INTERWRAP CORP PRIVATE LIMITED (SUCCESSOR OF OWENS CORNING INDUSTRIES (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED),MUMBAI vs. DCIT., CIRCLE -5(1), HYDERABAD

3 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd 7. That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. TPO/Ld. AO erred in not considering recurring compensation to contract labour amounting to Rs. 345 Lakhs as extraordinary cost.

8. That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. TPO/Ld. AO failed to grant adjustment of following extraordinary items amounting to total of Rs. 243 lakhs; a. Additional security charges on account of labour unrest b. Fixed power cost c. Fixed employee benefit expenses 9. That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. TPO/Ld. AO erred in considering Foreign Exchange loss amounting to Rs.56 lakhs while computing PLI of the Appellant.

11. That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. TPO/Ld. AO erred in not considering the following items as operating in nature a. sale of scrap b. provisions for doubtful debts written back c. Liabilities and provisions no longer required written back d. miscellaneous income; Rejection of TP Documentation and Cherry picking of comparables 12. That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. TPO/LA. AO erred in rejecting transfer pricing documentation maintained by the Appellant in accordance with the provisions of the Act read with the Income-tax Rules, 1962 (Rules) and undertaking a fresh economic analysis during the course of assessment proceedings and in particular modifying/rejecting the filters applied by the Assessee.

13. That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld, TPO/Ld. AO erred in adopting a search strategy that amounts to cherry picking of companies.

Selection of incomparable companies 4 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd 14. That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. TPO/Ld. AO erred in considering the following companies as comparables: a. ORO Tuff Glasses Pvt. Ltd. b. Dadakrupa Tuff Glass Private Limited c. Emerge Glass India Private Limited d. Sisecam Flat Glass India Private Limited e. Gold Plus Glass Industry Umited f. Gobind Glass and Industries Limited 15. That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. TPO/Ld. AO erred in including companies disregarding the functionally dissimilarity 16. That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. TPO/Ld. AO ought to have appreciated that the aforesaid companies did not have any extra-ordinary events as such of the Appellant. Rejection of comparable companies 17. That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. TPO/Ld. AO erred by not including following companies as comparable: a. Chandra Lakshmi Safety Glass Ltd. b. Goldstar Glasswares Pvt Ltd. Shri Balkishan Agarwal Glass Industries Ltd.

18. That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. TPO/Ld. AO erred in not appreciating that the comparables listed in Ground No.17 are functionally comparable and as such should be included in the list of comparables. Incorrect Margin computation of comparable companies.

19. That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. TPO/ Ld. AO erred in adopting incorrect margin of certain comparable companies. Not restricting the adjustment to the Value of International Transaction.

20. Without prejudice to the above grounds, the Ld. TPO/Ld AO, erred in calculating the Transfer Pricing Adjustment on entity level instead calculating the TP adjustment on the value of international transaction.

21. That the Ld. TPO/AO ought to have appreciated that the TP adjustment is more than double the value of actual international transaction which is benchmarked.

5 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd 22. That the Ld. TPO/AO ought to have appreciated that the price/value of the raw materials have not materially changed between the subject AY and the previous AY and as such the inference of the TPO that there is shifting of profits by payment of excess price for raw materials is unsustainable as it is purely relating to extra-ordinary events during the year.”

3. The assessee has also raised additional ground which reads as under :

On the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the DRP has erred in not quoting a valid computer-generated DIN on the body of the DRP directions issued under section 144C(5) of the Act, in contravention of Circular No.19/2019 issued by the CBDT, thereby rendering. such a direction to be invalid and never to have been issued as per Para 4 of the above said Circular.

7 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd The Hon’ble DRP, vide directions issued under Section 144C(5) of the Act dated 14.06.2022, adjudicated the objections raised by the assessee and issued specific directions with regard to comparables, operating margins, treatment of operating and non- operating items, and characterization of certain expenditure. The DRP also directed the TPO to treat scrap sales as operating income. Further, following the decisions of the Hon’ble ITAT in assessee’s own case for earlier years, the DRP deleted the adjustment towards royalty in entirety.

9 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd 10. The learned CIT-DR, Ms. U. Mini Chandran, on the other hand, strongly opposed the admission of the additional ground and submitted that, the assessee should not be permitted to raise a new ground at this stage. She further submitted that, the issue relating to DIN compliance is factual in nature and ought not to be entertained as an additional ground. Therefore, she prayed that the application filed by the assessee may be rejected.

