ITAT Hyderabad Judgments — December 2025

The Tribunal held that cash deposits into the Development Credit Bank were sufficiently explained by previous withdrawals and directed the AO to delete the addition. However, regarding the Axis Bank account held in the name of M/s. Madhu Infotech, the Tribunal found the ownership unclear and set aside the issue to the AO for further verification.

The Tribunal held that the amounts received were for the sale of land owned by the partnership firm and were accounted for as advances in the firm's books. Therefore, the additions made to the assessee's individual income were not sustainable.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were barred by limitation. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed on this legal ground.

The Tribunal found that while the assessee filed written submissions, they were close to the order date, and there was no evidence of a meaningful opportunity for the assessee to present documents. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to restore the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, directing a proper opportunity for hearing.

The Tribunal found that while the assessee filed written submissions, they were close to the order date, and there was no evidence of a meaningful opportunity for the assessee to present documents. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to restore the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, directing a proper opportunity for hearing.

The Tribunal found that while the assessee filed written submissions, they were close to the order date, and there was no evidence of a meaningful opportunity for the assessee to present documents. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to restore the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, directing a proper opportunity for hearing.

The Tribunal found that while the assessee filed written submissions, they were close to the order date, and there was no evidence of a meaningful opportunity for the assessee to present documents. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to restore the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, directing a proper opportunity for hearing.

The Tribunal found that while the assessee filed written submissions, they were close to the order date, and there was no evidence of a meaningful opportunity for the assessee to present documents. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to restore the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, directing a proper opportunity for hearing.

The Tribunal found that while the assessee filed written submissions, they were close to the order date, and there was no evidence of a meaningful opportunity for the assessee to present documents. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to restore the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, directing a proper opportunity for hearing.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 576 days, citing consistency with its earlier order in the assessee's own case for the assessment year 2016-2017. It set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(A) which had dismissed the appeals in limine and restored the matters to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, clarifying that while recovery proceedings are stayed under IBC, the determination of tax liability is not barred.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 576 days, citing consistency with its earlier order in the assessee's own case for the assessment year 2016-2017. It set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(A) which had dismissed the appeals in limine and restored the matters to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, clarifying that while recovery proceedings are stayed under IBC, the determination of tax liability is not barred.

The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148A and the subsequent notice under Section 148 were issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) outside the faceless mechanism, which is bad in law. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed for want of valid assumption of jurisdiction.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order dated 26.07.2022 was barred by limitation as it was passed after the expiry of the time limit prescribed under Section 153 of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.

The tribunal held that the final assessment order passed by the AO was beyond the limitation prescribed under Section 153(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and therefore, it was liable to be quashed. Other issues were kept open pending a Supreme Court decision.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was passed beyond the statutory time limit of September 30, 2021, as calculated under Section 153(1) read with Section 153(4) of the Act. Consequently, the assessment order was deemed barred by limitation and liable to be quashed.

The Tribunal held that ownership of land is not a prerequisite for agricultural income and lease agreements are not always necessary if possession is established. However, the assessee failed to provide satisfactory evidence for agricultural operations and sales, and the CIT(A)'s order was cryptic.

The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) outside the faceless mechanism, violating Section 151A and the e-Assessment Scheme, 2022. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction was invalid.

The Tribunal held that the amounts received were for the sale of land owned by the partnership firm and were accounted for as advances in the firm's books. Therefore, the additions made to the assessee's individual income were not sustainable.

The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148A and the subsequent notice under Section 148 were issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) outside the faceless mechanism, which is bad in law. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed for want of valid assumption of jurisdiction.

The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D should be restricted to the extent of exempt income earned. The investments were considered to be for commercial expediency and strategic business purposes.

The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 and subsequent assessment order were bad in law as they were issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer outside the faceless mechanism. Consequently, the impugned orders were quashed.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment order dated 06.12.2024 was passed beyond the time limit prescribed under Section 153(4) of the Act, considering the reference made to the Transfer Pricing Officer. Therefore, the assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that cash deposits into the Development Credit Bank were sufficiently explained by previous withdrawals and directed the AO to delete the addition. However, regarding the Axis Bank account held in the name of M/s. Madhu Infotech, the Tribunal found the ownership unclear and set aside the issue to the AO for further verification.

