107 orders · Page 2 of 3
The High Court held that a non-compete fee does not qualify as a depreciable intangible asset under Section 32(1)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, as it does not confer an exclusive right 'in rem'. The court followed its own precedent in Sharp Business Systems.
The High Court held that the ITAT's decision was correct, as the issues were covered by Supreme Court and High Court judgments. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The High Court held that the ITAT's decision was correct, as the issues were covered by Supreme Court and High Court judgments. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The High Court held that a non-compete fee does not qualify as a depreciable intangible asset under Section 32(1)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, as it does not confer an exclusive right 'in rem'. The court followed its own precedent in Sharp Business Systems.
The Court held that the impugned speaking order and certificate dated 02.06.2021 are liable to be quashed. The Court found that the speaking order did not reflect compliance with Rule 28AA of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, as none of the considerations prescribed in the rule appeared to have been taken into account. The Court relied on its previous judgment in *Manpowergroup Services India Pvt. Ltd.*, which held that the Assessing Officer cannot ignore the mandate of Rule 28AA and proceed on any other basis, as government actions must adhere to their own set rules and standards. The Court also noted that the respondents could not deny the non-compliance with Rule 28AA when specifically queried. Furthermore, the Court referred to *Lufthansa Cargo AG*, stating that an order disclosing non-application of mind to relevant considerations is arbitrary and liable to be set aside. The argument of alternate efficacious remedy was rejected, following *Manpowergroup Services India Pvt. Ltd.*. The impugned order and certificate were quashed, and the respondents were directed to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. Until a fresh certificate is issued, the petitioner's receipts will abide by the withholding tax certificates for the preceding period at 0.01%.
The High Court held that the ITAT's decision was correct, as the issues were covered by Supreme Court and High Court judgments. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The High Court held that the ITAT's decision was correct, as the issues were covered by Supreme Court and High Court judgments. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The High Court held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer were not based on any incriminating material found during the search, and the assessment proceedings were not pending on the date of the search. The findings of the lower appellate authorities were confirmed.
The High Court held that the additions were not based on any incriminating material found during the search and that the assessment was not pending on the date of search. The findings of the lower authorities were not perverse.
The High Court found that no substantial question of law arose from the ITAT's order. The ITAT's decision to not entertain the plea of diversion of income by overriding title afresh was upheld.
The High Court dismissed the appeals, finding that the appellant's arguments before the court contradicted their submissions before the lower authorities. The court noted that the foundational facts presented were diametrically opposite.
The High Court dismissed the appeals, finding that the appellant's arguments before the court contradicted their submissions before the lower authorities. The court noted that the foundational facts presented were diametrically opposite.
The High Court dismissed the appeals, finding that the appellant's arguments before the court contradicted their submissions before the lower authorities. The court noted that the foundational facts presented were diametrically opposite.
The High Court dismissed the appeals, finding that the appellant's arguments before the court contradicted their submissions before the lower authorities. The court noted that the foundational facts presented were diametrically opposite.
The High Court held that the ITAT's decision to reduce the commission rate based on past precedents and its finding that a ballpark rate could be arrived at were not perverse. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose.
The High Court held that the ITAT's decision to reduce the commission rate based on past precedents and its finding that a ballpark rate could be arrived at were not perverse. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose.
The High Court upheld the Family Court's decision, finding that the appellant had caused mental cruelty to the respondent and that the marriage had irretrievably broken down. The court found no infirmity in the impugned judgment.
The Tribunal erred in disallowing the deduction under Section 35DD, as it should be allowable to the resulting company. The Tribunal also erred in applying the matching principle to spread the one-time lease rent over the lease tenure.
The Delhi High Court held that the deduction under Section 35DD was allowable to the resulting company and that the commuted/discounted one-time lease rent was a revenue expenditure deductible in the year it was incurred, not subject to the matching principle.
The Tribunal erred in disallowing the deduction under Section 35DD, as it should be allowable to the resulting company. The Tribunal also erred in applying the matching principle to spread the one-time lease rent over the lease tenure.
The High Court held that the impugned assessment order dated April 7, 2021, and the consequential notices of demand under Section 156 and penalty proceedings under Section 274 read with Section 270A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were liable to be set aside. The Court reasoned that since there was a variation in the declared income (an addition of Rs. 13,95,890 was made), the respondent/revenue was required to issue a show cause notice-cum-draft assessment order in consonance with the provisions of Section 144B of the Act and the Faceless Assessment Scheme, 2019. The Court relied on its previous judgment in W.P. (C) No. 5552/2021. The operative direction was to set aside the impugned order and notices, granting liberty to the revenue to pass a fresh assessment order as per law, including a personal hearing to the petitioner via videoconferencing.
