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657 orders · Page 2 of 14
The Tribunal noted that in cases of bogus purchases, the addition should be restricted to the extent of benefit obtained by the assessee, such as cash discount. However, it also highlighted the need to examine the availability of unexplained cash for such purchases, which the CIT(A) had not done.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had applied his mind to the facts and circumstances, and his view was one of the plausible interpretations of law. The PCIT's disagreement with the Assessing Officer's view did not automatically render the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had applied his mind to the facts and circumstances, and his view was one of the plausible interpretations of law. The PCIT's disagreement with the Assessing Officer's view did not automatically render the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 186 days, considering it unintentional and based on a bonafide belief. The Tribunal also noted that the lower authorities had failed to decide the appeal on merits due to a lack of adequate submissions.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge the onus to prove the nature and source of the credits. The explanation that cash was withdrawn and kept at home for safe custody was not convincing, especially given the substantial withdrawals made by the assessee to her sons. The decisions relied upon by the assessee were distinguishable based on the facts.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance made by the CPC under Section 143(1) on the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was beyond the scope of adjustment permissible under Section 143(1) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that Section 80AC, prior to April 1, 2018, only specified disallowance for deductions under Sections 80-IA, 80-IAB, 80-IB, 80-IC, 80-ID, and 80-IE in case of belated filing of returns, and deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was not hit by these provisions. Therefore, the addition made on this account was deleted. The Tribunal also considered the delay in filing the appeals, acknowledging the pendency of rectification applications and the impact of the COVID-19 period exclusion. Respectfully following the decision of the co-ordinate bench in Vishva Villa Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. v/s ITO, the Tribunal allowed the appeals of the assessee and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).
The ITAT noted that the CIT(A) passed an ex parte order despite the assessee filing submissions and evidence and applying for additional evidence. The tribunal observed that the CIT(A) did not consider the submissions or evidence, proceeding in haste. Given the assessment was under section 144 (best judgment), the tribunal decided to grant the assessee another opportunity.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the current appeal was inadvertently filed and had become infructuous. Accepting the assessee's withdrawal request, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that Section 269SS prohibits the acceptance of loans or deposits in cash exceeding Rs. 20,000/-, and its violation entails a penalty under Section 271D, not an addition to income. The premise for making the addition was illegal.
The Tribunal held that management services are managerial in nature and not technical services, aligning with previous Tribunal decisions. Consequently, the assessee was not liable for TDS on these payments.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) due to the accountant's ill health. The Tribunal restored the case to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merit after granting the assessee an adequate opportunity to comply.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed non-receipt of hearing notices from the CIT(A) and requested an opportunity to present their case. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not decide the appeal on merits. Therefore, the appeals were restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that management services are managerial in nature and not technical services, aligning with previous Tribunal decisions. Consequently, the assessee was not liable for TDS on these payments.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance made by the CPC under Section 143(1) on the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was beyond the scope of adjustment permissible under Section 143(1) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that Section 80AC, prior to April 1, 2018, only specified disallowance for deductions under Sections 80-IA, 80-IAB, 80-IB, 80-IC, 80-ID, and 80-IE in case of belated filing of returns, and deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was not hit by these provisions. Therefore, the addition made on this account was deleted. The Tribunal also considered the delay in filing the appeals, acknowledging the pendency of rectification applications and the impact of the COVID-19 period exclusion. Respectfully following the decision of the co-ordinate bench in Vishva Villa Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. v/s ITO, the Tribunal allowed the appeals of the assessee and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).
The Tribunal held that Section 80CCC(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is applicable only when the assessee is covered under sub-section (1), meaning a deduction has been claimed and allowed under sub-section (1). Since the assessee admittedly did not claim any deduction under Section 80CCC(1) for the pension policies, Section 80CCC(2) is not applicable. However, the Tribunal noted that for the accretion of Rs. 16,39,726 (surrender value minus investment), reference is required to be made to the provisions of Section 10(10D) to determine if this amount is exempt. For this limited purpose, the matter was restored to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) to examine the eligibility of the proceeds from the surrender of the policy for exemption under Section 10(10D). The Tribunal did not decide on the taxability under Section 56 directly but remanded the issue for examination under Section 10(10D).
