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585 orders · Page 8 of 12
The Bombay High Court, Circuit Bench at Kolhapur, held that the present appeal has become infructuous. The Court noted the submission by the Revenue's counsel that the amended provision of Section 155(19) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, addresses deductions made prior to AY 2016-17. As the present dispute falls within this period (April 1, 2011, to March 31, 2012), the questions of law and the lis would no longer survive. The Court was also apprised that a rectification order for the Assessment Year 2012-13 had already been passed by the Assessing Officer. Therefore, the Court directed that the rectification order be complied with in accordance with the law. The appeal was disposed of on this basis, without delving into the merits of the original dispute.
The High Court held that the impugned order passed by the ITAT required to be quashed and set aside. The Court condoned the delay in filing the appeals, considering the pronouncements on the liberal approach to be adopted in matters of condonation of delay, especially when substantial justice is paramount. The Court referred to various Supreme Court judgments, including Collector (LA) v. Katiji and Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, emphasizing that justice on merits is to be preferred over technicalities that scuttle a decision on merits. The Court also noted the principle that the real test for sound exercise of discretion in condoning delay is not merely the physical running of time, but whether the delay indicates negligence or abandonment of the claim, or if third-party rights have intervened. The appeals were allowed on the questions of law raised, and the delay was condoned. The appeals were restored to the file of the CIT(A) to decide on merits. No costs were imposed.
The High Court held that the appeal did not raise any substantial question of law and accordingly rejected it. The Court found no basis for the Assessing Officer's addition of R&D expenditure to the income of units eligible for deduction under Section 80IB/IC. The Tribunal had observed that the products manufactured in the 80IB/IC eligible units were entirely unrelated to the products under development in the R&D units. Even in cases where variants of formulations (e.g., injectable form vs. tablet) were under development, these were distinct from what was manufactured. The Court noted that the R&D process takes 4-5 years before manufacturing, and in the current assessment year, the R&D expenditure was not related to the 80IB/IC eligible units. The Tribunal's finding that there was no nexus between R&D activities and the manufacturing units was upheld. The CIT(A)'s general comment that drugs manufactured in exempted units and research carried out in R&D units were in respect of the same items was found to be unsubstantiated, as no specific instance was pointed out. Therefore, the disallowance of R&D expenditure corresponding to the allocation to 80IB/IC units was deleted.
The High Court held that the Petitioner was not liable for the alleged offence. The Court noted that the complaint specifically stated that Accused No. 1 failed to file its Return of Income for AY 2014-15 as per Section 139(1) of the IT Act, constituting an offence under Section 276CC. However, perusal of Form 32, uploaded on the Company Registrar's website, showed the Petitioner's resignation letter dated October 1, 2013, accepted by the Board on December 30, 2013. Form 32 indicated the Petitioner ceased to be a director from December 30, 2013. The Company Master Data report also confirmed this. Therefore, during the period the offence was alleged to have been committed (between March 31, 2014, and September 30, 2014), the Petitioner was not a director. The Court found no offence committed by the Petitioner, distinguishing the case from compounding guidelines which assume an offence has been committed. The impugned orders were quashed and set aside qua the Petitioner. The criminal case against Accused Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5 is to continue.
The High Court of Judicature at Bombay disposed of the Writ Petition as withdrawn. The court granted the petitioners liberty to file appropriate proceedings with an application seeking condonation of delay. The protection of exemption from personal appearance before the learned Magistrate, which was granted until the next date, was extended until August 31, 2026. The court explicitly clarified that it had not considered the merits of the case, and all contentions on merits, including those related to delay condonation, were expressly kept open for future consideration in the appropriate proceedings.
The High Court granted the applicant leave to withdraw the present Criminal Application No. 606 of 2025. The applicant is granted liberty to file a Criminal Revision Application under Section 438 of the BNSS, 2023, before the Sessions Court. If the Criminal Revision Application is filed within four weeks from July 1, 2026, the Sessions Court shall not insist on an application for condonation of delay and shall adjudicate the revision on its merits. The applicant is permitted to apply for exemption from personal appearance before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for a period of six weeks from July 1, 2026. All contentions of the parties on the merits of the case are expressly left open for consideration in the Criminal Revision Application. The application is disposed of with the liberty granted.
