THE MANGALORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY LTD., vs. SRI A CHANDRASEKHAR

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2022

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.NARENDAR

AND

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.N.DESAI

WRIT PETITION NO.11423/2022 (GM-CON)

BETWEEN:

AND:

2 VIA CHERUKAVA, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, KERALA-679340 REPRESENTED BY HIS SPA HOLDER NIKHIL SATHIANATHAN S/O T M SATHIANATHAN, VIDYARATHNANAGAR, MANIPAL, UDUPI-576104.

REPRESENTED BY HIS SPA HOLDER NIKHIL SATHIANATHAN, S/O T M SATHIANATHAN, VIDYARATHNANAGAR, MANIPAL, UDUPI-576104.

3 5. SMT KRIPA CHANDRASHEKAR AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS W/O A CHANDRASHEKAR R/AT NO.520, AMARJYOTHI LAYOUT, NEW RING ROAD, DOMLUR, BANGALORE-560071. ... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI SANDESH J.CHOUTA, SR. ADV. FOR SRI ISMAIL MUNEEB, ADV. FOR R1 AND R2, SMT. ASHA SHETTY, ADV. FOR R4 AND R5, NOTICE TO R3 IS DISPENSED WITH V/O DATED.14/7/22.)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 22/02/2022 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, BANGALORE (ADDL. BENCH) IN CONSUMER COMPLAINT NO.52/2021 (ANNEXURE-A)

THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR “HEARING ON INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION” THIS DAY, G.NARENDAR J, MADE THE FOLLOWING:

ORDER

Heard the learned Senior counsel Sri Sriranga along with learned counsel Smt. Sumana Naganand, for the petitioners and the learned Senior counsel Sri Sandesh J Chouta along with learned counsel Sri. Ismail Muneeb for respondents No.1 and 2 and Smt. Asha Shetty, learned counsel for respondent Nos.4 and 5.

5 respondent herein. The said challenge is pending since 2010.

6 hence the writ petitions are not maintainable and that even the question of jurisdiction is to be tried by the National Commission, as it is specifically empowered to do so. He would submit that the writ petition is also hit by delay and laches as it is preferred after a delay of four months of the order of the State Consumer Council.

Section 51 reads as under: “ 51. Appeal to National Commission.-(1) Any person aggrieved by an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clauses (i) or (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1)

7 of section 47 may prefer an appeal against such order to the National Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed:

Provided that the National Commission shall not entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days unless it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:

Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the State Commission, shall be entertained by the National Commission unless the appellant has deposited fifty per cent. of that amount in the manner as may be prescribed.

(2) Save as otherwise expressly provided under this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the National Commission from any order passed in appeal by any State Commission, if the National Commission is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.

(3) In an appeal involving a question of law, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.

8 (4) Where the National Commission is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question and hear the appeal on that question:

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the National Commission to hear, for reasons to be recorded in writing, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question of law.

(5) An appeal may lie to the National Commission under this section from an order passed ex parte by the State Commission.”

9 against such order to the National Commission within a period of 30 days and that the appeal shall be preferred within a period of 30 days from the date on which an order is made.

(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall have jurisdiction—

(a) to entertain—

10 (i) complaints where the value of the goods or services paid as consideration exceeds rupees ten crore:

Provided that where the Central Government deems it necessary so to do, it may prescribe such other value, as it deems fit;

(ii) complaints against unfair contracts, where the value of goods or services paid as consideration exceeds ten crore rupees;

(iii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission;

(iv) appeals against the orders of the Central Authority; and

(b) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is pending before or has been decided by any State Commission where it appears to the National Commission that such State Commission has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

(2) The jurisdiction, powers and authority of the National Commission may be exercised by Benches thereof and a Bench may be constituted by

11 the President with one or more members as he may deem fit:

Provided that the senior-most member of the Bench shall preside over the Bench.

(3) Where the members of a Bench differ in opinion on any point, the points shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority, if there is a majority, but if the members are equally divided, they shall state the point or points on which they differ, and make a reference to the President who shall either hear the point or points himself or refer the case for hearing on such point or points by one or more of the other members and such point or points shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the members who have heard the case, including those who first heard it:

Provided that the President or the other member, as the case may be, shall give opinion on the point or points so referred within a period of two months from the date of such reference.”

