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544 orders · Page 9 of 11
The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the addition made by the AO. The High Court found that the documents lacked particulars of any person or nature of transaction, and without tangible material, the addition could not be sustained.
The High Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was not legally justified in adjourning the petitioner's appeal sine-die simply because the High Court had admitted an appeal in a similar case and framed substantial questions of law. The Court noted that the High Court's order admitting the appeal did not stay the effect or operation of the ITAT's order. Therefore, the ITAT ought not to have adjourned the matter sine-die, especially when the stay petition had been rejected. If the Tribunal chose not to decide on merits, it should have protected the interest of the assessee. The Court found that such an approach by the ITAT aggravated the petitioner-Trust's grievance and led to a sheer wastage of time and energy for all parties involved. Consequently, the High Court set aside the ITAT's order dated January 19, 2026, to the extent it adjourned the case sine-die. The ITAT was directed to decide the appeal in accordance with the law within two months from March 10, 2026. The Court explicitly stated that no observations or findings were made on the merits of the case.
The High Court found that the Competent Authority had not provided any sustainable reasons for issuing the tax withholding certificate at 10%. The authority was expected to elaborate on the nature of the transaction, record a prima-facie opinion, and address the petitioner's contentions and relied-upon judgments. Considering that a significant portion of the assessment year had passed and payments were subjected to 10% tax, despite the transactions prima facie appearing not exigible to tax, the Court deemed it appropriate to direct the issuance of a certificate for deduction at 2%. This was to address the Revenue's concern about potential scrutiny assessment while providing some relief to the petitioner. The order applies to the certificate for AY 2026-27 (FY 2025-26), and for subsequent years, the Competent Authority must consider applications expeditiously in accordance with the law.
The Delhi High Court held that all the substantial questions of law raised in the appeal stood decided against the appellant based on prior judgments. Specifically, questions A to F were decided against the appellant in ITA 491/2019, and questions G to I were covered by the decision in Writ Petition no. 6494/2019. Both these judgments were pronounced on 19.09.2024. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. The Court explicitly stated that the disposal of this appeal would not influence the decision on a miscellaneous application filed by the appellant concerning interest under Section 234B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as this specific question was not decided in the present appeal. The ratio decidendi is that an appeal will be dismissed if all its substantial questions of law have been decided against the appellant in previous, binding judgments.
The High Court condoned the delay in refiling the appeal, noting it was procedural. The court then dismissed the appeal as the issue was covered by a previous judgment of the same court, with a clarification that the order would abide by any Supreme Court decision.
The Tribunal decided that the appeal filed by the Revenue was to be dismissed. The reasoning was based on the submission made by the Revenue's counsel that the tax effect in the appeal was below the monetary limits prescribed by CBDT Circular No. 5/2024 and Circular No. 9/2024. The Tribunal accepted this submission and consequently dismissed the appeal. The ratio decidendi is that appeals with a tax effect below the prescribed monetary limits, as per CBDT circulars, are to be dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Delhi High Court held that even if the impugned order were set aside and the matter decided in favor of the petitioner, no practical relief would accrue to the assessee because the relevant financial year (2024-25) had already concluded. Therefore, the Court found no fruitful purpose in undertaking the exercise of deciding the petition on merits and brought the proceedings to a close. The Court disposed of the writ petition as infructuous. It clarified that the petitioner is free to file applications under Section 197 for subsequent years if advised, and any such application should be decided by the Competent Authority in accordance with law, without being influenced by the previous order. If any subsequent order is prejudicial to the petitioner, they are free to pursue legal remedies.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order and certificate issued by the Assessing Officer (AO) under Section 197 of the Act were unsustainable. The Tribunal noted that the AO had not considered the binding judgment of this Court in the petitioner's own case, PGS Exploration (Norway) AS v. Additional Director of Income Tax, which held that 2D/3D seismic survey activities are not FTS. Furthermore, the AO provided no reasoning for classifying the receipts as Royalty, nor did it explain the deviation from the previous year's assessment where the income was treated under Section 44BB. The Tribunal found that the AO's conclusion regarding FTS could not be sustained in light of the previous High Court ruling. Regarding Royalty, the Tribunal observed that while the Revenue raised this point in written submissions, the AO's order lacked any reasoning to support this classification. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and certificate and remanded the matter back to the AO to reconsider the law laid down by the Supreme Court in ONGC v. CIT and this Court in PGS Exploration (Norway) AS, as well as the issue of Royalty, and pass a fresh order within three weeks.
