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96 orders · Page 2 of 2
The Tribunal held that Ground Nos. 1 and 2, being general in nature, did not require specific findings. Regarding Ground No. 2 (disallowance under Section 43B), the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's arguments that amounts paid before the due date of filing the return should not be disallowed, and that for amounts debited to the profit and loss account, the benefit of unrealized amounts (cum-tax benefit) should be considered. The Assessing Officer (AO) was directed to verify these aspects and pass an appropriate order. Consequently, Ground No. 2 was allowed for statistical purposes. For Ground No. 3 (credit for prepaid taxes), the AO was directed to verify and grant appropriate relief. The grounds regarding interest under Sections 234B and 234C were held to be consequential and not adjudicated. The appeals for Assessment Years 2021-22 and 2022-23 were decided mutatis mutandis based on the decision for Assessment Year 2019-20. The overall result was that the appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order withdrawing approval under Section 10(23C)(vi) was passed without considering the overall activities of the Assessee Society. It was established that the Assessee had not provided any benefit to the trustee, nor were the funds diverted for personal benefit of trustees or any third person. All investments made by the Assessee satisfied the modes specified under Section 11(5) of the Act. The Tribunal referred to decisions in St. Wilfred Educational Society v. PCIT and DCIT v. Jaymahakali Shikshan Sanstha, which supported the view that payments for immoveable property are permissible under Section 11(5)(x) and that violations of Section 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d) are not attracted in such property transactions with third parties. The Tribunal also noted that the withdrawal of registration under Section 12A could not have been cancelled. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order dated 02.09.2025 passed by the CIT(Exemptions), Jaipur, and directed the restoration of registration with effect from AY 2013-14 onwards. The Tribunal refrained from dealing with certain legal issues raised, leaving them open. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should have considered the directions of the Hon'ble High Court regarding the condonation of delay. The assessee filed the appeal within 30 days from the receipt of the order with a prayer for condoning the delay. The CIT(A) did not deal with the petition for condonation of delay and dismissed the appeal. Therefore, the Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) and allowed grounds no. 2 to 5 raised by the assessee. Regarding ground no. 6, the Tribunal found that the notice issued under section 153C lacked jurisdiction because there was no transfer of the assessee's case from Delhi to Jaipur, as indicated by the address in the notices and PAN database. Relying on the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Deep Channel Kothari vs. CIT, the Tribunal held that objections regarding lack of jurisdiction must be decided first. Since the notice under section 153C was quashed due to lack of jurisdiction, grounds no. 7 to 11 became academic, ground no. 12 premature, and ground no. 13 general. Consequently, the appeal of the assessee in ITA No. 505/JP/2025 was allowed. The Tribunal further held that the facts and issues in ITA Nos. 506 to 509/JP/2025 were similar, and the decision in ITA No. 505/JP/2025 would apply mutatis mutandis, thus allowing these appeals as well.
The Tribunal observed that the Ld. CIT(A) dismissed the appeal on technical grounds (non-payment of advance tax) without addressing the merits of the additions. Considering the assessee's initial declaration of loss, the Tribunal deemed it necessary to evaluate the advance tax liability and the substantial additions on their merits. Therefore, the matter was restored to the Ld. CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication after providing both parties a proper opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) based on High Court directions. It was held that the notice issued under Section 153C by the Jaipur ITO lacked jurisdiction as the assessee's case was not transferred from Delhi to Jaipur.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, finding sufficient cause. It held that the CIT(A) erred in setting aside the assessment when the AO's remand report accepted the assessee's explanation for the turnover difference.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, imposing costs on the assessee. However, since the grounds raised were not adjudicated on merits by the CIT(A), the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the AO was not justified in making the addition as the cash sales were recorded in the assessee's regularly maintained and audited books of account. Since the sales were already part of the income credited in the Profit & Loss account, invoking Section 68 for cash credit would amount to double taxation.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) based on High Court directions. It was held that the notice issued under Section 153C by the Jaipur ITO lacked jurisdiction as the assessee's case was not transferred from Delhi to Jaipur.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was bad in law as the assessee had fully disclosed the facts during the original assessment. Furthermore, on merits, the provision for future expenses was allowable under Section 37(1) as it was a genuine business expenditure.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) based on High Court directions. It was held that the notice issued under Section 153C by the Jaipur ITO lacked jurisdiction as the assessee's case was not transferred from Delhi to Jaipur.
