was not the case here. Consequently, all additions made in respect of unsecured loans and disallowances of interest for these years were deemed unsustainable. The Tribunal relied on the settled position of law laid down in Abhisar Buildwell (supra). For assessment year 2019-20, the Tribunal held that since the additions for unsecured loans in earlier years were deleted, the consequential addition of interest in respect of those loans also cannot survive and is therefore deleted. The Tribunal expressly left undecided any other grounds raised by the assessee for AYs 2014-15 to 2018-19 as they became academic.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the appeal to the CIT(A)'s file. The assessee is granted one more opportunity to comply with Section 249(4) of the Act and seek exemption.
The Tribunal held that for the unabated assessment years (2014-15 to 2018-19), additions under Section 153A of the Act are unsustainable in the absence of incriminating material found during the search from the assessee's premises. The Tribunal reasoned that statements of third parties or material found from other premises, not relatable to the assessee's premises, cannot form the basis for additions in a Section 153A proceeding for completed assessments, unless other provisions are separately initiated, which was not the case here. Consequently, all additions made in respect of unsecured loans and disallowances of interest for these years were deemed unsustainable. The Tribunal relied on the settled position of law laid down in Abhisar Buildwell (supra). For assessment year 2019-20, the Tribunal held that since the additions for unsecured loans in earlier years were deleted, the consequential addition of interest in respect of those loans also cannot survive and is therefore deleted. The Tribunal expressly left undecided any other grounds raised by the assessee for AYs 2014-15 to 2018-19 as they became academic.
The Tribunal held that the possibility of incurring expenditure outside India, as per the assessee's objects, is not a valid ground for rejecting registration under Section 12AB. Such application of income outside India would only affect exemption under Section 11, not registration itself.
The Tribunal held that co-operative banks are in the nature of co-operative societies, and therefore, interest and dividend earned by the assessee from them are eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act.
The Tribunal found that the assessee's failure to respond was due to sufficient cause and not willful. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order was set aside to allow for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal found that the Ld. Commissioner dismissed the appeal in a cryptic manner without giving independent findings. Therefore, the Tribunal remanded the case back to the Ld. Commissioner for a fresh decision after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the Assessee.
The Tribunal held that providing scholarships to Indian students for overseas education, with the funds disbursed in India, does not constitute spending outside India. The trust deed also permitted such scholarships.
The Tribunal held that the quantum addition was set aside by the Ld.CIT(A) for fresh assessment, rendering the penalty grounds infructuous. The appellate order confirming the penalty was set aside, and the penalty order was restored to the AO for re-examination.
The Tribunal held that for the unabated assessment years (2014-15 to 2018-19), additions under Section 153A of the Act are unsustainable in the absence of incriminating material found during the search from the assessee's premises. The Tribunal reasoned that statements of third parties or material found from other premises, not relatable to the assessee's premises, cannot form the basis for additions in a Section 153A proceeding for completed assessments, unless other provisions are separately initiated, which was not the case here. Consequently, all additions made in respect of unsecured loans and disallowances of interest for these years were deemed unsustainable. The Tribunal relied on the settled position of law laid down in Abhisar Buildwell (supra). For assessment year 2019-20, the Tribunal held that since the additions for unsecured loans in earlier years were deleted, the consequential addition of interest in respect of those loans also cannot survive and is therefore deleted. The Tribunal expressly left undecided any other grounds raised by the assessee for AYs 2014-15 to 2018-19 as they became academic.
The Tribunal held that a co-operative bank is considered a co-operative society, and interest earned from investments in such banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). Relying on Apex Court and various High Court and ITAT judgments, the Tribunal found the disallowance to be unjustified.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) which deleted the additions made by the AO. The Tribunal found that the AO had not conducted independent inquiries and relied solely on an investigation report without corroborative evidence specific to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that for the unabated assessment years (2014-15 to 2018-19), additions under Section 153A of the Act are unsustainable in the absence of incriminating material found during the search from the assessee's premises. The Tribunal reasoned that statements of third parties or material found from other premises, not relatable to the assessee's premises, cannot form the basis for additions in a Section 153A proceeding for completed assessments, unless other provisions are separately initiated, which was not the case here. Consequently, all additions made in respect of unsecured loans and disallowances of interest for these years were deemed unsustainable. The Tribunal relied on the settled position of law laid down in Abhisar Buildwell (supra). For assessment year 2019-20, the Tribunal held that since the additions for unsecured loans in earlier years were deleted, the consequential addition of interest in respect of those loans also cannot survive and is therefore deleted. The Tribunal expressly left undecided any other grounds raised by the assessee for AYs 2014-15 to 2018-19 as they became academic.