The High Court held that the revenue's appeal should be considered pending on January 31, 2020. The court reasoned that the Tribunal's order dated June 22, 2018, dismissing the revenue's appeal, could be construed as an order dismissing the appeal in limine. This dismissal was based on a preliminary assessment of facts (i.e., the outcome of appeals for earlier assessment years) without a detailed discussion on the merits of the case. The subsequent order dated May 11, 2020, which allowed the revenue's miscellaneous application and restored the appeal, rectified an apparent error on the face of the record. Applying the doctrine of relation back, this order effectively breathed life into the appeal from an earlier date. Therefore, the conditions stipulated in FAQ No. 61 of Circular No. 21 of 2020 were met: the MA was pending on January 31, 2020, and it related to an appeal dismissed in limine before that date. Consequently, the impugned orders rejecting the assessee's forms under the 2020 Act were set aside, and the revenue was directed to consider the forms and proceed as per the 2020 Act.
The Tribunal erred in holding that the business was set up only upon grant of the IRDA license. The Court found that the assessee had taken all necessary steps to set up its business prior to obtaining the license, and the delay was on the part of the regulatory authority.
The High Court held that the Tribunal erred in remanding the matter as the CIT(A) had already verified the claims. The appellate authorities have the power to entertain and decide such claims if they are otherwise sustainable in law.
The High Court held that it cannot, in writ jurisdiction, adjudicate the tax liability of the assessee when challenging an order under Section 241A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court reasoned that determining tax liability is the domain of the statutory assessment and appeal process, not writ proceedings, except in cases of gross illegality or where the court can conclusively hold that no tax is due. The Court found that the Section 241A order provided detailed reasons and that the case did not fall into the exceptional category where the writ court should interfere. The Court clarified that the reasons given in the Section 241A order would not prejudice the ongoing assessment. Therefore, the petition seeking a mandamus for refund and challenging the Section 241A order was dismissed.
The High Court quashed the notice dated March 31, 2018, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the order granting sanction by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court found that the AO (respondent no. 1) failed to correlate the information received from the investigation wing with the formation of his belief that income had escaped assessment. This failure constituted a jurisdictional error, which the Court could correct under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court noted that the order recording reasons did not discuss the contents of the investigation report or statements made by individuals, and there was no reference to certain individuals whose statements were recorded. Although the assessee argued the notice was time-barred, the Court rejected this, stating limitation runs from the date of issuance, not service. The issue of a time lag between the order recording reasons and its furnishing was not pressed by the assessee and thus not decided. The Court also noted a potential breach of natural justice, but did not base its decision on it. The revenue's argument to relegate the assessee to statutory remedies was rejected.
The High Court held that the RBI's rejection was bad in law as it lacked proper reasoning and was passed contrary to regulations. The mere existence of an investigation by an enforcement agency does not ipso facto debar an Indian party from making overseas investments.
The High Court held that the IPAB's order was based on findings of fact supported by the evidence presented and the petitioner's procedural default in not filing a counter-statement. The court found no jurisdictional error or perversity warranting interference under writ jurisdiction.
The tribunal held that the interim maintenance order under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, should only be applicable until the date of the divorce decree. The direction for child's expenses was not challenged.
The High Court held that the questions of law raised by the revenue in the captioned appeals were covered by the judgment of the Division Bench of the same Court in the matter of Directorate of Income tax vs. Sheratan International Inc, 2009 SCC Online Del. 4231. Consequently, the appeals were disposed of in terms of the aforementioned judgment. The reasoning is based on the direct applicability of the precedent. The ratio decidendi is that if the issues in an appeal are identical to those decided in a prior binding judgment of the same court, the appeal should be decided in accordance with that precedent. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeals in terms of the cited judgment. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the questions of law raised by the revenue in the captioned appeals are covered by the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the matter of Directorate of Income tax vs. Sheratan International Inc, 2009 SCC Online Del. 4231. The reasoning is based on the submission made by the revenue's counsel, which was accepted. Consequently, the appeals were disposed of in terms of the aforementioned judgment. No specific finding on the merits of the individual appeals was made, as they were decided based on the precedent. Any pending applications were also closed. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeals in terms of the cited judgment.
The Tribunal held that the questions of law raised by the revenue in the captioned appeals are covered by the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the matter of Directorate of Income tax vs. Sheratan International Inc, 2009 SCC Online Del. 4231. The reasoning is based on the submission made by the revenue's counsel, which was accepted. Consequently, the appeals were disposed of in terms of the aforementioned judgment. No specific finding on the merits of the individual appeals was made, as they were decided based on the precedent. Any pending applications were also closed. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeals in terms of the cited judgment.
The ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee, setting aside the orders of the AO and CIT(A). The High Court found that the question of law raised by the revenue was purely based on facts and dismissed the appeal.
The High Court allowed the application filed by the appellant/assessee seeking leave to withdraw the instant appeal (ITA 216/2013). The reasoning was based on the assessee's submission that it had initiated steps to avail the benefit of the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020. The Court granted liberty to both the appellant/assessee and the respondent/Revenue to approach the Court if the designated authority does not issue a certificate in the prescribed form (Form-5). Consequently, the appeal was closed. The order passed in the application was to be placed in the case file of ITA No. 424/2013.
