Gujarat High Court Judgments — 2021

The High Court chose not to exercise its writ jurisdiction in this instance. While acknowledging the petitioner's reliance on cases like Morbi Plot Jain Tapgachh Sangh, where a fresh certificate was directed to be issued due to loss of documents in a flood, the Court noted that such "special circumstances" were not present here. The Court also distinguished the Dawoodi Bohra Masjid case, where the revenue had challenged the ITAT's order. The Court observed that the petitioner had already pursued the channel of making an application under the RTI Act. Instead of exhausting the appellate remedies under the RTI Act, the petitioner approached the High Court. Therefore, the application before the High Court was not entertained. The petition was disposed of, with a direction that the disposal would not prejudice the petitioner's rights. The Court implicitly suggested that the petitioner should pursue the RTI appellate authority for redressal.

The High Court held that the order disposing of objections by the Assessing Officer was not a speaking order and lacked proper application of mind, failing to deal with the specific contentions raised by the petitioner. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in GKN Driveshafts (INDIA) Ltd. and its own decision in Ashish Bohra, emphasizing that disposing of objections is not a mere formality. The Court also cited the Supreme Court's observations on writing judgments in Shakuntala Shukla, stressing the need for clarity, logical reasoning, and addressing all points. Consequently, the Court quashed and set aside the order disposing of objections dated July 27, 2021, and the subsequent assessment order dated September 28, 2021. The Court directed the Assessing Officer to pass a speaking order dealing with the petitioner's objections within two weeks. The merits of the reopening were not examined. The reassessment proceedings were to be completed within four weeks thereafter, subject to further directions.

The High Court granted permission to withdraw the petition. The court explicitly stated that it was not entering into the merits of the matter. The operative direction was that the present petition stands disposed of as withdrawn. No specific finding was given on the validity of the Section 148 notice or the objections raised by the petitioner. The issue of whether the reopening was validly initiated was left undecided as the petition was withdrawn.

The High Court allowed the petition, quashing the assessment order dated May 4, 2021. The Court held that the petitioner should be permitted to file the revised return. The Court reasoned that the delay in filing the revised return was a direct consequence of the time taken to obtain the NCLT order sanctioning the demerger, which was effective retrospectively. This situation falls outside the purview of Section 139(5) of the Act, as the delay was not due to an omission or wrong statement by the assessee but due to a procedural necessity. The Court emphasized the Supreme Court's decision in Dalmia Power Limited, stating that Section 119 of the Act would not be applicable in such circumstances, and the respondent authority should have permitted the revised return. The Court directed that the petitioner be allowed to file the revised return electronically within two weeks, or if not possible, the physically filed copy should be considered. The Court also commented on the need for the Income Tax Department to improvise its software to accommodate such situations arising from statutory orders.

The High Court allowed the petition. It held that the petitioner was entitled to file a revised return considering the NCLT order sanctioning the demerger with a retrospective appointed date of April 1, 2017. The Court noted that the time limit under Section 139(5) had expired by the time the NCLT order was received, making it impossible for the petitioner to file electronically within the prescribed period. The Court relied on the decision in Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax & Others Vs. Babubhai Ramanbhai Patel, stating that the original return would become insignificant. The Court quashed the assessment order and directed the respondent to process the revised return. If the revised return was not filed electronically, the petitioner was to be permitted to do so within one week, or the physically filed copy would be considered. The Court also commented on the limitations of the electronic filing software and the need for improvisation to avoid such litigation.

The High Court allowed the petition, quashing the rejection order dated March 30, 2021. The Court held that when an appellate authority condones the delay in filing an appeal, it relates back to the original date of filing, effectively meaning the appeal was filed within the statutory period. This principle, coupled with the fact that the petitioner's declaration was filed after the delay was condoned and before the declaration deadline expired, meant the petitioner was an 'appellant' whose appeal was pending as on January 31, 2020. The Court emphasized that the ITAT's order condoning the delay on February 23, 2021, did not hamper the petitioner's path to being considered under the VsV Act. Consequently, the petitioner is entitled to participate in the VsV Scheme, and his declaration is to be accepted by the respondent within three days of the order. The respondent is directed to permit all consequential procedural actions.