The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed non-receipt of hearing notices from the CIT(A) and requested an opportunity to present their case. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not decide the appeal on merits. Therefore, the appeals were restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal observed that the tax effect on the disputed additions before it was less than Rs.50 lacs, as prescribed in CBDT's Circular No.17/2019 dated 08.08.2019. The circular clearly states that the monetary limit for filing appeals before the Appellate Tribunal is Rs.50,00,000. Based on this circular, the Tribunal found that the appeal filed by the Revenue did not meet the threshold for litigation management. Therefore, the Tribunal decided that the appeal was not maintainable. The ratio decidendi is that appeals filed by the Revenue before the ITAT, where the tax effect is below the monetary limit stipulated by the CBDT circular, are liable to be dismissed on the grounds of low tax effect and for effective litigation management.
The Tribunal noted that the AO and CIT(A) did not properly examine the documents furnished by the assessee, such as financial statements, PANs, and incorporation details of the share applicants. The Tribunal set aside the order and restored the issue to the CIT(A) for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that the assessee society does not fall under the category of a co-operative bank or primary co-operative bank as defined under the BR Act, and therefore, is not hit by Section 80P(4). The AO was not justified in denying the deduction.
The Tribunal held that the reopening was based on suspicion and surmises, without proper application of mind, and lacked corroborating evidence. The assessee had denied any such transactions or claims for losses, and there was no material to support the AO's belief. Therefore, both the reopening and the addition were deemed invalid.
The Tribunal held that management services are managerial in nature and not technical services, aligning with previous Tribunal decisions. Consequently, the assessee was not liable for TDS on these payments.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal regarding transfer fees, upholding the CIT(A)'s decision that such fees are exempt based on the principle of mutuality and Supreme Court precedents. For the ALV on vacant properties, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s directive to compute ALV based on municipal rateable value, rejecting the Revenue's argument for fair rental value and confirming that Section 23(1)(c) does not apply where property was not let out at all. Both the Revenue's appeals and the assessee's cross-objections were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were rightly quashed by the CIT(A) because the transactions were already recorded in the assessee's books with corresponding sales, and the income was offered for taxation. Furthermore, in a subsequent year with identical facts, no addition was made.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's request for a denovo adjudication by the CIT(A) due to the ex-parte nature of the previous order and the availability of new documentary evidence. The Tribunal accepted the prayer to remit the matter back to the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the municipal rateable value should be adopted for computing the annual value of vacant properties, upholding the CIT(A)'s direction. Regarding transfer fees, the Tribunal followed the Supreme Court's decision in ITO vs. Venkatesh Premises Co-operative Society Ltd., holding that such fees are not taxable.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee failed to prove the genuineness of purchases and presented inadequate documentary evidence, the revenue also did not doubt the sales declared by the assessee. It was acknowledged that purchases are necessary for sales, suggesting a possibility of material being procured elsewhere at a lower cost. Therefore, restricting the disallowance to 10% of the disputed purchases, representing the profit element, was considered appropriate.
The Tribunal noted that the notice of hearing was indeed sent to an incorrect email ID not registered on the ITBA portal. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to restore the appeal back to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's request for a denovo adjudication by the CIT(A) due to the ex-parte nature of the previous order and the availability of new documentary evidence. The Tribunal accepted the prayer to remit the matter back to the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that a protective assessment cannot be made on a standalone basis without a substantive assessment. The impugned addition, made on a protective basis without framing any substantive assessment in the hands of the alleged other person/husband, is not sustainable in law.
The CIT(A) upheld the reassessment jurisdiction but deleted the addition made by the AO, holding that the assessee had provided sufficient documentation and the AO failed to make independent inquiries. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had deleted the addition without properly considering the observations of the Investigation Wing and the AO.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict the addition to 12.5% of the bogus purchases, considering that the sale proceeds were accounted for and the assessee executed contract works. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was denied a reasonable opportunity of being heard by the CIT(A) due to an ex-parte order. Considering that the assessee had a precedent from a co-ordinate bench on similar issues, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that substantial justice should not be denied on technicalities and that procedural law should aid, not obstruct, justice. It was further held that the object of limitation periods is to advance the cause of justice, and in this case, it was deemed just and proper to condone the significant delay.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from its investments in co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that co-operative banks are themselves co-operative societies and that a beneficial construction should be adopted in case of ambiguity.
With the consent of both parties, the Tribunal remanded the entire matter, including all grounds of appeal, back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) is directed to provide the assessee with a fair opportunity of hearing, and the assessee is instructed to comply with notices and participate in the proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the AO erred in rectifying the assessment order under section 154 of the Act. The crucial point was that at the time of framing the original assessment order, there were judgments in favour of the assessee regarding the delay in deposit of EPF & ESI. The subsequent Supreme Court judgment in 'Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT' was relied upon by the AO for rectification, but the Tribunal found this reliance to be improper as it was not available at the time of the original assessment.