The High Court granted the Applicant leave to withdraw the present Criminal Application with liberty to file a Criminal Revision Application before the Sessions Court under Section 438 of the BNSS, 2023. The Court directed that if the Criminal Revision Application is filed within four weeks from July 1, 2026, the Sessions Court shall not insist on an application for condonation of delay and shall adjudicate the revision on its merits. The Applicant was also permitted to apply for exemption from personal appearance before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for a period of six weeks from July 1, 2026. All contentions of the parties on the merits of the case were expressly left open for consideration in the Criminal Revision Application.
The High Court allowed the petitioner to withdraw the Writ Petition. The court directed that the petitioner would be at liberty to raise all their defenses before the Assessing Officer in the proceedings initiated under Sections 147/148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The court also requested the Assessing Officer to dispose of the proceedings under Sections 147/148 expeditiously. The decision was based on the petitioner's stated intention to withdraw and pursue their remedies before the Assessing Officer. No decision was made on the merits of the case.
The High Court granted the applicant leave to withdraw the present Criminal Application No. 608 of 2025. The applicant was granted liberty to file a Criminal Revision Application under Section 438 of the BNSS, 2023, before the appropriate Sessions Court. The Court directed that if the Criminal Revision Application is filed within four weeks from July 1, 2026, the Sessions Court shall not insist on an application for condonation of delay, and the revision shall be adjudicated on its merits. The applicant was also permitted to apply for exemption from personal appearance before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for a period of six weeks from July 1, 2026. All contentions of the parties on the merits of the case were expressly left open for consideration in the Criminal Revision Application.
The High Court has not made any substantive decision on the merits of the case in this excerpt. The court has issued procedural directions regarding the supply of copies to respondents. It has ordered that copies be supplied within two weeks, failing which the matters shall stand dismissed against the unserved respondents. If copies are supplied, notice is to be issued to the unserved respondents, returnable in four weeks. Any ad-interim relief granted is to continue until then. No findings on any substantive legal issues have been recorded, and no operative directions for relief or remand have been given.
The High Court directed the transfer of all the listed Writ Petitions and their connected Civil Applications to the Principal Seat of the High Court. This decision was made in compliance with the Supreme Court's judgment in Income Tax Officer, Ward 2(1), Chandigarh (supra) and the orders of the Principal Seat. The Court also noted that certain Writ Petitions, which were not initially on the board, were taken on board and are also to be transferred. Regarding the Civil Applications seeking amendment due to subsequent events, the Court allowed these applications in terms of their prayer clauses 'B' and 'C', directing that necessary amendments be carried out within four weeks of the matters being received at the Principal Seat. The specific grounds for amendment or the substantive issues of the Writ Petitions were not decided.
The High Court directed the transfer of all the listed Writ Petitions and their connected Civil Applications to the Principal Seat of the High Court. This decision was made in compliance with the Supreme Court's judgment in Income Tax Officer, Ward 2(1), Chandigarh (supra) and the orders of the Principal Seat. The Court also noted that certain Writ Petitions, which were not initially on the board, were taken on board and are also to be transferred. Regarding the Civil Applications seeking amendment due to subsequent events, the Court allowed these applications in terms of their prayer clauses 'B' and 'C', directing that necessary amendments be carried out within four weeks of the matters being received at the Principal Seat. The specific grounds for amendment or the substantive issues of the Writ Petitions were not decided.
The Bombay High Court quashed and set aside the impugned order dated January 17, 2025, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. The Court restored two applications filed by the petitioner (dated December 5, 2015, and August 31, 2015) to the file of the Magistrate. The Magistrate was requested to decide these applications expeditiously in accordance with law, taking into consideration that the petitioner is a senior citizen aged 86 years. The Court clarified that all contentions of the parties were expressly kept open. The reasoning was based on the previous High Court order which had indicated that defenses would be available to the petitioner if criminal prosecution was initiated, and that the petitioner could approach the competent court at that stage. The disposal of the petitioner's substantive appeal by the CIT(A) on December 1, 2025, was also noted.
