ITAT Jaipur Judgments — November 2025

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not committed any illegality in setting aside the penalty orders passed by the Assessing Officer. The primary reason for the CIT(A)'s decision was that the penalty orders were passed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The Tribunal, in its reasoning, referred to Section 271D, Section 271E, and Section 275(1) of the Act. Crucially, the Tribunal relied on the decision in the case of Hissaria Brothers (supra), which was upheld by the Hon'ble Apex Court. This precedent established that penalty proceedings under Sections 271D and 271E are independent of assessment proceedings and that the limitation period under Section 275(1)(c) applies. Since the Revenue did not present any counter-arguments or opposing precedents, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s findings. Therefore, all four appeals filed by the department were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the penalty orders were indeed passed beyond the period of limitation as stipulated under Section 275(1) of the Act. Therefore, the ITAT found no illegality in the orders of the CIT(A) which had set aside the penalty orders.

The Tribunal held that the penalty orders passed under Sections 271D and 271E were indeed barred by limitation. The reasoning was based on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Hissaria Brothers, which was also relied upon by the CIT(A). The Tribunal noted that the assessment orders were passed on 29.03.2024, and according to the ratio of Hissaria Brothers, the penalty orders should have been passed by 30.09.2024. Since the penalty orders were passed on 23.12.2024, they were beyond the prescribed limitation period. The Tribunal found no illegality in the CIT(A)'s orders setting aside the penalty orders on this ground. Consequently, all four appeals filed by the department were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not committed any illegality in setting aside the penalty orders passed under Sections 271D and 271E of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The primary reason for the CIT(A)'s decision was that the penalty orders were passed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) relied on the Hon'ble Apex Court's decision in Hissaria Brothers, which held that the relevant date for determining the limitation period for penalties under Sections 271D and 271E is the date of the assessment order. The CIT(A) observed that the assessment orders were passed on March 29, 2024, and therefore, the penalty orders should have been passed by September 30, 2024. Since the penalty orders were passed on December 23, 2024, they were indeed barred by limitation. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s findings, especially as the revenue offered no arguments to the contrary. Consequently, the appeals filed by the department were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the assessee from deposits with Kota Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Kota Nagrik Sahakari Bank Ltd. was eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that the Revenue's counsel did not attempt to distinguish the decision in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. (SC), relied upon by the Learned CIT(A), nor did they refer to any material suggesting that the two cooperative banks were engaged in lending money to the general public as their banking business. The Tribunal found that the Learned CIT(A) rightly observed that the interest income was eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. The addition made by the Assessing Officer was deleted. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Learned CIT(A) and allowed the appeal.

The Tribunal decided to delete the addition of Rs. 14,10,000/- made by the AO. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had submitted a cash book for the period 01.04.2016 to 31.03.2017, which showed a cash balance of Rs. 5,26,882/- as on 01.10.2016, increasing to Rs. 9,85,275/- as on 01.11.2016 due to cash sales. Further sales from 01.11.2016 to 10.11.2016 accumulated sufficient cash for the deposit of Rs. 14,10,000/- on 11.11.2016. The Tribunal found that the assessee maintained day-to-day sales accounts establishing cash sales. The CIT(A) had not appreciated this fact. The Tribunal also considered that the trading account and sales, including cash sales, were accepted by the AO, and the gross profit was taxed. Accepting the cash sales as the source of the deposit was therefore justified, and treating the deposit as unexplained would lead to double taxation. The GST returns filed by the assessee were also accepted by the GST Department. Therefore, the source of the cash deposit was held to be fully explained. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition of Rs. 14,10,000/-. Ground No. 2 raised by the assessee was allowed. Ground No. 3 was consequential. Grounds 1 and additional grounds 1 to 5 were rendered academic as the appeal was decided on facts. The operative direction was the deletion of the addition.

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) inadvertently considered the application for Section 80G approval as an application for registration under Section 12AB, which was an issue not before him, and thus the observation was without jurisdiction. The Tribunal observed that the assessee was already granted registration under Section 12AB, and the issue of its cancellation was not raised. The CIT(E), realizing the mistake, issued a revised order on 03.04.2025, rejecting the Section 80G application and cancelling the provisional approval. However, the Tribunal found that the assessee was not confronted with the specific issues pertaining to the Section 80G application on its merits. Therefore, even though the assessee had filed detailed submissions on merits, the Tribunal held that the CIT(E) did not deal with the Section 80G application properly. Consequently, the matter was set aside to the file of the CIT(E) to decide the application afresh in accordance with the law, without prejudice to past events. The Tribunal clarified that this decision does not reflect on the merits of the dispute. The appeal in ITA No. 779/JPR/2025 was allowed by quashing the Section 154 order, and the appeal in ITA No. 118/JPR/2025 was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) erred in rejecting the application solely on the ground of non-registration under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, as this was not a mandatory requirement for 80G registration. The Tribunal referred to a previous decision stating that absence of such registration does not render the application untenable.

The tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 147/148 were quashed by the Rajasthan High Court in a similar case, as the AO should have proceeded under Section 153C when seized material related to a third party. Consequently, the assessment order became ineffective.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence for the purchases, including bills, transport receipts, and bank payments. The subsequent sales were also accepted. The Tribunal noted that the non-compliance of the supplier with a notice under section 133(6) cannot be the sole basis for disallowing the assessee's purchases, especially when the assessee has fulfilled other requirements.

The Tribunal held that the appeals filed by the Revenue were not maintainable. This was because the Revenue subsequently issued notices under Section 153C of the Act after the CIT(A)'s order, thereby accepting the CIT(A)'s decision. The Tribunal relied on the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Shyam Sunder Khandelwal's case.

The Tribunal found that the assessee's claim regarding the purchase of land and the non-attraction of Section 56(2) warranted further examination. The Tribunal also noted issues with the communication of the remand report to the assessee.

The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal. Regarding the addition of Rs. 48,38,133/- on account of Sundry Creditors, the Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) rightly directed its deletion. The Tribunal noted that the majority of the outstanding amount related to NHAI and RSRDC, and the rest was paid off. It found no reason why the AO was not convinced by the assessee's explanation. The Tribunal cited the Special Bench decision in Manoj Agarwal v/s DCIT, [2008] 113 ITD 377 (Delhi), to emphasize that trade payables or outstanding liabilities are generally not covered under Section 68 when the purchase is accepted as genuine. The AO had not recorded any finding that the liability represented a cash credit or was non-genuine. The Tribunal also held that the CIT(A)'s power is co-terminus with the AO's, and no adverse view could be taken regarding the acceptance of additional evidence, as the CIT(A) considered the overall material on record. The judgment does not explicitly detail the findings on the other three grounds (Toll Equipment expenditure, Toll expenses, and unexplained cash credit), but the overall result indicates they were also decided in favor of the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition of Rs. 65,63,180/- on account of LTCG. The Tribunal found no merit in the CIT(A)'s reliance on the Vigyan Lodha case without properly discussing the facts of the present case. The Tribunal noted that the AO had initiated proceedings based on information received and data available, and there was no requirement for cross-examination of witnesses. The Tribunal concluded that the LTCG claim was based on sham transactions and thus the addition was justified. Consequently, the addition of Rs. 1,42,604/- on account of commission paid for arranging accommodation entry for LTCG was also sustained, as it was consequential to the main addition. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) regarding these two additions. The judgment does not explicitly detail the findings on the STCG and its related commission, but the overall result indicates a partial allowance for the Revenue, implying these additions might also be revisited or sustained. The Tribunal ordered the Assessing Officer to make re-calculations in accordance with the decision.

The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 was invalid because the prior approval for reopening the assessment was not obtained from the specified authority as required by Section 151 of the Act, given that the notice was issued beyond three years from the end of the assessment year.

The Tribunal held that the appeals filed by the Revenue were not maintainable. This was because the Revenue subsequently issued notices under Section 153C of the Act after the CIT(A)'s order, thereby accepting the CIT(A)'s decision. The Tribunal relied on the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Shyam Sunder Khandelwal's case.

The Tribunal held that the appeals filed by the Revenue were not maintainable. This was because the Revenue subsequently issued notices under Section 153C of the Act after the CIT(A)'s order, thereby accepting the CIT(A)'s decision. The Tribunal relied on the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Shyam Sunder Khandelwal's case.

The Tribunal held that the appeals filed by the Revenue were not maintainable. This was because the Revenue subsequently issued notices under Section 153C of the Act after the CIT(A)'s order, thereby accepting the CIT(A)'s decision. The Tribunal relied on the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Shyam Sunder Khandelwal's case.

The Tribunal held that the appeals filed by the Revenue were not maintainable. This was because the Revenue subsequently issued notices under Section 153C of the Act after the CIT(A)'s order, thereby accepting the CIT(A)'s decision. The Tribunal relied on the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Shyam Sunder Khandelwal's case.

