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1,438 tribunal orders from the Dehradun bench.
Counted from the judgments of this bench on BharatTax. The figure is how many of them cite each decision.
Delay in filing appeals, when supported by sufficient or justifiable cause, should be condoned with a liberal approach to ensure substantial justice. This principle prioritizes the cause of justice over mere technicalities.
Income derived by a non-resident for services related to mineral oil operations, falling under the presumptive taxation regime of Section 44BB, cannot simultaneously be treated as fees for technical services under Section 9(1)(vii). The specific presumptive provisions override the general FTS definition, particularly when DTAA applies.
Appellate authorities can consider new claims and additional grounds if the relevant facts are already on record. The purpose of assessment is to correctly determine tax liability, allowing both parties to raise issues.
Service tax paid to the Government of India is not 'on account of' the provision of services for mineral oil exploration and production, and thus does not form part of the aggregate taxable amount under Section 44BB(2)(a) and (b).
For computing presumptive income under Section 44BB, gross receipts do not include service tax reimbursements received from a client (like ONGC) if such amounts are not payments for services or plant/machinery directly used in the prospecting, extraction, or production of mineral oils.
In a search assessment under Section 153A, additions can only be made for completed or non-abated assessment years if incriminating material relevant to those years is found during the search, although notice under Section 153A(1) is mandatorily issued for six assessment years preceding the search.
An assessment under section 153A is without jurisdiction if there is an absence of incriminating material for an unabated assessment year.
Tax authorities must judge evidence using the test of human probabilities and consider the apparent as real until there are reasons to believe it is not. They can rely on circumstantial evidence and the preponderance of probabilities to determine the genuineness of transactions.
For assessments under Section 153C, a notice is legally unsustainable if there is no incriminating material correlated to the specific assessment years for which reassessment is sought.
Indirect tax components, such as sales tax, are included when calculating gross turnover or sales receipts for determining business income. Deductions relating to these taxes are subject to the provisions of Section 43B, requiring actual payment for deductibility.
For computing profits under the presumptive taxation scheme of section 44BB, gross revenue excludes service tax collected and deposited by the assessee but includes mobilization/demobilization fees for offshore services.
For transfer pricing purposes, distinct international transactions, such as royalty payments and manufacturing, should be benchmarked separately rather than aggregated. The selection of comparables must be based on a thorough Functions, Assets, and Risks (FAR) analysis, and loss-making entities are not automatically excluded if they satisfy other comparability criteria.
Strict adherence to approval protocols under Section 153D, including those in the Departmental Manual of Office Procedure, is essential for search assessments. An assessment is invalid if the approving authority fails to apply its mind or consider all relevant seized material before granting approval.
A mechanical approval by the prescribed authority under Section 151, made without independent application of mind, vitiates and renders the entire reassessment proceedings invalid. Such approvals, often indicated by brief, unreasoned endorsements, lead to the quashing of the reopening of assessment.
Late fees under section 234E are not applicable for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as the amendment to section 200A inserting clause (c) was effective from that date.
An assessee is not liable to pay advance tax or interest under Section 234B on income that was subject to tax deduction at source by the payer, even if the payer failed to deduct such tax. The provisions relating to payment of tax and payment of interest operate in different areas, implying that the failure of the deductor does not automatically shift advance tax liability to the recipient in such cases.
Section 44BB, which provides for presumptive taxation of profits and gains of business in the case of exploration of mineral oils, does not override the provisions of Sections 5, 9, or 90 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For business profits to be taxed in India, the existence of a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India must be established by the Revenue.
Section 43B of the Income Tax Act cannot be invoked if the issue is concluded against the revenue by a prior High Court decision. Such prior decision may preclude further substantial questions of law.
Government receipts, including various types of taxes received by an assessee, are consistently held to be taxable receipts.
Surcharge is part of rent.
Most recent orders on record, from 2026.
