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279 orders · Page 5 of 6
The Tribunal, while acknowledging the assessee's failure to appear, set aside the impugned order to ensure the principle of natural justice. The appeal was restored to the AO for denovo assessment.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had not appeared and the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal ex-parte. However, to provide a fair opportunity, the Tribunal set aside the appeal for denovo adjudication by the CIT(A), directing the assessee to present all relevant documents.
The Tribunal held that in the interest of justice, the assessee should be given another opportunity before the CIT(A) to present all relevant evidence. The appeal was set aside to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication, with the direction that the assessee must substantiate its case.
The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal, confirming the deletion of penalty related to the Section 68 addition as the quantum addition was already deleted. For the penalty on excess depreciation, the Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, directing reconsideration of the bona-fide error claim and the validity of the show-cause notice regarding specific charges.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's claim for donation should be allowed. It noted that the drawer's responsibility is to ensure sufficient balance at the time of encashment, and the cheques were eventually honored within their three-month validity period. The Tribunal found no justification for denying the claim based on initial insufficient balance or delayed encashment.
The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal, confirming the deletion of penalty related to the Section 68 addition as the quantum addition was already deleted. For the penalty on excess depreciation, the Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, directing reconsideration of the bona-fide error claim and the validity of the show-cause notice regarding specific charges.
The Tribunal held that it is in the interest of justice to give the assessee one more opportunity to present their case before the CIT(A). The appeal was set aside for denovo adjudication.
The Tribunal, relying on a Delhi High Court precedent, held that interest on refund under Section 244A must be calculated until the actual date the funds are released to the assessee, not merely the date of the order accepting the refund claim. The Tribunal directed the AO/CPC to grant interest to the assessee accordingly, until 30-01-2024.
The Tribunal, while noting the assessee's non-compliance, decided to set aside the impugned order and restore the matter to the Ld. AO for a de novo assessment, emphasizing the principle of natural justice. The assessee is directed to submit all necessary evidence to the Ld. AO for a fresh hearing and determination on merits.
The Tribunal held that recording the AO's satisfaction regarding the violation of Section 269SS in the assessment order is mandatory for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271D. Since the AO failed to record such satisfaction, the penalty was not validly initiated.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated for AYs 2008-09 and 2009-10 were valid. It reasoned that the AO's formation of belief based on gathered material, even if it involved reviewing previously considered aspects, did not necessarily constitute a prohibited change of opinion if the AO was not fully aware of the issue initially. The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)'s finding that the availability of 'reasons to believe' was crucial for initiating action under Section 148. Regarding the disallowance under Section 14A for AY 2013-14, the Tribunal followed the Special Bench decision in ACIT vs. Vireet Investments and held that Section 14A read with Rule 8D does not apply to the computation of book profit under Section 115JB. Consequently, the disallowance was deleted, and the CIT(A)'s order was affirmed on this issue. On the allowability of education cess and higher secondary education cess for AY 2013-14, the Tribunal found that Section 40(a)(ii) clearly prohibits the deduction of any sum paid on account of any rate or tax levied on profits or gains. As education cess is a part of the tax, it is ineligible for allowance. Therefore, the assessee's additional ground on this issue was dismissed.
The Tribunal, following a coordinate bench decision in a similar case, held that provisions for IBNR and IBNER are not deductible. The reasoning was that these provisions represent unascertained liabilities, not accrued to the assessee in the relevant assessment year.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated without jurisdiction as they were based on a change of opinion. The Tribunal also upheld the deletion of disallowance for provisions of claims incurred but not reported (IBNR) and incurred but not enough reported (IBNER).
The Tribunal found that the reassessment proceedings were initiated based on a change of opinion, which is not permissible. It also addressed issues related to depreciation on UPS and projectors, and disallowance of payments to motor vehicle dealers.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had, in fact, responded to the notices, albeit belatedly, with e-proceedings acknowledgements available on record. Given that the AO ultimately accepted the returned income in the assessment order, the Tribunal concluded that the penalty imposed under Section 271(1)(b) was not warranted and directed its deletion.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was not heard before the impugned order was passed, constituting a per-se violation of natural justice. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s order and restored the application back to the CIT(E) with a direction to pass a fresh order after providing an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal accepted 6% profit for the transport business turnover and confirmed 10% profit on the remaining turnover. The Section 40A(3) disallowance for cash withdrawals was deleted, holding it unnecessary once books are rejected and income estimated. The matter of unexplained property investment under Section 69A was remanded to the AO for de novo assessment to allow the assessee to present fresh evidence.
The Tribunal found that the audit fees recipient acknowledged the income in his ITR and noted that advocate fees were claimed to be paid via banking channels. It set aside the lower orders and remanded the matter to the AO for limited verification of these payments, directing allowance of both expenses if verified as paid and accounted for by the recipients.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated based on a change of opinion and lacked jurisdiction, thus being bad in law. Regarding IBNR and IBNER provisions, the Tribunal followed its previous decisions and held that these are unascertained liabilities and not deductible.
The Tribunal noted that the Ld.CIT(A) dismissed the appeal ex-parte without considering the merits. While the Tribunal did not agree to remand the matter back to the AO, it set aside the Ld.CIT(A)'s order for passing an ex-parte order. The appeal was restored to the Ld.CIT(A)'s file for adjudication after hearing the assessee.
The Tribunal held that there was a violation of natural justice as the assessee was not aware of the show-cause notice or the impugned order. The delay was condoned, and the matter was restored to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the show cause notice issued for levying penalty was bad in law as it failed to specify the exact fault (concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars) for which penalty was proposed. This violation of natural justice principles vitiates the penalty.
The Tribunal held that since the JDA was not a registered document, it had no legal effect under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, it could not be considered a 'transfer' for the purpose of Section 2(47)(v) of the Income Tax Act, rendering the reopening of assessment invalid.
The tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. They also admitted additional evidence, stating that failure of justice would occur if these documents were not considered. The assessment was set aside and remanded back to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment.
The Tribunal held that the inadvertent mistake should not deny the assessee its rightful registration, especially considering its long-standing registration history and the transition period to the new regime. The CIT(E)'s rejection was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in exercising jurisdiction under section 263 as the Assessing Officer had conducted a limited scrutiny and the guideline value alone cannot be the sole reason to deem an assessment erroneous. The revision was not sustainable in law.
The Tribunal held that reassessment proceedings initiated due to failure to discharge TDS liabilities were valid. However, it ruled that Section 14A read with Rule 8D does not apply to the computation of book profit under Section 115JB. The claim for deduction of education cess was also rejected.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated without jurisdiction as they were based on a change of opinion. The Tribunal also ruled on issues related to amortization of premium on securities and disallowance of provisions for claims incurred but not reported (IBNR) and incurred but not enough reported (IBNER).
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated without jurisdiction as they were based on a change of opinion. It also ruled that Section 14A read with Rule 8D does not apply to the computation of book profits under Section 115JB. However, the assessee's claim for deduction of education cess was dismissed as it is considered part of the tax.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated for AYs 2008-09 and 2009-10 were valid. It reasoned that the AO's formation of belief based on gathered material, even if it involved reviewing previously considered aspects, did not necessarily constitute a prohibited change of opinion if the AO was not fully aware of the issue initially. The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)'s finding that the availability of 'reasons to believe' was crucial for initiating action under Section 148. Regarding the disallowance under Section 14A for AY 2013-14, the Tribunal followed the Special Bench decision in ACIT vs. Vireet Investments and held that Section 14A read with Rule 8D does not apply to the computation of book profit under Section 115JB. Consequently, the disallowance was deleted, and the CIT(A)'s order was affirmed on this issue. On the allowability of education cess and higher secondary education cess for AY 2013-14, the Tribunal found that Section 40(a)(ii) clearly prohibits the deduction of any sum paid on account of any rate or tax levied on profits or gains. As education cess is a part of the tax, it is ineligible for allowance. Therefore, the assessee's additional ground on this issue was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that reassessment proceedings initiated due to failure to discharge TDS liabilities were valid. However, it ruled that Section 14A read with Rule 8D does not apply to the computation of book profit under Section 115JB. The claim for deduction of education cess was also rejected.
The Tribunal held that reassessment proceedings initiated due to failure to discharge TDS liabilities were valid. However, it ruled that Section 14A read with Rule 8D does not apply to the computation of book profit under Section 115JB. The claim for deduction of education cess was also rejected.
On the first issue, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had remanded the issue back to the AO for de novo adjudication. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's ground for statistical purposes, implying that the substantive decision on the taxability of foreign branch income was not made by the ITAT in this order, but the procedural aspect of remand was accepted. On the second issue, the Tribunal reversed the order of the CIT(A). It held that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had reversed the view of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court at Goa in Sesa Goa Ltd. (supra) by its order dated 15.04.2024. The Apex Court, in view of the amendment by way of insertion of an explanation in Section 40(a)(ii) of the Act by the Finance Act, 2022, held that education cess cannot be allowed as an expenditure or deduction. Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the Revenue's appeal on this issue, reversing the CIT(A)'s decision.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 9 days in filing the appeal, finding reasonable cause. Citing the Hon'ble Madras High Court decision in Thanjavur Silk Handloom Weavers Co-op. Production & Sales Society Ltd. v. UoI, the Tribunal held that the delay in obtaining the statutory audit report from the State Government constituted a reasonable cause for the belated filing of the TAR. The penalty levied under Section 271B was therefore deleted.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee is a registered credit society and clarified to the authorities that they only provide credit/loans to members. However, the AO and CIT(A) failed to examine the documents. The Tribunal set aside the order and restored the assessment to the AO for verification.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide the source of funds at the earliest and submitted loan creditor details at the fag end of the assessment, preventing verification. The CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition solely on the AO's failure to inquire.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance made by the CPC under Section 143(1) was justified. Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT, the Tribunal affirmed that employee contributions to PF and ESI can only be allowed as a deduction if paid within the prescribed due dates under the relevant Acts, and not merely before the due date of filing the income tax return.
On the first issue, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had remanded the issue back to the AO for de novo adjudication. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's ground for statistical purposes, implying that the substantive decision on the taxability of foreign branch income was not made by the ITAT in this order, but the procedural aspect of remand was accepted. On the second issue, the Tribunal reversed the order of the CIT(A). It held that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had reversed the view of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court at Goa in Sesa Goa Ltd. (supra) by its order dated 15.04.2024. The Apex Court, in view of the amendment by way of insertion of an explanation in Section 40(a)(ii) of the Act by the Finance Act, 2022, held that education cess cannot be allowed as an expenditure or deduction. Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the Revenue's appeal on this issue, reversing the CIT(A)'s decision.
The Tribunal granted permission for the withdrawal of the appeal and dismissed it as withdrawn. It further provided that the assessee retains the right to approach the Tribunal again should any prejudice arise concerning the settlement under the Direct Tax Vivad-se-Vishwas Scheme, 2024.
The assessee expressed a desire to withdraw the appeal after opting for the Vivad-Se-Vishwas Scheme, and the Revenue had no objection. The tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the performance bonus paid to the directors was directly linked to their duties and efforts in achieving the company's turnover target. Therefore, the disallowance by the AO was incorrect.
The Tribunal held that DDT is an additional income tax payable by the domestic company, and the rate applicable is as per Section 115-O of the Act, not the DTAA rate for non-resident shareholders. Treaty protection to domestic companies paying DDT would only apply if explicitly intended by the contracting states.
The Tribunal held that DDT is an additional income tax payable by the domestic company, and the rate applicable is as per Section 115-O of the Act, not the DTAA rate for non-resident shareholders. Treaty protection to domestic companies paying DDT would only apply if explicitly intended by the contracting states.
The Tribunal held that DDT is an additional income tax payable by the domestic company, and the rate applicable is as per Section 115-O of the Act, not the DTAA rate for non-resident shareholders. Treaty protection to domestic companies paying DDT would only apply if explicitly intended by the contracting states.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's submission of a letter dated 27.12.2024, stating the intention to withdraw the present appeal to avail the benefits under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme (DTVSV), 2024. The assessee had also informed that Form No.1 DTVSV was filed on 28.11.2024, and Form No.2 was issued on 20.12.2024. Accordingly, the Tribunal treated the appeal as dismissed as withdrawn, acknowledging the assessee's decision to opt for resolution under the DTVSV Scheme. The assessee was granted liberty to seek restoration of the appeal if the resolution under the DTVSV Scheme failed. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal took note of the assessee's petition for withdrawal and the reason provided (opting for the VSVS Scheme). Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that DDT is an additional income tax payable by the domestic company, and the rate applicable is as per Section 115-O of the Act, not the DTAA rate for non-resident shareholders. Treaty protection to domestic companies paying DDT would only apply if explicitly intended by the contracting states.
The Tribunal held that DDT is an additional income tax payable by the domestic company, and the rate applicable is as per Section 115-O of the Act, not the DTAA rate for non-resident shareholders. Treaty protection to domestic companies paying DDT would only apply if explicitly intended by the contracting states.
The Tribunal held that DDT is an additional income tax payable by the domestic company, and the rate applicable is as per Section 115-O of the Act, not the DTAA rate for non-resident shareholders. Treaty protection to domestic companies paying DDT would only apply if explicitly intended by the contracting states.
The Tribunal held that DDT is an additional income tax payable by the domestic company, and the rate applicable is as per Section 115-O of the Act, not the DTAA rate for non-resident shareholders. Treaty protection to domestic companies paying DDT would only apply if explicitly intended by the contracting states.