The High Court held that the petitioner qualifies as an 'appellant' under Section 2(1)(a)(ii) of the VSV Act. The Court reasoned that the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the High Court, as per Section 260(A)(2)(a) of the IT Act, commences from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the ITAT order. Since the certified copy was received in December 2020, and the appeal was filed on 30.10.2020, the period of 120 days had not expired on the specified date of 31.01.2020. The Court found that the respondent authority had failed to apply its mind to the provisions of Section 2(1)(a)(ii) of the VSV Act read with Section 260(A)(2)(a) of the IT Act. The rejection of the petitioner's declaration forms was quashed and set aside. The respondent was directed to accept the petitioner's declaration within three days of the order, and the petitioner was to comply with the payment requirements by 30.09.2021.

The High Court heard the learned advocate for the petitioner, who took the Court through the material on record and the relevant provisions of law and authorities. When the Court indicated it was disinclined to grant indulgence, the learned advocate, on instructions, sought withdrawal of the petition. Consequently, the petition was disposed of as withdrawn without entering into the merits of the matter. The rights of the parties to raise all issues before the appropriate authority were kept open. No specific finding was given on any of the issues raised by the petitioner.

The High Court, after hearing both sides and examining the material on record, including calling for details of the FIR filed by the CBI, indicated its disinclination to entertain the petition. Consequently, on instructions from the learned advocate for the petitioner, the petition was withdrawn. The Court disposed of the petition as withdrawn, discharged the notice, and vacated the interim relief. No specific finding was rendered on the merits of the reopening notice or the objections filed by the assessee. The ratio decidendi would pertain to the procedural aspect of withdrawal of a writ petition before a final decision on merits.

The High Court held that the order passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 264 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, rejecting the revision application on the ground of delay was not justifiable. The Court noted that Form 10CCB was filed by the petitioner before the assessment was finalized, and therefore, the order sustaining the rejection on the ground of delay was not sustainable. The Court emphasized that furnishing of Form 10CCB is a procedural requirement and need not be done along with the return, especially when it is filed prior to the completion of assessment. The Court found that technicalities should not obstruct substantial justice. Consequently, the impugned order dated March 19, 2021, was quashed. The Court directed the concerned authority to consider the petitioner's claim for exemption under Section 80IC on merits and pass consequential orders. The demand notice under Section 156 was suspended until the claim was determined. Liberty was granted to the petitioner to make a fresh application.

The High Court held that no penalty can be levied in the present circumstances. The survey took place on January 9, 2013, and the return for Assessment Year 2013-2014 was filed on September 29, 2013, approximately eight months later. Crucially, the books of account were not closed, and it was not a case of a revised return being filed. The Assessing Officer had not made any addition to the income as the Rs. 3.80 crore had already been declared in the return. Both the CIT(Appeals) and the ITAT correctly followed the decision of this Court in PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-3 vs. R UMEDBHAI JEWELLERS PVT. LTD. In that case, the Court held that penalty could not be imposed when the assessee, in its first year of operation, admitted certain income before the due date for filing the return and made a matching disclosure in the return, with no addition made by the Assessing Officer. The facts of the present case, where the return was filed after the survey and the books were not closed, align with this precedent, leading to the conclusion that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was not sustainable.

The High Court held that the ITAT, as a final fact-finding tribunal, had arrived at its conclusions after due consideration of the evidence. The Court noted the concurrent findings of both the CIT(Appeals) and the ITAT. The CIT(Appeals) had deleted the additions, finding that the assessee had discharged its primary onus by submitting supporting documents like confirmations, bank statements, and returns of income. The CIT(Appeals) also observed that the AO had not conducted further inquiries under Section 133(6) to verify the lenders' capacity. The ITAT concurred with this view, finding no reason to interfere with the CIT(Appeals)'s well-reasoned findings and noting the absence of any incriminating evidence in subsequent assessment orders of the creditors. The Court reiterated that all ingredients contemplated under Section 68, namely, identity of creditors, genuineness of transactions, and their creditworthiness, had been duly satisfied. Therefore, the Tax Appeal was dismissed.

The High Court, without entering into the merits of the case and keeping the legal issues alive for decision in an appropriate case, dismissed and disposed of the Tax Appeal solely on the ground of the monetary aspect. The Court noted that the tax effect involved in the appeal for Assessment Year 2002-2003 was Nil. Therefore, the appeal was not decided on the substantial questions of law raised, but rather on the procedural ground of insignificant tax effect. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal.

The High Court, without entering into the merits of the case, dismissed the Tax Appeal. The decision to dismiss was based solely on the monetary aspect of the appeal, specifically the tax effect of Rs.2805/- for Assessment Year 2001-2002. The Court stated that it was keeping the legal issue alive to be decided in an appropriate case. Therefore, no finding was given on the substantial questions of law regarding the deletion of the addition on account of non-operative finance or the reliance on the quashed ITAT order. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal and dispose of it on the ground of monetary aspect.