The High Court admitted the appeals and framed substantial questions of law. It questioned whether the ITAT was justified in allowing the appeal without considering the seized cheque books and statements recorded under Section 132(4).
The High Court admitted the appeals, framing substantial questions of law regarding the ITAT's decision to allow the appeal without sufficient incriminating material, especially given the possession of cheque books. It also questioned the ITAT's appreciation of statements recorded under Section 132(4) linked to post-search proceedings.
The High Court dismissed the appeals for want of prosecution. The reasoning was based on the consistent absence of the appellant on multiple hearing dates and the fact that the court notice sent to the appellant was returned unserved, with the postal endorsement indicating that no such firm/company/office existed at the provided address. The Court concluded that these circumstances demonstrated the appellant's lack of interest in pursuing the present appeals. No decision was made on the merits of the case.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeals for want of prosecution. The Court noted that nobody appeared on behalf of the appellant, M/s Sawhney Export House, on the current date of hearing, nor on the previous date. Furthermore, the court notice sent to the appellant was returned unserved with a note stating that no such firm, company, or office exists at the given address. Based on these observations, the Court concluded that the appellant had lost its interest in pursuing the present appeals. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed solely on the ground of non-prosecution, without any decision on the merits of the case.
The High Court held that the Tribunal should not have dismissed the appeal solely on the grounds of low tax effect. The court found that the case clearly fell within the exception provided in the circular for matters originating from SFIO information.
The High Court held that the appellant had lost interest in pursuing the present appeals. This conclusion was reached based on two primary observations: firstly, the consistent absence of any representative for the appellant on multiple hearing dates, including the current and previous dates. Secondly, the court noted that the official court notices sent to the appellant's registered address were returned unserved, with a specific endorsement indicating that no such firm, company, or office existed at the given location. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed for want of prosecution. The court did not delve into the merits of the substantive tax issues, if any, as the dismissal was purely procedural.
The High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the impugned order and certificate dated 25.09.2025. The Court directed the competent authority to issue a certificate at a NIL rate within seven days. The Court reasoned that the primary justification for issuing the certificate at 0.1% was the alleged outstanding demand for assessment years 2013-14 to 2016-17, which was found to be factually incorrect. The Court noted that the impugned order itself observed that airline operations are not exigible to tax, except for ground handling and engineering services. The Court found it unsustainable that a 0.1% certificate was issued for a small portion of transactions when NIL rate certificates had been issued for sixteen years and for a larger portion of the current financial year. This inconsistency reflected a non-application of mind and an unhealthy bureaucratic approach. The Court also directed the competent authority to continue issuing NIL rate certificates for income from airline operations within thirty days of application or by 15.05.2026, unless there is a change in law or the nature of transactions.
The High Court condoned the delay of 780 days in refiling the appeal, accepting the reasons stated in the application filed by the appellant. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. The reasoning for dismissal was based solely on the submission by the learned counsel for the appellant that the tax effect in the appeal fell below the limits prescribed by the CBDT Circulars No. 5/2024 and 9/2024. The High Court found this submission to be in order and proceeded to dismiss the appeal. No other issues were decided on merits. The ratio decidendi is that appeals with a tax effect below the prescribed monetary limits, as per CBDT circulars, are to be dismissed.
The High Court held that the petitioner is entitled to a certificate at a 'NIL' rate for the Matching Solution services, citing the previous order in Financial and Organisation Limited and the fact that the revenue did not dispute this aspect. The impugned order and certificate were set aside to this extent. For the Support Services, the Court noted that substantial part of the period was over and the amount involved (Rs. 67 lacs) was not substantial. Therefore, the Court left this issue to be decided at an appropriate stage or in an appropriate case, without pronouncing on the merits of the contentions of either party. The Court directed the competent authority to issue a certificate at NIL rate for Matching Solutions for the current and subsequent years, subject to the petitioner disclosing all facts and cooperating with any future inquiries regarding Permanent Establishment or taxability in India.
