3 orders · Page 1 of 1
The Tribunal held that all evidence regarding the disputed amount was subsequent to the balance sheet date of March 31, 2001. The dispute concerning the compensation amount did not crystallize before March 31, 2001, and as the liability did not accrue during the relevant previous year, it could not be allowed as a deduction. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner. Regarding the alternative plea for the subsequent assessment year, the Tribunal held that as it was not the subject matter of the relevant previous year, no such direction could be issued. The High Court, in the writ petition, held that the Commissioner, while exercising powers under Section 264, is not entitled to take into account material not placed before the Assessing Officer or events that took place subsequent to the order of assessment. The Court disagreed with the Gujarat High Court in Ramdev Exports and the Calcutta High Court in Smt. Phool Lata, concluding that the 'record' under Section 264(1) is only the record of proceedings before the assessing authority. Therefore, the assessee was not entitled to raise the question for the first time in revision proceedings. The writ petition was dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court observed that the notice issued by the Income Tax Officer under Section 148 was merely an intimation calling upon the petitioner to support the return filed for the assessment year 2001-02. Since no final order had been passed by the Assessing Officer, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the proceedings at that stage. The Court did not delve into the merits of the assessee's arguments regarding the applicability of the provisos to Section 80HHC or the validity of the reasons for re-opening the assessment. The ratio decidendi is that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to quash a notice that is merely a procedural step in the assessment process, especially when no final order has been passed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the writ petition.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground of the availability of an alternative remedy under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court cited several Supreme Court judgments, including A.V. Venkateshwaran v. R.S. Wadhwani, Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes, and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., to reiterate the principle that while the existence of an alternative remedy is not a bar to writ jurisdiction, it is a factor to be considered in exercising discretion. The Court found that the petitioner's case did not fall within the exceptions where writ jurisdiction can be exercised despite an alternative remedy, such as a violation of fundamental rights, failure of natural justice, or orders wholly without jurisdiction. The petitioner did not plead or argue that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction or that the impugned orders were ultra vires. Therefore, the Court held that the remedy under Section 260A was an effective alternative, and the petitioner should avail it. The petitioner was left free to file an appeal under Section 260A.