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784 orders · Page 7 of 16
The High Court held that the additions made under Section 68 based on statements recorded during a search were not justified. It also ruled that the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 153A and the subsequent additions were not justified given the materials seized and statements made.
The High Court held that the additions made under Section 68 based on statements recorded during a search were not justified. It also ruled that the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 153A and the subsequent additions were not justified given the materials seized and statements made.
The High Court held that the additions made under Section 68 based on statements recorded during a search were not justified. It also ruled that the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 153A and the subsequent additions were not justified given the materials seized and statements made.
The Tribunal found that the Will was not validly executed, but the MOS, recording an oral family settlement, was proved. The court upheld the Arbitral Tribunal's findings regarding the validity of the MOS and dismissed the petition.
The High Court upheld the finding of negligence but modified the compensation amount. It recalculated the loss of dependency by including future prospects, adjusting for conveyance allowance, and applying the correct multiplier based on the deceased's age. Non-pecuniary damages were also adjusted as per Supreme Court rulings.
The High Court held that depreciation, by its very nature, is neither a loss, expenditure, nor a trading liability. Therefore, it is not an expense for the purpose of computing deductible income under Section 10(29).
The Court held that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, specifically Section 14, imposes a moratorium on suits and proceedings against a corporate debtor. Therefore, the appeal could not proceed without the permission of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT).
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court noted the long history of the case, which had already taken over a year to serve the Respondent. Given that notices sent to the Respondent's address were returned unserved, and the Revenue's request for another opportunity to serve dasti, the Court deemed it appropriate to dismiss the appeal. However, liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the appeal once they are certain about the correct present address of the Respondent. The Court did not decide on the merits of the appeal itself.
The Court disposed of the petition. It took note of the respondent's submission that the NCLT had admitted a petition under Section 7 of the IBC against the respondent, thereby initiating the corporate insolvency resolution process. The Court also considered the Division Bench's decision in ITA No. 533/2017, which affirmed that the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC would remain in force until the CIRP is concluded, a resolution plan is approved, or liquidation is ordered. Consequently, the Court granted the petitioner liberty to revive the arbitration petition subject to further orders from the NCLT. The Court did not decide the merits of the arbitration claim itself but rather the procedural aspect of pursuing it during the moratorium.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose for consideration in the present appeal. The Court noted that the Assessee's appeal against the same impugned order had been allowed by a separate order on the same day. In that order, the Court had agreed with the Assessee that the Revenue had failed to establish the existence of an international transaction between the Assessee and its Associated Enterprise involving AMP expenses. Given this context and the fact that the Supreme Court's decision in the Sony Ericsson case was awaited without any stay, the High Court found no basis to entertain the Revenue's appeal. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court upheld the concurrent findings of the CIT(A) and ITAT. It was held that the payments were not FTS as there was no profit embedded in the reimbursement and no technical expertise was involved. The royalty payment was also found to have no capital element.
The High Court upheld the concurrent findings of the CIT(A) and ITAT. It was held that the payments were not FTS as there was no profit embedded in the reimbursement and no technical expertise was involved. The royalty payment was also found to have no capital element.
The High Court held that the ITAT was not justified in remanding the matter as the Revenue failed to establish the existence of an international transaction involving AMP expenses. The BLT was deemed an invalid basis for such determination.
The High Court held that the ITAT was not justified in remanding the matter as the Revenue failed to establish the existence of an international transaction involving AMP expenses. The 'Bright Line Test' was deemed an invalid basis for such determination.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the impugned order of the ITAT. The Court noted that the present case involved similar issues as previous appeals for AYs 2007-08 and 2008-09, where the Revenue's appeals against the ITAT's orders were dismissed by the High Court. Based on this precedent and the lack of a substantial question of law in the current appeal, the High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal. The specific findings of the ITAT on the inclusion/exclusion of comparables are not detailed, as the High Court's decision rests on the absence of a substantial question of law, not on the merits of the transfer pricing adjustment itself. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the ITAT's order. The Court noted that the issues raised by the Revenue in the present appeal had already been decided in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue in previous judgments by the same Court. These prior decisions were dated October 31st, 2016 (in ITA No. 642/2016), April 18th, 2017 (in ITA No. 305/2017), and May 15th, 2017 (in ITA No. 374 of 2017). Consequently, based on these prior pronouncements, the High Court found no independent substantial question of law to adjudicate and dismissed the appeal. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court upheld the orders of the CIT(A) and ITAT, finding no legal infirmity. It noted that the assessee had produced an agreement to sell, shifting the onus to the AO to disprove it, which the AO failed to do.
