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583 orders · Page 11 of 12
The Tribunal held that the maintenance and training services provided by the assessee did not make technical skills or knowledge available to the Indian customers, and therefore did not constitute FTS under Article 12 of the India-Singapore DTAA. The services were considered part of the software sub-licensing agreement.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee opted to resolve the dispute under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme-2024 and sought adjournment. The Ld. DR had no objection. Accordingly, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, with liberty to restore it if the scheme application is not accepted.
The Tribunal held that the appeal is partly allowed. Regarding the set-off of the current year's business loss of Rs. 55,45,600/- against income assessed under the head 'Income from other sources', the Tribunal found that Section 115BBE was not applicable for AY 2011-12. Citing Section 71(1), which allows set-off of losses under one head against income under another head, the Tribunal concluded that the business loss was eligible for set-off against income from other sources. The AO was directed to allow this set-off. However, concerning the set-off of brought forward business loss of Rs. 22,73,038/- from AY 2010-11, the Tribunal noted that the AO had not recorded any finding in this regard. Therefore, the matter was set aside to the file of the AO to examine this claim and decide it as per law. The contentions raised were left open for adjudication by the AO. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contentions regarding the exclusion of certain comparable companies. Upon excluding these comparables, the remaining ones aligned with the assessee's margins, indicating arm's length transactions. Consequently, the transfer pricing adjustments were deemed unsustainable.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to provide sufficient documentary evidence to substantiate its claims for reimbursement of expenses, disallowance of rent, and deduction u/s 24. Consequently, the matters were restored back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is eligible for the benefit of the first proviso to Section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act. The Tribunal considered the evidence of payment of sale consideration, including the payment schedule which was part of the registered agreement and the bank statements. It found that the assessee and his family members had made payments in accordance with the construction plan/progress of construction, with the initial payment of ₹3,60,720 made on April 30, 2011, much prior to the registration of the agreement to sale. The Tribunal noted that the total consideration of ₹39,64,200 was paid through banking channels. Therefore, the stamp duty value on the date of the agreement (April 30, 2011) should be considered, not the value at the time of registration. The addition made by the Assessing Officer was found to be unsustainable. The Tribunal allowed the appeal, setting aside the addition.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, acknowledging the substantial justice principle over technicalities, and admitted the appeal. The case was then restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision, giving the assessee another opportunity to represent their case.
The Tribunal held that the issues concerning discount offered to stockists and interest on delayed payments were covered by previous decisions of co-ordinate benches. Following the rule of consistency, the Tribunal agreed with the prior decisions.
The Tribunal condoned the delay after considering the 'sufficient cause' and the principles of substantial justice. The matter was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication, imposing a cost of Rs. 5,000/- on the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the grounds and submissions made by the assessee, who appears to be a man of average means, were brushed aside by both the authorities below without appreciating the contentions made and the documents submitted. The Tribunal found that the assessee's claim of using credit card payments for purchasing electronic goods for resale, supported by credit card statements and an explanation of his business venture, was not adequately considered. The failure to furnish certain documents like Sales Tax Registration and Sthapana certificate, and purchase/sales bills, was noted, but the Tribunal felt that the matter warranted a revisit at the CIT(A) level. The Tribunal decided to remand the matter back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication, applying the principles of natural justice and affording the assessee a due opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal did not decide the substantive issue of the addition itself but directed a fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the entire issue revolves around the sanctioning of the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act. It referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in UOI vs. Rajeev Bansal (Civil Appeal No. 8629 of 2024) dated 03/10/2024. The Supreme Court's judgment clarified that Section 151 imposes a check on the Revenue's power to reopen assessments and that the specified authority for sanction is directly correlated to the time when the notice is issued. Under the new regime, if more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, the approval must be obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or Chief Commissioner or Director General (Section 151(ii)). The Tribunal noted that in the present case, the notice under Section 148 and the order under Section 148A(d) were issued after taking sanction from the PCIT-20, Mumbai, which was not the specified authority as the notice was issued after three years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Therefore, the AO lacked jurisdiction to issue the notice under Section 148 without the approval of the specified authority. Consequently, the notice and the order were held to be invalid, rendering the assessment proceedings void-ab-initio. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the findings of the NFAC.