The High Court dismissed the Tax Appeal, disposing of it solely on the ground of the monetary aspect, without entering into the merits of the legal issues. The Court noted that the very issues of addition on account of non-operative finance and revelation of various cases under the Negotiable Instruments Act were challenged in other appeals. The tax effect involved in the appeal for Assessment Year 2000-2001 was Rs.1028/-. The Court stated that it was keeping the legal issue alive to be decided in an appropriate case. Therefore, no finding was given on the substantial questions of law raised by the revenue. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal.

The High Court, without entering into the merits of the case and keeping the legal issues alive for decision in an appropriate case, dismissed the Tax Appeal. The dismissal was solely on the ground of the monetary aspect, referencing CBDT Circular No.17 of 2019 dated 09.08.2019. The Court noted that the tax effect involved in the appeal for Assessment Year 1999-2000 was Rs.2,127/-. Therefore, the ITAT's order was not adjudicated on its substance, and no finding was given on the specific issues raised by the Revenue regarding the deletion of the addition for non-operative finance or the reliance on the quashed ITAT decision. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.

The High Court held that there was tangible material before the Assessing Officer (AO) to initiate proceedings under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found that the applicants failed to submit crucial documents like their stock register at the time of filing objections and petitions, submitting it only later with an affidavit in rejoinder without adequate explanation. Upon examination of the submitted documents, the Court noted several suspicious aspects, including the entry of gifted stock on 10.04.2014 with no opening balance of stock prior to that date, the absence of gift entries in the balance sheet, and suspicious annual VAT returns with no monthly sales reflected. The Court also noted that the applicants failed to show they were traders in gold and gold ornaments in preceding years. The Court concluded that the AO had a valid reason to believe that income had escaped assessment, citing the Apex Court's decisions in Central Provinces Manganese Ore Company Ltd. and Rajesh Jhaveri. The Court found that the AO had applied their mind to the relevant facts and was justified in reopening the assessment. Therefore, the impugned notices were held to be not without jurisdiction. The writ applications were rejected.

The High Court held that there was tangible material before the Assessing Officer (AO) to initiate proceedings under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found that the applicants failed to submit crucial documents like their stock register at the time of filing objections and petitions, submitting it only later with an affidavit in rejoinder without adequate explanation. Upon examination of the submitted documents, the Court noted several suspicious aspects, including the entry of gifted stock on 10.04.2014 with no opening balance of stock prior to that date, the absence of gift entries in the balance sheet, and suspicious annual VAT returns with no monthly sales reflected. The Court also noted that the applicants failed to show they were traders in gold and gold ornaments in preceding years. The Court concluded that the AO had a valid reason to believe that income had escaped assessment, citing the Apex Court's decisions in Central Provinces Manganese Ore Company Ltd. and Rajesh Jhaveri. The Court found that the AO had applied their mind to the relevant facts and was justified in reopening the assessment. Therefore, the impugned notices were held to be not without jurisdiction. The writ applications were rejected.

The High Court allowed the writ application, setting aside the impugned order dated July 12, 2019, passed by Respondent No. 2 to the extent it imposed the condition of adjusting future refunds. The Court granted an unconditional stay of the demand against the application filed by the writ applicants dated July 10, 2019, pending the final disposal of the appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The intimations dated July 22, 2019, were also quashed and set aside. The Court further requested the ITAT to dispose of the pending appeal within two months. The reasoning was based on the discretion available under Section 220(6) of the Income Tax Act and the principles outlined in the Office Memorandum dated February 29, 2016, particularly concerning the grant of stay when the demand is disputed. The Court found that the condition of unlimited adjustment of future refunds was not justified in the circumstances.

The High Court held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for reopening the assessment for AY 2012-13 was justified. The Court found a direct nexus and live link between the material that came to the notice of the Assessing Officer and the formation of his belief that income had escaped assessment. This belief was based on tangible material unearthed by the Investigation Wing, which indicated that the assessee was a provider of accommodation entries and had not disclosed commission income ranging from 0.5% to 1%. The Court noted that the petitioner had disclosed a meager income of Rs. 1,42,694/- despite a huge turnover of Rs. 24,10,82,501/- in her audited books of account for AY 2012-13. The Court distinguished the petitioner's reliance on cases dealing with change of opinion, stating that in this instance, the Assessing Officer had acted based on new, tangible material received from an investigation, which prima facie discredited the genuineness of the particulars furnished during the original assessment. The Court concluded that the formation of belief by the Assessing Officer was justified, and therefore, the petition failed.