The Tribunal held that the assessing officer had made a detailed enquiry and considered the assessee's submissions. The disallowance u/s 14A read with Rule 8D cannot exceed the exempt income earned, as per established judicial pronouncements. The PCIT failed to substantiate how the order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from deposits with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). It distinguished the Totgars case as dealing with Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and relied on other High Court judgments.
The Tribunal acknowledged the genuine and bonafide reasons cited by the assessee for non-appearance before the lower authorities, considering the serious litigations and financial constraints faced by the company and its director. In the interest of substantial justice, the Tribunal decided to remand the matter back to the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal held that management services are managerial in nature and not technical services, aligning with previous Tribunal decisions. Consequently, the assessee was not liable for TDS on these payments.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had specified the purposes for accumulation, which were in consonance with the trust's objects and not for non-charitable purposes. Citing previous decisions and judicial precedents, the Tribunal found that the conditions for accumulation under Section 11(2) were met.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) adjudicated an entirely new issue related to unexplained investment of Rs.2,25,53,000, confirmed under section 69A, which pertained to a different assessee. This was deemed a gross negligence, making the impugned order erroneous.
The Tribunal noted that the quantum appeal concerning the additions made was still pending before the CIT(A). Since the penalty is consequential to the additions, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the penalty appeal to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision after the quantum appeal is decided.
The Tribunal held that the expression 'sufficient cause' for condoning delay should be interpreted liberally to advance substantial justice. Citing Supreme Court pronouncements, the Tribunal emphasized that refusing to condone delay can result in meritorious matters being thrown out on technical grounds. Therefore, the Tribunal condoned the delay of 396 days.
The Tribunal held that substantial justice should not be denied on mere technicalities, and procedural law is an aid to justice. Citing precedents from Gujarat High Court, it was established that audit reports can be filed at a later stage with sufficient cause, and a charitable trust registered under section 12A should not be denied exemption solely based on the delay in furnishing Form 10B.
The Tribunal found that the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was bona fide due to technical difficulties in downloading the order. Therefore, the delay was condoned, and the case was restored to the file of the first appellate authority for deciding the appeal on its merit.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance made by the CPC under Section 143(1) on the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was beyond the scope of adjustment permissible under Section 143(1) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that Section 80AC, prior to April 1, 2018, only specified disallowance for deductions under Sections 80-IA, 80-IAB, 80-IB, 80-IC, 80-ID, and 80-IE in case of belated filing of returns, and deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was not hit by these provisions. Therefore, the addition made on this account was deleted. The Tribunal also considered the delay in filing the appeals, acknowledging the pendency of rectification applications and the impact of the COVID-19 period exclusion. Respectfully following the decision of the co-ordinate bench in Vishva Villa Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. v/s ITO, the Tribunal allowed the appeals of the assessee and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).
The Tribunal held that the disallowance made by the CPC under Section 143(1) on the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was beyond the scope of adjustment permissible under Section 143(1) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that Section 80AC, prior to April 1, 2018, only specified disallowance for deductions under Sections 80-IA, 80-IAB, 80-IB, 80-IC, 80-ID, and 80-IE in case of belated filing of returns, and deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was not hit by these provisions. Therefore, the addition made on this account was deleted. The Tribunal also considered the delay in filing the appeals, acknowledging the pendency of rectification applications and the impact of the COVID-19 period exclusion. Respectfully following the decision of the co-ordinate bench in Vishva Villa Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. v/s ITO, the Tribunal allowed the appeals of the assessee and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).
The Tribunal held that the disallowance made by the CPC under Section 143(1) on the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was beyond the scope of adjustment permissible under Section 143(1) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that Section 80AC, prior to April 1, 2018, only specified disallowance for deductions under Sections 80-IA, 80-IAB, 80-IB, 80-IC, 80-ID, and 80-IE in case of belated filing of returns, and deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was not hit by these provisions. Therefore, the addition made on this account was deleted. The Tribunal also considered the delay in filing the appeals, acknowledging the pendency of rectification applications and the impact of the COVID-19 period exclusion. Respectfully following the decision of the co-ordinate bench in Vishva Villa Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. v/s ITO, the Tribunal allowed the appeals of the assessee and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal without adjudicating on merits, solely based on non-compliance. Citing a High Court ruling, the Tribunal held that an appeal cannot be dismissed for non-prosecution. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside.