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632 tribunal orders from the Indore bench in 2024.
Showing 40 of 632 orders. Use the months below for the rest.
The Tribunal noted a discrepancy where the assessee claimed the appeal was for AY 1999-2000, and the Form 35 filed physically was also for AY 1999-2000. However, the CIT(A) passed the impugned order for AY 1998-99, and the appeal fee challan was also for AY 1998-99. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had passed an ex-parte order dismissing the appeal as non-maintainable due to the assessee's failure to respond to notices. Considering the apparent mistake at the CIT(A)'s level in disposing of the first appeal under the faceless mechanism and the discrepancy in the assessment years, the Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to comply with the notices issued by the CIT(A) on the dates of hearing, failing which the CIT(A) would be at liberty to pass an order as deemed fit. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The tribunal noted the assessee's submission regarding the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme application. Recording these details, the tribunal decided to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. The assessee was also informed that they could revive the appeal if their scheme application was rejected.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had a meritorious case and that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations. It observed that the assessee was entitled to exemption under Section 11/12 based on the proviso to Section 12A(2), as assessment proceedings were pending when registration was granted. The delay was condoned subject to payment of costs.
The Tribunal, to meet the ends of justice, imposed a cost of Rs. 5,000 on the assessee. Upon compliance, the CIT(A) is directed to grant one more opportunity for hearing and decide the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had overlooked crucial facts and evidence, specifically the statement of the assessee's Saving Bank Account from which Rs. 12,20,000/- was withdrawn on 24.02.2016. The Tribunal also noted that the purchase of agricultural land occurred prior to this withdrawal, negating the Revenue's claim that the withdrawn amount was used for the land purchase.
The Tribunal held that the assessee demonstrated a bona fide inadvertent human mistake in declaring the total cash and cash equivalent balance as cash in hand in the return of income, rather than segregating cash in hand, bank balances, and FDRs. This mistake was evident from the detailed breakup of accounts and was not a mala fide attempt to inflate cash in hand.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in confirming the addition without proper verification. While the CIT(A) correctly identified Section 69A as the appropriate section, the matter required detailed verification of the transactions, especially considering the volume of documents produced. The Tribunal noted that merely depositing in Specified Bank Notes should not be a ground for addition if the source is explained.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s observation that the AO had accepted the opening balance of unsecured loans was incorrect. The AO had explicitly rejected the assessee's claim for the opening balance due to the non-filing of returns and lack of audited accounts for earlier years, without conducting a factual examination of the documents submitted by the assessee. While agreeing with the legal principle that opening balances cannot be taxed in the current year, the Tribunal noted that the factual verification of the assessee's claim was necessary. The Tribunal also observed that the assessee, being a partnership firm, was legally required to file returns from AY 2006-07 onwards, irrespective of income or loss, and the reason provided by the assessee's counsel for non-filing was not legally tenable. Consequently, the Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after necessary factual verification of the opening balance claim, allowing opportunities to both parties and considering any remand report from the AO. Regarding the assessee's cross-objection, the Tribunal directed the CIT(A) to consider the additional legal grounds raised by the assessee and adjudicate them appropriately. Both the appeal and the cross-objection were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the addition by the AO was based on surrounding circumstances without direct material, and the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal ex-parte for non-prosecution. The assessee was not given a fair opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should have provided a fair opportunity to the assessee to present their case, especially since the assessee claimed the deposits were from agricultural income. The matter was remanded for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) was not justified in denying registration under Section 12AB solely based on the potential for commercial activity, as the law allows for such activities up to a certain limit and the actual impact is assessed annually. For Section 80G, the Tribunal noted a subsequent CBDT circular extending the filing deadline and a fresh application filed by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) was not justified in denying registration under Section 12AB solely based on the potential for commercial activity, as the law allows for such activities up to a certain limit and the actual impact is assessed annually. For Section 80G, the Tribunal noted a subsequent CBDT circular extending the filing deadline and a fresh application filed by the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed a valid belated return for AY 2019-20 based on a CBDT order extending the due date. It was held that the disallowance made by the CPC under Section 143(1) on the grounds of delayed filing was not tenable as per the provisions of Section 143(1) existing at that time, and also considering a consistent view from the ITAT, Rajkot.
The Tribunal held that the restriction under Section 13(1)(b) is not per se inapplicable to a 'charitable-cum-religious' trust, and the benefit to a particular community needs examination. The Tribunal allowed the appeal to provide the assessee an opportunity to make submissions before the CIT(E).