The Tribunal held that the appellant failed to provide sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal. The application for condonation of delay was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to file an application for condonation of delay and did not provide any sufficient cause for the delay. Therefore, the appeal was not maintainable. The Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeal as it was barred by limitation.

The Tribunal held that additions cannot be made without invoking specific provisions of the Income Tax Act. The AO failed to cite any section under which the addition was made, rendering it invalid.

The Tribunal quashed the proceedings initiated under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The primary reason for quashing was the lack of proper application of mind and satisfaction by the competent authorities for granting approval to reopen the case, as required under Section 151 of the Act. The Tribunal noted that the approval from the Principal CIT was a consolidated approval for 56 different assessees in one letter, which was not even signed by the Principal CIT but by an ITO (T&J), who was not a competent authority. Furthermore, the approval was found to be in photocopy, and the assessee's name was not even ticked in the approval list, raising doubts about whether the approval was obtained before the issue of the notice under Section 148. The Tribunal relied on decisions in Pr. CIT vs. N. C. Cables Ltd. and CIT vs. S. Goyanka Lime & Chemicals Ltd. to hold that the reopening was unsustainable due to procedural irregularities and violation of Section 151. Consequently, the notice issued under Section 148 and the assessment order passed were held to be null and void. The appeal of the assessee was allowed, and the order of the CIT(A) was quashed. Other grounds were not adjudicated as the proceedings were quashed.

The Tribunal held that the application for condonation of delay was not maintainable as it was not signed by the authorized person (Secretary) of the society. Consequently, with the dismissal of the condonation application, the appeal itself was dismissed as being barred by limitation.

The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, finding no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict the addition. The assessee's cross-objection was partly allowed, directing the addition to be restricted to 0.56% based on the average gross profit of the last three years.

The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals. Regarding the Revenue's grounds concerning limitation and the applicability of precedents like Grihalaxmi Vision and Hissaria Brothers, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s decision, particularly in light of the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Hissaria Brothers. The Tribunal confirmed the CIT(A)'s view that the proceedings were barred by limitation, thus the Revenue's ground regarding the deletion on technical grounds without deciding merits was also dismissed. For the Assessee's cross-objection, the Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271E was not sustainable due to the lack of satisfaction recorded in the assessment order for initiating such penalty. This was supported by the Apex Court's decision in CIT vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills and the jurisdictional High Court's decision in Sunil Agarwal. Consequently, the penalty was annulled on this ground. The Assessee did not press its ground 1.2, which was left undecided. The appeals of the Revenue were dismissed, and the cross-objections of the Assessee were partly allowed.

The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals. Regarding the Revenue's grounds concerning limitation (ii and iii), the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding, finding no infirmity in confirming the view of the CIT(A) based on the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Hissaria Brothers. The Tribunal noted that the amended provision of Section 271D(2) states that any penalty shall be imposed by the Joint Commissioner, and the AO was not allowed to impose the penalty. Therefore, the passing of the assessment order by the AO and the reference made by the AO had no bearing on deciding the limitation date for imposing penalty under Section 271E. Consequently, Revenue's grounds 2 and 3 were dismissed. Revenue's ground 1, concerning the deletion on technical grounds without deciding merits, was also dismissed as the proceedings were barred by limitation. The Tribunal also dismissed Revenue's ground 4, stating that the CIT(A) rightly followed the binding precedent of the Rajasthan High Court in Hissaria Brothers. The Revenue's appeal was dismissed. For the assessee's cross-objection, ground 1.1 regarding the lack of satisfaction for penalty initiation in the assessment order was allowed. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills and the jurisdictional High Court's decision in Sunil Agarwal, holding that penalty levied without satisfaction in the assessment order is not sustainable. Ground 1.2 raised by the assessee was not pressed and left undecided. The cross-objection was partly allowed.