12 would take the Court to clause (b) of Sub section (1) of Section 58. Elaborating further he would contend that a reading of clause (b) would clearly demonstrate that even the question of erroneous exercise of jurisdiction has to be the subject matter of an appeal to the National Commission. Proceeding further he would take the Court through Section 60 relating to the power of review and Section 67 of the Act which provides for remedy of an appeal against the order of National Commission.

13 Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious

14 of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. 48. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa a three-Judge Bench considered the question whether a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should be entertained in a matter involving challenge to the order of the assessment passed by the competent authority under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and corresponding law enacted by the State Legislature and answered the same in the negative by making the following observations: (SCC pp. 440-41, para 11) “11. Under the scheme of the Act, there is a hierarchy of authorities before which the petitioners can get adequate redress against the wrongful acts

15 complained of. The petitioners have the right to prefer an appeal before the prescribed authority under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. If the petitioners are dissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford in the following passage: (ER p. 495) ‘… There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon a statute. … But there is a third class viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. … The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases

16 of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to.’ The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant & Co. Ltd. and Secy. of State v. Mask & Co. It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine.” 49. The views expressed in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa were echoed in CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. in the following words: (SCC p. 264, para 3) “3. … Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by

17 statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged.”

18 However, the High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without availing the same unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such interference or there exist sufficient grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. (See State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. 12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Union of India v. T.R. Varma, State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Madras have held that though Article 226 confers very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ is absolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of the principles of natural justice or the procedure required for decision has not been adopted. [See N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja

19 Nainar, Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar, Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das, S.T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan, Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, L.L. Sudhakar Reddy v. State of A.P., Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha v. State of Maharashtra, Pratap Singh v. State of Haryana and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO.] 13. In Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Assn. of India, this Court has held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, the party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction for relief and observed as follows: (SCC pp. 343-45, paras 12-14) “12. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of Taxes this Court adverted to the rule of self-imposed restraint that the writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and observed: (AIR p. 1423, para 7) ‘7. … The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by the statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved

20 petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.’ 13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa this Court observed: (SCC pp. 440-41, para 11) ‘11. … It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford in the following passage: (ER p. 495) “… There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon a statute. … But there is a third class viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. … The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases

21 of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to.” The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspaper Ltd. and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. Ltd. and Secy. of State v. Mask and Co. It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine.’ 14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. (speaking for the majority of the larger Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para 77) ‘77. … So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226—or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32—is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment.’”

22 14. In Union of India v. Guwahati Carbon Ltd. this Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle and observed: (SCC p. 653, para 8) “8. Before we discuss the correctness of the impugned order, we intend to remind ourselves the observations made by this Court in Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta. In the said decision, this Court was pleased to observe that: (SCC p. 88, para 23). ‘23. … [when] a revenue statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all the other forums and modes of seeking [remedy] are excluded.’” 15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case, Titaghur Paper Mills case and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of

23 the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.”

24 the Constitution of India against the orders passed by the Commission, as a statutory appeal is provided and lies to this Court under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Once the legislature has provided for a statutory appeal to a higher court, it cannot be proper exercise of jurisdiction to permit the parties to bypass the statutory appeal to such higher court and entertain petitions in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even in the present case, the High Court has not exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law. The case is one of improper exercise of jurisdiction. It is not expected of us to deal with this issue at any greater length as we are dismissing this petition on other grounds. 9. While declining to interfere in the present special leave petition preferred against the order passed by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we hereby make it clear that the orders of the Commission are incapable of being questioned under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, as a statutory appeal in terms of Section 27- A(1)(c) lies to this Court. Therefore, we have no hesitation in issuing a direction of caution that it will not be a proper exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts to entertain writ petitions against such orders of the Commission.

25 14. Nextly, reliance is placed on the ruling in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 620 (Ibrat Faizan Vs. Omaxe Buildhome Private Limited) wherein at paragraphs 3, 15, 19 and 26 it is observed as under:

“ 3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the High Court holding that against the order passed by the National Commission passed in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘2019 Act’), a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable, the original respondent before the High Court has preferred the present appeal before this Court.

