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227 orders · Page 4 of 5
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals as withdrawn, noting that the assessees would be moving applications to withdraw them in due course as per the Vivad Se Vishwas Act. The assessees were granted liberty to apply for recall of the order if necessary.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals as withdrawn, noting that the assessees would be moving applications to withdraw them in due course as per the Vivad Se Vishwas Act. The assessees were granted liberty to apply for recall of the order if necessary.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals as withdrawn, noting that the assessees would be moving applications to withdraw them in due course as per the Vivad Se Vishwas Act. The assessees were granted liberty to apply for recall of the order if necessary.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals as withdrawn, noting that the assessees would be moving applications to withdraw them in due course as per the Vivad Se Vishwas Act. The assessees were granted liberty to apply for recall of the order if necessary.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals as withdrawn, noting that the assessees would be moving applications to withdraw them in due course as per the Vivad Se Vishwas Act. The assessees were granted liberty to apply for recall of the order if necessary.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals as withdrawn, noting that the assessees would be moving applications to withdraw them in due course as per the Vivad Se Vishwas Act. The assessees were granted liberty to apply for recall of the order if necessary.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals as withdrawn, noting that the assessees would be moving applications to withdraw them in due course as per the Vivad Se Vishwas Act. The assessees were granted liberty to apply for recall of the order if necessary.
The Tribunal held that the demand for late filing fees under Section 234E could not be made for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as the amendment to Section 200A enabling such demands was prospective. Therefore, the demand raised was invalid.
The Tribunal held that Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAA) override the provisions of the Income Tax Act, including Section 206AA, even if inconsistent. Therefore, tax deduction at source should be as per DTAA rates when applicable.
The Tribunal noted that the assesses were not interested in prosecuting the pending appeals due to opting for the Vivad Se Vishwas scheme. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas Act and would withdraw the appeals. Since the appeals were pending and the settlement process was underway, the Tribunal dismissed the appeals as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the cost of the DG set is an input cost for the construction of apartments and a mandatory requirement for statutory clearances, thus allowable as a business expenditure. The Tribunal also directed the AO to examine if the expenditure of Rs. 48,54,442/- crystallized in the relevant assessment year.
The Tribunal noted that since the assessee opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas Act, they were not interested in prosecuting the appeal. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that since the assesses have opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas scheme, there is no purpose in keeping the appeals pending. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal found that the issue of deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) requires fresh adjudication. It directed the Assessing Officer to re-examine the nature of the assessee's business, its bye-laws, and whether the principle of mutuality is violated, considering relevant Supreme Court and High Court decisions.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas Act and would withdraw the appeal. Since the scheme was opted for, keeping the appeal pending served no purpose. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 272A(2)(k) should be levied only from the date of payment of TDS to the date of filing the e-TDS statements, as the statements cannot be filed before tax payment. The delay in payment of TDS itself is covered by other penal provisions.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had initiated the process under the Vivad Se Vishwas Act and would be withdrawing the appeal. Therefore, keeping the appeal pending would serve no purpose.
The Tribunal held that the demand for late filing fees under Section 234E could not be made for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as the amendment to Section 200A enabling such demands was prospective. Therefore, the demand raised was invalid.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals as withdrawn, noting that the assessees would be moving applications to withdraw them in due course as per the Vivad Se Vishwas Act. The assessees were granted liberty to apply for recall of the order if necessary.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme and would withdraw the appeal. Therefore, keeping the appeal pending would serve no purpose.
The Tribunal restored the issue of deduction for credit facilities to the AO for fresh consideration, emphasizing the need to examine the RBI license and the nature of business. Regarding investment income, the Tribunal noted that interest from cooperative banks is assessable as 'Income from Other Sources' and directed the AO to decide afresh based on apex court and high court judgments.
The Tribunal noted that the levy of fees under Section 234E for TDS statements filed prior to June 1, 2015, was questionable based on the Karnataka High Court's ruling. Therefore, the Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A) and remanded the matter for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal noted that the levy of fees under Section 234E for TDS statements filed prior to June 1, 2015, was questionable based on the Karnataka High Court's ruling. Therefore, the Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A) and remanded the matter for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee intended to withdraw the appeals after completing the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme formalities. Since the assessee had opted for the scheme, keeping the appeals pending would serve no purpose.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals) could not sustain an addition under Section 69A after deleting it under Section 68, as it exceeded the scope of the appeal. The Tribunal followed the Allahabad High Court judgment in Smt. Sarika Jain v. CIT.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals) erred in not admitting the additional grounds, which were purely legal and supported by evidence. The Tribunal admitted the additional ground and directed the Assessing Officer to examine the evidence.