The Tribunal noted that the penalty under Section 271AAC(1) was levied by the AO in respect of a cash deposit of Rs. 10,70,000 during the demonetization period. The assessee had opted for the DTVSV Scheme, 2024, and had paid the requisite tax demand. However, Form 4, which would entitle the assessee to a waiver of penalty, had not yet been issued by the Principal CIT, Agra-1, despite the assessee's request. The AO had levied the penalty precisely because Form 4 had not been issued. The Tribunal found the assessee's request to be reasonable, considering the circumstances. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the learned CIT(A) and directed the learned CIT(A) to keep the appeal pending until the matter regarding the issuance of Form 4 under the DTVSV Scheme is finally decided by the learned PCIT, Agra-1. All grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the penalty itself but remanded the matter for procedural completion.
The Tribunal held that the additional evidence filed by the assessee in respect of sundry creditors, namely the ledger accounts for the immediate subsequent year, was admitted in the interest of justice due to a substantial cause for not filing it before the lower authorities. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee's submissions regarding the cost of construction for capital gains, supported by the balance sheet for FY 2006-07 (AY 2007-08), and the fact that the addition of Rs. 25,84,000/- on account of cash deposit was also made in the assessment order of the assessee's husband, were not adequately dealt with by the CIT(A). Furthermore, the factual verification required for the sundry creditors issue, for which additional evidence was admitted, necessitated a fresh examination. Consequently, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the file of the AO for a fresh assessment in respect of the issues confirmed or partly confirmed by the CIT(A) that were under appeal. The AO was directed to admit the additional evidence during the fresh assessment proceedings. All grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal decided to condone the delay of approximately 663 days in filing the appeal, finding the reasons provided by the assessee regarding his wife's health and issues with his counsel to be sufficient. The Tribunal acknowledged the non-cooperative conduct of the assessee in the appellate proceedings but, in the interest of justice, decided to restore the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) for a fresh assessment. The addition of Rs. 1,59,54,170/- made by the AO under Section 68 read with Section 115BBE of the Act was set aside. The reasoning was based on the assessee's submission that the cash deposits were from cash sales in his liquor business and the need to provide him an opportunity to explain these facts before the AO. The ratio decidendi is that in cases of significant delay attributable to circumstances beyond the assessee's control and where a prima facie case for re-examination of facts exists, the appellate authorities should lean towards providing an opportunity for a fresh assessment, even if there was prior non-compliance, to ensure justice. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, remanding the matter to the AO.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's claim for exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiad) was rejected by the lower authorities primarily because the assessee could not conclusively prove that the cash deposits were indeed student fees received during the year. The Tribunal acknowledged that the annual gross receipts were below Rs. 1 crore. In the interest of justice, and considering the assessee's request to produce evidence, the Tribunal decided to afford the assessee an opportunity to prove the nature of the cash deposits. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the Assessing Officer to consider the fresh evidence to be produced by the assessee. The Assessing Officer was directed to pass a fresh order in accordance with law, ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(A) ought to have provided at least one more opportunity to the assessee to file the reasons for the delay in filing the appeal before dismissing it. Adhering to the principles of natural justice, the ITAT deemed it fit to restore the matter to the file of the CIT(A). The direction was for the assessee to file a proper condonation application before the CIT(A), who would then decide it in accordance with the law and subsequently decide the appeal. The first appellate authority was also directed to ensure substantial compliance with the principles of natural justice. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that while the CIT(A) had issued multiple notices, the order could not be sustained as there was no finding on the assessee's core contention regarding its role as an intermediary and the inapplicability of TDS under Section 194Q. The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's non-appearance despite opportunities but emphasized the need for substantial justice. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s ex-parte order and restored the matter to the CIT(A)'s file for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to be diligent in attending future hearings. All grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the revenues from contracts for services and facilities in relation to prospecting/extraction/production of oil and gas in India are not FTS/royalty and fall under Section 44BB, allowing Ground No. 1 of the assessee. Regarding the determination of income, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had already given a finding of fact that the assessee has not carried out any activity in India in relation to the supply of cement units and batch mixers to ONGC, and that title and risk transferred out of India. The AO had not controverted these submissions, nor established any business connection or PE for these offshore supplies. Following the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries vs. DIT, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision that since all parts of the transaction were carried out outside Indian soil, it cannot be taxed in India, thus dismissing Grounds 7 to 10 of the Revenue. With respect to interest on income-tax refund, the