The Tribunal held that the issue of limitation for imposing penalty under Section 271E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was squarely covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hissaria Brothers (386 ITR 719). This decision affirmed that penalty orders under Sections 271D and 271E passed beyond six months from the end of the month in which the assessments were completed are barred by limitation. The Tribunal also referred to the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court's decision in CIT v. Jitendra Singh Rathore, which held that even when the competent authority to impose penalty is the Joint CIT, the limitation period should be reckoned from the date of the first show cause notice for initiation of penalty proceedings. The Tribunal found that the penalty orders in question were passed beyond the prescribed limitation period as per Section 275(1)(c) of the Act. Therefore, the deletion of penalties by the CIT(A) on the ground of limitation was upheld. The Tribunal did not explicitly decide on the other grounds raised by the assessee in their cross-objections, as the appeals were dismissed on the preliminary issue of limitation.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in deleting the penalty on technical grounds, specifically concerning the limitation period. Regarding Revenue's grounds (ii) and (iii), the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s finding that the limitation period for imposing penalty under section 271E is linked to the assessment order date, not the show cause notice date, and upheld the CIT(A)'s reliance on the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Hissaria Brothers. Consequently, Revenue's grounds (ii) and (iii) were dismissed. Since the penalty proceedings were barred by limitation, the CIT(A) rightly did not decide the merits, leading to the dismissal of Revenue's ground (i). The Tribunal also addressed the assessee's ground 1.1, holding that the penalty levied without any satisfaction recorded in the assessment order for its initiation is not sustainable, citing the Apex Court's decision in CIT Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills and the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Sunil Agarwal. Therefore, the penalty was also unsustainable on this ground. The assessee did not press ground 1.2. The cross-objection was partly allowed on ground 1.1. The appeals of the Revenue were dismissed, and the cross-objections of the assessee were partly allowed.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue. On the issue of limitation for imposing penalty under Section 271E, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding that the penalty proceedings were barred by limitation, aligning with the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Hissaria Brothers. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s decision to not decide the merits of the dispute as the proceedings were time-barred. Therefore, Revenue's grounds regarding limitation and ignoring precedents were dismissed. Regarding the assessee's cross-objection, the Tribunal partly allowed it on the ground that no satisfaction for the initiation of penalty under Section 271E was recorded in the assessment order. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in CIT Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills and the jurisdictional High Court's decision in Sunil Agarwal, Vijay Kumar Chordia, holding that penalty levied without satisfaction in the assessment order cannot survive. The assessee's alternative ground (1.2) was not pressed and left undecided. Consequently, the Revenue's appeals were dismissed, and the assessee's cross-objections were partly allowed.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) rightly deleted the penalty on technical grounds, specifically concerning the limitation period. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A)'s finding that the penalty proceedings were barred by limitation, as the relevant date for determining limitation for penalty under Section 271E is the date of the show cause notice issued by the Additional/Joint Commissioner, not the date of the assessment order. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's grounds related to limitation, citing the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Hissaria Brothers and the Kerala High Court's decision in Grihalaxmi Vision. Consequently, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A) not deciding the merits of the penalty levy. Regarding the assessee's cross-objection, the Tribunal held that the penalty was not sustainable as no satisfaction for initiating penalty under Section 271E was recorded in the assessment order. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills and the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Sunil Agarwal, which held that penalty under Section 271E cannot be levied without such satisfaction. The assessee did not press ground 1.2 of its cross-objection. Therefore, the Revenue's appeals were dismissed, and the assessee's cross-objections were partly allowed.

The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeals. Regarding the revenue's grounds concerning limitation and the CIT(A)'s reliance on technical grounds, the Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s finding on the limitation period, as per the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Hissaria Brothers, was correct. The Tribunal agreed that the penalty proceedings were barred by limitation, and therefore, the CIT(A) rightly did not decide the merits. Thus, grounds 1, 2, and 3 raised by the revenue were dismissed. The Tribunal also dismissed ground 4, finding no error in the CIT(A)'s reliance on Hissaria Brothers. For the assessee's cross-objection, the Tribunal held that the penalty was not sustainable as no satisfaction for initiating penalty under Section 271E was recorded in the assessment order, citing the Apex Court's decision in CIT v. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills and the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Sunil Agarwal. Therefore, ground 1.1 of the assessee's cross-objection was allowed. Ground 1.2 of the assessee's cross-objection was not pressed and left undecided. Consequently, the revenue's appeals were dismissed, and the assessee's cross-objections were partly allowed.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in deleting the penalty on grounds of limitation. Regarding Revenue's grounds 2 and 3, the Tribunal relied on the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Hissaria Brothers, which held that the limitation for penalty proceedings under sections 271D/E starts from the issue of the show cause notice by the Additional/Joint CIT, not the date of the assessment order. The Tribunal noted that the amended provision of section 271D(2) also supports this view. Consequently, Revenue's grounds 2 and 3 were dismissed. As the penalty proceedings were barred by limitation, the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) rightly did not decide the merits, dismissing Revenue's ground 1. Thus, the Revenue's appeal for AY 2017-18 was dismissed. In the assessee's cross-objection, the Tribunal found that no satisfaction was recorded in the assessment order for initiating penalty under section 271E. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in CIT v. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills and the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Sunil Agarwal, the Tribunal held that a penalty levied without satisfaction in the assessment order is not sustainable. Therefore, the assessee's ground 1.1 was allowed. The assessee did not press ground 1.2, leaving it undecided. The cross-objection was partly allowed.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge its onus to establish the source and nature of the cash deposits, and no material was submitted in the appellate proceedings. Therefore, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer to provide another opportunity.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in exercising powers under Section 263 as the material available to him was the same as that with the AO, and the PCIT did not conduct independent inquiry. The PCIT's view was merely a different opinion, not a case of erroneous assessment prejudicial to revenue.