26 on behalf of the respondent - original writ petitioner before the High Court has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Associated Cement Companies Limited v. P.N. Sharma, AIR 1965 SC 1595 (paras 44 & 45), and the subsequent decision of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261.

(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall have jurisdiction—

(a) to entertain—

(i) complaints where the value of the goods or services paid as consideration exceeds rupees ten crore: Provided that where the Central Government deems it necessary so to do, it may prescribe such other value, as it deems fit;

(ii) complaints against unfair contracts, where the value of goods or services paid as consideration exceeds ten crore rupees;

27 (iii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission;

(iv) appeals against the orders of the Central Authority; and

(b) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is pending before or has been decided by any State Commission where it appears to the National Commission that such State Commission has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

(2) The jurisdiction, powers and authority of the National Commission may be exercised by Benches thereof and a Bench may be constituted by the President with one or more members as he may deem fit:

Provided that the senior-most member of the Bench shall preside over the Bench.

(3) Where the members of a Bench differ in opinion on any point, the points shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority, if there is a majority, but if the members are equally divided, they shall state the point or points on which they differ, and make a reference to the President who

28 shall either hear the point or points himself or refer the case for hearing on such point or points by one or more of the other members and such point or points shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the members who have heard the case, including those who first heard it:

Provided that the President or the other member, as the case may be, shall give opinion on the point or points so referred within a period of two months from the date of such reference.

Xxx xxx

xxx

(a) of sub-section (1) of Section 58, may prefer an appeal against such order to the Supreme Court within a period of thirty days from the date of the order:

Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:

Provided further that no appeal by a person who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of

29 the National Commission shall be entertained by the Supreme Court unless that person has deposited fifty per cent of that amount in the manner as may be prescribed.”

30 through paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has placed reliance on its own ruling which is as under: “ 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at length. At the outset, it is required to be noted that against the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer under the provisions of the MVAT Act and CST Act, the assessee straightway preferred writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is not in dispute that the statutes provide for the right of appeal against the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer and against the order passed by the first appellate authority, an appeal/revision before the Tribunal. In that view of the matter, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the assessment order in view of the availability of statutory remedy under the Act. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Satyawati Tondon (supra) in which this Court had an occasion to consider the entertainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by by-passing the statutory remedies, is required to be referred to. After considering the earlier decisions of this Court, in

31 paragraphs 49 to 52, it was observed and held as under:

“49. The views expressed in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433 were echoed in CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. (1985) 1 SCC 260 in the following words: (SCC p. 264, para 3) “3. … Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged.”

“5. In our opinion, the order which was passed by the Tribunal directing sale of mortgaged property was appealable under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short ‘the Act’). The High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 in view of the provision for alternative remedy contained in the Act. We do not propose to go into the correctness of the decision of the High Court and whether the order passed by the Tribunal was correct or not has to be decided before an appropriate forum.

33 by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act.”

34 Constitution. Paras 29 and 30 of that judgment which contain the views of this Court read as under: (SCC pp. 175-76)

“29. In our opinion, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty-bound to take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration and decide for itself even in the absence of proper affidavits from the State and its instrumentalities as to whether any case at all is made out requiring its interference on the basis of the material made available on record. There is nothing like issuing an ex parte writ of mandamus, order or direction in a public law remedy. Further, while considering the validity of impugned action or inaction the Court will not consider itself restricted to the pleadings of the State but would be free to satisfy itself whether any case as such is made out by a person invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved;

35 (b) the petition reveals all material facts; (c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute; (d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches; (e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation; (f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors.

The Court in appropriate cases in its discretion may direct the State or its instrumentalities as the case may be to file proper affidavits placing all the relevant facts truly and accurately for the consideration of the Court and particularly in cases where public revenue and public interest are involved. Such directions are always required to be complied with by the State. No relief could be granted in a public law remedy as a matter of course only on the ground that the State did not file its counter-affidavit opposing the writ petition. Further, empty and self-defeating affidavits or statements of Government spokesmen by themselves do not form basis to grant any relief to a person in a public law remedy to which he is not otherwise entitled to in law.”