The High Court allowed the writ application, quashing the reference made by the Revenue to the TPO under Section 92CA(1) and the notice dated 20th December 2019 issued by the TPO under Sections 92CA(2) and 92D(3). The Court found substance in the assessee's contention that the Assessing Officer (AO) overlooked the jurisdictional requirement of recording satisfaction that there ought to be an income or potential of an income arising or being affected by the determination of the ALP of an international transaction. The Court noted that this specific plea was taken in the objections but was not addressed in the order disposing of the objections. The Court reiterated the principle that tax can be charged only on income, and in the absence of income arising, the issue of applying ALP to the transactional value itself does not arise. If income is noticed and chargeable to tax under normal provisions, then Chapter X of the Act could be invoked. The proceedings were remitted to the AO for fresh consideration, with a direction to provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee and pass a reasoned order dealing with the objections in accordance with law within four weeks.

The High Court held that the Assessing Officer does possess the jurisdiction to issue directions for a special audit under Section 142(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found that the impugned directions did not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. It reasoned that even if a few queries out of a larger set were found to be unwarranted, as argued by the assessee, this would not render the entire order directing the special audit a nullity. The Court distinguished between orders that are null and void (lacking inherent jurisdiction) and those that are irregular, wrong, or illegal (exercise of jurisdiction in a wrongful manner), citing *Deepak Agro Foods vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.*. Therefore, the petitions were dismissed as devoid of merits. Additionally, the Court directed that the period during which the petitions remained pending in the High Court, from the date of issuance of notice (14.6.2021) until the pronouncement of the judgment, shall be excluded while counting the period prescribed under Section 142(2C) of the Act, as per the ratio in *VLS Finance Ltd. & Anr. Vs. CIT & Anr.*. The interim relief was extended until 7.9.2021 to enable the petitioners to approach a higher forum.

The High Court held that the Assessing Officer does possess the jurisdiction to issue directions for a special audit under Section 142(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found that the impugned directions did not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. It reasoned that even if a few queries out of a larger set were found to be unwarranted, as argued by the assessee, this would not render the entire order directing the special audit a nullity. The Court distinguished between orders that are null and void (lacking inherent jurisdiction) and those that are irregular, wrong, or illegal (exercise of jurisdiction in a wrongful manner), citing *Deepak Agro Foods vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.*. Therefore, the petitions were dismissed as devoid of merits. Additionally, the Court directed that the period during which the petitions remained pending in the High Court, from the date of issuance of notice (14.6.2021) until the pronouncement of the judgment, shall be excluded while counting the period prescribed under Section 142(2C) of the Act, as per the ratio in *VLS Finance Ltd. & Anr. Vs. CIT & Anr.*. The interim relief was extended until 7.9.2021 to enable the petitioners to approach a higher forum.

The High Court dismissed the petition. The Court reiterated the observation from Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. that at the time of recording reasons for reopening, there should be prima facie material, and the sufficiency or correctness of the material is not to be considered at that stage. The Court noted that the AO is not precluded from reopening an assessment based on fresh material discovered subsequently, as held in Ess Kay Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. Regarding the petitioner's reliance on United Electrical Company (P) Ltd., the Court found it not applicable as it was prior to the amendment. The Court observed that in the present case, a detailed investigation report, based on documentary evidence and statements of entry providers, indicated the petitioner was a beneficiary of accommodation entries, suggesting escaped income. Therefore, it could not be said that the reopening was based merely on a change of opinion. The Court distinguished the case from S.P. Agarwalla @ Sukhdeo by finding tangible material and established facts supporting the reopening. Similarly, Lakhmani Mewal Das was distinguished as the present case had tangible material, not vague or far-fetched information. The Court also noted that the CBDT letter regarding coercion was not applicable to the facts of the case. The Court concluded that the reopening was based on tangible material and dismissed the petition.

The High Court held that there was no substantial question of law involved in the appeals and dismissed them. The Court reasoned that Section 194H of the Income Tax Act, 1961, defines commission or brokerage to include payments received or receivable by a person acting on behalf of another for services rendered, *not being professional services*. The Explanation to Section 194H explicitly excludes services rendered in the course of carrying on a medical profession. Therefore, any payment received by a doctor for medical services is outside the purview of Section 194H. The Court found it difficult to accept the Revenue's submission that doctors acted as agents. It agreed with the Tribunal that doctors were not bound to prescribe specific medicines, and thus, no agency relationship existed. Consequently, Section 194H could not be invoked. The Court found no illegality or infirmity in the Tribunal's impugned order.