The Tribunal found that while the assessee failed to provide complete documentary evidence for the cost of improvement, the property's sale consideration was based on its improved value. The Tribunal directed the AO to allow the cost of improvement as claimed, considering the overall facts and the property's sale value.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the assessee's age, dependence on others, and the prima facie injustice in the assessment. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication to allow the assessee to present supporting evidence.

The Tribunal held that the disallowance was arbitrary and contrary to the facts, as Form 56F was filed within the extended due date. It further noted that Section 10AA does not mandate filing the return within the due date under Section 139(1) as a precondition for claiming the deduction.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was passed beyond the prescribed limitation period under Section 153(4) of the Act, following precedents from the Madras and Bombay High Courts. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 was invalid because the AO did not obtain prior approval from the specified higher authorities as required by Section 151 of the Act for reassessment proceedings initiated beyond three years from the end of the assessment year. Consequently, the assessment framed by the AO was quashed.

The Tribunal admitted additional evidence furnished by the assessee, which prima facie suggested the deposits were collections for the bank. Since these evidences were not examined by lower authorities, the Tribunal remanded the matter to the AO for de novo adjudication, providing the assessee another opportunity to present her case.

The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's contention that the AO exceeded the scope of limited scrutiny by examining purchases for sales turnover mismatch. However, it remanded the issue of net profit estimation to the AO, directing recomputation based on either the industry average or the assessee's average net profit rate for the preceding three years, and ordered the exclusion of taxes collected on sales from gross receipts.

The Tribunal found the explanation for the inordinate delay unconvincing and reflective of gross negligence, especially for an educational institution. Citing a Supreme Court precedent, it ruled that the assessee failed to demonstrate "sufficient cause" for the delay, thus dismissing the appeal as time-barred.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was passed beyond the limitation prescribed under Section 153(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and therefore, it was liable to be quashed.

The Tribunal found that the omission to claim TDS was a procedural lapse and the substantive right under Section 199 could not be denied on technical grounds. The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to verify if the corresponding income was offered for taxation and then grant the due TDS credit.

The Tribunal found that while the assessee filed written submissions, they were close to the order date, and there was no evidence of a meaningful opportunity for the assessee to present documents. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to restore the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, directing a proper opportunity for hearing.

The Tribunal held that the approval for issuing the notice under Section 148 was obtained from an incompetent authority, as more than three years had elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings were bad in law.

The Tribunal admitted the additional ground of appeal, which was purely legal and related to the limitation period. It found that the assessment order was indeed passed beyond the prescribed time limits, rendering it invalid.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were indeed barred by limitation as they were passed after the expiry of the time limits stipulated in Section 153 of the Act, including extensions. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.

The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that the assessment orders were barred by limitation. It relied on previous ITAT Hyderabad Bench decisions which followed High Court judgments on the interplay between Section 144C and Section 153 of the Act.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 576 days, citing consistency with its earlier order in the assessee's own case for the assessment year 2016-2017. It set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(A) which had dismissed the appeals in limine and restored the matters to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, clarifying that while recovery proceedings are stayed under IBC, the determination of tax liability is not barred.

The Tribunal found 'sufficient cause' for the 87-day delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), citing the death of the Secretary and subsequent communication failures. It condoned the delay, set aside the CIT(A)'s order (which was dismissed in limine), and remanded the entire matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication on merits, allowing the assessee to present relevant records and details.