36 dealing with the issue whether the alternative statutory remedy available under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 can be bypassed and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution could be invoked. After examining the scheme of the Act, the Court observed: (SCC p. 781, paras 31-32)

“31. When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal statute, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. In this case the High Court is a statutory forum of appeal on a question of law. That should not be abdicated and given a go-by by a litigant for invoking the forum of judicial review of the High Court under writ jurisdiction. The High Court, with great respect, fell into a manifest error by not appreciating this aspect of the matter. It has however dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.

37 7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decision, the High Court has seriously erred in entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the assessment order, by- passing the statutory remedies.

38 para 17 and Annexure G. He would contend that the writ petition is preferred invoking the provisions of Article 227.

39 has merely been sent back to the appellate authority and in fact the deposit was made on the directions of the High Court and that the deposits are to be maintained pending during the pendency of the appeal and are subject to the appeal. He would contend that the impugned order is contrary to the earlier orders of this Court and in that view of the matter, the writ petitions requires to be allowed and the order of the consumer forum, impugned herein requires to be set aside.

40 of the Labour Court. The learned Single Judge was right, but then, only because the jurisdiction of the High Court, while exercising of its power of judicial review was limited, it would not mean that even a jurisdictional error could not have been corrected. The provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India would be attracted if the inferior Tribunal has, inter alia, committed a jurisdictional error. What would be the ground for judicial review, in regard to the orders passed by an inferior Tribunal is no longer res integra.”

“ 8. We are of the view that the High Court has not transgressed the limitations inherent in the grant of the writ of certiorari. The High Court had rightly perceived the patent illegality in the impugned award warranting interference in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The High Court is right in pointing out that the material evidence, especially the admissions of the witness examined on behalf of the management were not considered at all. Moreover,

41 the conclusions reached are wholly perverse and do not reasonably follow from the evidence on record. For instance, the fact that no appointment letters were issued or filed does not possibly lead to the conclusion that the management's version must be true. Similarly, if the Workers' Unions had taken the stand that antedated appointment letters were issued describing the employees as trainees after the dispute had arisen, it is difficult to comprehend how that would demolish the case of the Union that the persons concerned were really employed as workmen (helpers) but not as trainees. The Industrial Court makes a bald observation that there was no satisfactory evidence on record to suggest that these persons were employed by the respondents as “regular” employees at any point of time. This bald conclusion/observation, as rightly pointed out by the High Court, ignores the material evidence on record. In fact, the evidence has not been adverted to at all while discussing the issues. There was total non- application of mind on the part of the Tribunal to the crucial evidence. The management's witness categorically stated that the workers concerned were engaged in production of goods and that no other workmen were employed for production of goods. In fact, one of the allegations of the management was that they adopted go-slow tactics and did not turn out sufficient work. According to the Industrial Court,

42 the fact that the “trainees” were employed for performing the regular nature of work would not by itself make them workmen. The question then is, would it lead to an inference that they were trainees? The answer must be clearly in the negative. No evidence whatsoever was adduced on behalf of the management to show that for more than one and half years those persons remained as “trainees” in the true sense of the term. It is pertinent to note the statement of the management's witness that in June- July 1989, the Company did not have any permanent workmen and all the persons employed were trainees. It would be impossible to believe that the entire production activity was being carried on with none other than the so-called trainees. If there were trainees, there should have been trainers too. The management evidently came forward with a false plea dubbing the employees/workmen as trainees so as to resort to summary termination and deny the legitimate benefits. On the facts and evidence brought on record, the conclusion was inescapable that the appellant employer resorted to unfair labour practice. There would have been travesty of justice if the High Court declined to interfere with the findings arbitrarily and without reasonable basis reached by the Industrial Court.”

43 21. Elaborating further on the issue of entertainability/maintainability of the writ petitions, he would take the Court through the ruling of the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court reported in 2022 SCC onLine Del 1274 (Lucina Land Development Ltd. v. Union of India and Others) and would place emphasis on the observations made in paragraphs 15, 20, 21, 22, 23 which reads as under: “ 15. Mr. Piyush Singh, learned Counsel for the allottees, submitted that the present petition was not maintainable under Article 227 of Constitution of India, in view of the availability of an alternate remedy by way of an appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 23 of the 1986 Act, which provides for a right of appeal against every order passed by the learned NCDRC under Section 21(a)(i) of the 1986 Act. 20. There is a fundamental jurisprudential difference between judicial review jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction. The nature of the power exercised by a court in each case is also essentially different. The exercise of powers under Article 227, in a sense, more constricted than the exercise of powers under Article 226, inasmuch as the scope of