The Tribunal first addressed the delay in filing the appeal. Citing Section 253(5) of the Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition Vs Mst. Katiji and others, the Tribunal held that a mistaken understanding of legal provisions, as explained by the Revenue, constitutes a 'sufficient cause' for condoning the delay. The Tribunal found that the Revenue had indeed filed Form No. 8A in terms of Section 158AB and had deferred filing this appeal due to a mistaken understanding of the provision. Therefore, the delay was condoned, and the appeal was admitted. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had deleted the addition by following multiple decisions of the ITAT in the assessee's own case for earlier assessment years, which held that interest earned on deposits with banks, FDRs, and saving bank accounts is an integral part of the business activity of providing credit facilities to members and is therefore covered under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). The Revenue could not demonstrate that these ITAT decisions had been reversed by a higher forum. A co-ordinate bench of the ITAT had also upheld the CIT(A)'s order in similar appeals for AY 2017-18 and AY 2018-19. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the issue was squarely covered by previous judicial pronouncements in favour of the assessee and upheld the impugned order of the CIT(A). The Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal acknowledged the substantial delay but considered the reasons provided, including the FIRs, suspension of the management, and the subsequent quashing of FIRs and restoration of the committee, as preventing the assessee from timely filing. It noted that the delay was not due to malafide intent. The Tribunal also considered the principle of liberal interpretation for condoning delay.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals for both Assessment Years 2013-14 and 2014-15. The Tribunal acknowledged the significant disruption caused to the assessee's functioning due to the registration of FIRs against its President, the suspension of its management committee, and the subsequent quashing of these FIRs by the Hon'ble High Court. The Tribunal found that the assessee's explanation for the delay was plausible, as the society remained non-functional for approximately four years until a new management committee was elected and restored. The Tribunal noted that the assessee obtained copies of the impugned orders from the CIT(A) only after the new management took charge. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(A) and remanded the matters back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, including the adjudication of any additional grounds raised by the assessee, after providing the assessee with an opportunity of hearing. The ratio decidendi is that significant disruptions and legal proceedings affecting the management and functioning of an assessee can constitute sufficient cause for condoning delays in filing appeals, provided the delay is not attributable to malafide intent or deliberate negligence.
The Tribunal held that goodwill arising from amalgamation is an eligible intangible asset for depreciation. The claim was allowed based on Supreme Court precedents which established goodwill as a business or commercial right of a similar nature.
The Tribunal held that the penalty orders were time-barred, as the limitation period for passing such orders should be reckoned from the date the Assessing Officer recommended the initiation of penalty proceedings, not from the date the show-cause notice was issued. Consequently, the penalty orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition of Rs. 3,49,00,000/- made under Section 68. The assessee had provided sufficient documentation, including bank statements, ledger accounts, and account confirmations with PAN and addresses, to establish the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the lenders.
The Tribunal held that the penalty orders were time-barred, as the limitation period for passing such orders should be reckoned from the date the Assessing Officer recommended the initiation of penalty proceedings, not from the date the show-cause notice was issued. Consequently, the penalty orders were quashed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to provide the assessee with an opportunity of hearing, and the assessee was directed to participate without seeking unnecessary adjournments.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to exemption under Section 11/12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The admitted facts were that the assessee filed a belated return under Section 139(4) for AY 2011-12, beyond the due date under Section 139(1), which was the reason for the AO denying exemption. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee's submission that the CBDT's Instruction dated 23.04.2019 clearly directs subordinate authorities to allow exemption if the return has been filed within the time limit of Section 139. They also concurred with the ITAT Delhi Bench's view in Conference of Religious India, where exemption was allowed even when the return was filed belatedly under Section 139(4). However, since the claim for exemption under Section 11/12 involves a different type of working based on the application and accumulation of income, the Tribunal found it appropriate to remand the matters back to the AO. The AO is to provide the assessee an opportunity to furnish necessary information for computing the exemption under Section 11/12 and then allow the admissible exemption. Other grounds were not adjudicated as the matters were remanded.
The Tribunal set aside the addition of Rs. 10,00,000/- and remanded it to the AO for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee an opportunity to submit supporting evidence. The addition of Rs. 79,102/- on account of interest income was deleted as the assessee had already declared income exceeding the presumptive income under Section 44AD.
The Tribunal held that the AO's estimation of net profit at 8% was arbitrary and lacked basis, especially considering the low profit margins in wholesale sugar trading. The Tribunal directed the AO to assess income by applying a net profit rate of 0.40%.