The Tribunal held that commencement of business activities, such as entering into agreements and obtaining necessary permissions, is sufficient for allowing business expenditure, even if income has not yet been generated. Earning income is not a prerequisite for claiming such deductions.
The tribunal held that the CIT(A) should have issued a defect notice and provided an opportunity for correction. Given the ex-parte nature of the original assessment, the tribunal remanded the issue back to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(Appeals) did not consider the assessee's argument that an Income Tax Practitioner was solely responsible for the fraudulent refund claim. The Tribunal remanded the issue to the CIT(Appeals) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal found that the Ld.CIT(A) had proceeded on the basis that Section 153A is automatically triggered by a search, irrespective of incriminating material. The Tribunal noted that there was no categorical observation by the authorities below regarding the existence of incriminating material unearthed during the search leading to undisclosed income.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, noting that no purpose would be served in keeping it pending since the assessee had already initiated proceedings under the Vivad Se Vishwas Act. The assessee was granted liberty to seek recall of the order if necessary.
The Tribunal held that the AO's addition was based solely on news articles, which are inadmissible hearsay evidence without corroboration. The CIT(A) had rightly deleted the addition, as the news reports did not constitute adequate material on record.
The Tribunal agreed to the assessee's request for withdrawal of the appeal. The grounds of appeal were treated as dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee intended to withdraw the appeals after completing the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme formalities. Since the assessee had opted for the scheme, keeping the appeals pending would serve no purpose.
The Tribunal noted that since the assesses had opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas scheme, they were not interested in prosecuting the pending appeals. Therefore, the Tribunal dismissed the appeals as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Exemptions) failed to examine the compliance of various conditions prescribed under Section 80G(5) and drew an adverse inference solely based on excess income. The Tribunal set aside the CIT's order and restored the application for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the addition made under Section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act is not sustainable when the difference between the fair market value and the actual consideration is less than 10% of the actual consideration. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention, noting that the addition sustained by the CIT(A) of Rs. 15,92,800/- worked out to less than 10% of the actual consideration of Rs. 2,33,00,000/-. The Tribunal relied on decisions of coordinate benches, including M/s. John Fowler (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT, which followed the Jaipur Bench in Smt. Sita Bai Khetan vs. ITO, holding that a difference less than 10% should be ignored. The Tribunal also referred to the third proviso to Section 50C(1) (though effective later) as being curative in nature, supporting the principle of ignoring small differences. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the AO to ignore the difference and allowed the assessee's appeal.
The Tribunal held that the AO's assessment order was indeed erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue as it lacked inquiry on several issues raised by the PCIT. However, the Tribunal directed the AO to restrict inquiries to specific issues, excluding the settled penny stock matter.
The Tribunal noted that a previous ITAT order in the assessee's own case for an earlier AY had allowed the Revenue's appeal on a similar issue, holding that deduction under Section 36(1)(viia) requires the provision to be debited to the bad and doubtful debts account. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that interest on non-performing assets should be taxed on a receipt basis, not accrual basis, following precedents from the High Court and its own coordinate bench. The AO was not justified in bringing such interest to tax on an accrual basis.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 14A cannot be automatically added while computing book profits under Section 115JB. Following a Special Bench decision, the Tribunal found that the CIT(A) was justified in quashing the AO's order passed under Section 154.
The ITAT admitted additional grounds, including one related to the limitation of the assessment order, which was rejected. Another additional ground concerning the computation of net income for Section 80P deduction was remitted to the CIT(A) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee sought withdrawal of the appeal due to opting for the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal directed the exclusion of Infosys BPO Ltd. and TCS e-Serve Ltd. from the list of comparable companies used by the TPO for benchmarking the ITES segment. The Tribunal found these companies functionally dissimilar and possessing brand value not comparable to the assessee's captive service provider model.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, noting that no purpose would be served by keeping the appeal pending. Liberty was granted to move for recall of the order if Form 1 was not accepted by the revenue.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, considering that no purpose would be served in keeping the appeal pending due to the assessee's opting for the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme. Liberty was granted to move for recall if Form 1 was not accepted.
The ITAT found that the CIT(A) erred in rejecting the additional evidence without giving the assessee a fair opportunity. The Tribunal remitted the issue back to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that while the right to cross-examination is not absolute, it must be granted if the statements are not merely secondary or subordinate evidence. The case was remitted to the Assessing Officer for re-examination, with directions to provide statements and grant cross-examination if necessary.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the assessee liberty to seek recall of the order if they opt out of the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme. Both the assessee and revenue agreed to this proposition.