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The High Court held that the 2nd respondent's failure to decide the stay application for over 8 months was unreasonable and incumbent upon them to dispose of it expeditiously. The Court found it unacceptable for the 2nd respondent to remain silent and allow recovery proceedings to continue, potentially making the appeal infructuous. Consequently, the impugned notice dated 28-10-2019 was set aside. The 2nd respondent was directed to decide the stay application filed on 26.02.2019 within one week from the date of receipt of the order, after providing a hearing to the petitioner. The Court did not decide on the merits of the stay application itself, but rather on the procedural delay in its disposal.
The High Court held that the issue of disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act was settled by a prior Division Bench decision of the same High Court in I.T.T.A.No.430 of 2014, dated July 17, 2014. This decision, confirmed by the Supreme Court's dismissal of a Special Leave Petition (SLP), stated that if profit is estimated (whether by ignoring or rejecting books of account), there is no scope for allowability or disallowability of any deduction. The Court reasoned that such provisions for deduction/disallowance are to be considered when books of account are available and accepted. Consequently, the Revenue cannot assert a right to allow or disallow deductions once books of account are rejected. In light of this settled position, the substantial questions of law raised by the Revenue were considered to be settled against them, and the incidental questions did not survive for independent consideration. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal. The Court noted that the ITAT had found as a fact that the AO had conducted an enquiry after reopening the proceedings and applied his mind. Once there was an application of mind by the AO, the CIT could not invoke jurisdiction under Section 263 to re-appreciate the facts. The Court observed that the assessment was reopened under Section 148/147 and completed under Section 143(3). In such circumstances, the CIT's attempt to re-appreciate facts under Section 263 was not permissible. Therefore, the appeal did not give rise to any substantial question of law. The Court did not decide the merits of the capital gains computation or the applicability of Section 50C, as the primary issue was the validity of the Section 263 revision.
The Tribunal held that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice. The refusal of the Assessing Officer to look into the sources of cash deposits, on the ground that there was no specific direction from the ITAT to do so, cannot be considered a violation of natural justice. If the AO's refusal was wrong, it should be canvassed in a regular appeal. Regarding compliance with the ITAT's directions, the Tribunal noted that the operative portion of the ITAT's order was silent on whether the AO followed the directions in letter and spirit. The Tribunal explicitly stated it did not wish to record a finding either way to avoid prejudicing either party. However, it observed that while the ITAT mentioned grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes, the discussion was confined to re-computation of peak credit. The Tribunal concluded that the allegation of non-compliance was not patently made out to bypass the alternative remedy of appeal. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed, leaving it open for the petitioner to approach the CIT(Appeals), with a direction to the CIT(Appeals) to consider any such appeal independently without being influenced by the observations in the writ petition order.
The High Court held that the Writ Petition was maintainable. The Court reasoned that the ITAT's order, though dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution on the first date of hearing, contained a passing observation that could not be treated as a dismissal on merits. Consequently, the Assessee could not be compelled to file an appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Furthermore, the Court found that the proviso to Rule 24 of the ITAT Rules, 1963, could not be invoked. The Court emphasized that Section 254(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, mandates the ITAT to pass orders after giving both parties an opportunity of being heard, and a mere dismissal for non-prosecution without going into the merits, when the statute requires disposal on merits, is not permissible. The Court also noted that Section 254(2) of the Act, dealing with rectification, was not a solution for the failure to comply with Section 254(1). Therefore, the Writ Petition was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the ITAT for fresh disposal on merits.