The Tribunal held that while proceedings were validly initiated against the deceased before his death, passing the assessment orders in the name of the deceased was an irregularity, not an invalidity. The matters were remanded to the AO to pass fresh assessment orders in the name of the legal representatives.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to exemption under Section 11/12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The admitted facts were that the assessee filed a belated return under Section 139(4) for AY 2011-12, beyond the due date under Section 139(1), which was the reason for the AO denying exemption. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee's submission that the CBDT's Instruction dated 23.04.2019 clearly directs subordinate authorities to allow exemption if the return has been filed within the time limit of Section 139. They also concurred with the ITAT Delhi Bench's view in Conference of Religious India, where exemption was allowed even when the return was filed belatedly under Section 139(4). However, since the claim for exemption under Section 11/12 involves a different type of working based on the application and accumulation of income, the Tribunal found it appropriate to remand the matters back to the AO. The AO is to provide the assessee an opportunity to furnish necessary information for computing the exemption under Section 11/12 and then allow the admissible exemption. Other grounds were not adjudicated as the matters were remanded.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to exemption under Section 11/12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The admitted facts were that the assessee filed a belated return under Section 139(4) for AY 2011-12, beyond the due date under Section 139(1), which was the reason for the AO denying exemption. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee's submission that the CBDT's Instruction dated 23.04.2019 clearly directs subordinate authorities to allow exemption if the return has been filed within the time limit of Section 139. They also concurred with the ITAT Delhi Bench's view in Conference of Religious India, where exemption was allowed even when the return was filed belatedly under Section 139(4). However, since the claim for exemption under Section 11/12 involves a different type of working based on the application and accumulation of income, the Tribunal found it appropriate to remand the matters back to the AO. The AO is to provide the assessee an opportunity to furnish necessary information for computing the exemption under Section 11/12 and then allow the admissible exemption. Other grounds were not adjudicated as the matters were remanded.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to exemption under Section 11/12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The admitted facts were that the assessee filed a belated return under Section 139(4) for AY 2011-12, beyond the due date under Section 139(1), which was the reason for the AO denying exemption. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee's submission that the CBDT's Instruction dated 23.04.2019 clearly directs subordinate authorities to allow exemption if the return has been filed within the time limit of Section 139. They also concurred with the ITAT Delhi Bench's view in Conference of Religious India, where exemption was allowed even when the return was filed belatedly under Section 139(4). However, since the claim for exemption under Section 11/12 involves a different type of working based on the application and accumulation of income, the Tribunal found it appropriate to remand the matters back to the AO. The AO is to provide the assessee an opportunity to furnish necessary information for computing the exemption under Section 11/12 and then allow the admissible exemption. Other grounds were not adjudicated as the matters were remanded.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee. The Tribunal noted that for Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to be attracted, the transferee must have taken possession and performed or be willing to perform their part. In this case, the CIT(A) found that possession was never handed over and the property remained with the appellant. Furthermore, the transferee had not discharged the sale consideration and had ordered stop-payment of cheques. Therefore, Section 53A was not attracted, and consequently, there was no transfer under Section 2(47)(v) of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal also observed that the sale deeds were ultimately cancelled through arbitration and court proceedings, and the assessee had paid compensation with interest as per the court order. Since the transactions were cancelled and no real income arose, the addition made by the AO was not sustainable and was deleted. The Tribunal considered the cancellation of sale deeds through arbitration and court orders as evidence that the transactions did not result in any income. The issue of validity of reopening was rendered academic. The addition of Rs. 5,14,46,400/- was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263 when the issue of unsecured loan was already pending before the CIT(A). The Tribunal noted that the loan transaction was conducted through banking channels and supported by documentation, and that the assessee's appeal against the AO's addition was already pending.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was a builder/developer and not merely a contractor. It also found that the completion certificates for the projects met the requirements of Section 80-IB(10), despite some initial doubts raised by the AO.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activities qualified for deduction under Section 80IB(11A), considering the processing of potatoes into chips as manufacturing. The Tribunal also found that the reopening of assessment by the AO was not valid in this case.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activities constituted manufacturing eligible for deduction under Section 80IB(11A), following various judicial precedents. The Tribunal also found that the reopening of assessment by the AO was not justified.
The Tribunal held that the issues raised by the Revenue were recurring and had already been settled in favour of the assessee by previous ITAT orders. The Tribunal found no reason to deviate from the established precedents.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activities qualified for deduction under Section 80IB(11A), considering the processing of potatoes into chips as manufacturing. The Tribunal also found that the reopening of assessment by the AO was not valid in this case.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activities qualified for deduction under Section 80IB(11A), considering the processing of potatoes into chips as manufacturing. The Tribunal also found that the reopening of assessment by the AO was not valid in this case.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was a builder/developer, not just a contractor, and that the completion certificates for the projects were valid. Therefore, the deduction under Section 80-IB(10) was admissible.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activities qualified for deduction under Section 80IB(11A), considering the processing of potatoes into chips as manufacturing. The Tribunal also found that the reopening of assessment by the AO was not valid in this case.
The Tribunal held that the issues raised by the Revenue were recurring and had already been settled in favour of the assessee by previous ITAT orders. The Tribunal found no reason to deviate from the established precedents.