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The High Court held that the respondent-assessee is indeed a developer of infrastructure facilities and not merely a works contractor. The Court found that the assessee had undertaken comprehensive responsibilities, including preliminary and detailed site surveys, formulation of designs, acquisition of land, obtaining statutory permissions, undertaking the development, construction, and execution of projects, procurement of materials, installation of components, erection, and commissioning. Crucially, the assessee had invested its own funds and borrowed funds, undertaken all risks involved, deployed technical personnel and machinery, and bore both business and entrepreneurial/investment risks. The direct work orders issued by various government authorities to the assessee/consortium confirmed that the assessee had itself entered into agreements for developing the infrastructure facilities. Therefore, all conditions for claiming deduction under Section 80-IA(4) were met. The Court answered the substantial question of law against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee, dismissing the appeals. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeals.
The High Court held that the respondent-assessee is indeed a developer of infrastructure facilities and not merely a works contractor. The Court found that the assessee had undertaken comprehensive responsibilities, including preliminary and detailed site surveys, formulation of designs, acquisition of land, obtaining statutory permissions, undertaking the development, construction, and execution of projects, procurement of materials, installation of components, erection, and commissioning. Crucially, the assessee had invested its own funds and borrowed funds, undertaken all risks involved, deployed technical personnel and machinery, and bore both business and entrepreneurial/investment risks. The direct work orders issued by various government authorities to the assessee/consortium confirmed that the assessee had itself entered into agreements for developing the infrastructure facilities. Therefore, all conditions for claiming deduction under Section 80-IA(4) were met. The Court answered the substantial question of law against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee, dismissing the appeals. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeals.
The High Court held that the respondent-assessee is indeed a developer of infrastructure facilities and not merely a works contractor. The Court found that the assessee had undertaken comprehensive responsibilities, including preliminary and detailed site surveys, formulation of designs, acquisition of land, obtaining statutory permissions, undertaking the development, construction, and execution of projects, procurement of materials, installation of components, erection, and commissioning. Crucially, the assessee had invested its own funds and borrowed funds, undertaken all risks involved, deployed technical personnel and machinery, and bore both business and entrepreneurial/investment risks. The direct work orders issued by various government authorities to the assessee/consortium confirmed that the assessee had itself entered into agreements for developing the infrastructure facilities. Therefore, all conditions for claiming deduction under Section 80-IA(4) were met. The Court answered the substantial question of law against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee, dismissing the appeals. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeals.
The High Court held that the limitation period for preferring an appeal commences from the date on which a copy of the judgment and order passed by the ITAT is received by the aggrieved party. The Court reasoned that for an aggrieved party to deliberate and decide whether to appeal, they need a complete copy of the judgment to understand the findings and reasons. To hold otherwise would deprive the party of their right to appeal based on cogent grounds. The Court found that the applicant received the ITAT's order on 27th February 2025. Regarding the second issue, the Court adopted a liberal and justice-oriented approach, considering the delay was not inordinate and did not indicate deliberate or mala fide conduct. The applicant provided a stage-wise explanation for the 88-day delay, which was found to be bona fide. The Court noted that no irreversible prejudice would be caused to the revenue by condoning the delay. Therefore, the application for condonation of delay was allowed.
The High Court observed that the tax effect of Rs. 1,21,95,792/- was below the monetary limits prescribed in CBDT Circular No. 9/2024, dated 17th September 2024. Consequently, the Court disposed of the appeal as withdrawn/not pressed in view of the said circular. Liberty was granted to the Revenue to apply in the event the case falls within the exceptions of the circular. The Court also directed refund of court fees, if any, as per rules. No specific issue regarding the merits of the assessment was decided.
The High Court observed that the tax effect in the appeal, amounting to Rs. 58,45,423/-, was below the monetary limits prescribed by CBDT Circular No. 9/2024, dated 17th September 2024. Consequently, the Court disposed of the appeal as withdrawn or not pressed. The Court granted liberty to the Revenue to apply in the event the case fell within the exceptions of the said circular. No decision was made on the merits of the substantive tax dispute.
The High Court observed that the tax effect in the appeal filed by the Revenue was Rs. 92,32,315/-, which is below the monetary limits prescribed in CBDT Circular No. 9/2024, dated 17th September 2024. Consequently, the Court disposed of the appeal as withdrawn or not pressed. Liberty was granted to the Revenue to apply in the event the case falls within the exceptions of the said circular. The Court also directed for the refund of court fees, if any, as per Rules.