The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings were barred by limitation, upholding the CIT(A)'s decision. Additionally, the Tribunal found that penalty under Section 271E was not sustainable due to the absence of satisfaction in the assessment order.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) rightly deleted the penalty on technical grounds, specifically the issue of limitation. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s finding that the penalty proceedings were barred by limitation, dismissing Revenue's grounds 2 and 3. The Tribunal also dismissed Revenue's ground 1, stating that since the proceedings were barred by limitation, the CIT(A) rightly did not decide the merits. Regarding the assessee's cross-objection, the Tribunal held that the penalty was not sustainable as no satisfaction for initiating penalty under Section 271E was recorded in the assessment order, citing the Apex Court's decision in CIT Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills and the jurisdictional High Court's decision in Sunil Agarwal, Vijay Kumar Chordia and others Vs. JCIT. The assessee did not press ground 1.2. Therefore, the cross-objection was partly allowed. The appeals of the Revenue were dismissed, and the cross-objections of the assessee were partly allowed.

The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings were barred by limitation. The CIT(A) had correctly determined that the relevant date for calculating the limitation period for imposing penalty under section 271E was the date of the assessment order, not the date of the show cause notice, aligning with the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Hissaria Brothers. Consequently, Revenue's grounds related to limitation and ignoring precedents were dismissed. Regarding the assessee's cross-objection, the Tribunal found that no satisfaction was recorded in the assessment order for initiating penalty proceedings under section 271E. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in CIT Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills and the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Sunil Agarwal, the Tribunal held that a penalty levied without such satisfaction in the assessment order is not sustainable. Therefore, the penalty was annulled on this ground. The assessee did not press ground 1.2 of its cross-objection, leaving it undecided. The appeals of the Revenue were dismissed, and the cross-objections were partly allowed.

The Tribunal held that the findings of the Ld. CIT(A) regarding the limitation period for imposing penalty under Section 271E were correct. The Tribunal noted that the amended provision of Section 271D(2) states that penalty shall be imposed by the Joint Commissioner, and the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Hissaria Brothers was considered relevant. Therefore, grounds 2 and 3 raised by the Revenue were dismissed. Regarding Revenue's ground 1, the Tribunal affirmed that since the proceedings were barred by limitation, the CIT(A) rightly did not decide the merits. Thus, Revenue's appeal in ITA No. 1168/JP/2025 was dismissed. For the assessee's cross-objection ground 1.1, the Tribunal found that no satisfaction was recorded in the assessment order for the levy of penalty under Section 271E. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in CIT Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills and the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Sunil Agarwal, Vijay Kumar Chordia and others Vs. JCIT, the Tribunal held that penalty levied without satisfaction in the assessment order is not sustainable. Therefore, the penalty was not sustainable on this ground as well. The assessee's ground 1.2 was not pressed and left undecided. Consequently, the cross-objection was partly allowed. The decision in the lead case was applied mutatis mutandis to all other appeals and cross-objections.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO under Section 69C were legally untenable as there was no nexus established between the seized documents and the alleged unexplained expenditure. The Tribunal also noted that the LIC policy payments and property investments were already recorded in the assessee's books and ITR.

The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings were barred by limitation, upholding the CIT(A)'s decision. Additionally, the Tribunal found that penalty under Section 271E was not sustainable due to the absence of satisfaction in the assessment order.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO under Section 69C were legally untenable as there was no nexus established between the seized documents and the alleged unexplained expenditure. The Tribunal also noted that the LIC policy payments and property investments were already recorded in the assessee's books and ITR.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO under Section 69C were legally untenable as there was no nexus established between the seized documents and the alleged unexplained expenditure. The Tribunal also noted that the LIC policy payments and property investments were already recorded in the assessee's books and ITR.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal based on two technical grounds raised by the assessee. Firstly, regarding the validity of the assessment order, the Tribunal followed the binding precedent of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and various High Courts and ITAT benches, holding that the assessment order passed without issuing a notice under section 143(2) is void ab initio and lacks jurisdiction. Secondly, concerning the approval granted by the JCIT under section 153D, the Tribunal found that the approval was granted in a consolidated manner for multiple assessment years without due application of mind and without separate consideration for each year. Citing judgments from the Supreme Court (ACIT vs. Serajuddin & Co., PCIT vs. Anuj Bansal), High Courts (Allahabad, Delhi), and coordinate benches of the ITAT, the Tribunal held that such mechanical and consolidated approval is invalid. Consequently, the assessment orders for Assessment Year 2019-20 were quashed. As these technical grounds were decided in favour of the assessee, the other grounds raised by the assessee were rendered academic and not required to be decided. The operative direction was to quash the assessment order.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) under Section 69C were legally untenable. The Tribunal noted that the assessment orders did not establish any direct nexus between the seized documents and the alleged unexplained expenditures of Rs. 6,95,634/- and Rs. 96,832/-. The AO failed to demonstrate how the seized material pertained to the assessee or evidenced the use of unaccounted income for the investments. The Tribunal found that the additions were based on presumption rather than concrete material linking the investment to undisclosed income. Furthermore, it was noted that LIC policy payments and property investments were already recorded in the assessee's Income Tax Returns (ITR). Respectfully following the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in DCIT vs. M/s U.K. Paints (Overseas) Ltd., where assessments under Section 153C were set aside due to the absence of incriminating material, the Tribunal found no merit in making these additions. The Tribunal also considered the technical grounds raised by the assessee, including the violation of natural justice in passing ex-parte orders and the mechanical initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) without proper satisfaction. Based on these observations, the appeal in ITA No. 760/JPR/2025 was allowed. The Tribunal ruled that the decision in the lead case would apply mutatis mutandis to the other appeals (ITA Nos. 759, 756, 757 & 758/JPR/2025).

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had not established any direct nexus between the seized documents and the alleged unexplained expenditure of Rs. 6,95,634/- and Rs. 96,832/-. The AO failed to demonstrate how the seized material pertained to the assessee or evidenced the use of unaccounted income for the investment. The Tribunal found the invocation of Section 69C to be legally untenable as the additions appeared to be based on presumption rather than concrete material linking the investment to undisclosed income. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that LIC policy payments and property investments were already recorded in the assessee's Income Tax Returns. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in DCIT vs. M/s U.K. Paints (Overseas) Ltd., which held that assessments under Section 153C are rightly set aside when no incriminating material is found. Consequently, the additions made by the AO were not sustained. The Tribunal also noted that the issues in other appeals were similar and would apply mutatis mutandis. The appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) based on High Court directions. It was held that the notice issued under Section 153C by the Jaipur ITO lacked jurisdiction as the assessee's case was not transferred from Delhi to Jaipur.

The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 of the Act was bad in law because it was based on incorrect facts, as the assessee had filed their return of income and the information regarding the property sale was available in the ITR. The CIT(A) failed to address this crucial issue.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to the assessee's age and circumstances. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal for non-submission of documents. While disagreeing with the CIT(A)'s approach, the Tribunal restored the matter to the AO for fresh adjudication to provide the assessee an opportunity to present her case, allowing the appeal for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that Ground No. 1, being general, did not require specific findings. Regarding Ground No. 2, concerning the disallowance of Rs. 1,71,69,480/- (a revised figure from the initial Rs. 1,95,27,206/-), the Tribunal accepted the assessee's arguments that amounts paid before the due date of filing the return should be allowed, and that the benefit of amounts not realized (cum-tax benefit) should be considered. The Assessing Officer was directed to verify these aspects and pass an appropriate order. Ground No. 3, relating to the correct credit for prepaid taxes, was also directed to be verified by the Assessing Officer for appropriate relief. The Tribunal noted that the grounds regarding interest under Sections 234B and 234C were consequential and thus not adjudicated. Consequently, the appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, with the operative direction for the AO to verify and pass orders as per law.