The Tribunal held that the challenge to the reopening of assessment under section 148 was not pressed by the assessee and was therefore dismissed as not pressed. Regarding the disallowance of alleged bogus purchases, the Tribunal noted that the assessee was formerly a partnership firm, Quality Construction Company, and that a Co-ordinate Bench in the same AY 2010-11 had dealt with identical facts and purchases. Following the jurisdictional Bombay High Court decision in Pr. CIT v. Suraj Infrastructures (P.) Ltd., which allowed estimation of gross profit at 12.5% on alleged bogus purchases, the Tribunal directed the AO to restrict the addition to 12.5% of the alleged bogus purchases and delete the remaining addition. The Tribunal found the decision relied upon by the revenue to be factually distinguishable. On the issue of TDS credit, the Tribunal found that it required factual verification and remitted the issue back to the AO with a direction to examine the claim based on evidence and grant credit in accordance with law, after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal noted that the AO had not rejected the books of accounts but had accepted them except for the alleged bogus purchases.
The Tribunal found that the PCIT's reasoning in the Section 263 order was not forceful. The original assessment order itself, before rectification, had addressed the issue of double taxation. The Tribunal concluded that the rectification under Section 154 was justified to correct the double taxation.
The Tribunal condoned the 20-day delay in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause due to medical exigency. It was held that the assessee was prevented by reasonable cause from complying with the notice, and the default was not deliberate.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had confirmed the penalty by completely ignoring the Assessee's submissions and not dealing with them on merits. Therefore, the matter was set aside to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the addition of INR 60,34,965/- (FD3, FD4, FD5) was not sustainable as the bank confirmed these deposits did not belong to the assessee. For the remaining addition of INR 6,52,786/- (FD1, FD2), the case was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination, considering the assessee's explanation of inheritance.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was issued after the expiry of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year (31.03.2022) and the alleged escaped income was below the INR 50 lakh threshold. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings were initiated in violation of Section 149(1)(a)/(b) of the Act. The Tribunal quashed the notice and the subsequent assessment order.
The Tribunal noted that both the lower authorities had passed ex-parte orders. The assessee provided an affidavit explaining the delay and the circumstances leading to the non-compliance with notices, including severe mental distress and financial challenges due to the company's liquidation and the departure of employees. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal in limine for non-compliance. In the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal deemed it fit to restore the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO). The assessee is directed to furnish necessary details, and the AO is directed to verify these details and decide the issue afresh after affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the additions made by the AO or confirmed by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the explanation provided by the assessee for the delay in filing the return and requisite reports was reasonable and justified. Relying on a coordinate bench's decision, the Tribunal set aside the appellate order and remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer for allowing the claim under Section 11(2) after due verification.
The Tribunal held that there has been substantial compliance with the requirements under Section 115BAA, as the assessee declared its intention to opt for the section and paid taxes at the 22% rate without claiming deductions. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Dilip Kumar (2018) 9 SCC on the Doctrine of Substantial Compliance, emphasizing that procedural lapses should not override substantive benefits when mandatory requirements are met. The Tribunal noted that the Income Tax Portal was not accepting the filing of Form 10IC for the relevant assessment year and that CBDT had extended time limits for condonation. Following decisions of co-ordinate benches of ITAT Kolkata and Ahmedabad, the Tribunal restored the issue to the Assessing Officer (AO). The AO is directed to take on record the Form 10IC (which the assessee is directed to file electronically or before the Jurisdictional AO) and consider it in consonance with the CBDT Circular and the return of income. The AO will then adjudicate whether the assessee is entitled to the tax rate under Section 115BAA, ensuring the assessee is given an opportunity of hearing. The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the issue of deduction under section 80P(2)(d) for interest income from cooperative banks is a debatable issue. Such debatable issues cannot be added under section 143(1) by CPC. Following judicial discipline and precedents from the ITAT, the addition made by the AO was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment beyond four years was not justified as the assessee had disclosed the transactions and furnished supporting documents. The AO's addition based on survey report and non-response from the vendor was not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263 as the AO had conducted sufficient inquiry and made specific findings regarding the unsecured loans and interest. The PCIT's view on the debatable issue of deemed rent was also not sustainable for invoking revisionary powers.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed not to have received all notices and had requested adjournment. Considering the need for a fair hearing and factual examination of the payment of the provision, the Tribunal remitted the appeal back to the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the reopening was not based on new tangible material as the information was available before the original assessment. Furthermore, the assessee had provided sufficient documentary evidence to prove the genuineness of the loan, and the AO/CIT(A) had not recorded any adverse findings against this evidence.