The High Court observed that the tax effect of Rs. 34,40,153/- was below the monetary limits stipulated in CBDT Circular No. 9/2024, dated 17th September 2024. Consequently, the Court disposed of the appeal as withdrawn or not pressed. The Court granted liberty to the appellant (Revenue) to apply for revival of the appeal if the case falls within the exceptions mentioned in the said circular. No decision was made on the merits of the original dispute.
The High Court observed that the tax effect of Rs. 26,18,409/- was below the monetary limits prescribed in CBDT Circular No. 9/2024, dated 17th September 2024. Consequently, the Court disposed of the appeal as withdrawn/not pressed in view of the said circular. The Court granted liberty to the Revenue to apply in the event the case fell within the exceptions of the circular. No decision was made on the substantive merits of the ITAT's order.
The High Court, after hearing the learned counsel for the appellant, allowed the appeal to be withdrawn/not pressed. This decision was made in accordance with CBDT Circular No. 9 of 2024, which provides for the withdrawal of appeals where the tax effect is below specified monetary limits. The Court granted the appellant liberty to move the Court again if the case is found to fall under the exceptions outlined in the circular. The operative direction is that the appeal is withdrawn/not pressed. No specific issue regarding the merits of the assessment was decided.
The High Court held that the reassessment proceedings were not validly initiated. Firstly, the notice dated 24th March 2026 under Section 148A(1) was not accompanied by the necessary information, which was only provided on 27th May 2026, rendering the initial notice defective. Secondly, the Court found that Section 56(2)(x) of the Act could not be invoked in the facts of the case. The Revenue had failed to appreciate that the transaction was a proportionate rights allotment where the Petitioner's shareholding remained unchanged, and no disproportionate benefit was identified. The mere difference between the subscription price and the fair market value did not constitute receipt of property for inadequate consideration in this context. The Court also noted that the Revenue's reliance solely on a price difference arising from a proportionate rights allotment was insufficient grounds for invoking Section 56(2)(x). The Court concluded that the basis for reassessment was unsustainable and that the reassessment proceedings could not be sustained. The impugned notices and order were set aside. The Court did not examine other grounds urged by the Petitioner, leaving them open.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal to be withdrawn by the Appellant. The reasoning provided is that the Appellant's counsel sought to withdraw the appeal in view of CBDT Circular No. 09/2024, dated 17th September 2024. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the case was made. The operative direction was to allow the appeal to be withdrawn and disposed of accordingly, with a direction for refund of court fees as per rules.
The High Court recorded the statement made by the learned AGP as an undertaking to the Court. The Court directed the petitioner to produce his Aadhar Card, Pan-card, along with Form No. 16-A and relevant decisions of the High Court on the point before respondent no.3. Upon presentation of these documents, respondent no.3 was directed to take necessary steps to refund the deducted amount to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the documents. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions. No specific finding on the entitlement to the refund itself was made, but rather a procedural mechanism for its release was established based on the revenue's submission.
The High Court recorded the statement made by the learned AGP as an undertaking to the Court. The Court directed the petitioner to produce his Aadhar Card, PAN card, along with Form No. 16-A and relevant decisions of the High Court on the point before respondent no.3. Upon presentation of these documents, respondent no.3 was directed to take necessary steps to refund the deducted amount to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the documents. The Court did not delve into the merits of the tax deduction or the petitioner's entitlement beyond the procedural requirement of submitting necessary documents. The ratio decidendi is that procedural compliance, as undertaken by the revenue, can lead to the resolution of refund claims.
The High Court held that the Draft Assessment Order dated 25th March 2024 was indeed passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 153(1) read with Section 153(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Court found that the period of limitation expired on December 31, 2023. Consequently, the Draft Assessment Order was without jurisdiction and illegal. The Court also addressed the Revenue's preliminary objection regarding the alternative remedy, stating that the existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226, especially when the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction. Relying on established principles and its own prior decision in Kedaara Capital Fund II LLP, the Court held that it would not relegate the assessee to the statutory appeal process to adjudicate a jurisdictional objection. Therefore, the Court quashed and set aside the Draft Assessment Order, the consequential Final Assessment Order, the Notice of Demand, and the Penalty Show Cause Notice. The Rule was made absolute.