The Tribunal condoned a 4-day delay in filing one appeal, accepting the assessee's explanation of financial constraints affecting fee deposit. Regarding the disallowance under Section 43B, the Tribunal noted that the assessee was required to submit proof of payment of GST and Service Tax/TDS. The assessee failed to submit the challans despite ample opportunities, both before the jurisdictional AO and during appellate proceedings. Consequently, it was presumed that the amounts were not paid. However, for Assessment Year 2021-22 (ITA No. 198/JP/2025) and Assessment Year 2022-23 (ITA No. 199/JP/2025), the Tribunal directed the AO to verify whether payments were made before the due date of filing the return and to consider the benefit for amounts not realized from debtors (cum-tax benefit). The Tribunal also directed verification of credit for prepaid taxes and short TDS. Interest under Sections 234B and 234C was held to be consequential. Therefore, the appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was legally valid as the assessee failed to disclose material facts truly. It also upheld the CIT(A)'s view that for computing exemption under section 54F, the stamp duty value (deemed full value of consideration as per section 50C) should be taken into account, not just the actual sale consideration.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to the assessee's ill health and medical treatment for a neuro-disease. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for providing another opportunity of being heard, subject to payment of costs.
The Tribunal noted that the AO collected information under Section 133(6) without providing it to the assessee, and the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal in a short period. Considering the principles of natural justice and the assessee's request for one chance, the matter was restored to the AO.
The Tribunal restored the quantum appeal to the AO for fresh adjudication, providing one more opportunity to the assessee. Consequently, the penalty appeal was rendered infructuous and would depend on the set-aside proceedings.
The Tribunal restored the quantum appeal to the AO for fresh adjudication, providing one more opportunity to the assessee. Consequently, the penalty appeal was rendered infructuous and would depend on the set-aside proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the appellant failed to establish sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal. Neither the representative nor the authorized representative appeared before the Tribunal to argue the case.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had admitted additional evidence and called for a remand report. However, the CIT(A) should have decided the issue rather than remanding it. The Tribunal relied on High Court decisions to hold that investment in the name of the wife qualifies for deduction under Section 54B, and that expenses for agricultural activity betterment should be considered part of the land investment.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to 100% exemption under Section 54F as the entire investment was made by him and the son's name was added for convenience. The claim for transfer expenses was dismissed due to lack of evidence.
The Tribunal held that reassessment proceedings initiated by a non-jurisdictional Assessing Officer are void ab-initio. Relying on binding precedents, including High Court decisions, the Tribunal quashed the impugned assessment order on the technical ground of lack of jurisdiction, rendering the merits of the disallowances academic. Consequently, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the interest amounts received by an assessee in respect of delayed payment of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) will be treated as accruals to the principal compensation amount and classified as 'Capital Gains' for the purposes of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, these interest amounts will also get the benefit of Section 10(37) of the Act if the land compulsorily acquired is agricultural land. The Tribunal reasoned that the payment of interest on delayed payment of compensation, whether under Section 28 or Section 34 of the LAA, partakes the character of the principal compensation itself, as it compensates for the loss of use of the principal amount. Recent judicial pronouncements recognize the right to property as a human right and a constitutional right under Article 300A. The developed jurisprudence on property rights necessitates treating such interest payments as an accretion to the compensation. Since the interest amounts received are not in the nature of interest as defined under Section 2(28A), the provisions of Section 56 of the Act will not be attracted. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s finding and dismissed the revenue's appeal.