The Tribunal considered the submissions of both parties and the material on record. It was evident that the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) occurred because the assessee became aware of the assessment order at a later stage. The Tribunal found the reasons explained by the assessee to constitute a sufficient cause to condone the delay of 294 days. The Tribunal held that the assessee should not suffer for the lapses of the earlier consultant, especially as the Karta resides outside India, and there was no indication of deliberate inaction or malafide intention. Consequently, the delay was condoned. Furthermore, since the assessment was completed ex parte under Section 144 without the assessee's participation, and the CIT(A) had not examined the matter on merits, the Tribunal deemed it proper to remand the issue to the file of the Ld. AO for de novo adjudication. The Ld. AO was directed to provide the assessee with a due opportunity of being heard, and the assessee was permitted to file all evidence and submissions. The assessee was also directed not to seek unnecessary adjournments. The issues regarding the addition of Rs.1,73,00,000/-, the classification of rental income, and the validity of the assessment order were not adjudicated on merits by the CIT(A) and were therefore remitted back to the AO.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were barred by limitation. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed on this legal ground.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) observed that the orders under Section 148A(d) and notices under Section 148 of the Act for all assessment years were issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) and not the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO). Following the Hon'ble High Court of Telangana's judgment in Kankanala Ravindra Reddy Vs. ITO, the ITAT held that the assessment proceedings initiated by the JAO outside the faceless mechanism were illegal, constituting an invalid assumption of jurisdiction.

The Tribunal ruled that since the agreement for sale and the initial advance were made before the amendment to Section 269SS, the assessee had a bonafide belief that the section did not apply to property sales at that time. This constituted a reasonable cause under Section 273B for accepting the balance consideration in cash. Therefore, the Tribunal deleted the penalty imposed under Section 271D, finding that the A.O. had erred in levying it. The additional legal ground challenging the validity of the A.O.'s order was dismissed as infructuous.

During the hearing, the assessee requested to withdraw the appeal, as the CIT(E) had subsequently granted 80G approval for the assessment years 2026-2027 to 2028-2029. The Tribunal accepted the withdrawal request and dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.

The Tribunal, noting the assessee's request for withdrawal due to duplicate filing and the lack of objection from the Departmental Representative, granted permission for the withdrawal of the appeal.

The Tribunal considered the rival submissions and examined the AO's order, noting that the AO had specifically requested ledger accounts, purchase bills, transportation memos, and details of the mode of payment. The assessee failed to furnish these crucial documents, preventing the AO from verifying the source of payments and the genuineness of purchases. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A), while admitting additional evidence under Rule 46A, examined documents for only one party and presumed the rest were in order, which is an insufficient substitute for actual verification. Furthermore, the AO did not submit a remand report. In these circumstances, the verification of evidence was incomplete. The Tribunal distinguished the assessee's relied-upon case. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the AO for de novo verification of all evidences pertaining to all thirteen parties, including purchase bills, transportation memos, ledger accounts, payment proofs, and bank statements. The AO is to pass a speaking order after providing an adequate opportunity of being heard. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal noted that the assessment was framed ex-parte by the AO due to the assessee's non-prosecution. The AO had added the entire sale proceeds of the capital asset (Rs. 3,18,000/-) and the entire sale consideration of immovable properties (Rs. 58,83,000/-) as income without allowing any deduction for the cost of acquisition or examining if any capital gains actually arose. The Tribunal found that the assessment lacked proper computation of income in accordance with the Act. Despite the assessee's non-cooperation, the Tribunal held that the assessment required proper verification of factual positions, including the cost of acquisition and other relevant details, which are fundamental to income computation. In the interest of substantial justice, the Tribunal decided to provide one more opportunity to the assessee to determine the correct tax liability. The Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities and restored the matter to the file of the AO for de novo adjudication. The AO was directed to verify the details of the assets sold, examine the cost of acquisition and other material, and compute the income strictly in accordance with law, while affording the assessee a fair opportunity. The assessee was directed to cooperate in the proceedings, failing which the AO could proceed as per law. The issue of whether the CIT(A) provided a fair opportunity was implicitly addressed by setting aside the order and remanding for de novo adjudication. The specific amounts in grounds 2 and 3 were not decided on merits but were part of the overall remand. The applicability of Section 69A and Section 115BBE was also not decided on merits.

The ITAT first condoned the 16-day delay for the appeal before itself, citing a technical lapse/misunderstanding. However, regarding the 2247-day delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), the ITAT found the assessee's explanations of health issues, COVID-19, and professional negligence insufficient and unsubstantiated. The ITAT upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, noting the Supreme Court's limitation extension for COVID-19 was inapplicable as the original deadline expired prior to the covered period.