The High Court allowed the appeal to be withdrawn. The Court noted that the learned Counsel for the Appellant sought to withdraw the appeal in view of CBDT Circular No. 09/2024, dated 17th September 2024. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of as withdrawn. The Court also directed that the refund of court fees, if any, be allowed as per the rules. No other issues were decided on merits.
In Income Tax Appeal No. 353 of 2015, the High Court noted that the disputed claim/tax effect of Rs. 61,29,134/- was below the monetary limits stipulated in CBDT Circular No. 09/2024, dated 17th September 2024. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of as not pressed, with liberty granted to apply if the appeal fell under any exceptions to the Tax Effect Circular. In Income Tax Appeal No. 859 of 2015, the Revenue's counsel sought to withdraw the appeal in view of CBDT Circular No. 09/2024. The High Court allowed the appeal to be withdrawn and disposed of it accordingly. Refund of court fees was permitted as per rules.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal to be withdrawn. The reasoning provided is that the appellant's counsel sought to withdraw the appeal in view of CBDT Circular No. 09/2024, dated 17th September 2024. The appeal was accordingly allowed to be withdrawn and stands disposed of as such. The Tribunal also directed that the refund of court fees, if any, be allowed as per the rules. No specific issue was decided on merits, as the appeal was withdrawn. Therefore, no ratio decidendi for future cases on the substantive issues of the appeal can be extracted. The operative direction is the withdrawal of the appeal and refund of court fees.
The High Court allowed the appeal to be withdrawn by the Appellant. The reasoning provided is solely based on the Appellant's request to withdraw the appeal in light of CBDT Circular No. 09/2024, dated 17th September 2024. The Court noted that the matter was called out and the learned Counsel for the Appellant sought to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the case was made. Refund of court fees, if any, was allowed as per rules. No issues were expressly left undecided as the appeal was withdrawn.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal to be withdrawn. The reasoning provided is that the appellant's counsel sought to withdraw the appeal in view of CBDT Circular No. 09/2024. The operative direction was to allow the appeal to be withdrawn and dispose of it accordingly. Refund of court fees was also permitted as per rules. No issues were decided on merits.
The High Court allowed the appeal to be withdrawn. The reasoning was based on the appellant's counsel's submission that the withdrawal was sought in light of CBDT Circular No. 09/2024. The operative direction was that the appeal stands disposed of as withdrawn. No issues on the merits of the assessment were decided, and no refund of court fees was mentioned as being disallowed.
The High Court disposed of Income Tax Appeal No. 353 of 2015 as not pressed, in view of CBDT Circular No. 09/2024, dated 17th September 2024, noting that the disputed claim/tax effect of Rs. 61,29,134/- was below the monetary limits prescribed by the circular. Liberty was granted to apply in case the appeal fell under the exceptions of the Tax Effect Circular. For Income Tax Appeal No. 859 of 2015, the Court allowed the appeal to be withdrawn and disposed of it accordingly, also citing CBDT Circular No. 09/2024. The reasoning for both decisions was based on the monetary limits set by the CBDT circular, which dictates the threshold for filing appeals by the Revenue. The principle is that appeals below a certain tax effect are generally not to be pursued unless specific exceptions apply. Refund of court fees was allowed as per rules for the withdrawn appeal.
The High Court held that the Petitioner's grievance was justified and admitted by the Revenue. The Petitioner had specifically requested a personal hearing through Video Conferencing, but could not avail it due to technical glitches, which was no fault of their own. The Court noted that Section 144B(6)(vii) & (viii) of the IT Act incorporates principles of natural justice into the faceless assessment procedure, specifically contemplating a personal hearing via Video Conferencing when requested. The inability to avail this facility due to technical issues constituted a violation of natural justice. Consequently, the Draft Assessment Order dated September 26, 2023, and the Final Assessment Order dated October 30, 2023, were quashed and set aside. The assessment proceedings were remanded to Respondent No. 3 for fresh adjudication, with a direction to afford the Petitioner a reasonable and effective opportunity of hearing, including personal hearing via Video Conferencing, and to consider all submissions and documents. The Court explicitly stated that no observations on merits were made, and all contentions on the merits of the assessment were kept open.
