ITAT Chennai Judgments — January 2025

The Tribunal held that DDT is an additional income tax payable by the domestic company, and the rate applicable is as per Section 115-O of the Act, not the DTAA rate for non-resident shareholders. Treaty protection to domestic companies paying DDT would only apply if explicitly intended by the contracting states.

The Tribunal held that DDT is an additional income tax payable by the domestic company, and the rate applicable is as per Section 115-O of the Act, not the DTAA rate for non-resident shareholders. Treaty protection to domestic companies paying DDT would only apply if explicitly intended by the contracting states.

The Tribunal found that the assessee was engaged in a systematic business of selling mosquito nets, and the cash deposits were proceeds from sales. Given the absence of proper books of accounts, the Tribunal estimated a net profit of 12% on the admitted cash deposit of Rs.21,64,516/-, thereby confirming an addition of Rs.2,59,742/- and deleting the balance amount of Rs.19,04,774/-.

The Tribunal held that DDT is an additional income tax payable by the domestic company, and the rate applicable is as per Section 115-O of the Act, not the DTAA rate for non-resident shareholders. Treaty protection to domestic companies paying DDT would only apply if explicitly intended by the contracting states.

The Tribunal held that DDT is an additional income tax payable by the domestic company, and the rate applicable is as per Section 115-O of the Act, not the DTAA rate for non-resident shareholders. Treaty protection to domestic companies paying DDT would only apply if explicitly intended by the contracting states.

The Tribunal held that DDT is an additional income tax payable by the domestic company, and the rate applicable is as per Section 115-O of the Act, not the DTAA rate for non-resident shareholders. Treaty protection to domestic companies paying DDT would only apply if explicitly intended by the contracting states.

The Tribunal held that DDT is an additional income tax payable by the domestic company, and the rate applicable is as per Section 115-O of the Act, not the DTAA rate for non-resident shareholders. Treaty protection to domestic companies paying DDT would only apply if explicitly intended by the contracting states.

The Tribunal held that DDT is an additional income tax payable by the domestic company, and the rate applicable is as per Section 115-O of the Act, not the DTAA rate for non-resident shareholders. Treaty protection to domestic companies paying DDT would only apply if explicitly intended by the contracting states.

Recognizing the assessee's election to proceed under the DTVSV scheme, the tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The tribunal also granted the assessee the liberty to restore the appeal if the resolution under the DTVSV scheme fails.

The Tribunal acknowledged that notices were sent via e-mail and not in physical form. In the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal decided to provide the assessee with another opportunity to present their case. The issues were restored to the file of the CIT(A) for re-adjudication, with a direction for the assessee to cooperate and avoid unnecessary adjournments.

The Tribunal upheld the PCIT's invocation of Section 263, agreeing that the assessment orders were erroneous due to the AO's lack of inquiry regarding 80G deductions, and affirmed the direction for verification of general 80G claims and 35(2AB) deductions. However, the Tribunal disagreed with the PCIT's direction to disallow 80G deduction on CSR expenditure, citing consistent ITAT rulings that such deductions are allowable if they meet 80G criteria.

The tribunal noted the assessee's contention that the funds' names and nature (growth funds with taxable income) had changed and directed the A.O. to re-examine whether these funds are debt or equity-oriented and if their income is taxable. If the income from these funds forms part of total income, the investments are to be excluded from the average value for disallowance computation under Rule 8D(2)(iii). The assessee is directed to provide necessary details.

The Tribunal held that the AO had conducted necessary inquiries and allowed the deduction after verification. The PCIT's order under Section 263 was found to be without jurisdiction as the issue was already examined, and the AO had applied the law correctly. Similar revision orders have been quashed by ITAT in other cases.

The Tribunal upheld the PCIT's invocation of Section 263, agreeing that the assessment orders were erroneous due to the AO's lack of inquiry regarding 80G deductions, and affirmed the direction for verification of general 80G claims and 35(2AB) deductions. However, the Tribunal disagreed with the PCIT's direction to disallow 80G deduction on CSR expenditure, citing consistent ITAT rulings that such deductions are allowable if they meet 80G criteria.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal by the Revenue. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s decision on the issue of membership fee taxation and the disallowance of capital expenditure was supported by earlier decisions of the Tribunal in the assessee's own case and hence dismissed the grounds of appeal filed by the Revenue.

The Tribunal accepted the prayer for another opportunity and set aside the impugned order. The appeal was restored to the file of CIT(E) with a direction to the assessee to file the required documents.

The Tribunal, considering the principles of natural justice, granted the assessee another opportunity of hearing. The impugned order was set aside, and the assessment was restored to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment.

The Tribunal condoned the delay due to sufficient cause. While noting the assessee's negligence and failure to represent, the Tribunal, adhering to principles of natural justice, set aside the impugned order and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment, allowing the assessee an opportunity to substantiate their case.

The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and restored the matters to the AO for de novo assessment, granting the assessee another opportunity to substantiate their case.

The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and restored the matters to the AO for de novo assessment, granting the assessee another opportunity to substantiate their case.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to substantiate its stand during the first appeal but, in the interest of natural justice, granted another opportunity. The impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.

The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the matter of registration under Section 80G back to the file of the Ld. CIT(E). The assessee was directed to substantiate its case.

The Tribunal held the reassessment proceedings to be invalid as they were initiated beyond four years based on a mere change of opinion, utilizing material already available during the original Section 143(3) assessment, without any fresh tangible material. Citing the Supreme Court's ruling in *Kelvinator of India Ltd.*, the Tribunal concluded that such a reopening constituted an impermissible review of the order. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed on legal grounds, making the discussion on merits infructuous.

The Tribunal has not yet decided the issue as the provided excerpt is incomplete. The judgment is ongoing, and the findings, reasoning, and operative directions are not available. Therefore, no principle can be extracted, and no issue has been expressly left undecided as the decision is pending.

The Tribunal held that the penalty could not be levied on income estimated under Section 44AD, especially when the AO accepted that the assessee was carrying out business. The case was not fit for levying a penalty.

The Tribunal, while noting the assessee's negligence and failure to substantiate the case before lower authorities, granted an opportunity to the assessee to present their case before the AO, keeping in mind the principle of natural justice. The impugned order was set aside and the assessment was restored for de novo assessment.

The Tribunal clarified that, as per Section 143(1D) proviso, for AY 2017-18 onwards, processing under Section 143(1) can be done despite a Section 143(2) notice. Thus, the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal and should have decided it on merits. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the case back for adjudication on merits.

The Tribunal noted that three out of four notices were issued during the COVID-19 lockdown. Considering the circumstances, the Tribunal decided to take a lenient view and delete the penalty.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking revisionary powers under Section 263 as the AO had conducted inquiries and applied their mind. The PCIT's order was quashed because the foundation for revision was missing, and the AO's view was not demonstrably incorrect.