The High Court, considering the respondent's submission that the certificate was issued bonafidely under a misconception, chose not to impose heavy penalties but cautioned the respondent for future conduct. Instead of setting aside and remanding the matter for issuing a 'Nil' rate certificate, the Court ordered that the certificate dated 28.01.2026, issued at 5.25%, shall be treated as a certificate of 'Nil' rate. The competent authority was directed to issue an amended/rectified certificate of 'Nil' rate within seven days of furnishing a copy of this order. Additionally, the Court issued further directions: (i) the competent officer shall issue 'Nil' rate certificates for Financial Year 2025-26 (AY 2026-27) and subsequent years upon application, within 30 days, provided no new findings of PE are made; (ii) for subsequent years, the competent authority can record a finding of PE and taxability after issuing notice to the petitioner, but shall not be bound by the 'Nil' rate direction if such PE is established; and (iii) the petitioner must disclose all facts truthfully in applications and cooperate with any notices for subsequent years.
The High Court held that it would not interfere directly under its writ jurisdiction against the order of the appellate authority, as a remedy of appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is available to the petitioners. The Court reasoned that the statutory appellate mechanism is the appropriate forum to address grievances arising from such orders. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed. However, the Court granted a concession to the petitioners, directing that if they file an appeal before the Tribunal within four weeks from the date of the order, the Tribunal should appropriately consider the time spent between the filing of the writ petition (10.01.2026) and the filing of the appeal. No specific finding was given on the substantive issue of the assessment order being passed against a deceased assessee.
The High Court held that in view of the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant (Revenue) that the tax effect in the instant appeal falls below the limits prescribed in CBDT Circular No. 5/2024 dated 15.03.2024 read with Circular No. 9/2024 dated 17.09.2024, the appeal is dismissed. The reasoning is based on the Revenue's own submission that the appeal does not meet the threshold for litigation as per the circulars. The ratio decidendi is that appeals filed by the Revenue, where the tax effect is below the prescribed monetary limits as per extant CBDT circulars, are liable to be dismissed. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeal along with pending applications.
The Delhi High Court held that the notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated March 31, 2023, and the subsequent order under Section 148A(d) are barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that the original assessment for AY 2016-17 was completed under Section 143(3) on December 9, 2018. The petitioner had filed its return on October 8, 2016, and provided all necessary material for assessment. According to the first proviso to Section 147 and Section 149 of the Act, reassessment beyond four years from the end of the assessment year is permissible only if there was a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. Since the petitioner had disclosed all material facts, the extended period of six years for reopening was not available. The notice dated March 31, 2023, was issued beyond the four-year period from the end of AY 2016-17, making it barred by limitation. Therefore, the impugned notice and order were set aside, and the assessment proceedings were quashed. The Court also briefly addressed the issue of concurrent jurisdiction for issuing notices under Section 148, stating that both jurisdictional and faceless officers have concurrent jurisdiction, citing TKS Builders Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, but noted this was academic in light of the limitation issue.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged that appeals for AY 2011-12, AY 2014-15, and AY 2015-16 had been pending for over seven years. However, the Court declined to interfere with the calendar of the Appellate Authority, especially considering the pendency of MAP proceedings. The Court noted that without awareness of the overall pendency of the Appellate Authority relative to the number of authorities, it could not pass sweeping directions. Consequently, the Court granted the petitioner liberty to move an application for expeditious disposal of the appeals before the CIT(A) or a higher authority within the Income Tax Department. This application should highlight the urgency, and the concerned authorities are expected to take up the appeals for hearing in accordance with law and assigned priority. The Court did not decide on the merits of the appeals themselves.
