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955 orders · Page 4 of 20
The ITAT correctly held that the assessment order was time-barred as it was passed after the stipulated one-month period from the end of the month in which the DRP's directions were uploaded. The High Court found no substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's decision.
The High Court of Delhi, in its order dated October 29, 2025, decided to set aside the impugned order passed under Section 148A(3) and the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, both dated June 30, 2025. The Court remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer (AO). The AO is directed to provide an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner and permit the petitioner to produce all relevant documents supporting its stand. Subsequently, the AO is to pass a fresh and reasoned order. The Court specified that this exercise should be completed within a period of eight weeks from the date of the order. The principle derived is that where an AO fails to consider a crucial objection raised by the assessee, particularly concerning prior adjudication of the same issue, the proceedings may be set aside and remanded for fresh consideration after affording due opportunity to the assessee.
The High Court held that the approval granted by the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax was mechanical and lacked independent application of mind, failing to meet the requirements of Section 153D.
The High Court, for parity of reasons with its earlier judgment in Mahendra Kumar Jhanwar v. Income Tax Officer Ward 36(1) New Delhi, set aside the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Act. The matter was remanded back to the Assessing Officer (AO) to decide the issue of the surviving period for issuing the notice. The AO is to consider the limitation chart presented by the petitioner and the judgments of the Supreme Court (Union of India & Others v. Rajeev Bansal) and the High Court. The AO must grant an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and pass a detailed and speaking order. This exercise is to be completed within eight weeks from the date of the order. The petition was disposed of in these terms.
The High Court of Delhi, noting that the Revenue did not contest the petitioner's submission that its contentions were not considered, set aside the order dated 29.06.2025 passed under Section 148A(3) and the notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The matter was remanded back to the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer was directed to pass a fresh, reasoned order after providing the petitioner with an opportunity to be heard. The Court stipulated that the entire process, including the hearing, must be completed within six weeks from the date of the order as an outer limit. The petition was disposed of on these terms.
The High Court held that the approval granted by the competent authority was mechanical and lacked independent application of mind, similar to previous judgments. Therefore, the ITAT's view was upheld.
The High Court held that the penalty notices were invalid because they did not specify which limb of Section 271(1)(c) (concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars) was invoked. This rendered the penalty proceedings bad in law.
The High Court held that the approval granted by the competent authority was mechanical and lacked independent application of mind, similar to previous judgments. Therefore, the ITAT's view was upheld.
The High Court held that the penalty notices were invalid because they did not specify which limb of Section 271(1)(c) (concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars) was invoked. This rendered the penalty proceedings bad in law.
The High Court held that the approval granted by the competent authority was mechanical and lacked independent application of mind, similar to previous judgments. Therefore, the ITAT's view was upheld.
The High Court held that the approval granted by the competent authority was mechanical and lacked independent application of mind, similar to previous judgments. Therefore, the ITAT's view was upheld.
The High Court held that the approval granted by the competent authority was mechanical and lacked independent application of mind, similar to previous judgments. Therefore, the approval did not fulfill the mandate of Section 153D.
The High Court held that the penalty notices were invalid because they did not specify which limb of Section 271(1)(c) (concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars) was invoked. This rendered the penalty proceedings bad in law.
The High Court held that the penalty notices were invalid because they did not specify which limb of Section 271(1)(c) (concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars) was invoked. This rendered the penalty proceedings bad in law.
The High Court held that the approval granted by the competent authority was mechanical and lacked independent application of mind, similar to previous judgments. Therefore, the ITAT's view was upheld.
The High Court held that the penalty notices were invalid because they did not specify which limb of Section 271(1)(c) (concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars) was invoked. This rendered the penalty proceedings bad in law.
The High Court held that the approval granted by the competent authority was mechanical and lacked independent application of mind, similar to previous judgments. Therefore, the ITAT's view was upheld.
The High Court, following the directions of the Supreme Court in Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Reliance Industries Ltd. (SLP (Diary no. 56889/2024) decided on February 24, 2025), remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer (AO). The AO is directed to apply his mind to the facts of the case and the position of law, considering the timelines provided in the chart submitted by the petitioner. The AO shall grant a hearing to the petitioner and pass appropriate orders within four weeks from the date of the order. The petitioner is granted liberty to submit the same chart before the AO for his consideration. The petition is disposed of with these directions.
The Delhi High Court set aside the order dated 30.06.2025 passed under Section 148A(3) and the consequential notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found that while a reply dated 27.06.2025 was filed by the petitioner, it was not explicitly referenced in the order under Section 148A(3), although certain references to documents submitted in that reply suggested it might have been considered. However, in light of the petitioner's submission that they are not amenable to Indian tax laws and the reliance on the Angelantoni Test Technologies Srl judgment, the Court deemed it appropriate to remand the matter. The AO is directed to consider all material placed by the petitioner pursuant to the notice under Section 148A(1) and pass a reasoned order, taking into account the case laws referred to in the replies. The petitioner is granted liberty to file a note of submissions within three weeks, and the AO is to pass a reasoned order within eight weeks thereafter. The operative direction is to set aside the impugned order and notice and remand the matter for fresh consideration.