44 examination of the merits of the decision under challenge is, under Article 226, more expansive than under Article 227. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, what the court is essentially concerned with is ensuring that the courts and tribunals subject to its supervisory jurisdiction exercise their powers appropriately. 21. The Article 227 court does not sit in appeal over the decisions of the court or tribunal below. It is not expected to scrutinize the merits of the said decision with a view to correct the said decision on merits. If, however, the decision is one which involves erroneous exercise of jurisdiction or assumption of power where no power exists, then the court, under Article 227, would be justified in interfering. Equally, if the decision demonstrates discharge, of the Court or Tribunal below, of its functions otherwise than the manner in which the law requires the Court of Tribunal to so discharge, the decision can be corrected in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction vested in the High Court. Else, the position in law is trite, as enunciated in Estralla Rubber v Dass Estate, Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel and Puri Investment v. Young India that a writ court, under Article 227, is not even empowered to correct errors in the orders passed by the courts below. The distinction is as explicit as it is nuanced.

45 22. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society refers to ”Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India”. The opening sentence in para 53 of the report in the said case holds that adequate safeguards, against orders passed by the learned NCDRC, are available to an aggrieved party by way of writ to a High Court under Article 226/227 or to the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of the India or by way of an appeal under Section 23 of the 1986 Act. It does not, however, provide any further guidance as to the circumstances in which these remedies would, individually, be available against the decision of the learned NCDRC. Even so, the view canvassed by Mr Piyush Singh, if accepted, would amount to holding that, where the appellate remedy under Section 23 of the 1986 Act is available, the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India stands irrevocably foreclosed, which would militate against the tenor of the view expressed in Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society. 23. The issue, however, stands largely answered, in principle, by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai v. Tuticorin Educational Society (“Virudhunagar”, hereinafter), though the said decision did not examine the issue in the backdrop of the 1986 Act. In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the aspect of availability of

46 a remedy to the High Court, seeking exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over the courts below, where a remedy of appeal against the decision of courts below was available under the CPC. Paras 11 to 13 of the report read thus: “11. Secondly, the High Court ought to have seen that when a remedy of appeal under section 104 (1)(i) read with Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was directly available, the respondents 1 and 2 ought to have taken recourse to the same. It is true that the availability of a remedy of appeal may not always be a bar for the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. In A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan & Ors, this Court held that "though no hurdle can be put against the exercise of the Constitutional powers of the High Court, it is a well recognized principle which gained judicial recognition that the High Court should direct the party to avail himself of such remedies before he resorts to a Constitutional remedy".

47 authorities and tribunals. In respect of cases falling under the first category, which may involve suits and other proceedings before civil courts, the availability of an appellate remedy in terms of the provisions of CPC, may have to be construed as a near total bar. [emphasis by this Court] Otherwise, there is a danger that someone may challenge in a revision under Article 227, even a decree passed in a suit, on the same grounds on which the respondents 1 and 2 invoked the jurisdiction of the High court. This is why, a 3 member Bench of this court, while overruling the decision in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai, pointed out in Radhey Shyam Vs. Chhabi Nath that “orders of civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts”. 13. Therefore wherever the proceedings are under the code of Civil Procedure and the forum is the Civil Court, the availability of a remedy under the CPC, will deter the High Court, not merely as a measure of self imposed restriction, but as a matter of discipline and prudence, from exercising its power of superintendence under the Constitution. Hence, the High Court ought not to have entertained the revision under Article 227 especially in a case where a specific remedy of appeal is provided under the Code of Civil Procedure itself."