The High Court found substantial merit in the assessee's argument that the jurisdictional issue regarding non-compliance with Section 144B of the Act, which goes to the root of the matter, was not decided by the ITAT in its impugned order or the order dismissing the Miscellaneous Application. The Court rejected the Revenue's contention that the jurisdictional issue was not raised before the ITAT, noting it was specifically raised in the assessee's Miscellaneous Application. The Court also referred to a previous order by a co-ordinate bench allowing the assessee to canvass all grounds on merits in the appeal. Therefore, the Court held that the jurisdictional issue, which goes to the root of the matter, needs to be adjudicated by the ITAT. Additionally, the Court opined that on merits, the ITAT was required to consider and appreciate the documentary evidence produced by the assessee to prove the genuineness and creditworthiness of the transactions. Consequently, the impugned order of the ITAT was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the ITAT for adjudication of the jurisdictional issue and appreciation of evidence on merits. The appeal was allowed on the re-framed question of law.
The High Court held that the Tribunal was not justified in upholding the PCIT's order under Section 263. The Court found that the AO had indeed conducted a proper inquiry, as evidenced by the notice dated 21st October 2019, which specifically required reconciliation of 26AS/CIB/AIR/OLTAS/ServiceTax/STT/Sales-tax returns with audited books of account and the return of income. The assessee had duly replied to these queries. Therefore, it was not a case of lack of or inadequate inquiry by the AO. The Court also noted that the PCIT had not raised further queries before passing the Section 263 order. The ITAT's decision to uphold the PCIT's order primarily on the ground of the assessee's failure to appear during revision proceedings was considered an exercise of revisionary powers without legal warrant. The reliance by the ITAT on decisions in CIT Vs. Ballarpur Industries Ltd. and Sify Software Ltd. v/s ACIT was deemed not apposite, as in those cases, the AO had not raised any queries, unlike the present case. Consequently, the impugned order of the ITAT was quashed and set aside. The appeal was allowed.
The High Court held that the jurisdictional issue regarding non-compliance with Section 144B of the Act, which goes to the root of the matter, had not been decided by the ITAT in its impugned order or the order dismissing the Miscellaneous Application. The Court rejected the revenue's contention that the issue was not raised before the ITAT, noting it was specifically raised in the Miscellaneous Application. The Court also considered a previous order allowing the assessee to canvass all grounds in the appeal. Therefore, the Court found that the jurisdictional issue needed adjudication by the ITAT. Furthermore, the Court was of the view that even on merits, the ITAT was required to consider and appreciate the documentary evidence produced by the assessee to prove the genuineness and creditworthiness of transactions. Consequently, the impugned order of the ITAT was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the ITAT for adjudication of the jurisdictional issue and appreciation of evidence. The appeal was allowed on the re-framed question of law.
The High Court, in light of the Supreme Court's order remitting matters back and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the Writ Petition, directed the revival of the Petitioner's appeal before the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The Court ordered that the Petitioner be permitted to raise additional grounds on the legality and merits of the re-assessment, including the issue of limitation for the issuance of the notice under Section 148 for AY 2015-16. The Commissioner (Appeals) was directed to provide a hearing opportunity to the Petitioner and complete the adjudication within 3 months. Crucially, the Assessment Order dated March 22, 2023, was directed not to be acted upon during the pendency of the appeal. The Court clarified that the appeal would be adjudicated on its own merits and in accordance with law. The operative directions included revival of the appeal, permission to raise additional grounds, and a stay on coercive action.
The High Court held that the reliance placed by the Revenue on the judgment in Kishinchand Chellaram (supra) was misplaced and did not advance their case. For questions (a) to (c), concerning the royalty issue, the Court answered them in the affirmative in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue. This implies the ITAT's decision on the quantum of royalty was upheld. For questions (d) to (g) and the additional question for AY 2017-18, concerning the PE issue, the Court stated that these questions did not give rise to any substantial question of law and therefore were not entertained. This means the ITAT's findings on the PE issue were also upheld, as the Revenue's appeals on these points were dismissed. The operative direction was that all appeals were disposed of in these terms, with no order as to costs.
The High Court decided questions (a) to (c) in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue, answering them in the affirmative. The Court found the Revenue's reliance on the judgment in Kishinchand Chellaram (supra) to be misplaced. The Court distinguished the facts from Kishinchand Chellaram, noting that the present case concerned the interpretation of "paid" under Article 12 of the India-US DTAA, unlike the former which dealt with dividend taxation under the Income-tax Act. The Court also referred to its own decision in Pfizer Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax (2003) 259 ITR 391, emphasizing that for dividend income paid to a non-resident, tax accrues only on payment, not on declaration, as per Section 9(1)(iv). Questions (d) to (g) and the additional question for AY 2017-18 were not entertained as they did not give rise to any substantial question of law. All appeals were disposed of in these terms.