The High Court held that there was no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. The Court found no substantial question of law involved. The reasoning was based on the conjoint reading of Section 194H and its Explanation. The Explanation clarifies that 'commission or brokerage' includes payments received by a person acting on behalf of another for services rendered, not being 'professional services'. Medical services are explicitly mentioned as professional services in the Explanation. Therefore, payments received by doctors for their medical services would not fall under Section 194H. The Court agreed with the Tribunal that the doctors were not bound to prescribe the assessee's medicines, and thus, they could not be considered agents of the assessee. In the absence of an agency relationship, Section 194H could not be invoked. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that there was no substantial question of law involved in the appeals and dismissed them. The Court reasoned that Section 194H of the Income Tax Act, 1961, defines commission or brokerage to include payments received or receivable by a person acting on behalf of another for services rendered, *not being professional services*. The Explanation to Section 194H explicitly excludes services rendered in the course of carrying on a medical profession. Therefore, any payment received by a doctor for medical services is outside the purview of Section 194H. The Court found it difficult to accept the Revenue's submission that doctors acted as agents. It agreed with the Tribunal that doctors were not bound to prescribe specific medicines, and thus, no agency relationship existed. Consequently, Section 194H could not be invoked. The Court found no illegality or infirmity in the Tribunal's impugned order.

The High Court held that there was no substantial question of law involved in the appeals and dismissed them. The Court reasoned that Section 194H of the Income Tax Act, 1961, defines commission or brokerage to include payments received or receivable by a person acting on behalf of another for services rendered, *not being professional services*. The Explanation to Section 194H explicitly excludes services rendered in the course of carrying on a medical profession. Therefore, any payment received by a doctor for medical services is outside the purview of Section 194H. The Court found it difficult to accept the Revenue's submission that doctors acted as agents. It agreed with the Tribunal that doctors were not bound to prescribe specific medicines, and thus, no agency relationship existed. Consequently, Section 194H could not be invoked. The Court found no illegality or infirmity in the Tribunal's impugned order.

The High Court held that there was no substantial question of law involved in the appeals and dismissed them. The Court reasoned that Section 194H of the Income Tax Act, 1961, defines commission or brokerage to include payments received or receivable by a person acting on behalf of another for services rendered, *not being professional services*. The Explanation to Section 194H explicitly excludes services rendered in the course of carrying on a medical profession. Therefore, any payment received by a doctor for medical services is outside the purview of Section 194H. The Court found it difficult to accept the Revenue's submission that doctors acted as agents. It agreed with the Tribunal that doctors were not bound to prescribe specific medicines, and thus, no agency relationship existed. Consequently, Section 194H could not be invoked. The Court found no illegality or infirmity in the Tribunal's impugned order.

The High Court held that there was no substantial question of law involved in the appeals and dismissed them. The Court reasoned that Section 194H of the Income Tax Act, 1961, defines commission or brokerage to include payments received or receivable by a person acting on behalf of another for services rendered, *not being professional services*. The Explanation to Section 194H explicitly excludes services rendered in the course of carrying on a medical profession. Therefore, any payment received by a doctor for medical services is outside the purview of Section 194H. The Court found it difficult to accept the Revenue's submission that doctors acted as agents. It agreed with the Tribunal that doctors were not bound to prescribe specific medicines, and thus, no agency relationship existed. Consequently, Section 194H could not be invoked. The Court found no illegality or infirmity in the Tribunal's impugned order.

The High Court held that the notice dated March 27, 2019, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for reopening the assessment for AY 2013-14 was valid and justified. The Court reasoned that at the stage of issuing a notice under Section 148, the Assessing Officer (AO) only needs to have a 'reason to believe' that income has escaped assessment, not to establish the fact of escapement. The information received from the Investigation Wing, Kolkata, regarding the petitioner being a beneficiary of accommodation entries from companies allegedly controlled by entry operators, constituted sufficient material for the AO to form a belief of escapement of income. The Court noted that the reopening was initiated after a period of four years, and the proper procedure, including obtaining specific approval from the competent authority, was observed. The Court relied on precedents like Aaspas Multimedia Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, emphasizing that the sufficiency or correctness of the material is not to be considered at this stage, and it is open for the assessee to prove the erroneousness of the assumptions during the assessment proceedings. The objections raised by the petitioner against the reopening were found to be without merit, and the order disposing of these objections was also deemed well-reasoned. Therefore, the petition was dismissed.