The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings under sections 271D and 271E are independent of assessment proceedings and are governed by the limitation period prescribed under section 275(1)(c). This clause mandates that penalty proceedings must be completed within six months from the end of the month in which the proceedings during which the action for imposition of penalty is initiated are completed, or six months from the end of the month in which action for imposition of penalty is initiated, whichever is later. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) correctly applied this provision and that the penalty proceedings were barred by limitation. The Tribunal also noted that the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Hissaria Brothers, which was followed by the CIT(A), was binding. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) rightly did not decide the merits of the dispute as the proceedings were time-barred. The appeals were dismissed on these grounds.
The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings under sections 271D and 271E are independent of assessment proceedings and are governed by the limitation period prescribed under section 275(1)(c) of the Act. This clause requires penalty proceedings to be completed within six months from the end of the month in which the proceedings during which the action for imposition of penalty is initiated are completed, or six months from the end of the month in which action for imposition of penalty is initiated, whichever expires later. The Tribunal found that section 275(1)(a) and (b) do not apply as the expression 'other relevant thing' is absent in clause (c). Therefore, the completion of appellate proceedings arising from assessment proceedings has no relevance for penalty proceedings under sections 271D and 271E. The Tribunal also noted that the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Hissaria Brothers, which was followed by the CIT(A), was binding. Consequently, the penalty proceedings were held to be barred by limitation. The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the penalty on technical grounds without delving into the merits, as the proceedings were time-barred. All grounds raised by the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee, dismissing the Revenue's appeals. On the issue of limitation, the Tribunal referred to Section 275(1)(c) of the Act, which prescribes a limitation period of six months from the end of the month in which the penalty proceedings are initiated. The Tribunal distinguished this from Section 275(1)(a) and (b), which relate to assessment proceedings and allow for extensions based on appeals. The Tribunal reasoned that penalty proceedings under sections 271D and 271E are independent of assessment proceedings. Therefore, the completion of appellate proceedings arising from assessment orders has no bearing on the limitation for these penalty proceedings. The Tribunal found that the penalty proceedings were initiated on 01.07.2024, and the relevant limitation period under section 275(1)(c) had expired. Consequently, the CIT(A) was correct in deleting the penalty on technical grounds of limitation. The Tribunal also noted that the amended provisions of the Act effective from 01.04.2025 grant the power to impose such penalties to the Assessing Officer, further supporting the view that the original proceedings were subject to the prescribed limitations. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision not to decide the merits as the proceedings were barred by limitation.
The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings under sections 271D and 271E are independent of assessment proceedings and fall under clause (c) of section 275(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This clause prescribes a limitation period of six months from the end of the month in which the proceedings during which the action for imposition of penalty is initiated are completed, or six months from the end of the month in which action for imposition of penalty is initiated, whichever expires later. Unlike clause (a) of section 275(1), clause (c) does not provide for an extended limitation period based on the completion of appellate proceedings arising from assessment or other related proceedings. Therefore, the completion of appellate proceedings from the assessment order has no bearing on the limitation for penalty under sections 271D and 271E. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) rightly decided the issue on technical grounds (limitation) and therefore did not need to decide the merits of the dispute. The Tribunal also noted that the Rajasthan High Court, in the case of Hissaria Brothers, had taken a similar view, which was considered binding. Consequently, the grounds raised by the Revenue were dismissed. The penalty was deleted on the ground of limitation.