The High Court decided questions (a) to (c) in favour of the Assessee (GIA US) and against the Revenue. The Court found the Revenue's reliance on the judgment in Kishinchand Chellaram (supra) to be misplaced. The Court distinguished the present case from Kishinchand Chellaram, noting that the issue here was the amount "paid" as contemplated under Article 12 of the India-US DTAA, not the taxability of a dividend declared but not yet remitted. The Court referred to its own decision in Pfizer Corporation vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax, which held that dividend income paid to a non-resident is deemed to accrue in India only upon payment, not declaration. Therefore, the ITAT's decision on the royalty issue, allowing reduction based on the APA and considering the payment aspect, was upheld. Questions (d) to (g) and the additional question for AY 2017-18 were not entertained as they did not give rise to any substantial question of law. All appeals were disposed of accordingly.
The High Court answered questions (a) to (c) in the affirmative, in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue. The Court found the reliance by the Revenue on the judgment in Kishinchand Chellaram (supra) to be misplaced. The Court distinguished the facts from Kishinchand Chellaram, where a company's resolution to treat dividends as loans did not alter the character of the receipt for tax purposes. In the present case, the issue was the quantum of 'paid' royalty under Article 12 of the India-US DTAA. The Court referred to Pfizer Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax (2003) 259 ITR 391, where it was held that dividend income paid to a non-resident is deemed to accrue in India only on payment, not on declaration, as per Section 9(1)(iv). The Court held that the reliance on Kishinchand Chellaram was not applicable to determine the amount 'paid' as royalty under the DTAA. Questions (d) to (g), and the additional question for AY 2017-18, were not entertained as they did not give rise to any substantial question of law. All appeals were disposed of on these terms.
The High Court held that the reliance placed by the Revenue on the judgment in Kishinchand Chellaram (supra) was misplaced and did not support their case concerning the royalty issue. The Court found that the facts in the present case were different from Kishinchand Chellaram, particularly concerning the interpretation of the word 'paid' under Article 12 of the India-US DTAA, as distinguished from 'declared' or 'distributed' under Section 8 of the Income Tax Act. The Court answered questions (a) to (c) in the affirmative, in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue. For questions (d) to (g) and the additional question for AY 2017-18, the Court held that they did not give rise to any substantial question of law and therefore were not entertained. Consequently, all appeals were disposed of in terms of these findings, with no order as to costs.
The High Court held that the reliance placed by the Revenue on the judgment in Kishinchand Chellaram (supra) was misplaced and did not support their case. For questions (a) to (c) concerning the royalty issue, the Court answered them in the affirmative in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue. This implies the Tribunal's decision to allow reduction of returned income based on the APA, allow revision of income, and permit adjustments consequent to the APA (including secondary adjustments) was upheld. The Court reasoned that the facts in the present case were different from Kishinchand Chellaram, particularly concerning the interpretation of "paid" under Article 12 of the India-US DTAA and the applicability of Section 9(1)(iv) as discussed in Pfizer Corporation. The Court found that the dividend income paid to a non-resident is deemed to accrue in India only on payment, not on declaration, distinguishing it from the case where tax liability attaches upon payment. Questions (d) to (g) and the additional question for AY 2017-18 concerning the PE issue were not entertained as they did not give rise to any substantial question of law. Therefore, the appeals were disposed of in terms of these findings.
The High Court held that the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the assessee. The Court found that the assessee had virtually written off the debt as irrecoverable by making a provision in the P&L account and a corresponding entry in the ledger of Gannon Dunkerly & Co. Limited on the liability side. The Court reasoned that the assessee could not expressly reflect the amount as "written off" in the P&L account and Ledger without giving undue advantage to Gannon Dunkerly & Co. Ltd. in the ongoing litigation. The institution of legal proceedings was considered ample testimony of the amount being irrecoverable. The Court relied on the Supreme Court decisions in "Vijaya Bank (Supra)" and "Southern Technologies Limited (Supra)", which held that an assessee is entitled to claim deduction even without specifically writing off the bad debt in the Profit and Loss Account, particularly when litigation is pending for recovery. The Court concluded that this was not a case of merely making a provision for bad debts. The judgment and order of the ITAT relating to the disallowance of deduction was set aside, and the order of the CIT(A) was restored to that extent.