The High Court held that the petitioner qualifies as an 'appellant' under Section 2(i)(a) of The Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shatrusailya Digvijaysingh Jadeja, which held that for a scheme like this, the pendency of an appeal is sufficient, and it is not for the designated authority to determine if the appeal is valid or competent. The Court reasoned that the object of the Vivad se Vishwas Act is to settle disputes, and an appeal does not cease to be an appeal merely because it is irregular or incompetent, or because the delay in filing it has not been condoned. The rejection of the declaration solely on the ground of delay in filing the appeal, without condonation, was therefore incorrect. The impugned communication rejecting the declaration was quashed and set aside, and the respondent was directed to accept the declaration if otherwise valid.

The High Court did not enter into the merits of the case. It noted that the objections filed by petitioner No. 2, Bharat Shah, were still pending before the concerned Assessing Officer. Without deciding the preliminary objection regarding maintainability, the Court directed the concerned respondent (Assessing Officer) to decide the objections filed by petitioner No. 2 in accordance with law. The Court also directed that the order on the objections be communicated to the petitioner. The petition was disposed of subject to this direction. No specific finding was given on the maintainability of the petition.

The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Assessing Officer had valid reasons to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. The Court found that the reopening was based on tangible information received from the Investigation Wing, which indicated that the petitioner was a beneficiary of accommodation entries to the tune of Rs. 1,06,16,632/- and that the sales transactions were not genuine. The Court distinguished the present case from the precedents cited by the petitioner, stating that in this instance, there was a rational connection between the information received and the belief of escapement of income. The Court reiterated that the sufficiency or correctness of the material is not to be considered at the stage of issuing a notice for reopening, and it is open to the assessee to prove otherwise during the assessment proceedings. Therefore, the impugned notice was considered justified and valid in the eyes of the law.

The Court held that the Assessing Officer (AO) could assume jurisdiction under Section 147/148 based on subsequent reliable and creditworthy information from investigating wings, even if it unearths bogus transactions or accommodation entries. The Court found no substance in the petitioner's submission that the reopening was impermissible. Mere production of books of accounts or documents during the original assessment did not amount to a full and true disclosure, especially when subsequent credible information indicated the petitioner was a beneficiary of accommodation entries. The Court cited *Phool Chand Bajrang Lal vs. Income Tax Officer* (1993 203 ITR 456 (SC)) to emphasize that acquiring fresh, specific, and reliable information exposing the falsity of the assessee's statement at the time of original assessment allows for reopening, even if the transaction was initially disclosed. The Court also referred to *Ess Kay Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax* (247 ITR 818 (SC)) stating that an AO is not precluded from reopening an earlier year's assessment based on fresh material discovered subsequently. The Court noted that the petitioner's contention about Jignesh Shah's lack of interest in Arihant Enterprise Ltd. at the relevant time was raised for the first time in the rejoinder affidavit and was not raised in the objections. Furthermore, the petitioner's failure to respond to the Section 133(6) notice was also considered. The Court found the AO's order rejecting objections to be just and proper.

The High Court held that the Assessing Officer had valid reasons to believe that income had escaped assessment, justifying the reopening of the assessment. The Court found that the Assessing Officer's belief was based on inquiries and investigations by the Investigation Wing, Kolkata, which suggested that the investor companies were not in existence or were bogus. The Court noted that the reasons for the belief had a rational connection to the formation of the belief that income had escaped assessment due to the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The Court distinguished the case from Ayachi Chandrashekhar Narsangji (supra) by observing that in the present case, the department had found the investor companies to be shell/paper companies, unlike the repayment of loan scenario in the cited case. The Court also emphasized that at the stage of recording reasons for reopening, the sufficiency or correctness of the material is not to be gone into, and it is open for the assessee to prove the erroneousness of the assumed facts during the assessment proceedings. The Court found that the procedure for reopening was substantially complied with, including obtaining necessary approvals, and the order rejecting the assessee's objections was well-reasoned. Therefore, the petition was dismissed.