“ 28. “Complaint” is defined under Section 2(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 in the following manner:

“2. (1)(c) ‘complaint’ means any allegation in writing made by a complainant that— (i) an unfair trade practice or a restrictive trade practice has been adopted by any trader or service provider; (ii) the goods bought by him or agreed to be bought by him suffer from one or more defects; (iii) the services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired or availed of by him suffer from deficiency in any respect; (iv) a trader or the service provider, as the case may be, has charged for the goods or for the services mentioned in the complaint, a price in excess of the price— (a) fixed by or under any law for the time being in force;

(b) displayed on the goods or any package containing such goods; (c) displayed on the price list exhibited by him by or under any law for the time being in force; (d) agreed between the parties;

(v) goods which will be hazardous to life and safety when used are being offered for sale to the public— (a) in contravention of any standards relating to safety of such goods as required to be complied with ,by or under any law for the time being in force; (b) if the trader could have known with due diligence that the goods so offered are unsafe to the public; (vi) services which are hazardous or likely to be hazardous to life and safety of the public when used, are being offered by the service provider which such person could have known with due diligence to be injurious to life and safety;

with a view to obtaining any relief provided by or under this Act;”

Therefore, it is only in respect to aforementioned aspects that a consumer complaint can be filed viz.: (i) Unfair trade practice or restrictive trade practice. (ii) When there is a defective goods.

50 (iii) Deficiency in services. (iv) Hazardous goods. (v) Hazardous services. (vi) A price in excess of the price fixed under any law, etc.

“2. (1)(g) ‘deficiency’ means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service.”

Therefore, it is clear that the nature of transaction under Section 126 does not come within the ambit of “complaint”.

51 made under Section 126 of the Electricity Act, 2003 or action taken under Sections 135 to 140 of the Electricity Act, 2003?”

(1999) 1 SCC 81 : (AIR 1999 SC 509). Taking note of the law laid down by the Apex Court with respect to the Bench hunting we find that the petitioner had no reason to approach this Court when already a civil suit was pending. Such an action of the petitioner definitely falls

52 within the category of Bench hunting. In light of the facts and law referred to hereinabove by the Apex Court, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner has no right to avail two remedies simultaneously, first before the Civil Court and then filing this writ petition by raising various disputed questions of facts which cannot be examined by the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are of the further opinion that the High Court exercises extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, a discretionary jurisdiction, equity jurisdiction and therefore it was called Court of equity as well. The facts and circumstances of the case show that it is a clear case of abuse of process of Court and of law. The Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kamla Devi, reported in (1996) 8 SCC 285 : (AIR 1996 SC 1733) held as under: “The facts and circumstances of the case show that it was a clear case of abuse of process of Court and of law. The averment made in the plaint to the effect that the officers of the appellant-Corporation went to Ghaziabad to attach the movables of the respondent or her grandchildren to realise the tax under the order of assessment was a total falsehood and a mere pretence to create jurisdiction in Ghaziabad Court as no document had been field before the Ghaziabad Court in support of the

53 allegations. Moreover, the frame of the suit and the language and terms in which the declaration and prohibitory injunction were asked for suggest a clear attempt to overreach the process of Court. The object clearly was to obtain a declaration that the assessment order was illegal and invalid from the Court outside Delhi. The fact that the plaintiff- respondent chose to conceal the fact of her filing the appeal against the assessment order is also indicative of the mala fides on her part. The bill of demand pursuant to the assessment order was sent to the respondent after filing of the suit. Once the Supreme Court is satisfied that the respondent abused the process of law and misused the legal system, the objections put forward by the respondents' counsel are of no consequence. The Supreme Court is entitled to act in such cases to prevent such abuse and misuse. Accordingly, the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Ghaziabad is set aside. In view of the reprehensible conduct, the respondents are directed to pay exemplary costs in a sum of Rs. 50,000/-. Such practices ought to be put down with a stern hand so that other similarly mined may desist from indulging in similar acts.”

54 Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh ((2021) 6 SCC 771) and would impress upon the observations made in paragraph 27. In paragraph 27 the Hon’ble Apex Court has set out the principles of law with regard to maintainability of a writ petition despite the availability of alternative and efficacious remedy. Paragraphs 27 to 27.6 and 28 read as under: “ 27. The principles of law which emerge are that:

27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well.

27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person.

27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where : (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural

55 justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged.

27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law.

27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion.

27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.

56 Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India among other decisions.”

“ 11. We can draw strength from the observations of this Court in Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., vs. Paramount Polymers (P) Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 101, where there was a similarity as in the present case, of a specific clause dealing with electricity dues. It was observed that in such a scenario if a transferee desires to enjoy the service connection, he shall pay the outstanding dues, if any, to the supplier of electricity and a reconnection or a new connection shall not be given to any premises where there are arrears on account of dues to the supplier unless they are so declared in advance.