10 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd 12. The learned counsel for the assessee, Shri SP Chidambaram, Advocate, referring to the final assessment order passed by the A.O. under Section 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) r.w.s. 144B dated 28.07.2022, submitted that, the assessment order passed by the A.O. is barred by limitation in view of the provisions of Section 153(1) read with sub-section (4) of the Act, which has been clearly laid down by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Roca Bathroom Products Private Limited (2022) 445 ITR 537 (Madras) and the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Limited Vs. ACIT, International Taxation (2023) 457 ITR 161 (Bombay), wherein it has been held that the final assessment order passed by the A.O. beyond the time limit provided under Section 153(1) read with Section 153(4) of the Act is barred by limitation. The learned counsel for the assessee, further referring to the dates and events in the present case, submitted that the normal time limit for completion of assessment under Section 153(1) of the Act for the present Assessment Year 2018-19 is 18 months from the end of the relevant assessment year, which would expire on 30.09.2020, and the period for completion of assessment shall stand extended by another 12 months, if any reference is made under Section 92CA, and the 11 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd same would extend the time limit up to 30.09.2021, whereas the A.O. passed the final assessment order only on 28.07.2022, which is beyond the limitation provided under the Act, and therefore, cannot be sustained. Therefore, he submitted that the final assessment order passed by the A.O. should be quashed.

13. The Ld. CIT-DR for the Revenue, Ms. U. Mini Chandran, on the other hand, referring to provisions of Section 153 and provisions of Section 144C of the Act, submitted that, both the sections are mutually exclusive and operate for a different purpose which is evident from non-obstante clause under Section 144C of the Act, which overrides all other provisions of the Act, including the provisions of Section 153(1) and 153(4) of the Act. Therefore, the arguments of the counsel for the assessee in light of provisions of Section 153(1) and 153(4) of the Act, that upper limit provided for completion of assessment would also be applicable to the cases where reference under Section 92CA of the Act was made to the TPO, is devoid of merit and cannot be accepted going by the wording of Section 144C of the Act. The Ld. CIT-DR further submitted that, although this issue is in favour of the assessee by the decisions of various High Courts, including the decision of 12 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Roca Bathroom Products Private Limited (supra) and also the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Limited Vs. ACIT, International Taxation (supra), but fact remains that the Revenue has challenged the order of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Limited Vs. ACIT, International Taxation (supra) and the same has been stayed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Limited Vs. ACIT, International Taxation (supra) has delivered a split verdict where one Hon'ble Judge has decided the issue in favour of the Revenue and another Hon'ble Judge has decided the issue in favour of the assessee and the matter is still pending for adjudication before a Larger Bench. Therefore, she submitted that, since the matter has not attained finality at the level of Hon'ble Supreme Court, either the matter may be kept pending on this issue or decided in favour of the Revenue.

“18. The main contentions of the Department, through their counsel are that Section 144C is a code in itself and hence on remand by the ITAT, the power of DRP to take up the dispute on additions by IPO, is not circumscribed by Section 153 and that in the absence of any express time limits contemplated under the Act, the time limits under Section 153 for reassessment cannot be read into Section 144C more particularly when the provisions of Section 153 are excluded by the non-obstante clause in section 144C(13) and hence the proceedings are not barred by limitation. Per contra, it has been contended by the learned senior counsels appearing for the respondent(s)/assessees 14 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd that the outer time limit under Section 153 is applicable to every proceedings on remand and the department having slept over the issue for several years, cannot now redo the proceedings afresh, after certain rights have vested with the assessees. Even if specific provisions are not there to deal with this situation, the proceedings must be concluded within a reasonable time and hence the impugned proceedings are liable to be struck down and rightly done so by the learned Judge.

19. Admittedly, the facts including the dates are not under dispute. As regards the appeal in W.A.No.1854 of 2021, even though the remand was on 24-1-2013 and the assessee had received the order on 8-2-2013, the first notice by the DRP was issued on 19-2-2014 and the first hearing in the Chennai office was on 10-3-2014. Therefore, it is lucid that the DRP had the knowledge of the order before 19-2-2014. The matter was heard on various dates in Chennai office and written submissions were also filed. Thereafter, the files have been transferred to Bengaluru by the CBDT notification dated 31.12.2014. The Learned Judge relying upon the findings in the batch of cases which was decided first and rendered additional findings, which have been extracted in paragraphs 10 and 11 above, has allowed the writ petitions holding that the time limit under Section 153 (2A) was not adhered to and in any case, the proceedings have not been concluded within a reasonable time.