The High Court dismissed the stay applications filed by the Department. The appeals were listed for further hearing.
The High Court held that Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) are not penal but compensatory and for recovery of tax. Therefore, the ITAT's view that these sections are penal and that 'sufficient cause' is a relevant consideration was incorrect.
The Tribunal held that the LOs and POs did not constitute a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India. The activities carried out were considered preparatory or auxiliary in nature and did not amount to carrying on the business of the enterprise in India.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's liaison offices and project offices did not constitute a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India. Therefore, the income attributable to these offices was not taxable in India as per the India-Japan Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA).
The ITAT correctly held that the CIT's order under Section 263 was unsustainable as the amendment to Section 11(6) was not applicable to the assessment year in question, and the CIT had merely taken a different view without sufficient grounds.
The High Court held that considering the fact that the matter had been remanded to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision, no substantial question of law arose for consideration from the impugned order of the ITAT. The Court found no substantial question of law that warranted its intervention. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed. The ITAT's decision to remand the case to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision was upheld by the High Court, effectively meaning the issues were not decided on merits by the High Court.
The High Court held that while the assessee had issues with documentation and registration, the denial of Cenvat credit for countervailing duty paid on inputs was not justified. The court found that some documents existed regarding the payments made, which could legitimately be claimed as input credit.
The High Court held that the Revenue's challenge to the ITAT's power to review its order was not maintainable. This was because the order allowing the review application under Section 254(2) was not challenged by the Revenue and had attained finality.
The High Court held that the ITAT erred in remanding the matter to the TPO for a de novo determination of ALP. The court found that the ITAT should have adjudicated the issues itself, as all relevant details were available on record.
The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)'s order, which had examined the additions on merits after considering remand reports and additional evidence. The CIT(A) found that the Assessee had established the genuineness and creditworthiness of entities contributing to share capital.
The High Court held that the property measured 90 sq. yards and was owned by the mother. The documents relied upon by the defendant were found to be invalid and not conferring title. The five legal heirs were declared entitled to a 1/5th share each.
The High Court held that remanding the matter to the AO for cross-examination of Mr. Garg, who was unavailable, and for re-examining firms from whom purchases were made, would not serve any purpose as sufficient material was already on record. The ITAT should have decided the matter on merits.
The High Court held that the ITAT did not err in deleting the addition of Rs. 22.90 crores transferred to capital reserve. The loan was utilized for purchasing capital assets, and the waiver of such a loan does not amount to taxable income.
The High Court held that the ITAT should not have adjudicated on a ground not specifically raised in the memorandum of appeal without giving the affected party sufficient opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the ITAT's order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was justified in annulling the assessment order by invoking Section 124(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The reasoning was based on the admitted fact that the jurisdiction of the case was transferred from ITO Ward 19(4), New Delhi to ACIT, Circle 19(1) New Delhi by an order under Section 127 of the Act. Consequently, the ITAT rightly concluded that no jurisdiction was vested with the ITO, Ward 19(4). Therefore, the notice issued by him under Section 143(2) on 21st July, 2008, was invalid. The inevitable result of an invalid notice issued by an officer lacking jurisdiction is that the consequential assessment order would be invalid. The Tribunal found no substantial question of law arising from the impugned order of the ITAT. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court disposed of the appeal, noting that the husband could raise all available grounds in the ongoing Section 125 Cr.P.C. proceedings. The court clarified that the impugned order would not impede the husband's arguments in the new proceedings.