The Bombay High Court, Bench at Aurangabad, has not delivered a final decision on the merits of the case. Instead, the court has issued notice to the respondents and granted ad interim relief. The court has stayed the operation of the notice under Section 148 dated March 30, 2025, for AY 2015-16, pending the hearing and final disposal of the writ petition. This interim order indicates that the court found prima facie merit in the petitioner's challenge to the validity of the notice based on the ten-year limitation period. The court has not yet decided on the substantive issues raised by the petitioner regarding the applicability of Section 153C and the ten-year block period. The operative direction is the stay of the impugned notice.
The High Court held that the issue raised in the appeal by the Revenue for Assessment Year 2013-14 is covered against the Department by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) v. Kolhapur Zilla Sahkari Dudh Utpadak Sangh Ltd., [2023] 293 Taxman 603 (SC). Based on this submission by the Revenue's counsel, the Court found that no substantial question of law arises from the appeal. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed. The ratio decidendi is that if a High Court appeal is rendered infructuous or devoid of a substantial question of law due to a binding Supreme Court precedent, it should be dismissed. No specific issue was left undecided.
The Bombay High Court noted the submission by the Revenue's counsel that the issue raised in the appeal for Assessment Year 2009-10 is covered against the Department by the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) v. Kolhapur Zilla Sahkari Dudh Utpadak Sangh Ltd., [2023] 293 Taxman 603 (SC). The Revenue's counsel further submitted that the appeal may accordingly be dismissed as no substantial question of law arises. The Court accepted this submission and accordingly dismissed the appeal. The ratio decidendi is that if an issue is squarely covered by a Supreme Court judgment, an appeal on that issue does not present a substantial question of law and should be dismissed.
The High Court held that the existence of surpluses, by itself, does not establish that the hospital existed for profit. It reasoned that the Petitioner's objects, actual activities, and the use of funds during the period in question clearly demonstrated that it existed solely for philanthropic purposes and not for profit. The Court found that the Respondent No. 1's grounds for rejecting the applications were not sustainable. Consequently, the impugned orders rejecting the Petitioner's applications for approval under Section 10(23C)(via) were quashed and set aside. The Court directed Respondent No. 1, or the competent authority, to issue the requisite approval orders for AYs 2002-03 to 2010-11 and AYs 2011-12 to 2021-22 within eight weeks of the judgment's upload. The ratio decidendi is that the overall conduct and application of funds, in line with stated philanthropic objects, are paramount in determining if an institution exists solely for philanthropic purposes, rather than solely on the generation of surplus.
The High Court held that the Petitioner hospital satisfies the requirement of existing solely for philanthropic purposes and not for purposes of profit under Section 10(23C)(via) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Court found that the Petitioner's objects, actual activities, and the use of its funds clearly established its philanthropic nature. The Court reasoned that the mere generation of surplus, by itself, does not establish that the Hospital existed for profit. The Court noted that the Petitioner's Memorandum and Articles of Association, its registration as a public trust, and the application of its income and property towards its stated objects were indicative of its philanthropic purpose. The Court quashed and set aside the impugned orders of the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax. The Court directed the Respondent or the competent authority to issue the requisite approval orders for Assessment Years 2002-03 to 2010-11 and for Assessment Years 2011-12 to 2021-22, consistent with the judgment's findings, within eight weeks of the judgment's upload.
The Bombay High Court at Kolhapur, acknowledging the submission made by the Revenue's counsel, held that the issue raised in the appeal for Assessment Year 2012-13 is indeed covered against the Department by the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) v. Kolhapur Zilla Sahkari Dudh Utpadak Sangh Ltd., [2023] 293 Taxman 603 (SC). Consequently, the Court found that no substantial question of law arises. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. No specific findings on the merits of the original dispute were made, as the dismissal was based on the Supreme Court's precedent.
The High Court, considering that the Petitioner had limited the relief sought to a direction for the CIT(A) to hear and decide the pending appeal, disposed of the Writ Petition on that basis. The Court requested the CIT(A) to hear and decide the Petitioner's appeal, which challenged the Assessment Order dated 14th March 2024 and the reassessment proceedings for Assessment Year 2018-19, as expeditiously as possible. The Court suggested a timeframe of preferably within four months from the date the order is brought to the CIT(A)'s attention. The Court made no order as to costs. The broader reliefs initially sought in the Writ Petition were not adjudicated upon.