The Tribunal held that additions under Section 153A cannot be made in the absence of incriminating material found from the assessee's premises during the search. Statements of third parties or material from other premises are insufficient for unabated assessments.
The Tribunal held that the adjustment made by the CPC under Section 143(1)(a) disallowing the deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was not sustainable for Assessment Year 2012-13. The Tribunal reasoned that the provisions of Section 143(1)(a)(v), which allow disallowance of deductions claimed under Chapter VI-A for delayed filing, were introduced with effect from 01.04.2018. Since the assessment year in question is 2012-13, this provision, with its extended scope, was not applicable. The Tribunal also referred to its own decision in the assessee's case for AY 2021-22, which clarified that a deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) is not an 'incorrect claim' as it is not subject to statutory limits or percentages. The Tribunal further held on merits that co-operative banks are co-operative societies, and income earned by the assessee society from such banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d), as Section 80P(4) is not attracted to the assessee. Consequently, the impugned order of the CIT(A) and the adjustment made by the CPC were set aside. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not provide sufficient reasons for deleting the addition and considered details not before the AO. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the appeal for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, subject to a deposit, and set aside the ex-parte order. The case was remanded to the Commissioner for a fresh decision on merits.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO based on WhatsApp conversations with Dr. Satish Desai was factually incorrect and based on surmises, as no actual exchange of money was proved. Similarly, additions based on empty envelopes were not sustainable as Section 69A was not applicable.
The Tribunal held that the AO had conducted necessary verification and the view taken was plausible. The PCIT's order under Section 263 was not justified as the assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.
The Tribunal held as follows: Regarding Ground No. 1 (Validity of proceedings): The first assessment order, issued in the name of Zyma Laboratories Limited, was found to be unsigned and thus non-est in the eyes of law. The second order, issued in the name of Lupin Investments Private Limited as successor, was physically signed and considered valid. Therefore, the contentions regarding the invalidity of proceedings were dismissed. Regarding Ground No. 2 (Addition under Section 56(2)(viia)): The Tribunal found force in the assessee's contentions. Citing decisions of co-ordinate benches in similar cases (Vora Financial Services (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT, VITP (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT, DCIT vs. Venture Lighting India Ltd., DCIT vs. Globe Capital Market Ltd., and DCIT vs. TPS Infrastructure Ltd.), the Tribunal held that Section 56(2)(viia) is not applicable to the buy-back of a company's own shares. The reasoning was that for the provision to apply, the shares must become the 'property' of the recipient company, and this can only happen if they are shares of 'any other company', not its own shares. Since the assessee bought back and extinguished its own shares, the conditions of 'becoming property' and 'shares of any other company' were not met. The AO was directed to delete the addition. This ground was allowed. Regarding Grounds 3 & 4 (Interest income and deduction): The Tribunal noted that the assessee had consistently shown interest income under 'income from other sources' in earlier years, which was accepted. However, the orders of the lower authorities were silent on the assessee's claim for deduction under Section 35AC. In the interest of justice and fair play, the issue was restored to the file of the AO. The assessee was directed to furnish evidence for the Section 35AC claim, and the AO was directed to examine it and decide afresh after affording an opportunity of being heard. These grounds were allowed for statistical purposes. Regarding Ground No. 5 (Interest under Section 234B): The Tribunal stated that the levy of interest under Section 234B is mandatory and consequential. The AO was directed to charge interest as per the relevant provisions of law. This ground was disposed of accordingly. Operative Directions: The addition under Section 56(2)(viia) was directed to be deleted. The issue of deduction under Section 35AC was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication. Interest under Section 234B was to be charged as per law. The appeal was allowed in part for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found that the notices did indeed go into the spam folder and acknowledged the assessee's interest in pursuing the appeal on merit. The case was restored to the CIT(A) for a decision on merit after allowing a fair opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided all relevant details for the LTCG and paid STT on the transactions. The denial of exemption was solely based on the non-filing of a revised return, which is not a valid ground for denial when all other conditions are met.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) had failed to properly adjudicate the issues before him, mixing the application for 80G renewal with a Section 12AB registration application. The order was set aside due to procedural lapses and lack of proper consideration.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged her primary onus by explaining the source of money, supported by TDS reflected in Form 26AS. The AO failed to bring any adverse material to disprove the assessee's claim, making the addition under Section 69A unjustified.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged her primary onus by explaining the source of money, supported by TDS reflected in Form 26AS. The AO failed to bring any adverse material to disprove the assessee's claim, making the addition under Section 69A unjustified.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged her primary onus by explaining the source of money, supported by TDS reflected in Form 26AS. The AO failed to bring any adverse material to disprove the assessee's claim, making the addition under Section 69A unjustified.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition as the shares were received prior to the applicability of Section 56(2)(viia) and no incriminating material was found during the search to support the addition. The Tribunal relied on its own coordinate bench's decision on identical facts.
The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: Regarding Ground No. 1 (legality of search), the Tribunal noted that this issue had already been decided by the Bench in other group cases for earlier assessment years, where the AO's order was found to be out of limitation. Applying the same reasoning mutatis mutandis, this ground of appeal was allowed. Regarding Ground No. 2 (general ground), it was dismissed as the assessee could not prove it. Regarding Ground No. 3 (addition under Section 68), the Tribunal noted the AO's basis for addition was the admission of cash receipts from walk-in customers not entered into books by an accountant. However, the assessee contended that these amounts were accounted for and cash receipts were verified. The judgment does not explicitly state the Tribunal's final finding on this issue, but it appears to be part of the partly allowed outcome. Regarding Ground No. 4 (addition under Section 41(1)), the Tribunal held that the liability was appearing in the assessee's books of accounts, and there was no cessation or remission of liability. Merely because three years expired did not automatically invoke Section 41(1) if the liability continued in the books. The creditor was identifiable, part payment was made, and a notice was served on the creditor. The Tribunal relied on several High Court and Supreme Court decisions, including CIT v. Enam Securities (P.) Ltd., Sugauli Sugar Works Pvt Ltd, and Pr. CIT v. Pukhraj S Jain, to hold that the addition under Section 41(1) was not justified and deserved to be deleted. Consequently, this ground was allowed. The appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's plea that the non-representation before the CIT(A) was a bona fide error. Considering the principles of natural justice, the ITAT remitted the case back to the CIT(A) to provide the assessee with another opportunity to present their case properly and adjudicate the issues on merits.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) did not consider the merits of the case and rejected the application solely on the ground of non-compliance with a notice. The Tribunal decided to remand the issue back to the CIT(E) to grant approval based on submitted documents, considering the trust's past approvals.
The Tribunal noted that the lower authorities had rejected the assessee's contentions without fully considering the documentary evidence. Specifically, the assessee claimed to have recognized revenue in subsequent years for a significant portion of the advances. The Tribunal observed that the lower authorities had not looked into the terms and conditions of the contractual obligation with NPCIL, from whom a substantial advance was received, and which had an extended project completion timeline. The Tribunal also noted that out of Rs. 84.82 crores advanced by other customers, Rs. 77.30 crores had already been offered to tax. Consequently, the Tribunal deemed it fit to remand the issues concerning the addition on advances and the consequential interest levies back to the Assessing Officer (AO) for verification. The AO was directed to verify whether the assessee had offered the advances to tax in subsequent years upon project completion, consider the terms of the agreement with NPCIL, and take into account the assessee's method of accounting for revenue recognition in earlier and subsequent years. Grounds 1 to 8 were allowed for statistical purposes. Grounds 9 to 11, pertaining to interest, were also remanded to the AO for factual verification, with the consequential grounds on sections 234B and 234C not requiring separate adjudication. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 14A should not exceed the exempt income and that the total expenses claimed by the assessee were significantly lower. Regarding Section 68 additions, the Tribunal noted that the AO's own remand report accepted the genuineness and creditworthiness of the loan transactions after verification.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s orders, allowing the appeals for statistical purposes. It directed the CIT(A) to reconsider the assessee's application for condonation of delay and decide the matter afresh in accordance with the law.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not appear before the AO nor before the learned CIT(A) for most of the proceedings. While the learned CIT(A) issued multiple notices, the assessee only responded to two, and the submission filed was on a jurisdictional issue without addressing the merits of the additions or providing documentary evidence. The Tribunal acknowledged the recent amendment empowering the CIT(A) to set aside and remand cases under section 144, but observed that this power was not exercised. In the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal decided to grant the assessee one more opportunity to represent its case on merits and produce supporting documents. Therefore, the matter was restored to the file of the jurisdictional AO for de novo adjudication after considering all details and submissions from the assessee, and providing a due opportunity of hearing. The other grievances were not adjudicated at this stage. The impugned orders were set aside, and the grounds raised were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had not appeared before the Assessing Officer (AO) nor the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (CIT(A)) nor provided necessary documentary evidence for their claims. The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal, upholding the additions made by the AO. The Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity to the assessee for a de novo adjudication on merits.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s orders, allowing the appeals for statistical purposes. It directed the CIT(A) to reconsider the assessee's application for condonation of delay and decide the matter afresh in accordance with the law.
The tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Observing that the assessee was not given a proper opportunity to present details regarding sales promotion expenses, the tribunal restored the issue to the AO for fresh examination after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard.