ITAT Chennai Judgments — January 2025

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)'s order relied on conjecture and human probability. While the assessee's explanation for the cash deposits was not fully satisfactory, the Tribunal directed that the addition should be restricted to 20% of the disputed amount, i.e., Rs. 6,62,000/-, to meet the ends of justice.

The Tribunal held that the proceedings initiated by the AO under Sections 147/148 were based on irrelevant and unconnected facts, as the cash deposits pertained to another individual. The Tribunal found no merit in the Revenue's argument to remit the matter back to the AO and upheld the CIT(A)'s order.

The Tribunal, citing precedent that technical mistakes should be overlooked, set aside the CIT(E)'s order. It directed the CIT(E) to re-adjudicate the application, ignoring the technical error regarding the trust's status and allowing the assessee to provide necessary documents to establish its correct status.

The Tribunal, acknowledging the CIT(E)'s justified rejection, remitted the matter back to the CIT(E) for reconsideration of the Form-10AB application, granting the assessee a final opportunity. This remand is conditional on the assessee paying costs of Rs. 25,000/- to the Tamil Nadu State Legal Services Authority within 30 days, with an expectation of full compliance to future notices.

The Tribunal held that no TDS was deductible on provisions made for expenses where no income had accrued to vendors and no invoices were received. However, interest under section 201(1A) was leviable on actual payments made to non-resident vendors.

The Tribunal, relying on various High Court and coordinate bench decisions, held that the filing of Form-10B is merely a directory requirement and not a mandatory condition. It concluded that belated submission does not disentitle the assessee from claiming exemption under Section 11. Consequently, the order of the Ld. CIT(A) was set aside, and the Assessing Officer was directed to allow the exemption claim.

The Tribunal held that the compensation received on relinquishment of a right to acquire a property is a capital receipt, not business income. The taxability of income depends on its real nature, not its entry in books of account. Therefore, the compensation is taxable as Long Term Capital Gain.

The CIT(A) deleted the additions, a decision affirmed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order and noted that official government records (GOMs) clearly demonstrated that a different individual held the position of Revenue Minister during the relevant period, thereby disproving the Revenue's hypothesis that the assessee received the alleged payments.

The Tribunal held that no TDS was deductible on provisions made for expenses where no income had accrued to vendors and no invoices were received. However, interest under section 201(1A) was leviable on actual payments made to non-resident vendors.

The Tribunal held that since no income accrued to the vendors at the time of provision creation and no invoices were received or payments made, TDS was not deductible at that stage. Therefore, the assessee could not be deemed an 'assessee in default'.

The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's legal grounds challenging the validity of the reassessment proceedings. However, it found the Assessing Officer's order on the merits of the additions (especially Rs. 42 lakhs for unsold plots under Section 69A) to be non-speaking and lacking proper inquiry. Therefore, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the AO for fresh adjudication de novo, allowing the assessee to provide further evidence.

The Tribunal held that no TDS was deductible on provisions made for expenses where no income had accrued to vendors and no invoices were received. However, interest under section 201(1A) was leviable on actual payments made to non-resident vendors.

The Tribunal held that no TDS was deductible on provisions made for expenses where no income had accrued to vendors and no invoices were received. However, interest under section 201(1A) was leviable on actual payments made to non-resident vendors.

The Tribunal held that no TDS was deductible on provisions made for expenses where no income had accrued to vendors and no invoices were received. However, interest under section 201(1A) was leviable on actual payments made to non-resident vendors.

The Tribunal held that no TDS was deductible on provisions made for expenses where no income had accrued to vendors and no invoices were received. However, interest under section 201(1A) was leviable on actual payments made to non-resident vendors.

The Tribunal held that since no invoices were received and no payments were made as of March 31, 2015, the provision was merely an estimation. Therefore, TDS was not deductible at that stage, and the assessee could not be treated as an 'assessee in default'. The Tribunal found the facts similar to the case of Biocon Ltd. v. DCIT.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had made a mistake in applying under the wrong section and failed to respond to the show-cause notice. However, in the interest of justice, the matter was restored to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration, with a direction to provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity to furnish the required evidence.