The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings under sections 271D and 271E are independent of assessment proceedings and are governed by section 275(1)(c) of the Act. This clause mandates that penalty proceedings must be completed within six months from the end of the month in which the proceedings during which the action for imposition of penalty is initiated are completed, or six months from the end of the month in which action for imposition of penalty is initiated, whichever is later. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) correctly applied this provision, and the penalty was time-barred. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that since the proceedings were barred by limitation, there was no need to decide the merits of the penalty levy, thus dismissing Revenue's ground no. 1. Grounds no. 2 and 3 were dismissed as the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s finding, relying on the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Hissaria Bros. The Tribunal also noted the amendment to section 271D effective from April 1, 2025, giving the power to impose penalty to the Assessing Officer, but this did not affect the current case. The appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not appear, and the Department was not given adequate opportunity to argue. The Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision, emphasizing that this decision does not reflect on the merits of the case.
The Tribunal held that the AO's interpretation of the figures in the seized notebook as unexplained money in lakhs was not sustainable due to a lack of tangible evidence and flawed correlation with other documents. The CIT(A)'s reduction of the addition was found to be reasonable.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed ITR for the subsequent year showing a net profit of 3.23%. Considering this, the Tribunal directed the AO to tax the net profit at 3.5% instead of the 8% estimated by the AO and the 1.4% declared by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) was not justified in cancelling the registration without providing the assessee an opportunity to confront the Inspector's report, which violated principles of natural justice. The matter was restored to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication.
Ground No. 1 related to ESI/PF disallowance was dismissed as not pressed by the assessee. For Ground No. 2 regarding Section 244A interest calculation, the tribunal remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer, instructing them to re-examine the issue and provide the assessee an opportunity to submit relevant documents for a fair calculation of interest.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter for fresh decision, granting the assessee another opportunity to be heard. The assessee was burdened with costs of Rs. 6,000/- for non-compliance.
The tribunal is hearing an appeal filed by the assessee against the order of the CIT(A). The specific grounds of appeal are not detailed in the provided excerpt.
The Tribunal held that registration under the RPT Act, 1959, is not a mandatory requirement for registration under Section 12AB. It also found no evidence of proper notice for deficiencies regarding genuineness and noted that the CIT(E)'s order lacked specific instances of non-genuineness despite extensive documents submitted by the appellant. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s orders and directed the CIT(E) to register the applicant under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) and grant approval under Section 80G(5)(iii).
The Tribunal noted a delay of 178 days in filing the appeals but condoned it, finding sufficient cause. The Tribunal restored the matters back to the file of the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, directing the assessee to produce necessary documents.
The Tribunal noted a delay of 178 days in filing the appeals but condoned it, finding sufficient cause. The Tribunal restored the matters back to the file of the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, directing the assessee to produce necessary documents.
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's grounds of appeal. Regarding jurisdiction under Section 153C and approval under Section 153D, the judgment refers to the findings of the CIT(A) which are not fully detailed here but appear to have upheld the AO's actions. On the issue of the Evidence Act, the Tribunal held that the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, does not strictly apply to quasi-judicial proceedings before an Assessing Officer. It cited the case of LKS Gold House (P.) Ltd. v. Deputy and other Madras High Court decisions, stating that assessment proceedings are quasi-judicial, not strictly judicial. The Tribunal found that the AO is not governed by the strict rules of evidence and that the definition of 'Books and Books of Accounts' under Section 2(12A) of the Act, even before amendment, included electronic data storage devices. The amendment to Section 2(12A) was considered clarificatory and retrospective. Therefore, the argument of jurisdictional error based on the Evidence Act was rejected. The specific findings on the additions and Section 115BBE are not fully detailed in the provided excerpt, but the overall dismissal of the grounds suggests they were also upheld.
The ITAT condoned the delay in filing the appeal, considering the assessee's explanation. However, the Tribunal noted the assessee's non-compliance and non-responsiveness during the appellate proceedings before the CIT(A).