20. As rightly contended by the learned senior counsels and affirmed by the Learned Judge, the DRP proceedings is a continuation of assessment proceedings. To put it further, it is a part of assessment proceedings, once the objections are filed and under section 144C (12) a period of 9 months is prescribed. within which, directions are in be issued by the DRP, falling which any directions are to be treated as otiose. As seen from the timeline discussed in the earlier paragraphs, the original assessment proceedings are to be completed within 21 months and the additional time of 12 months is granted when proceedings before TPO is pending. The TPO has to pass orders before 60 days prior to the last date. Then 30 days time is given to the assessee to file their objection before the DRP and the DRP is given 9 months time and thereafter, within one month from the end of the month of receipt of directions from DRP, the final order is to be passed. This court is not in consonance with the contention of the learned senior panel counsel for the appellants revenue that the time period of 33 months, provided initially is for the draft order and not for the final order. A careful perusal of the timeline would indicate that the time limit is for the final assessment and not for the draft order. The anomaly in the argument is that in the present cases, no fresh draft order was passed, but the DRP had Issued the notices. If the contention of the appellants/revenue was to hold some water, they must have passed the draft assessment order immediately on receipt of the order from the Tribunal, but instead, notice was issued by the DRP. In any case, it is a far cry for the revenue as because no order has been passed for more than 5 years.

21. As held above, the assessment has to be concluded within 21 months when there is no reference and when there is a reference, it has to be concluded within 33 months. In the additional 12 months, the draft order is to he passed, the objections have to be filed, the DRP has to issue the directions and the final order is to be passed. The provisions under section 144C and section 153 are not mutually exclusive as both contain provisions relating to Section 92CA and are inter-dependent and overlapping. On remand, prior to amendment as per Section 153 (2A), the Assessing officer is given 12 months to pass a fresh assessment order. Therefore, it is incumbent on hina to do ss, irrespective of the fact that DRP has completed the hearing and issued the directions or not. As rightly held by the learned judge, we are of the view that the DRP ought to have 15 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd concluded the proceedings within 9 months from the date of receipt of the Tribunal's order, when it had issued a notice on 19-2-2014 and conducted the hearing as early as on 10-3-2014 and on several dates. The DRP at Chennai, in fact ought to have passed orders before 19-11-2014, even if the date of receipt of the notice is taken as 19-2-2014. In that event, the assessing officer ought to have passed the order before 31-12-2014 or at the latest before 31-3-2015 considering that the order was received during the Financial year 2013-14. The transfer of the files to Bengaluru, after the lapse of the time, will not indefinitely extend the time and can have no impact on the time lines. It is an inter-department arrangement and it cannot defeat the rights of the assessee.

12. In Canado Sugar Refining Co. v. R. [1898 AC 735:67 LJPC 125), Lord Davy observed "Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter." …………… 14. This rule of construction which is also spoken of as "ex visceribus actus" helps in avoiding any inconsistency either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute.

16 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd 4) The courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation which reduces one of the provisions as a "dead letter" or "useless lumber" is not harmonious construction. 5) To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose." (ii) CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers [2003] 126 Taxman 321/259 ITR 449: "16. The courts will have to reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. (See Salmon v. Duncombe [(1886) 11 AC 627:55 LJPC 69: 55 LT 446 (PC)] AC at p. 634, Curtis v. Stovin [(1889) 22 QBD 513: 58 LJQB 174:60 LT 772 (CA)] referred to in S. Teja Singh case [AIR 1959 SC 352: (1959) 35 ITR 408]).

18. The statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.

19. The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. (See RS. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka [(1992) 1 SCC 335: 1992 SCC (L&S) 286: (1992) 19 ATC 507: AIR 1992 SC 81]) Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is the duty of the court to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the same Act. (See Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain [(1997) 1 SCC 373: AIR 1997 SC 1006])." (iii) Franklin Templeton Trustee Services (P.) Lid. v. Amruta Garg [2021] 124 taxmann.com 326/164 SCL 720: "17. The concept of "absurdity" in the context of interpretation of statutes is construed to include any result which is unworkable, impracticable, illogical, futile or pointless, artificial, or productive of a disproportionate counter-mischief [See Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edn., p. 969.]. Logic referred to herein is not formal or syllogistic logic, but acceptance that enacted law would not set a standard which is palpably unjust, unfair, unreasonable or does not make any sense. [Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edn., p. 986.) When an interpretation is beset with practical difficulties, the courts have not shied from turning sides to accept an interpretation that offers a pragmatic solution that will serve the needs of society [Id, p. 971, quoting Griffiths, L.J.J. Therefore, when there is choice between two interpretations, we would avoid a "construction" which would reduce the legislation to futility, and should rather accept the "construction" based on the view that draftsmen would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. We must strive as far as possible to give meaningful life to enactment or rule and avoid cadaveric consequences [See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 14th Edn., p. 50.]"