The Tribunal, in the interest of justice and equity, restored the appeal to the files of the CIT(A) to provide the assessee another opportunity to represent their case. The assessee was directed to cooperate with the Revenue and not seek unnecessary adjournments.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, acknowledging the assessee's application under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme. It granted the assessee liberty to reinstate the appeal if their application under the scheme is not accepted.

The Tribunal held that taxing these personal expenses in the hands of the director would amount to double taxation, as the company had already disallowed these expenses and offered them to tax. The provisions of Section 2(24)(iv), 17(2)(iv) and 28(iv) were held to be inapplicable.

The Tribunal noted that the documents supporting the assessee's claim had not been examined by the AO or CIT(A). Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the AO for proper examination of the documents and the cash deposits.

The Tribunal found that the capital gains from the property sales were indeed declared in previous assessment years (2014-15 and 2016-17) and accepted by the AO in scrutiny assessments. Considering the assessee's situation as a widow with four children, her explanation for retaining cash for family needs until demonetization was deemed plausible and accepted. Consequently, the addition of Rs. 61.93 Lacs was deleted.

The Tribunal remitted the appeals back to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination, directing the AO to provide the assessee with an adequate opportunity of being heard and to conduct inquiries afresh without being influenced by prior observations. The orders of the CIT(A) and AO were set aside.

The Tribunal held that interest earned by a cooperative society from investments in another cooperative society/bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) unless it is established that the latter bank possesses an RBI license to do banking business with the public. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decision in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd.

The Tribunal held that the Ld.CIT(A) erred in not condoning the delay in filing the appeals, considering the medical emergency and other circumstances explained by the assessee. The Tribunal relied on a Supreme Court decision where a similar large delay was condoned.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 45 days and restored the assessment to the file of the AO for de novo assessment. A cost of Rs. 5,000/- was imposed on the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO was unjustified as the property was co-owned and the on-money should have been taxed proportionately in the hands of all co-owners, not solely on the assessee. The assessee had already offered more than his proportionate share.

The Tribunal, noting the assessee's advanced age, decided the appeal directly. Following a co-ordinate bench decision in a similar case, it ruled that the addition based solely on Ms. Subhadra G.'s uncorroborated statement, which lacked concrete data, was not sustainable in law, especially when the assessee was a regular income tax payer. The impugned addition was therefore deleted.

The Tribunal held that the Ld.CIT(A) erred in not condoning the delay in filing the appeals, considering the medical emergency and other circumstances explained by the assessee. The Tribunal relied on a Supreme Court decision where a similar large delay was condoned.

The Tribunal held that the expenditure on the dedicated power feeder line was revenue in nature, as it facilitated business efficiency without transferring ownership. For modernization expenses, the issue was remitted to the CIT(A). For prior period electricity charges, the matter was also restored to the CIT(A) to verify current status and allow if not claimed earlier.

The Tribunal held that software payments were not royalty, and following the decision of the High Court of Madras and Supreme Court, the disallowance was not justified. The Tribunal also held that the CIT(A)'s decision on benchmarking the ALP of outstanding receivables using the LIBOR rate was appropriate.

The Tribunal held that software payments were not royalty, and following the decision of the High Court of Madras and Supreme Court, the disallowance was not justified. The Tribunal also held that the CIT(A)'s decision on benchmarking the ALP of outstanding receivables using the LIBOR rate was appropriate.

The Tribunal noted that statements recorded under Section 133A do not have evidentiary value, unlike those under Section 132(4). The AO heavily relied on the managing partner's statement, which was later retracted and lacked legal backing.

The Tribunal remitted the appeals back to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination, directing the AO to provide the assessee with an adequate opportunity of being heard and to conduct inquiries afresh without being influenced by prior observations. The orders of the CIT(A) and AO were set aside.

The assessee's counsel informed the tribunal that the assessee had opted for the VSVS scheme 2024 and wished to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.