The High Court held that the impugned proceedings are covered by the concession given by the Assistant Solicitor General in the case of Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal. Consequently, the impugned notice dated June 29, 2022, issued under Section 148 of the Act, and the orders dated June 29, 2022, along with prior and consequential proceedings, were quashed. The ratio decidendi is that if proceedings are time-barred as per a Supreme Court judgment and the Revenue concedes this position, the High Court will quash such proceedings. The writ petitions were allowed, and pending applications were disposed of.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged that appeals for AY 2011-12, AY 2014-15, and AY 2015-16 have been pending for over seven years. However, the Court declined to interfere with the appellate authority's calendar or issue sweeping directions, especially considering the pendency of MAP proceedings. The Court noted that without awareness of the appellate authority's pendency relative to the number of authorities, it could not pass such directions. Instead, the Court granted the petitioner liberty to move an application for expeditious disposal of the appeals before the CIT(A) or a higher authority within the Income Tax Department. Such an application should highlight the urgency and request the appeals to be taken up for hearing in accordance with law and assigned priority. The Court did not decide the merits of the appeals themselves.
The High Court held that while the petitioner committed a default in not uploading Form No. 67 by the due date, this technical or venial breach should not lead to the denial of its substantial right to claim Foreign Tax Credit (FTC) of Rs. 1,01,34,300/-. Such denial would amount to withholding a substantial amount without legal authority, leading to unjust enrichment. The Court referred to the case of Vijay Gupta v. Commissioner of Income Tax and Anr., stating that the Principal Commissioner has sufficient powers under Section 264 to consider applications in cases of assessee default, and such defaults could and should have been condoned. Although the Court could have remanded the matter back to the Commissioner for a fresh decision on the Section 264 application, it considered this an empty formality. Since the petitioner had subsequently furnished Form No. 67 on September 14, 2022, the Court, exercising its writ jurisdiction, directed the Assessing Officer (AO) to allow the FTC after verifying the facts in accordance with law. If the AO is of the view that FTC cannot be allowed, a speaking order must be passed, reserving the petitioner's right to pursue further remedies. The AO was directed to complete this exercise within two months. The writ petitions were allowed with identical directions for other connected matters.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged the long pendency of the appeals, noting that some had been pending for over seven years. However, the Court declined to issue sweeping directions to interfere with the calendar of the Appellate Authority, particularly in light of the pending MAP proceedings. The Court observed that without awareness of the overall pendency and the number of Appellate Authorities, it could not pass such orders. Instead, the Court granted the petitioner liberty to move an application for expeditious disposal of the appeals before the CIT(A) or a higher authority within the Income Tax Department. This application should highlight the urgency, and the authorities are expected to take up the appeals for hearing in accordance with law and assigned priority. The Court did not decide the merits of the appeals themselves.
The High Court condoned the delay, finding it bonafide under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The appeal was then dismissed as the issue had been decided by the same court in a previous judgment concerning the respondent's own case.
The Tribunal upheld the Assessing Officer's denial of deduction for duty drawback, citing Supreme Court precedents. However, the Court allowed the deduction of excise and customs duties paid on raw materials from the duty drawback received.
The Tribunal was not justified in directing the grant of registration without proper inquiry into the genuineness of the trust's activities. The matter should have been remanded to the Commissioner for a thorough examination.
The Tribunal held that the excise duty subsidy was a capital receipt, not taxable. The High Court agreed, finding no nexus to reduce it from the block of assets as it was reimbursement of duty paid, not directly linked to asset cost.
The Tribunal was not justified in directing the grant of registration without proper inquiry into the genuineness of the trust's activities. The matter should have been remanded to the Commissioner for a thorough examination.
The High Court condoned the delay, finding it to be bonafide under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The appeals were then dismissed as the issue had been decided by the same court in a previous judgment concerning the respondent.
The High Court condoned the delay of 1540 days in filing the appeals, finding it to be bonafide due to the appellant pursuing remedies before the Tribunal and the Court. The appeals were subsequently dismissed following a previous judgment of the High Court in the respondent's own case.
The High Court condoned the delay of 1540 days, finding it to be bonafide under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The appeals were subsequently dismissed as the issue had been decided by the same court in a prior judgment.