The Tribunal held that while the denial of carry forward of loss might have been debatable, the AO should have exercised discretion not to impose a penalty as the assessee, having no taxable income in India, did not derive any benefit from setting off the loss.
The Tribunal held that the TPO failed to apply any prescribed method under Section 92C(1) of the Act for determining the Arm's Length Price (ALP) for international transactions, making the adjustments arbitrary and ad-hoc. Following its own precedents and High Court decisions, the Tribunal directed the deletion of the transfer pricing adjustment.
The Tribunal held that the issue of allowing deduction under section 43B for an unaccrued liability was debatable and thus not rectifiable under section 154. The matter was remanded back to the AO for verification and correct computation.
The Tribunal held that the impugned notice under Section 148 is set-aside and the resultant order is quashed. The Tribunal relied on the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decisions in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal and Deepak Steel and Power Limited, which acknowledged the revenue's concession that for Assessment Year 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. Consequently, the additional ground raised by the assessee regarding the invalidity of the re-opening was allowed. As the assessment order was quashed, the Tribunal did not delve into the merits of the case. The operative direction is to quash the notice and the assessment order.
The tribunal decided that the appeals are dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to revive if the Vivad Se Vishwas application is rejected. The appellant did not submit sources of income, and the CIT(A) confirmed the additions.
The Tribunal held that the appeals were not maintainable due to the absence of tax effect in both years. The court also noted that the grounds of appeal by the Revenue/AO were not in accordance with the disallowance made by the AO.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient justification for the projections adopted in the DCF method, which were corroborated by supporting documents. The AO was not justified in rejecting the DCF method.
The Tribunal, following its earlier decision in the assessee's own case, held that the non-issuance of a mandatory notice under Section 143(2) after the assessee has responded to a Section 148 notice is a fatal procedural irregularity. Consequently, the reassessment order passed without such compliance was deemed unsustainable and was quashed, making discussion on the merits of the additions academic.
The Tribunal held that the appeals were not maintainable due to the absence of tax effect in both years. The court also noted that the grounds of appeal by the Revenue/AO were not in accordance with the disallowance made by the AO.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of interest expenditure under Section 14A read with Rule 8D(ii) was not legally tenable and directed its deletion. The reasoning was based on the consistent view of various High Courts and the Supreme Court, including CIT vs. Microlabs Ltd., Reliance Utilities & Power Ltd., and CIT vs. UTI Bank Ltd., which held that if interest-free own funds available with the assessee exceed their investments in tax-free securities, investments are presumed to be made out of own funds, and proportionate disallowance of interest expenditure is not warranted. Regarding the disallowance of administrative expenses under Rule 8D(iii), the Tribunal confirmed the disallowance of Rs. 5,25,615, finding sufficient merit in the assessment order and respectfully following the decision in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (Bom). On the issue of book profits under Section 115JB, the Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 14A cannot be imported into the computation of book profits, citing Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax and a Special Bench decision in Vireet Investment P.Ltd. Therefore, the addition to book profits was set aside. The appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal observed a communication gap between the appellant and the Revenue. While the Revenue was not entirely at fault for adding the amounts due to the old PAN not being cancelled and bank accounts being linked to it, the appellant was under the impression that transactions could be reflected under the new PAN. Citing the Bombay High Court's decision in Bhavana Steel Vs. ITO, the Tribunal set aside the assessment.