The High Court held that questions (a) to (c), relating to the royalty issue, were to be answered in the affirmative in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue. The Court found the Revenue's reliance on the judgment in Kishinchand Chellaram (supra) to be misplaced. It distinguished the facts of the present case from Kishinchand Chellaram, particularly concerning the interpretation of the word "paid" under Article 12 of the India-US DTAA and Section 9(1)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as interpreted in Pfizer Corporation (supra). The Court noted that Section 9(1)(iv) contemplates dividend income being deemed to accrue in India only upon payment, not declaration. Questions (d) to (g) and the additional question for AY 2017-18, concerning the PE issue, were not entertained as they did not give rise to any substantial question of law. All appeals were disposed of in terms of these findings.
The High Court allowed the petition. The Court held that the notice under Section 148 for AY 2014-15 was issued on March 26, 2021, which is after the expiry of the four-year period from the end of the assessment year (March 31, 2019). According to the proviso to Section 147, reopening after four years is permissible only if income escaped assessment due to the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The Court found that the petitioner had disclosed all material facts necessary for the assessment, including its business, its status as a subsidiary, and its license agreement with the Chennai Port Trust, in its Annual Report, Tax Audit Report, Form 3CEB, and Income Tax Return. The 'Reasons to Believe' provided by the revenue contained a bald statement of non-disclosure without specifying which material facts were not disclosed. Therefore, the reopening under Section 147 was held to be invalid. The Court quashed and set aside the notice dated March 26, 2021, the order dated February 14, 2022, and the show cause notice dated March 15, 2022, along with the draft assessment order.
The High Court held that the reliance placed by the Revenue on the judgment in Kishinchand Chellaram (supra) was misplaced and did not advance their case. For questions (a) to (c), concerning the royalty issue, the Court answered them in the affirmative in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue. This implies the Tribunal's decision to allow reduction of returned income based on the APA, revise income, and allow adjustments as a consequence of the APA was upheld. The Court found that the facts of the present case were different from Kishinchand Chellaram, particularly concerning the interpretation of 'paid' under Article 12 of the India-US DTAA and Section 9(1)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, as discussed in the Pfizer Corporation case. Questions (d) to (g), and the additional question for AY 2017-18, relating to the PE issue, were not entertained as they did not give rise to any substantial question of law. Therefore, the appeals were disposed of in terms of the affirmative answers to questions (a) to (c) and the non-entertainment of the PE-related questions.
The High Court held that the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2015-16 is time-barred. This decision is based on the admitted fact that the notice was issued on or after April 1, 2021, and pertains to AY 2015-16. The Court relied on the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal, which was reiterated in the Supreme Court's order dated May 4, 2026. The Supreme Court had directed that if a matter pertains to AY 2015-16, no further adjudicatory exercise is required by the High Court, other than declaring the notice as time-barred. Consequently, the Writ Petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice was set aside. Any action taken or emanating from the said Notice was also quashed and set aside. The Rule was made absolute, and the Writ Petition was disposed of accordingly.
The High Court held that the Writ Petition stands revived. It found that the impugned Notice under Section 148 was issued on or after April 1, 2021, and pertains to Assessment Year 2015-16. Following the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Rajeev Bansal, the Court held that the Notice is clearly time-barred. Consequently, the Writ Petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 was set aside. Any action taken or emanating from the said Notice was also quashed and set aside. The Rule was made absolute, and the Writ Petition was disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.
The High Court held that the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2015-16 is clearly time-barred. This decision is based on the admitted fact that the notice was issued on or after April 1, 2021, and pertains to Assessment Year 2015-16. The court relied on the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Rajeev Bansal, wherein it was accepted that reassessment notices for Assessment Year 2015-16 would be barred by time. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice under Section 148 was set aside. Any action taken or emanating from the said notice was also quashed and set aside. The court found the objections raised by the petitioner's counsel to the revival of the petition to be irrelevant in light of the Supreme Court's order and the conceded position of the Revenue.