The High Court held that the license fee paid for the use of goodwill was not an expenditure prohibited by law, as the primary purpose was to leverage the firm's established reputation. The ad-hoc disallowance of travelling and entertainment expenses was also found to be unjustified.
The High Court held that the license fee paid for the use of goodwill was not an expenditure prohibited by law, as the primary purpose was to leverage the firm's established reputation. The ad-hoc disallowance of travelling and entertainment expenses was also found to be unjustified.
The High Court held that the approval granted by the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax was mechanical and lacked independent application of mind, failing to meet the requirements of Section 153D. Therefore, the ITAT's view was upheld.
The High Court held that the approval granted by the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax was mechanical and lacked independent application of mind, failing to meet the requirements of Section 153D. Therefore, the ITAT's view was upheld.
The High Court held that the approval granted by the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax was mechanical and lacked independent application of mind, failing to meet the requirements of Section 153D. Therefore, the ITAT's view was upheld.
The High Court held that the initial notice issued under Section 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was erroneous and defective, having been issued against a deceased person despite prior intimation of death. Consequently, the proceedings initiated pursuant to this defective notice cannot be considered valid. The Court found the submission of the Revenue that the error was rectified by issuing subsequent notices in the name of the deceased through the legal heir unappealing. The Court's reasoning was that if the initial notice is flawed, the subsequent proceedings stemming from it are vitiated. Therefore, the notice under Section 148A(b), the order under Section 148A(d), and the notice under Section 148 of the Act were all set aside. The Court clarified that this decision does not preclude the respondents from initiating fresh action in accordance with the law, leaving all pleas and contentions open to be decided by the Assessing Officer. The petition was disposed of on this basis.
The High Court held that the license fee paid for the use of goodwill was not an expenditure prohibited by law, as the primary purpose was to leverage the firm's established reputation. The ad-hoc disallowance of travelling and entertainment expenses was also found to be unjustified.
The High Court noted the CIT(A)'s observation as the best way forward and found the ITAT's decision to allow the appeal untenable. The court ordered that the status quo be maintained until the next hearing.
The High Court held that the license fee paid for the use of goodwill was not an expenditure prohibited by law, as the primary purpose was to leverage the firm's established reputation. The ad-hoc disallowance of travelling and entertainment expenses was also found to be unjustified.
The High Court held that the license fee paid for the use of goodwill was not an expenditure prohibited by law, as the primary purpose was to leverage the firm's established reputation. The ad-hoc disallowance of travelling and entertainment expenses was also found to be unjustified.
The High Court noted the appellant's plea regarding the non-maintainability of the petition before it. Consequently, the learned counsel for the appellant stated that they would withdraw the present appeal. The Court granted liberty to the appellant to file the appeal before the appropriate Court having jurisdiction. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. The pending application was also dismissed as infructuous. The Court did not decide any substantive issue on merits.
The Delhi High Court, acknowledging the settlement under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, disposed of all the pending appeals. The appeals were decided based on the full and final settlement.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in the appeal. The Court noted that the issue was covered against the Revenue by the judgment in PCIT v. Sahara India Life Insurance Company Ltd. Furthermore, the Court observed that it had previously dismissed appeals filed by the Revenue on an identical issue in the case of Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Corteva Agriscience Pvt. Ltd. The Tribunal had also relied on the Sahara India Life Insurance Company Ltd. judgment. Consequently, as no substantial question of law was found, the appeal, along with pending applications, was dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The Delhi High Court, acknowledging the settlement under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, disposed of all the pending appeals. The appeals were decided based on the full and final settlement.
The High Court of Delhi, in this interim order, has not decided any substantive issues of the appeal. The court has only addressed procedural matters. The delay of 634 days in re-filing the appeal by the Revenue has been condoned. An exemption application filed by the Revenue has been allowed, subject to just exceptions. The court has directed that the appeal paper-book be provided to the assessee's counsel and has listed the matter for further hearing on 04.11.2025. No findings on the merits of the case have been made, and no operative directions regarding the assessment itself have been issued.
The High Court noted that the ITAT correctly deleted the addition on account of interest as the assessee had sufficient interest-free funds. The Court also held that the amendment to Section 14A by the Finance Act, 2022, is not retrospective and thus not applicable to the assessment year in question.
The Court noted that the appellant's counsel had not received instructions from the appellant. Additionally, court notices sent to the appellant were returned unserved, with the postal report stating the company had "shifted years back". In light of these circumstances, the Court dismissed the appeals for non-prosecution. No decision was made on the merits of the case.
The High Court dismissed the appeals for non-prosecution. The court noted that the appellant's counsel had not received instructions from the appellant. Additionally, court notices sent to the appellant were returned unserved with the remark that the company had "shifted years back". Based on these facts, the court concluded that the appeals could not be prosecuted and therefore dismissed them. No decision was made on the merits of the appeals.