Tribunal held that as it arose and was attributable to the PE in India, it becomes part of business profit under Article 7 of the India-US DTAA, taxable at MMR, dismissing Ground 3 of the assessee. Consequently, the assessee's appeal was partly allowed, and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the revenues from contracts for services and facilities in relation to prospecting/extraction/production of oil and gas in India are not FTS/royalty and fall under Section 44BB, allowing Ground No. 1 of the assessee. Regarding the determination of income, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had already given a finding of fact that the assessee has not carried out any activity in India in relation to the supply of cement units and batch mixers to ONGC, and that title and risk transferred out of India. The AO had not controverted these submissions, nor established any business connection or PE for these offshore supplies. Following the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries vs. DIT, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision that since all parts of the transaction were carried out outside Indian soil, it cannot be taxed in India, thus dismissing Grounds 7 to 10 of the Revenue. With respect to interest on income-tax refund, the Tribunal held that as it arose and was attributable to the PE in India, it becomes part of business profit under Article 7 of the India-US DTAA, taxable at MMR, dismissing Ground 3 of the assessee. Consequently, the assessee's appeal was partly allowed, and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The ITAT condoned the delay in filing the appeal before it, acknowledging the assessee's explanation of a communication gap with his tax consultant and his limited understanding of appellate procedures. The Tribunal noted that both the Assessing Officer's order and the CIT(A)'s order were passed ex parte. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, the ITAT deemed it fit to set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) and remand the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration. The Tribunal directed the assessee to be vigilant about future notices and make full compliance to ensure adequate material for the Assessing Officer to take an appropriate view. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal allowed the appeals, holding that the compensation received by the assessee under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS), 2019, was fully exempt from tax under Section 10(10B) of the Act. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of the ITAT Pune, ITAT Ahmedabad, and ITAT Chandigarh on identical facts. The Tribunal noted that CIT(A)s had taken different stands on similar issues, emphasizing the importance of consistency in judicial decisions. The Tribunal also found support from the ITAT Ahmedabad decision in Vishnu Mohan T Nair v. Income Tax Officer, which suggested that the substance of the payment, rather than hyper-technical interpretations, should be considered, and that a pragmatic approach should be taken for employees in lower rungs. The Tribunal directed the assessee to file revised computations of income before the respective Jurisdictional Assessing Officers to claim the exemption, and for the Revenue authorities to compute the tax liability and grant refunds after due verification. The impugned findings of the CIT(A) were set aside.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed a typographical error in filing the return for AY 2017-18. The AO passed the assessment order based on this erroneous income, and the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal, stating that the assessee had not furnished contemporaneous documentary evidence to substantiate the alleged mistake in declaring 'Income from Other Sources'. The CIT(A) also held that without complete scrutiny or specific investigation, the sanctity of the claim for reduction could not be determined. In the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal decided to restore the issue of determination of correct income from other sources, including whether it was due to a typographical mistake, to the file of the Assessing Officer for adjudication de novo. The Assessing Officer was directed to provide three effective opportunities to the assessee to furnish evidence, and the assessee was directed to furnish the requisite documents. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 13,24,500/- under Section 56(2)(vii)(b) was made on account of the difference between the stamp duty value and the sale consideration. It was noted that the AO did not refer the matter to the DVO under Section 50C(2) despite the assessee's request, and the CIT(A) did not consider the approved valuer's report submitted during the first appellate stage, citing the lack of reasons for not furnishing it earlier. Consequently, the Tribunal found it just and appropriate to restore the matter to the AO. The valuation report dated 11.11.2024 was admitted as additional evidence. The AO was directed to refer the matter to the DVO, pass a fresh order after considering both valuation reports, and provide the assessee with an adequate opportunity of hearing. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal allowed the appeals, holding that the compensation received by the assessee under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS), 2019, was fully exempt from tax under Section 10(10B) of the Act. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of the ITAT Pune, ITAT Ahmedabad, and ITAT Chandigarh on identical facts. The Tribunal noted that CIT(A)s had taken different stands on similar issues, emphasizing the importance of consistency in judicial decisions. The Tribunal also found support from the ITAT Ahmedabad decision in Vishnu Mohan T Nair v. Income Tax Officer, which suggested that the substance of the payment, rather than hyper-technical interpretations, should be considered, and that a pragmatic approach should be taken for employees in lower rungs. The Tribunal directed the assessee to file revised computations of income before the respective Jurisdictional Assessing Officers to claim the exemption, and for the Revenue authorities to compute the tax liability and grant refunds after due verification. The impugned findings of the CIT(A) were set aside.