16.1. That electricity dues, where they are statutory in character under the Electricity Act and as per the terms and conditions of supply, cannot be waived in view of the provisions of the Act itself, more specifically Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (in pari material with Section 24 of the Electricity Act, 1910), and cannot partake the character of dues of purely contractual nature.

16.2. Where, as in cases of the e- auction notice in question, the existence of electricity dues, whether quantified or not, has been specifically mentioned as a liability of the purchaser and the sale is on “as is where is, whatever there is and without recourse basis”, there can be no doubt that the liability to pay

60 electricity dues exists on the respondent (purchaser).

16.3. The debate over connection or reconnection would not exist in cases like the present one where both aspects are covered as per Clause 8.4 of the General Terms & Conditions of Supply.”

36.01. An installation can be transferred from one Consumer to another person subject to the following Conditions:

61 (a) The registered Consumer shall furnish a consent letter for transferring the installation and also the deposits held in his name to the transferee.

Note: In the absence of the consent letter from the registered Consumer, the transferee shall produce any one of the following documents in respect of such installation:

i) Proof of ownership of the installation in the form of Registered sale deed or partition deed or katha / succession or heir ship certificate or deed of last will.

ii) Proof of occupancy such as valid power of attorney or latest rent paid receipt or valid lease deed in respect of only non-commercial lighting and non-commercial combined lighting and heating installations.

(a) An indemnity bond as per Annex -9 shall be executed by the transferee indemnifying the Licensee against all disputes that may arise out of such transfer. (b) There shall be no arrears outstanding against the installation.

(c) The transferee shall:

62 (i) Pay Transfer fee as specified under Clause 30.10

(ii) Produce the documents as specified in 36.01 Note: (i) / ii)

(iii) Execute a fresh power supply Agreement with the Licensee.

(iv) Furnish photocopy of the licence / clearance issued in his favour by local authority if such licence / clearance is required under any statute

(iii) Undertake to pay any dues that may arise due to any short claims detected at a later date even in respect of periods prior to the date of transfer.

(iv) Pay fresh deposit as if he is a new Consumer in case there is no consent for transfer of deposit from the registered Consumer.

In case consent of the registered Consumer for transfer of deposit is produced, no additional deposit shall be demanded at the time of transfer of installation.

36.02. The power supply Agreement with the original registered Consumer is deemed to be terminated from the date of order of transfer of installation or from the date of expiry of 7 days from

63 the date of compliance of required formalities by the transferee whichever is earlier.

36.03. The officers who are empowered to sign the power supply Agreement are also empowered to effect the transfer of such installation to another person.

64 30. We have gone through the complaint lodged by the respondents No.1 and 2 before the Karnataka State Disputes Redressal Commission which came to be registered as C.C. No.52/2021. Several pleadings relating to factual aspects of the matter have been pleaded, which we do not intend to traverse for the present.

ii. Complainants are not liable to pay any amount demanded by the Opposite parties No 2, 3 and rupees 11,24,773 deposited by the complaints is liable to be refunded with an interest at 18% percent per annum.

iii. Issue direction to the Opposite Party No 2&3 to pay financial loss suffered by the complainants by way of compensation of rupees 1,50,05,398/- to the complainants with interest 18% per annum.

iv. And also pay compensation for mental agony undergone by Complainants.

65 v. And also pay cost of these proceedings and grant any such another further reliefs.

The learned Single Judge while disposing of the writ petition by order dated 11.12.2019 appears to have not dealt with the issue of the amount in deposit. We also do not have the benefit of a copy of the interim order to know if the amounts were permitted to be appropriated by the instant petitioner or were required to be maintained as deposits also is not forthcoming. Be that as it may, we are of the considered opinion that the reliefs sought for and the reliefs granted with the exception of the direction to refund the deposit are well within the powers of the State Commission and involve adjudication of disputed facts. There being no error of jurisdiction or there being no patent illegality, nor there being a breach of any fundamental right the instant writ petitions, in our considered opinion are not entertainable as repeatedly held by the Hon’ble Apex Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the ruling of Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and others vs. Commercial Steel Ltd., reported in 2021 SCC onLine SC 884 has crystallized the criterion required for the High Court to entertain a writ petition in para 11. Para 11 reads as under:

“11. The respondent had a statutory remedy under section 107. Instead of availing of the remedy, the respondent instituted a petition under Article 226. The existence of an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. But a writ petition can be entertained in exceptional circumstances where there is:

(i) a breach of fundamental rights; (ii) a violation of the principles of natural justice; (iii) an excess of jurisdiction; or (iv) a challenge to the vires of the statute or delegated legislation.