The High Court held that it should be loath to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 when a statutory alternative remedy is available. The Income Tax Act provides a complete machinery for challenging assessment orders, and therefore, the petitioner should have availed the appellate remedy. The Court noted that the Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada and Others v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited emphasized the importance of exhausting alternative remedies. Regarding the merits, the Court observed that the AO had followed due procedure and passed a speaking order. While the petitioner claimed a violation of natural justice due to an unconsidered adjournment request, the Court noted the revenue's contention that the request was received after the order was passed. Even if an irregularity occurred, it would not warrant interference under Article 226 when an efficacious alternative remedy exists. The Court also addressed the 'change of opinion' argument, referencing Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Kelvinator India Limited. It clarified that post-April 1, 1989, reopening is permissible if there is tangible material indicating escapement of income, which has a live link with the belief. In this case, the revenue pointed to non-deduction of TDS as per Annexure 6 of Form 3CD, which was not considered during the original assessment. Therefore, considering this material was not a change of opinion but a valid basis for reopening. The petition was dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy.

The High Court held that the petition fails and is dismissed. The Court found that the assessing authority had a 'reason to believe' that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. The information received from the DGIT (Investigation) on March 26, 2015, indicating the petitioner's beneficiary status in entry operations, was considered justifiable material to form this belief. The Court noted that the assessing authority's function at this stage is to administer the statute and form a belief, not to establish the fact of escapement. Even if scrutiny assessment was undertaken, if substantial new material is found, reopening is permissible. The Court distinguished the case of GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. by stating that the department had not considered the petitioner's objections because the petitioner failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The Court found that the reasons for the formation of belief by the Assessing Officer had a rational connection with the belief that income had escaped assessment due to the petitioner's failure to disclose material facts. The rejection order of the petitioner's objections was also deemed well-reasoned. Therefore, no interference was called for under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Tribunal held that the Petitioner qualified as an 'appellant' under Section 2(i)(a) of The Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020. The Court reasoned that the object of the Act was to settle disputes, and the definition of 'appellant' includes a person whose appeal is pending before an appellate forum on the specified date. The judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shatrusailya Digvijaysingh Jadeja was relied upon, which held that the declarant authority should not determine if an appeal is 'sham', 'ineffective', or 'infructuous'. The Supreme Court's observation in Raja Kulkarni v. The State of Bombay was also cited, stating that when a section contemplates the pendency of an appeal, it is sufficient if an appeal is pending, and its validity or competence is for the appellate court to decide. Therefore, the Respondent could not reject the declaration solely on the ground that the appeal was irregular or incompetent due to un-condoned delay. The impugned communication rejecting the declaration was quashed and set aside, and the Respondent was directed to accept the declaration if otherwise valid.

The High Court noted that the petitioner's return of income had already been processed by the Centralized Processing Centre on February 23, 2021, and an intimation had been sent. In light of this, the Court found that the petitioner's grievance regarding the validity of the return did not survive. Although the petitioner's counsel pointed out portal issues causing the return to be displayed as 'invalid', the primary fact of processing was accepted. The petition was therefore disposed of. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to revive the petition in case of future difficulty. No specific finding was made on the portal issue itself, as the petition was disposed of based on the processing of the return.

The High Court observed that the Standing Counsel for the respondent had stated that the objections filed by the petitioner had not been dealt with and were pending. Under these circumstances, the Court directed the respondents to take into consideration the objections filed by the petitioner before proceeding further with the reassessment proceedings. The petition was disposed of subject to this direction. The Court did not decide on the merits of the objections themselves or the validity of the reopening notice, but rather on the procedural lapse of not addressing the objections first. The ratio decidendi is that a taxpayer's objections to reopening proceedings must be considered before further steps are taken in the reassessment.

The High Court of Gujarat held that the petitioner's grievance did not survive in view of the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent, which confirmed that the petitioner's return of income had already been processed and an intimation had been sent. The Court noted that the learned counsel for the petitioner did not dispute this fact. Therefore, the petition was disposed of. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to revive the petition in case of any difficulty, implying that the formal processing of the return addressed the core issue raised.

The High Court held that the petitioner's submissions lacked substance. It was noted that the petitioner did not raise any objection regarding the non-grant of interest under Section 38(2) of the Act after the appeals were disposed of. Crucially, the orders passed in appeals for all three assessment years were subsequently taken into revision by the Additional Commissioner (Investigation) under Section 75 of the Act. This revisionary order imposed an additional liability on the petitioner to pay tax and interest. The petitioner, availing of an Amnesty Scheme, paid the tax amount and was granted remission for the interest. The court reasoned that since the appellate order was revised, and the petitioner was found liable to pay additional tax and interest, the question of invoking Section 38(2) for refund interest did not arise. The petitioner was not entitled to any refund by virtue of the revisionary orders; rather, they were liable to pay. Therefore, the invocation of Section 38(2) was considered misplaced. The petitions were dismissed.