17 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd 23. Further, similar non-obstante clause is also used in section 144C(4) with a same limited purpose to imply, even though there might be a larger time limit under Section 153, once the order of TPO is accepted or not objected to, causing a deeming fiction of acceptance, the final order is to be passed immediately. The object is to conclude the proceedings as expeditiously as possible and the authority need not wait for the last date to pass the orders. The limitation prescribed under the statute is for the assessing officer and therefore, it is his duty to pass order in time irrespective of whether the directions are received from DRP or not. As held by us above, the DRP will have no authority to issue directions after nine months and a further period of one month as per section 144C (13) and three months under section 153 (2A) is available, within which period no orders have been passed in the present cases. The reference made by the learned senior counsels on the judgments in Nokia India (P) Ltd. (supra) and Vedenta Ltd. (Supra) is well founded. The timeline given under the Act is to be strictly followed.

24. Insofar as the challenge to the show cause notice issued is concerned, though generally, the High Court will be circumspected to interfere at the stage of show cause notice, the law on the point is well settled with exceptions carved in the following cases; a. when the notice is issued beyond the period of limitation, b. when the notice is without authority, c. when notice is issued without following the procedures under the applicable Act or the rules framed thereunder and d. when the notice is issued with a prejudiced mind. The challenge must be available ex-facic leaving no room for the court to peruse or discuss intricate facts. In the present case, the challenge is on the ground of limitation and hence, we hold that the proceedings under Article 226 of the constitution are maintainable, 25. As regards the relief sought in other appeals viz., W.A.No.1517/2021 etc. batch, the findings rendered above are equally applicable. In these cases, for the assessment year 2009-10, the order of remand to the Assessing officer was passed on 18-12-2015 and insofar as the assessment year 2010-11 is concerned, for one issue, it was passed on 18-12-2015 and for other two issues, it was passed on 23-9-2016 after the amendment, by which time, the time limit was brought dewn to 9 months. As such, fresh orders ought to have been passed before 31-3-2017 for the assessment year 2009-10 and for one issue relating to the assessment year 2010-11 reckoning the 12 months from the financial year 2015-16 and on or before 31-12-2017 reckoning 9 months from the financial year 2016-17. Therefore, the Assessing officer ought to have passed a draft assessment order immediately and asked the assessee to file their objections with the DRP. For the mistake and the lapse of the Assessing officer, the vested right of the Assessee cannot be taken away.

26. We are not oblivious of the fact that any finding on the aspect of reasonableness in time in passing orders when no time is provided would be superfluous in view of our decision in earlier paragraphs. It is necessary to decide on the issue as in this case, the revenue has taken more than 5 years in one appeal and 4 years in other appeals, which is unacceptable as rightly held by the learned judge. We are not alone on this issue and are fortified by the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard.

18 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd (i) Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. State of Haryana 1988 taxmann.com 761 "15. Before we part with the case, we would like to indicate that assessment of tax should be completed with expedition. It involves the revenue to the State. In the case of a registered dealer who collects sales tax on behalf of the State, there is no justification for him to withhold the payment of the is so collected. If a timely assessment is completed, the dues of the State can be conveniently ascertained and collected. Delay in completion of assessment often creates problems. The assessee would be required to keep up all the evidence in support of his transactions. Where evidence is necessary, with the lapse of time, there is scope for its being lost. Oral evidence as and when required to be produced by the assessing authority may not be available if a long period intervenes between the transactions and the consideration of the matter by the assessing authority. Long delay thus is not in the interest of either the assessee or the State, In view of the fact that a period of limitation has been prescribed for bringing the escaped turnover into the net of taxation, such an eventuality cannot be grappled with appropriately unless timely assessment is completed. In several taxing statutes, even in a situation like this, where assessment under Section 11(3) or 28(3) of the respective Acts is contemplated, a period of limitation is provided. Until by statute, such a limitation is provided, it is proper for the State Governments to require, by statutory rules or appropriate instructions, to ensure completion of assessments with expedition and reasonable haste but subject to rules of natural justice." (ii) Govt. of India v. Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals [1989] 3 SCC 483: "6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents urged that Rule 12 is unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as it does not provide for any period of limitation for the recovery of duty. He urged that in the absence of any prescribed period for recovery of the duty as contemplated by Rule 12, the officer may act arbitrarily in recovering the amount after lapse of long period of time. We find no substance in the submission. While it is true that Rule 12 does not prescribe any period within which recovery of any duty as contemplated by the rule is to be made, but that by itself does not render the rule unreasonable or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the absence of any period of limitation it is settled that every authority is to exercise the power within a reasonable period. What would be reasonable period, would depend upon the facts of each case. Whenever a question regarding the inordinate delay in issuance of notice of demand is raised, it would be open to the assessee to contend that it is bad on the ground of delay and it will be for the relevant officer to consider the question whether in the facts and circumstances of the case notice of demand for recovery was made within reasonable period. No hard and fast rules can be laid down in this regard as the determination of the question will depend upon the facts of each case." (iii) State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Co-op. Milk P. Union Ltd. [2007] 11 SCC 363:

19 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd 17. A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefor, the same would not mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at any time.

18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors.

19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years. The view of the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be unreasonable. Reasonable period, keeping in view the discussions made hereinbefore, must be found out from the statutory scheme. As indicated hereinbefore, maximum period of limitation provided for in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act is five years.

28. With the above directions, all the writ appeals are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.”

15. A similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Limited Vs. 21 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd ACIT, International Taxation (supra) and after considering the relevant facts in paragraphs 23 to 34 of the order, it has been held as under :

“23. No doubt, section 144C of the Act is a self contained code of assessment and time limits are inbuilt at each stage of the procedure contemplated. Section 144C envisions a special assessment, one which includes the determination of Arms Length Price (ALP) of international transactions engaged in by the assessee. The DRP was constituted bearing in mind the necessity for an expert body to look into intricate matters concerning valuation and transfer pricing and it is for this reason that specific timelines have been drawn within the framework of section 1440 to ensure prompt and expeditious finalisation of this special assessment. The purpose is to fast-track a special type of assessment. That cannot be considered to mean that overall time limits prescribed have been given a go by in the process.

27. Having considered the language of sections 144C and 153, we cannot accept that the provisions of section 153 are excluded to the operation of section 144C.

16. We further note that, the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal, Hyderabad has also considered identical issue in the case of Aveva Solutions India LLP, Hyderabad Vs. ITO, Ward-8(1), Hyderabad in dated 19.11.2025 where under identical 24 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd set of facts, the Tribunal by following the decision of Hon'ble Madras High Court and also the decision in the case of Hon'ble Bombay High Court cited above has held as under :

“11. Therefore, following the Judgments of Hon'ble Madras High Court as well as Hon'ble Bombay High Court cited (supra), we hold that the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer on 18.10.2024 is barred by limitation and consequently, the same is liable to be quashed. We order accordingly.

17. So far as the interest of the Revenue is concerned, we are of the considered opinion that the interest of the Revenue has already been considered and protected, as has been observed in paragraphs 36, 37 and 38 of the order which, for ready reference, is reproduced hereunder : “36. For all the aforesaid reasons, the impugned notices issued and the proceedings drawn by the respondent-Department is neither tenable, nor sustainable. The notices so issued and the procedure adopted being per se illegal, deserves to be and are accordingly set aside/quashed. As a consequence, all the impugned orders getting quashed, the consequential orders passed by the respondent- Department pursuant to the notices issued under Section 147 and 148 would also get quashed and it is ordered accordingly. The reason we are quashing the consequential order is on the principles that when the initiation of the proceedings itself was procedurally wrong, the subsequent orders also gets nullified automatically.

18. We would only further like to make observations that since we are inclined to dispose of the instant writ petition, conscious of the fact that the earlier order of this High Court in the case of Kanakala Ravindra Reddy (1 supra) is subjected to challenge before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP No.3574 of 2024, preferred by the Income Tax 26 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd Department, we make it clear that allowing of the instant writ petition is subject to outcome of the aforesaid SLP preferred by the Revenue against the decision of this High Court in the case of Kanakala Ravindra Reddy (1 supra). This, in other words, would mean that either of the parties, if they so want, may move an appropriate petition seeking revival of this writ petition in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the pending SLP on the very same issue.”

Order pronounced in the Open Court on 10th December, 2025. श्री विजय पाल राि (मंजूनाथ जी) (VIJAY PAL RAO) (MANJUNATHA G.) उपाध्यक्ष /VICE PRESIDENT लेखा सदस्य/ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Hyderabad, dated 10.12.2025. TYNM/sps 30 Interwrap Corp Private Ltd