The High Court decided the issue based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner (appellant). The court held that the tax effect in the instant appeal falls below the limits prescribed in CBDT Circular No.5/2024 dated 15.03.2024 read with Circular No. 9/2024 dated 17.09.2024. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. The reasoning is that appeals with a tax effect below the prescribed monetary limits are not to be pursued as per the CBDT circulars. The ratio decidendi is that appeals that do not meet the minimum tax effect threshold stipulated by CBDT circulars are liable for dismissal. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Delhi High Court, following its own judgment in Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax Central-1 v. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. (2024) 465 ITR 101 (Delhi), allowed all the writ petitions. The Court found that the notices issued under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Years 2010-11 to 2013-14 were indeed beyond the period of limitation, as argued by the petitioner. The reasoning was based on the principle that if the satisfaction note was dated 24.06.2022, then subsequent notices for those assessment years would be time-barred. The ratio decidendi is that the limitation period for issuing notices under Section 153C must be strictly adhered to, and if the initiating event (satisfaction note) falls on a particular date, subsequent actions must be within the prescribed time frame from that date. The impugned notices were quashed, and pending applications were disposed of.
The High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeals, considering the Revenue's pursuit of remedies under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The appeals were then dismissed as the issue was decided by a previous judgment of the same court.
The High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding it to be bonafide under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The appeals were subsequently dismissed, following a previous judgment of the High Court in the respondent's own case.
The Delhi High Court rejected the department's appeal. The court held that the department could not take contradictory stands for different assessment years on the same set of facts and legal issues.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The reasoning provided is that the tax effect in the instant appeal falls below the limits prescribed in CBDT Circular No. 5/2024 dated 15.03.2024 read with Circular No. 9/2024 dated 17.09.2024. The ratio decidendi is that appeals with a tax effect below the prescribed monetary limits, as per CBDT circulars, are to be dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal. No issues were left undecided.
The High Court condoned the delay of 1540 days in filing the appeals, finding it to be bonafide due to the appellant pursuing remedies under a misconception. The appeals were then dismissed following a previous judgment of the Court.
The High Court set aside the impugned order dated 23.06.2025 (passed on 21.08.2025) and the consequential certificate dated 21.08.2025. The Court directed the competent authority to issue a certificate at a 'NIL' rate for AY 2026-27 within fifteen days. Furthermore, the Court directed the competent authority to continue issuing 'NIL' rate certificates for each subsequent year within thirty days of the application being filed. The Court noted that the competent authority's reliance on a set-aside assessment order for AY 1999-2000, despite being aware of the ITAT's decision on similar facts for an erstwhile group entity, was shocking and contrary to judicial discipline. The Court found the competent authority's finding of 'Royalty' to be based on conjectures and surmises, lacking concrete reasoning. While acknowledging that Section 197 orders are for advance tax and refunds are possible, the Court stated that accepting this argument would frustrate the purpose of Section 197. The Court also clarified that for subsequent years, the competent authority would not be bound by this direction if a Permanent Establishment is found or transactions are taxable in India, but prior notice to the petitioner would be required.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to interest under Section 244A as the delay in claiming TDS was due to a technical glitch and not the assessee's fault. The Assessing Officer incorrectly denied the interest without following the procedure prescribed in Section 244A(2).
The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision, following its own prior judgment and a Supreme Court affirmation. The court found no substantial difference in facts between the present case and the precedent.
The Tribunal held that the initiation of reassessment proceedings was based on a change of opinion, as the audit objection did not present a new fact but rather a different perspective on existing facts. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision.
The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision, following its own prior judgment and a Supreme Court affirmation. The court found no substantial difference in facts between the present case and the precedent.
The High Court of Delhi held that the appeal is dismissed. This decision was based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the tax effect in the instant appeal falls below the limits prescribed in CBDT Circular No.5/2024 dated 15.03.2024 read with Circular No. 9/2024 dated 17.09.2024. The reasoning is that appeals with a tax effect below the stipulated monetary limits are not to be pursued. The ratio decidendi is that the Revenue should adhere to the monetary limits set by the CBDT for filing appeals to streamline litigation. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision, following its own prior judgment and a Supreme Court affirmation. The court found no substantial difference in facts between the present case and the precedent.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated based on a mere change of opinion, as the audit objection did not reveal any new facts but rather a different interpretation of existing facts. The High Court upheld this decision, stating that reassessment cannot be triggered by an audit objection.
The Tribunal's decision to quash the penalty proceedings was upheld. The High Court noted that the issue had attained finality as the Special Leave Petition against similar judgments was rejected.