527 orders · Page 4 of 11
The Court noted that the Assessment Order, which formed the basis for the penalty, had already been set aside by the same Court in a previous writ petition. Consequently, the penalty order was also deemed unsustainable.
The tribunal held that for Section 2(47)(v) of the IT Act to apply, possession must be delivered in terms of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. Since possession was not delivered, the documents did not constitute a 'Transfer'.
The Court found that the petitioners' claim was not necessarily an attempt to evade taxes but a consequence of the respondent's actions. Therefore, the dispute was arbitrable, and an arbitrator was appointed.
The tribunal held that the assessment order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice as the petitioner was not given an opportunity to respond to the show cause notice. The order was set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration.
The High Court acknowledged that the petitioner did not receive the notices due to the amalgamation issue and was not afforded an opportunity to respond. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside.
The Tribunal noted that the company's affairs were not conducted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of its members or the public. The report of the Official Liquidator was accepted.
The High Court held that the issue was no longer res integra as it had granted relief in identical circumstances for AY 2007-08. The impugned orders of the ITAT were found unsustainable and in violation of the court's previous order.
The Tribunal granted the Revenue's request to withdraw the appeal. The reasoning provided is that the learned advocate for the appellant (Revenue) filed a memo seeking leave to withdraw the appeal. The Tribunal considered this memo, granted the leave, and consequently dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, an interlocutory application (I.A. No. 2/2022) filed in the appeal was also disposed of as it no longer survived for consideration. No decision on the merits of the original dispute was made.
The High Court acknowledged that the issue was covered by a prior ruling. The Revenue did not dispute the position of law presented by the assessee.
The High Court held that the Assessing Officer had no material to conclude that the assessee paid 'on-money'. The assessment was based on unsigned seized documents and statements from land owners that were later retracted or contradicted by affidavits.
The High Court held that the writ petitions were not maintainable due to the availability of an alternative and efficacious statutory remedy under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The court emphasized that writ jurisdiction should not be invoked to bypass statutory appeal mechanisms.
The High Court held that once approval is granted by the Ministry of Commerce, it is the Revenue's duty to notify the Industrial Park for the benefit under Section 80IA. The Court agreed with the Gujarat High Court's view that the CBDT notification is a formality and directed its issuance.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, upholding the assessee's claim for deduction. The court found that the assessee had not leased out more than 50% of the total area to any single lessee, based on a remand report.
The High Court held that a notification declaring Bangalore as an urban area under Section 280Y(d) in 1967 would continue to be applicable for the purposes of Section 54G, following the Supreme Court's decision in Fibre Boards Pvt. Ltd. Therefore, the assessee is entitled to the benefit under Section 54G.
The High Court held that the ITAT's order was factually incorrect and based on misconstrued law. The court found that the warranty expenses incurred exceeded the provisions made, and the provision was based on past business experience.
The Court held that the sanction to prosecute the petitioner, who was the head of the department, was not granted by the competent authority as per the relevant rules. Therefore, the proceedings were vitiated.
The High Court held that the ITAT's order was factually incorrect and based on misconstrued law. The court found that the warranty expenses incurred exceeded the provisions made, and the provision was based on past business experience.
The High Court held that the ITAT was justified in directing the Assessing Officer to adopt the project completion method as per AS-9, especially since the Revenue had accepted this method in a prior assessment year. The court found no error in the ITAT's order regarding the accounting method.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law raised in the appeal were covered by a previous decision. Consequently, the questions of law were held against the Revenue and in favor of the Assessee.
The High Court acknowledged that the substantial questions of law raised in the appeal were covered by prior judgments. Consequently, the questions of law were held against the Revenue and in favor of the assessee.
The High Court held that Section 194A(3)(ix) of the Income Tax Act exempts interest on compensation awarded by Motor Accident Claims Tribunals from TDS. Therefore, the Tribunal's order was untenable.
The Tribunal held that while depreciation on software is allowable, it should be restricted to 30% due to less than 180 days of use. The business development expenditure was deemed allowable based on commercial expediency, as its genuineness was not disputed.
The Tribunal and CIT(A) held that the interest expenditure was deductible as it was incurred for business purposes and not for acquiring an asset for extension of business. The EMD was treated as stock-in-trade, and the interest received on it was offered to tax.
The High Court held that the freezing of accounts was done in accordance with Section 102 of the Cr.P.C. and upheld the Magistrate's order rejecting the de-freezement application.
The High Court held that similar cases should be treated alike and that relief granted to one litigant should be extended to others in similar circumstances. Consequently, the impugned notice and provisional attachment order were quashed.