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 470 days in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause based on the assessee's affidavit explaining the non-receipt of the order and the demise of her husband. Regarding the addition of Rs. 6,99,273/- under Section 69, the Tribunal noted that the AO treated the loss incurred on commodity transactions as unexplained investment. The assessee had submitted that the source of payment for the loss was an opening cash balance of Rs. 2,20,000/-, net income of Rs. 1,10,000/-, and borrowings of Rs. 8,00,000/- through account payee cheques, totaling Rs. 11,30,000/-. The payment of the loss was made through bank transfer. The Tribunal observed that the AO did not address these submissions and made the addition without rebutting the evidence. The Tribunal found that the source of payment of the loss of Rs. 6,99,273/- was proved and deleted the addition. Since this was the only addition made by the AO, the Tribunal did not deem it fit to decide other grounds of appeal. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 153C is valid. It reasoned that Section 153C is predicated on seized material from another person containing information bearing on the assessee's total income. Discarding such material would defeat the purpose of the section. The Tribunal found that the assessee had not produced any positive evidence to rebut the seized material, merely pleading ignorance and denial, which, in the presence of incriminating material, suggests acceptance. The Tribunal also noted that the presumption under Section 292C is applicable. Citing ITAT Cochin's decision in Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax vs. T.G. Chandrakumar and Madhya Pradesh High Court's decision in Vijay Jain vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Ujjain, the Tribunal emphasized that in real estate transactions, unaccounted cash payments are common, and the onus is on the assessee to prove the falsity of the evidence. The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to discharge this onus. The Tribunal's decision on the specific grounds was not fully detailed in the provided excerpt, but the reasoning strongly supports upholding the additions. The operative directions are not explicitly stated but imply that the additions are likely to be sustained.
The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: 1. **Jurisdiction under Section 153C:** The Tribunal found that the AO had correctly assumed jurisdiction under section 153C. The search action on the Gokul Kripa Group yielded documents relating to the assessee, establishing a nexus. The satisfaction note was properly drawn and sent to the AO. The assessee's argument that the seized material did not contain any reference to the appellant was rejected, as the AO had identified specific entries in the seized excel sheet pertaining to the assessee's transactions. 2. **Approval under Section 153D:** The Tribunal did not explicitly address the ground regarding the absence of proper approval under section 153D in the provided excerpt. This issue appears to be left undecided or not elaborated upon in the portion of the judgment available. 3. **Addition of Rs. 16,21,91,214/-:** The Tribunal upheld the addition. The reasoning was based on the seized excel sheet, which contained details of cash and cheque payments made by Gokul Kripa Group for land purchases. The AO established the authenticity of these entries by comparing them with the assessee's ledger account. The Tribunal rejected the assessee's plea for copies of complete statements of third parties, citing principles of natural justice and the lack of demonstrated prejudice. The ratio is that when incriminating material directly links the assessee to unaccounted transactions, and the assessee fails to provide contrary evidence or demonstrate prejudice from non-provision of complete third-party statements, the additions are sustainable. 4. **Invocation of Section 115BBE:** The Tribunal did not explicitly address the invocation of section 115BBE in the provided excerpt. This issue appears to be left undecided or not elaborated upon in the portion of the judgment available. Operative Directions: The appeals were not fully allowed or dismissed based on the provided text. The Tribunal upheld the AO's jurisdiction and the addition related to capital gains, implying relief on this aspect was denied. However, the issues concerning section 153D and section 115BBE were not definitively resolved in the excerpt.
The Tribunal held that registration under the RPT Act, 1959, is not a mandatory requirement for registration under Section 12AB. It also found no evidence of proper notice for deficiencies regarding genuineness and noted that the CIT(E)'s order lacked specific instances of non-genuineness despite extensive documents submitted by the appellant. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s orders and directed the CIT(E) to register the applicant under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) and grant approval under Section 80G(5)(iii).
The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the assessee's bonafide reasons and the principle that an appellate authority cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution. The Tribunal held that the AO's denial of exemption under section 11, based on the lack of 12AB registration, did not survive as the assessee was subsequently granted registration.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to issues with the firm's accountant. Given the assessee's non-compliance, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh assessment after providing an opportunity of being heard, with a cost of Rs. 5,000/- imposed on the assessee.