The High Court allowed the appellant's application to withdraw the appeal. Liberty was granted to both parties to approach the court if the designated authority fails to issue the required certificate.
The Delhi High Court allowed the application filed by the appellant/assessee seeking leave to withdraw the instant appeal. The Court reasoned that the assessee had initiated steps to resolve the tax dispute under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020. The Court granted liberty to both the appellant/assessee and the respondent/Revenue to approach the Court if the designated authority fails to issue a certificate in the prescribed form (Form-5). Consequently, the appeal was closed. The order passed in this application was to be placed in the case file concerning ITA No. 425/2013.
The High Court allowed the application for withdrawal of the appeal. Liberty was granted to both parties to approach the court if the designated authority does not issue the required certificate.
The Tribunal held that the additions for AYs 2006-07 and 2007-08 were not sustainable as the same amount could not be taxed twice. The addition of interest was also deleted due to lack of evidence. The High Court agreed that no substantial question of law arose.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose for its consideration. Regarding the addition under Section 68, the Court noted that the ITAT found the AO's approach intriguing, as the assessee had already accounted for sales and purchases in its business income. The ITAT observed that making an addition under Section 68 or 69C was contradictory to accepting the business income. The Court found no justification from the Revenue for attracting Section 68, other than the argument of no net effect on business income, which it deemed not the relevant yardstick. The Court also noted that the allowability of expenditure under Section 69C was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication. On the merits of high-seas sales, the ITAT had observed that the buyer parties' names and addresses were mentioned in customs documents, and these parties possessed importer-exporter codes. Although unserved notices were a ground for suspicion, the ITAT found them insufficient to conclude that sales were not genuine, especially given customs approval and clearance of goods by buyers. The High Court found no perversity in the ITAT's approach and concluded that the issues touched upon findings of fact, thus no question of law arose.
The High Court allowed the appellant's application for withdrawal of the appeal. The reasoning is based on the appellant's stated intention to avail the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2020, and the respondent's lack of objection. The operative direction is that the appeal is disposed of as withdrawn. No issues were decided on merits, and no specific findings were made regarding the underlying tax dispute.
The Tribunal found that the statement of the third party, recorded during their separate search, could not be the sole basis for additions under Section 153A without following the mandatory provisions of Section 153C. The High Court agreed that no substantial question of law arose.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that penalty proceedings cannot survive if the underlying assessment issue is debatable. The Court reiterated its position, citing its decision in Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-2 Vs. Harsh International Pvt. Ltd., which held that if the quantum order itself is challenged and substantial questions of law are framed, the alleged concealment is not final and the issue is disputable. The Court also referred to its prior decisions in CIT Vs. Liquid Investment Ltd. and CIT Vs. Thomson Press India Ltd., where penalty deletion was upheld on the ground that the issue was debatable. Furthermore, the Court noted that there was no finding that any details supplied by the assessee in its return were found to be incorrect, erroneous, or false, and that the CIT(A) had observed no evidence of wilful furnishing of inaccurate details to avoid tax. The Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad Vs. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd. was also cited, emphasizing that a claim not being accepted by the Revenue does not automatically attract penalty. The Court concluded that no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The Tribunal found that the statement of the third party, recorded during their separate search, could not be the sole basis for additions under Section 153A without following the mandatory provisions of Section 153C. The High Court agreed that no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal found that the statement of the third party, recorded during their separate search, could not be the sole basis for additions under Section 153A without following the mandatory provisions of Section 153C. The High Court agreed that no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal found that the statement of the third party, recorded during their separate search, could not be the sole basis for additions under Section 153A without following the mandatory provisions of Section 153C. The High Court agreed that no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal found that the statement of the third party, recorded during their separate search, could not be the sole basis for additions under Section 153A without following the mandatory provisions of Section 153C. The High Court agreed that no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal found that the statement of the third party, recorded during their separate search, could not be the sole basis for additions under Section 153A without following the mandatory provisions of Section 153C. The High Court agreed that no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal found that the statement of the third party, recorded during their separate search, could not be the sole basis for additions under Section 153A without following the mandatory provisions of Section 153C. The High Court agreed that no substantial question of law arose.
The High Court held that the appeal did not raise any substantial question of law. The court found that the appellant was seeking a re-appreciation of evidence, which is not the scope of an appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, when there are concurrent findings of fact by the Assessing Officer, CIT(A), and the ITAT. The court further opined that the appellant's contention regarding ignored material evidence, specifically the scrapping of the project, was also a facet of evidence appreciation and did not constitute a substantial question of law. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. No specific issue was left undecided.
The High Court held that possession of money is a facet of ownership, and since the appellant was found in possession, he was considered the owner for the purpose of Section 69A. The explanation offered by the appellant was found unsatisfactory.