The tribunal admitted the assessee's request for withdrawal of the appeal.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed a significant portion of their salary income was exempt under Section 10. Given that documentary evidence like salary slips were now available, the Tribunal restored the issue to the AO for factual verification.
The Tribunal deleted the disallowance of depreciation on intangible assets. Regarding Section 80G deduction for CSR expenses, the Tribunal remanded the matter to the AO to allow the deduction subject to fulfillment of conditions, relying on a co-ordinate bench decision.
The Tribunal held that the issues raised in the appeals for assessment years 2018-19, 2019-20, and 2020-21 were identical to those considered in the lead case for assessment year 2015-16. Therefore, the findings and conclusions from the lead case were applied mutatis mutandis to these appeals. The judgment states that all grounds of appeal filed by the Revenue in these subsequent assessment years were dismissed. The specific reasoning for each issue, as decided in the lead case (which is not fully provided in the excerpt), would have led to the dismissal of the Revenue's grounds. The operative direction was that the appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the CIT(A) order was passed ex-parte and, in the interest of substantial justice, set aside the order. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication, with a direction to provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the appeals filed by the Revenue for assessment years 2018-19, 2019-20, and 2020-21 were dismissed. The reasoning provided in the lead case for assessment year 2015-16 was applied mutatis mutandis to these subsequent assessment years. The judgment does not explicitly detail the findings on each specific ground for the lead case but states that the CIT(A)'s orders were upheld. Consequently, the additions made by the AO were deleted, and the relief granted by the CIT(A) was sustained. The Tribunal's decision implies that it agreed with the CIT(A)'s conclusions regarding the taxability of transfers from the shareholder's account, the consolidation of surplus, the exemption of dividend income, income from pension funds, and interest on tax-free bonds. The ratio decidendi would be that the CIT(A) correctly applied the provisions of the Act and the relevant schedules in determining the taxability of these items for the life insurance business. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal dismissed all the appeals filed by the Revenue. For the issues concerning the transfer from shareholder to policy accounts and the consolidation of surplus, the Tribunal found that the CIT(A) was correct in concluding that the transfer was of a capital asset and not taxable, and that the net surplus should be taxed. Regarding dividend income, pension fund income, and interest on tax-free bonds, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to grant exemption under the respective sections (10(34), 10(23AAB), and Section 10 for tax-free bonds). The Tribunal's reasoning appears to be that the CIT(A) correctly applied the provisions of the Act and the First Schedule to the insurance business. The Tribunal noted that the revised grounds of appeal were largely a re-articulation of the original grounds and that the findings in the lead case for AY 2015-16 would apply mutatis mutandis to other assessment years. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing a bonafide mistake and reliance on Supreme Court judgments emphasizing that procedural delays should not defeat justice. The Tribunal also noted the assessee's non-compliance and indifference but decided to remand the matter for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the matter needed to be remanded to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) for verification of whether the expenditure claimed was paid within the due date. The additions are to be deleted if the expenditure was paid within the due date.
The Tribunal held that there was ambiguity in the interpretation of 'otherwise' and that the appellant was not given an effective opportunity to explain its case or file necessary documents. The matter was remitted to the CIT(E).
The Tribunal noted that no one appeared for the appellant on the day of the hearing, despite a notice being sent. There was no adjournment letter or supporting documents filed. Consequently, in the absence of the appellant and supporting documentation, the appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that for a valid revision order under Section 263, the conditions of 'error' and 'prejudicial to the interest of revenue' must be satisfied. Following the Supreme Court's ratio in Malabar Industrial Company, if the AO follows one of two possible views, it cannot be termed an 'error'. The Tribunal found that the donation under Section 80G was eligible for deduction even when claimed as CSR expenditure, hence the PCIT's order was bad in law.
The Tribunal held that Sections 69A and 69B of the Income Tax Act are applicable only when there is excess cash or stock not recorded in the books, and the assessee fails to provide a satisfactory explanation. In this case, there was a deficit of both cash and stock, making the sections inapplicable.