The High Court held that the rejection order was non-speaking, cryptic, and passed without application of mind, violating principles of natural justice. Consequently, the order was quashed.
The High Court found that the assessment order was passed ex-parte without providing a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, violating principles of natural justice. Therefore, the impugned order and demand notice were set aside.
The tribunal held that passing an order without considering the reply, despite a minor delay, violates principles of natural justice. The impugned order was quashed and the matter was remitted back for fresh consideration.
The court directed the petitioner to file objections to both the original and subsequent notices. The respondents were ordered to proceed under Section 148A(d) after providing a personal hearing, with all defenses available to the petitioner preserved.
The tribunal held that the condition imposed by the executive order to surrender land without specific legal authority or statutory support violates Article 300A of the Constitution. The doctrine of approbate and reprobate cannot override statutory provisions.
The High Court of Karnataka did not decide on the merits of the case. The judgment records that the learned counsel for the petitioner filed a memo seeking permission to withdraw the petition. This memo was placed on record. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition as withdrawn. No findings were made on the validity of the Section 148 notice or any other substantive issue related to the assessment. The operative direction was solely to dismiss the petition due to its withdrawal by the petitioner.
The High Court found that the assessee had shown the source for stamp duty and registration charges. Since additional documents were not considered by the ITAT and the matter was being remanded for other issues, the court decided to also remand this issue.
The High Court held that the 20% deposit requirement for a stay, as per circulars, is directory and not mandatory, depending on the facts. The court quashed the impugned orders and directed the appeals to be disposed of expeditiously without insisting on the deposit.
The High Court considered the memo filed by the appellants seeking leave to withdraw the appeal with liberty to file an appeal before the appropriate High Court. The Court granted the leave as prayed for. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with the liberty granted to the appellants to file an appeal before the appropriate High Court. No costs were awarded.
The High Court held that the impugned orders were passed in violation of the principles of natural justice as the petitioner's request for a personal hearing was not granted. The Court set aside the orders and remitted the matter back for reconsideration.
The High Court quashed the notices issued under Section 24(1) of the PBPT Act. Consequently, the subsequent orders passed under Section 24(3) and 24(4) of the same Act were also set aside.
The High Court allowed the transfer of the matrimonial case from Chitradurga to Nanjangud. The court considered the hardship to the petitioner and the existing criminal proceedings in Nanjangud.
The High Court quashed the notices issued under Section 24(1) of the PBPT Act. The court also set aside the subsequent orders passed by the Initiating Officer based on these notices.
The High Court set aside the impugned assessment orders and remitted the matter back to the respondent. The petitioner was granted liberty to file their response, which the respondent must consider after providing a personal hearing.
The High Court quashed the notices issued under Section 24(1) of the PBPT Act. It also set aside the subsequent orders passed by the respondent, finding them unlawful and illegal.
The High Court quashed the notices issued under Section 24(1) of the PBPT Act. The court also set aside the subsequent orders passed by the Initiating Officer based on these notices.
The High Court quashed the notices issued under Section 24(1) of the PBPT Act. It also set aside subsequent orders passed by the respondent based on these notices.
The High Court quashed the notices issued under Section 24(1) of the PBPT Act. It also set aside subsequent orders passed by the respondent based on these notices.
The High Court quashed the notices issued under Section 24(1) of the PBPT Act. It also set aside subsequent orders passed by the respondent based on these notices.
The High Court quashed the notices issued under Section 24(1) of the PBPT Act. It also set aside subsequent orders passed by the respondent based on these notices.
The High Court quashed the notices issued under Section 24(1) of the PBPT Act. It also set aside subsequent orders passed by the respondent based on these notices.
The High Court quashed the notices issued under Section 24(1) of the PBPT Act. It also set aside subsequent orders passed by the respondent based on these notices.
The High Court quashed the notices issued under Section 24(1) of the PBPT Act. It also set aside subsequent orders passed by the respondent based on these notices.
The High Court of Karnataka, upon considering the memo filed by the appellant's counsel, noted that the Assessing Officer had granted full relief on merits. This rendered the legal issues raised in the appeal academic. Therefore, the Court ordered that the appeal be disposed of accordingly, with liberty granted to the appellant to revive the appeal if the need arises. No costs were imposed. The specific legal questions that were to be decided were not adjudicated upon due to the settlement at the Assessing Officer level.
The High Court found conflicting findings from the ITAT regarding whether the assessee's activity constituted 'manufacture'. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the ITAT for a clear finding on this aspect and to examine the veracity of the bills.