The High Court held that the impugned notice issued under Section 148 for Assessment Year 2015-16 was time-barred. This decision was based on the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal. The Supreme Court's order dated 4th May 2026, in a batch of appeals, directed that if a matter pertains to Assessment Year 2015-16, no further adjudicatory exercise is required by the High Court, except to declare the notice as time-barred in light of the Rajeev Bansal decision. Since the present case involves AY 2015-16 and the notice was issued on or after 1st April 2021, it is clearly time-barred. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, and the notice was set aside, along with any consequential actions.
The High Court held that the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2015-16 is clearly time-barred. This decision is based on the admitted fact that the Notice was issued on or after April 1, 2021, and pertains to Assessment Year 2015-16. The court relied on the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Rajeev Bansal. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice, along with any action taken or emanating from it, was quashed and set aside. The court found the objections raised by the petitioner regarding the revival of the petition to be irrelevant given the clear concession on the time-bar issue. No further adjudicatory exercise was required for this assessment year.
The High Court held that the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2015-16, is time-barred. This finding is based on the admitted fact that the Notice was issued on or after 1st April 2021 and pertains to AY 2015-16. The Court relied on the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2693), as recorded in the Supreme Court's order dated 4th May 2026. The Supreme Court had directed that if a matter pertains to AY 2015-16, no further adjudication is required, and the notices should be declared time-barred. Consequently, the Writ Petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice, along with any consequential actions, was set aside. The rule was made absolute.
The High Court held that the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2015-16 is time-barred. This decision is based on the admitted fact that the notice was issued on or after 1st April 2021 and pertains to AY 2015-16. The Court relied on the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal. As per the Supreme Court's order dated 4th May 2026, if a matter pertains to AY 2015-16, no further adjudicatory exercise is required by the High Court, except to declare the notice as time-barred. Consequently, the Writ Petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice under Section 148 was set aside. Any action taken or emanating from the said Notice was also quashed.
The High Court held that the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2015-16 is time-barred. This decision is based on the admitted fact that the Notice was issued on or after 1st April 2021 and pertains to AY 2015-16. The court relied on the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal. As per the Supreme Court's order dated 4th May 2026, if a matter pertains to AY 2015-16, no further adjudicatory exercise is required by the High Court, except to declare the Notice as time-barred. Consequently, the Writ Petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice was set aside. Any action taken or emanating from the said Notice was also quashed and set aside. The Rule was made absolute, and the Writ Petition was disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.
The High Court held that the Notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2015-16, issued on or after April 1, 2021, is clearly time-barred. This decision was based on the admitted facts of the case and the concession made by the Revenue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Rajeev Bansal (2024) 167 taxmann.com 70 (SC). Specifically, paragraph 19(f) of the Rajeev Bansal judgment records the Revenue's concession that for the assessment year 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion within the prescribed period under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA). Consequently, the impugned Notice under Section 148 was set aside, and any consequential action was quashed. The Rule was made absolute, and the Writ Petition was disposed of.
The High Court held that the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2015-16 is time-barred. This decision is based on the admitted fact that the notice was issued on or after 1st April 2021 and pertains to AY 2015-16. The Court relied on the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal. Consequently, the Writ Petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice, along with any action taken or emanating from it, was set aside. The Court made the rule absolute and disposed of the petition accordingly, with no order as to costs. The primary issue of jurisdiction concerning faceless assessment, initially raised, became moot due to the time-barring of the notice.
The High Court held that the Writ Petition stands revived. It noted that the impugned Notice under Section 148 was issued on or after April 1, 2021, and pertains to Assessment Year 2015-16. In light of the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Rajeev Bansal, the Court held that the Notice is clearly time-barred. Consequently, the Writ Petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 was set aside. Any action taken or emanating from the said Notice was also quashed and set aside. The Rule was made absolute, and the Writ Petition was disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs. The Court did not leave any issue undecided.
The High Court held that the Writ Petition should be revived. It noted that it is an admitted fact that the impugned Notice under Section 148 pertains to Assessment Year 2015-16 and was issued on or after April 1, 2021. Following the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Supreme Court in *Union of India & Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal*, the Court held that the Notice is clearly time-barred. Consequently, the Writ Petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice issued under Section 148, along with any action taken or emanating from it, was quashed and set aside. The Court made no further adjudicatory exercise necessary, as the issue was resolved by the time-barring concession for Assessment Year 2015-16.