The Tribunal decided to condone the delay of 66 days in filing the appeal, finding the assessee's explanation regarding health issues and communication lapses sufficient. Regarding the ex-parte order by the CIT(A), the Tribunal acknowledged that the first appellate authority had provided 11 opportunities to the assessee, which were not utilized. The Tribunal also noted that the original assessment order was passed ex-parte under Section 144. Despite the assessee's non-cooperative conduct, in the interest of justice and to provide one more opportunity, the Tribunal decided to restore the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) for a fresh assessment in accordance with law. The appeal was consequently allowed for statistical purposes. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee's non-cooperative conduct and failure to respond to multiple notices from the CIT(A) were noted and not appreciated, the assessment order itself was passed ex-parte under Section 144 of the Act. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) for a fresh assessment in accordance with the law. The Tribunal found that the assessee's appeal should be allowed for statistical purposes. The operative direction is to set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the AO for fresh assessment. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 132 days in filing the appeal, treating the cause shown by the assessee as sufficient in the interest of justice, given the uncontroverted affidavit. The Tribunal noted that the NFAC had passed the impugned order ex-parte because the assessee did not respond to notices issued on 18.08.2025, 15.09.2025, and 06.10.2025. While acknowledging the assessee's non-cooperative conduct, the Tribunal, in the interest of justice, decided to restore the matter back to the file of the learned CIT(A) for passing an order afresh on merits in accordance with law. The Tribunal directed the first appellate authority to ensure substantial compliance with the principles of natural justice. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by setting aside the assessment order and remanding the matter to the AO for factual verification without adjudicating the pure legal grounds raised by the assessee. The Tribunal referred to the Delhi High Court's decision in Akasaki Technology (P) Ltd v. PCIT, which stated that if an infirmity arises at the CIT(A)'s level, the issue should be decided by the CIT(A) and not remanded back to the AO, especially when jurisdictional grounds were raised. Consequently, the impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the CIT(A) to pass a fresh order in light of the legal grounds raised by the assessee and the observations of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not applied its mind properly or conducted a critical analysis of the assessee's contentions. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) merely observed that the Assessing Officer's findings did not suffer from any factual or legal infirmity, without appreciating the assessee's arguments. The Tribunal emphasized that the reason is the 'life of law' and that the absence of analysis indicates a non-application of mind. Citing Section 250(6) of the Act, the Tribunal stated that the CIT(A) was expected to state points for determination, decisions thereon, and reasons. In the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal decided to remit the matter back to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits and to pass a speaking order. The assessee was directed to be diligent and cooperative. The Tribunal explicitly stated that it had not made any observations on the merits of the case. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the ends of justice require giving the assessee an opportunity to contest the matter on merits. The Tribunal was of the considered view that a mere technical glitch in mentioning the wrong provision of law in an online application should not prejudice the substantial rights of the assessee. Consequently, the issue was restored to the file of the learned CIT(A) with a direction to allow the assessee to revise its application, specifying the correct provision of law under which it intends to seek registration and corresponding approval. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC erred in dismissing the assessee's appeal solely on the ground of delay without condoning it. The Tribunal found that the explanation provided by the assessee, including the affidavit of the counsel, constituted a sufficient cause for the delay of 112 days in filing the first appeal before the NFAC. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Sambhaji and Ors V Gangabai and Ors, the Tribunal emphasized that the object of procedural rules and limitation periods is to advance the cause of justice. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal condoned the delay of 112 days. Consequently, the impugned order dated 03.12.2025 passed by the NFAC was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the NFAC for passing an order afresh on merits, ensuring substantial compliance with the principles of natural justice. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that the Assessing Officer had considered only the credit side of the bank account and ignored the debit side, specifically the withdrawals totaling Rs. 1,73,10,000/-. The AO also overlooked the opening cash balance of Rs. 42,56,274/- and cash sale proceeds of Rs. 1,08,62,989/-. The Tribunal noted the assessee's submission regarding the reconciliation of bank accounts, opening balance, cash withdrawals, and sales proceeds. Considering these factors and the desire to meet the ends of substantial justice, the Tribunal directed that the addition be restricted to Rs. 25,00,000/-. The remaining addition of Rs. 2,46,20,500/- was directed to be deleted. The issue regarding the applicability of Section 115BBE was not explicitly decided, but the relief granted implies its non-application in its original form.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 17,62,500/- as unexplained cash investment is unsustainable. The Tribunal noted that the revenue did not dispute the registered sale deed amount of Rs. 37,50,000/- paid by cheque, nor did it dispute that this amount was paid electronically. The assessee had categorically denied making any additional cash payment. The Assessing Officer's reasoning that the possibility of unaccounted cash payments could not be ruled out simply because a transaction occurred, and the CIT(A)'s observation that the registered consideration was for registration purposes and did not rule out unaccounted consideration, were found to be insufficient. Crucially, the Tribunal found that the assessee was neither provided with the material seized during the search nor afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the individuals whose statements were the basis for the addition. The confirmation letter from the builder, which stated that only the registered sale consideration was paid, was brushed aside by the CIT(A) without proper justification. Therefore, the Tribunal deleted the addition of Rs. 17,62,500/-. The issue regarding the jurisdiction of reassessment was not explicitly decided as the primary ground for deletion was the lack of procedural fairness.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not fully explain the source of cash deposits and the reasons for withdrawals exceeding Rs. 10,000. The CIT(A) had also noted the assessee's admission of maintaining some cash as capital investment for smooth business functioning, without quantifying it or explaining its source. Therefore, the assessee's submission that no addition should be made was not tenable. However, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission seeking the application of the peak credit theory. To provide another opportunity, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the AO for applying the peak credit in respect of the cash deposits. The Tribunal clarified that the assessed total income should not exceed Rs. 8,41,615, which was the assessed total income by the AO. All grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's Authorized Representative (AR) had stated that a physical appeal (ITA No. 617/Agr/2026) had already been filed on 10.08.2026 against the same impugned order dated 02.01.2026. Consequently, the AR moved an application requesting that the present online-filed appeal be considered as withdrawn, as it was a duplicate filing. In view of the prayer made by the assessee, the Tribunal dismissed the present duplicate appeal as withdrawn. No other issue was decided.
The Tribunal held that the assumption of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer in reopening the case under Section 147 of the Act was bad in law. The primary reason for reopening was the verification of unsecured loans amounting to Rs. 1,55,48,922. However, the disallowances made by the AO were under Section 40(a)(ia) for non-deduction of TDS on interest expenses and rent, and no addition was made on account of unsecured loans. The Tribunal, following the ratio of the cited precedents, including ATS Infrastructure Ltd. v. ACIT, concluded that additions not emanating from the reasons for reopening do not survive. Therefore, the reassessment order was quashed. Consequently, the remaining factual and legal issues were not adjudicated upon. The appeal was allowed on this preliminary legal ground.