“4. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length on the entertainability of

68 the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the High Court against the Assessment Order and the reasoning given by the High Court while entertaining the writ petition against the Assessment Order despite the statutory remedy by way of an appeal available, we are of the opinion that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the Assessment Order denying the Input rebate against which a statutory appeal would be available under Section 46(1) of the MP VAT Act, 2002.

69 Appeal No. 4956 of 2022, decided on 20.09.2022) is required to be referred to. After taking into consideration the earlier decision of this Court in the case of United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110, it is observed and held that in a tax matter when a statutory remedy of appeal is available, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the Assessment Order by-passing the statutory remedy of appeal. While holding so, this Court considered the observations made by this Court in paragraphs 49 to 53 in Satyawati Tondon (supra), which read as under:

“49. The views expressed in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433 were echoed in CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. (1985) 1 SCC 260 in the following words: (SCC p. 264, para 3)

“3. … Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the

70 Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged.”

(2001) 6 SCC 569 this Court considered the question whether a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution was maintainable against an order passed by the Tribunal under Section 19 of the DRT Act and observed: (SCC p. 570, paras 5- 6)

“5. In our opinion, the order which was passed by the Tribunal directing sale of mortgaged property was appealable under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short ‘the Act’). The High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 in view of the provision for alternative remedy contained in the Act. We do not propose

71 to go into the correctness of the decision of the High Court and whether the order passed by the Tribunal was correct or not has to be decided before an appropriate forum.

72 quashing the show-cause notice issued to the respondent under the Orissa Sales Tax Act by observing that the High Court had completely ignored the parameters laid down by this Court in a large number of cases relating to exhaustion of alternative remedy.

“29. In our opinion, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty-bound to take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration and decide for itself even in the absence of proper affidavits from the State and its instrumentalities as to whether any case at all is made out requiring its interference on the basis of the material made available on record. There is nothing like issuing an ex parte writ of mandamus, order or direction in a public law remedy. Further, while considering the validity of impugned action or inaction the Court will not

73 consider itself restricted to the pleadings of the State but would be free to satisfy itself whether any case as such is made out by a person invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty- bound to consider whether:

(a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved;

(b) the petition reveals all material facts;

(c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute;

(d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches;

(e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation;

(f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors.

The Court in appropriate cases in its discretion may direct the State or its instrumentalities as the case may be to file proper affidavits placing all the

74 relevant facts truly and accurately for the consideration of the Court and particularly in cases where public revenue and public interest are involved. Such directions are always required to be complied with by the State. No relief could be granted in a public law remedy as a matter of course only on the ground that the State did not file its counter-affidavit opposing the writ petition. Further, empty and self-defeating affidavits or statements of Government spokesmen by themselves do not form basis to grant any relief to a person in a public law remedy to which he is not otherwise entitled to in law.”

75 the High Court under writ jurisdiction. The High Court, with great respect, fell into a manifest error by not appreciating this aspect of the matter. It has however dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.

76 dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative, efficacious statutory remedy, being available to the petitioners under the provisions of Section 51 of The Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The dismissal of the writ petitions is subject to the orders below.

77 would not empower the State Commission to pass orders in that regard. The issue regarding deposit requires to be worked out by the parties before this Court alone and it could not have been the subject matter of the complaint. In that view of the matter, the direction directing the respondents to refund the amount in deposit in so far as the respondents No.1 and 2 is concerned is set aside and liberty is reserved to the parties to work out their remedies before this Court.

78 down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the ruling reported in 2021 SCC onLine SC 884 in the case of Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and others vs. Commercial Steel Ltd., the second writ petition requires to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The order impugned directing refund of deposit is set aside.

79 they shall not precipitate the execution proceedings before the State Commission for a period of two weeks from today.

In view of disposal of the writ petitions, the pending applications, if any, do not survive for consideration.

Sd/- JUDGE

Sd/- JUDGE

ykl CT-HR