The High Court held that remanding the matter to the AO for cross-examination of Mr. Garg, who was unavailable, and for re-examining firms from whom purchases were made, would not serve any purpose as sufficient material was already on record. The ITAT should have decided the matter on merits.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was void ab initio as it was passed against a non-existent entity. This was based on the High Court's decision in Spice Infotainment Ltd. v. CIT, which established that proceedings against a non-existent entity are a jurisdictional defect.
The High Court held that the question framed by the Court on 19th December 2005 in the present appeals (ITA 1213/2005 and ITA 1214/2005) should be answered in the negative, which means in favor of the Assessee and against the Revenue. This decision is based on the High Court's prior order dated 17th November 2015, which had already decided the identical issue raised in ITA 299/2003 in favor of the Assessee. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and the impugned order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was set aside. The ratio decidendi is that where identical issues have been decided in favor of an assessee in a prior appeal, subsequent appeals involving the same assessee and the same issue should follow that precedent.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue. The Court noted that the appeals were directed against a common order of the ITAT dated December 6, 2016, for the assessment years 2004-05, 2005-06, 2007-08, and 2006-07. The High Court observed that in a previous order dated April 25, 2016, in ITA No. 263/2016 and other connected matters, the Revenue's appeals for these very assessment years had already been dismissed by the same Court. Therefore, following its own precedent, the Court dismissed the present appeals. No specific finding on the merits of the ITAT's order was made, as the dismissal was based on a prior decision.
The Tribunal held that since the application of income far exceeded the actual income, no tax was payable. Therefore, the appeal had no tax effect and could not be entertained.
The High Court held that the materials on record, including the SFIO report, supported the Central Government's order for investigation. The court found no infirmity with the impugned judgment that dismissed Sunair's writ petition.
The Tribunal held that the AO's invocation of Section 145 and the additions made based on conjectures and surmises were not justified. The CIT(A) and ITAT found no material to prove inter-unit transfers or errors in the audited books of account, affirming the Assessee's declared trading results.
The Delhi High Court noted that the Revenue confirmed that the application of income by the assessee-society was more than 85% for Assessment Year 2012-13. Consequently, the Revenue conceded that the question of denying the exemption to the assessee under Section 11(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, did not arise. The Court found that the question framed by it earlier was no longer required to be answered. The impugned order of the ITAT dated May 30, 2016, was therefore maintained. The appeal was dismissed.
The tribunal held that the circular regarding age limit for prosecution applies to the age at the time of commission of the offence, not when proceedings are initiated. The petitioner was found to be under 70 years old when the undisclosed account was opened in 1991.
The High Court found the Revenue's appeals to be misconceived because the Assessee's cross-objections had been dismissed. Therefore, the appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.
The High Court found the Revenue's appeals to be misconceived because the Assessee's cross-objections had been dismissed. Therefore, the appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.
The High Court held that the question of law urged by the Revenue was already decided against them by previous judgments of the same court. Therefore, the current appeals were dismissed.
The tribunal held that the respondent was the exclusive owner of the trademark 'MADAAN' based on the dissolution deed and subsequent registration. The adoption of 'House of Madaan' by the appellant was deemed dishonest and an attempt to trade on the respondent's goodwill.
The High Court held that the question of law urged by the Revenue was already decided against them by previous judgments of the same court. Therefore, the current appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the question of law urged by the Revenue was already decided against them by previous judgments of the same court. Therefore, the current appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the claimant failed to prove the incentive income and set aside that part of the award. It also directed the deduction of income tax after considering standard deductions. The court upheld most of the other compensation heads but reduced the interest rate from 10% to 9% per annum.
The High Court dismissed the government's appeals, holding them responsible for the deaths due to negligence. It also enhanced the compensation for the claimants based on a specific formula for pecuniary and standard compensation.