The High Court held that the petitioner's submissions lacked substance. It was noted that the petitioner did not raise any objection regarding the non-grant of interest under Section 38(2) of the Act after the appeals were disposed of. Crucially, the orders passed in appeals for all three assessment years were subsequently taken into revision by the Additional Commissioner (Investigation) under Section 75 of the Act. This revisionary order imposed an additional liability on the petitioner to pay tax and interest. The petitioner, availing of an Amnesty Scheme, paid the tax amount and was granted remission for the interest. The court reasoned that since the appellate order was revised, and the petitioner was found liable to pay additional tax and interest, the question of invoking Section 38(2) for refund interest did not arise. The petitioner was not entitled to any refund by virtue of the revisionary orders; rather, they were liable to pay. Therefore, the invocation of Section 38(2) was considered misplaced. The petitions were dismissed.

The High Court held that the petitioner's submissions lacked substance. It was noted that the petitioner did not raise any objection regarding the non-grant of interest under Section 38(2) of the Act after the appeals were disposed of. Crucially, the orders passed in appeals for all three assessment years were subsequently taken into revision by the Additional Commissioner (Investigation) under Section 75 of the Act. This revisionary order imposed an additional liability on the petitioner to pay tax and interest. The petitioner, availing of an Amnesty Scheme, paid the tax amount and was granted remission for the interest. The court reasoned that since the appellate order was revised, and the petitioner was found liable to pay additional tax and interest, the question of invoking Section 38(2) for refund interest did not arise. The petitioner was not entitled to any refund by virtue of the revisionary orders; rather, they were liable to pay. Therefore, the invocation of Section 38(2) was considered misplaced. The petitions were dismissed.

The High Court dismissed the Special Civil Application filed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court stated that it had previously dealt with the common order dated 09.09.2020, which was impugned in the present petition, in Special Civil Application No. 7520 of 2021. In that earlier case, the Court had dismissed the petition by passing a detailed order on 24.06.2021. To avoid duplication, the present petition was also dismissed in terms of the said order dated 24.06.2021. Therefore, the petition stood dismissed accordingly. The judgment does not delve into the merits of the ITAT's order or provide any specific reasoning beyond referencing the prior decision. No issue was left undecided.

The High Court dismissed the Special Civil Application filed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court's decision was based on its previous order dated 24.06.2021 in Special Civil Application No. 7520 of 2021, which had also challenged the same ITAT order dated 09.09.2020. The Court found no reason to deviate from its prior decision and therefore dismissed the present petition to avoid duplication. The specific grounds or reasoning behind the ITAT's order dated 09.09.2020, or the merits of the original appeal, were not discussed or decided in this High Court judgment. The operative direction was the dismissal of the petition.

The High Court held that it had previously dealt with the common order dated 09.09.2020, which was impugned in the present petition. In a prior Special Civil Application (No. 7520 of 2021), the Court had dismissed the petition by passing a detailed order on 24.06.2021. Therefore, to avoid duplication, the present petition was also dismissed in terms of the said order dated 24.06.2021. The reasoning for dismissal was based on the precedent set by the earlier judgment concerning the same ITAT order. No specific findings were made on the merits of the ITAT's order itself, as the dismissal was procedural, following a prior decision.

The High Court held that the present Special Civil Application should be dismissed. This decision was based on the fact that the court had already dealt with the common order dated 09.09.2020, passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, in a previous petition (Special Civil Application No. 7520 of 2021). The earlier petition was dismissed by a detailed order on 24.06.2021. Therefore, to avoid duplication, the present petition was dismissed in terms of the order passed in the earlier case. The ratio decidendi is that if a High Court has already ruled on a specific order of the ITAT in a prior writ petition, subsequent identical petitions challenging the same order will be dismissed on the same grounds, following the principle of judicial precedent and avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.

The Gujarat High Court held that it was not inclined to entertain the present Special Civil Application at this juncture. The court reasoned that since the Assessing Officer had already passed an assessment order dated May 16, 2021, for the Assessment Year 2012-13, the proper course for the petitioner would be to challenge this order by filing an appeal as permitted under the Income Tax Act. The court explicitly stated that it had not gone into the merits of the case. It clarified that the petitioner would be at liberty to raise all issues and contentions raised in the present petition in the appeal that may be filed, provided it is legally permissible. The petition was dismissed with this liberty granted.