The High Court of Delhi, comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vinod Kumar, noted the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appeal was primarily filed against an order dated 06.08.2024, which was passed in M.A. 447/DEL/2023 in ITA 286 & 421/DEL/2022, and that the appellant wished to withdraw the same. The Court accepted this submission and proceeded to dismiss the appeal and the applications as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the original appeal or the order under challenge was made. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal and applications as withdrawn.
The High Court held that the appeal and the applications are dismissed as withdrawn. The reasoning provided is that the appellant's counsel, citing CBDT Circular No. 09/2024 which mandates withdrawal of appeals with a tax effect below a certain threshold (in this case, less than two crores), expressed the intention to withdraw the appeal. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeal and the associated applications. No issue was expressly left undecided; the decision was based on the appellant's request for withdrawal.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the issues were covered by previous judgments of the Court. Specifically, the AMP expenses issue was covered by the assessee's own case, and the Section 14A issue was covered by judgments concerning the retrospective application of amendments.
The Tribunal decided that the appeal filed by the appellant, PR Commissioner of Income Tax Central 3, was to be dismissed as withdrawn. The reasoning provided was that the appellant's counsel stated the appeal was filed inadvertently and expressed a wish to withdraw it. Consequently, the appeal and the associated application (CM APPL. 63726/2025) were dismissed as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the original appeals (ITA 286 & 421/DEL/2022) or the miscellaneous application.
The High Court set aside the impugned order under Section 148A(3) and the notice under Section 148, both dated June 28, 2025. The Court disposed of the petition on the terms that the matter be remanded back to the Assessing Officer (AO). This was based on the revenue's plea that the issue could be considered by the AO if the petitioner filed all necessary documents. The petitioner agreed to file the required documents within three weeks. The AO, upon receipt of these documents, is to consider them and pass a reasoned order under Section 148A(3) and proceed thereafter. The petitioner will be given an opportunity of hearing by the AO. The Court did not decide on the merits of the alleged transaction but facilitated a procedural re-examination.
The High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, finding no substantial questions of law. The decision was based on previous judgments by the same court in identical matters involving the same assessee and the issue of Advertisement, Marketing, and Promotion (AMP) expenses.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court relied on its own judgment in Manju Somani v. Income Tax Officer, which held that the proviso to Section 149 of the Act clearly indicates that reassessment proceedings pertaining to a period prior to April 1, 2021, must adhere to the timeframes existing prior to the Finance Act, 2021. The Court noted that Section 149(1)(b), as it stood before the amendments by the Finance Act, 2021, prescribed a period of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year as the terminal point for issuing a notice under Section 148. Since the impugned notice for AY 2015-16 was issued after this period had elapsed, the Court found the action unsustainable. The Court also observed that the present case, relating to AY 2015-16, being an earlier year than AY 2016-17 dealt with in Manju Somani, should naturally follow the same course. Consequently, the impugned order under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under Section 148 were set aside.
The High Court of Delhi condoned the delay of 387 days in refiling the appeal filed by the Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi-7. The Court found the reasons stated in the application for condonation to be sufficient. The application for condonation of delay was disposed of. Subsequently, the Court issued notice on the appeal itself, returnable on December 15, 2025. The substantive issues of the appeal, as decided by the ITAT, were not addressed in this order. The principle derived from this order pertains to the High Court's discretion in condoning significant delays in filing appeals, particularly when supported by stated reasons and in light of similar past considerations. No specific findings on the merits of the appeal were made at this stage.
The High Court held that the reassessment proceedings were barred by limitation. Relying on the Supreme Court judgments in Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal and Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal, the Court noted that the period surviving from the date of the deemed show cause notice (08.06.2021) till the extended period under TOLA (30.06.2021) was 22 days. The period from the issuance of the deemed notice until the date the assessee was allowed to file a reply (08.06.2021 to 16.06.2022) was to be excluded. The clock for the revenue to issue the Section 148 notice started ticking on 16.06.2022. Therefore, the last date for issuing the notice under Section 148 was 08.07.2022. Since the actual notice was issued on 25.07.2022, it was time-barred. The Court also noted that the revenue's counsel did not show anything contrary to the petitioner's contentions regarding limitation. Consequently, the order under Section 148A(d) dated 25.07.2022, the notice under Section 148 dated 25.07.2022, and any consequent assessment order (if passed, as the final assessment order was stated to be passed on 22.05.2023) were set aside.
The High Court noted that the appellant's counsel stated the appeal was filed inadvertently, as a prior appeal (ITA 355/2023) concerning the same impugned order had already been dismissed against the revenue in favour of the respondent on 10.07.2023. Consequently, the Court found no reason to proceed with the current appeal. The appeal and the associated application were dismissed as withdrawn. No specific findings on the merits of the case were made, as the dismissal was based on the procedural ground of inadvertent filing and the existence of a prior dismissed appeal.
The High Court found no justification to entertain the appeals, citing the principle of consistency and the lack of distinguishing facts. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.