The High Court held that the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2015-16, issued on or after April 1, 2021, is clearly time-barred. The Court found that the concession made by the Revenue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Rajeev Bansal squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Paragraph 19(f) of the Rajeev Bansal judgment, which was relied upon, states the Revenue's concession that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped. Consequently, the Writ Petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 was set aside. Any action taken or emanating from the said Notice was also quashed and set aside. The Rule was made absolute, and the Writ Petition was disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.
The High Court held that the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2015-16 is time-barred. This decision was based on the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal. The Supreme Court's order dated 4th May 2026 clearly stated that if a matter pertains to AY 2015-16, no further adjudicatory exercise is required by the High Court, except to declare the notice as time-barred. Since it was an admitted fact that the impugned notice was issued on or after 1st April 2021 and pertained to AY 2015-16, the notice was consequently set aside. Any action taken or emanating from the said notice was also quashed. The rule was made absolute, and the Writ Petition was disposed of.
The High Court held that the Writ Petition stands revived. It found that the impugned Notice under Section 148 was issued on or after April 1, 2021, and pertains to Assessment Year 2015-16. In light of the concession made by the Learned Additional Solicitor General before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Rajeev Bansal, the Court held that the Notice is clearly time-barred. Consequently, the Writ Petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 was set aside. Any action taken or emanating from the said Notice was also quashed and set aside. The Rule was made absolute, and the Writ Petition was disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs. The Court noted that if the matter pertains to AY 2015-16, no further adjudicatory exercise is required, except to declare the notices as time-barred.
The High Court held that the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2015-16, is time-barred. This decision is based on the admitted fact that the Notice was issued on or after 1st April 2021 and pertains to Assessment Year 2015-16. The Court relied on the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Rajeev Bansal. The reasoning is that if the matter pertains to Assessment Year 2015-16, no further adjudicatory exercise is required, except to declare the notice as time-barred. Consequently, the Writ Petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice, along with any consequential actions, was set aside. The rule was made absolute.
The High Court held that the Writ Petition should be revived. It found that the impugned Notice under Section 148 was issued on or after 1st April 2021 and pertains to Assessment Year 2015-16. Based on the admitted facts and the concession made by the Learned Additional Solicitor General before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Rajeev Bansal, the Court concluded that the Notice is clearly time-barred. Consequently, the Writ Petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 was set aside. Any action taken or emanating from the said Notice was also quashed and set aside. The Court noted that if the matter pertains to Assessment Year 2015-16, no further adjudicatory exercise is required, except to declare the notices as time-barred. The rule was made absolute, and the Writ Petition was disposed of accordingly.
The High Court held that the Writ Petition stands revived. It found that the impugned Notice under Section 148 was issued on or after 1st April 2021 and pertains to Assessment Year 2015-16. Following the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Rajeev Bansal, the Court held that the Notice is clearly time-barred. Consequently, the Writ Petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 was set aside. Any action taken or emanating from the said Notice was also quashed and set aside. The Rule was made absolute, and the Writ Petition was disposed of accordingly. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the Writ Petition stands revived. It found that the impugned Notice under Section 148 was issued on or after April 1, 2021, and pertains to Assessment Year 2015-16. In light of the concession made by the Learned Additional Solicitor General before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal, the court held that the Notice is clearly time-barred. Consequently, the Writ Petition was allowed, and the impugned Notice issued under Section 148 was set aside. Any action taken or emanating from the said Notice was also quashed and set aside. The Rule was made absolute, and the Writ Petition was disposed of accordingly.
The High Court held that the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2015-16 is clearly time-barred. This conclusion is based on the admitted fact that the notice was issued on or after 1st April 2021 and pertains to AY 2015-16, coupled with the concession made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal. Following the Supreme Court's order dated 4th May 2026, which stipulated that if a matter pertains to AY 2015-16, no further adjudicatory exercise is required except to declare the notice as time-barred, the Court found no necessity for further deliberation. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, and the impugned notice was set aside. Any action taken or emanating from the said notice was also quashed and set aside. The rule was made absolute, and the writ petition was disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.