The High Court noted that the Petitioner's appeal before the CIT(A) had been pending for six and a half years. Considering the peculiar facts of the case, the Court requested the CIT(A) to hear and decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible, and in any event, within a period of 12 weeks from the date of the order. The Writ Petition was disposed of in these terms. The Court did not explicitly decide on the merits of the Petitioner's claims regarding the quashing of orders or the release of bank accounts, as the primary relief sought and granted was the expeditious disposal of the appeal. The operative direction was to the CIT(A) to decide the pending appeal within the specified timeframe. No issue was expressly left undecided, as the petition was disposed of based on the agreed-upon direction.
The High Court held that the original notice under Section 148A(1) clearly specified only one ground for reopening the assessment, which was the escapement of interest income amounting to Rs. 2,51,237/-, based on information from the Risk Management Portal. No other ground was mentioned in the notice. The Assessing Officer dropped this specific claim after considering the petitioner's reply. However, the impugned order introduced a new ground concerning the non-disclosure of a Rs. 83,87,386/- transaction for immovable property purchase, which was not part of the original notice. The Court found that since this ground was not in the original notice, there were no foundational facts for the Assessing Officer to assume jurisdiction under Section 148A to pass the impugned order regarding this transaction. Therefore, the impugned order was quashed to the extent it held the petitioner liable for reassessment concerning the immovable property transaction. The Court rejected the Revenue's plea for remand, noting that the Assessing Officer's affidavit did not claim any mistake in omitting the second ground, and remanding the case for a non-existent ground in the notice would serve no purpose.
The High Court held that the Assessing Officer (AO) was incorrect in rejecting the assessee's second application for waiver of penalty. Firstly, the amendments made by the Finance Act, 2026, effective from March 1, 2026, explicitly allow for waiver applications even in cases where penalty is levied for under-reporting of income due to misreporting. The assessee had fulfilled the conditions under the amended Section 270AA(1), including paying additional income-tax. Secondly, the Court found that the amendments created a fresh cause of action, particularly by allowing waiver applications within one month of receiving the penalty order, which was not possible under the pre-amended provisions. Therefore, the assessee's second application, filed on July 22, 2026, after receiving the penalty order on June 29, 2026, was valid. The Court noted that the satisfaction of all conditions in Section 270AA(1) makes it mandatory for the AO to grant waiver. Consequently, the impugned order rejecting the waiver application was quashed, and the AO was directed to allow the application and grant waiver of penalty.
The High Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable. The Court found that the NCLT had acted within its jurisdiction under the IBC. The NCLT's observations, which the Petitioners found objectionable, were based on the settled legal position that once a resolution plan is approved, claims pertaining to the period prior to the approval stand extinguished. The Court distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in 'S. Rajendra v.s Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (Benami Prohibition and Ors)', stating that it dealt with a conflict between two special statutes (IBC and Benami Act), whereas the present case involved state tax legislation. The Court reasoned that allowing such an argument would collapse the settled position of law regarding the extinguishment of claims upon resolution plan approval. Therefore, the Petitioners' reliance on the S. Rajendra judgment to claim lack of jurisdiction was misplaced. The Court directed the Petitioners to avail the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 61 of the IBC. No observations were made on the merits of the matter.
The High Court held that in reassessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer must dispose of the assessee's objections by a speaking order before issuing a Notice under Section 143(2). The Court rejected the Revenue's argument that this only applied to the final Assessment Order, emphasizing the Supreme Court's explicit direction in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. to dispose of objections before proceeding with the assessment. Furthermore, the Court found that the issuance of the Notice under Section 142(1) on 12th November 2019 was in clear violation of the High Court's decision in Asian Paints Ltd. This is because the Notice was issued before the expiry of the 4-week period from the date of the order rejecting the Petitioner's objections (31st October 2019). Consequently, the Notices dated 2nd September 2019 (Section 143(2)) and 12th November 2019 (Section 142(1)) were set aside. Other contentions were left undecided.
The High Court held that while education is a charitable purpose, merely running an educational institution does not automatically grant property tax exemption. The Trust must establish that its buildings and lands, or portions thereof, are solely occupied and used for public charitable purposes. The Court found that the Petitioner had failed to make out such a case, observing that the Trust accepted fees and donations and did not provide free education. Consequently, the Court held that exemption from tax could not be granted. The Court did not accept the contention that being a linguistic minority institution by itself entitled the Trust to exemption. The Court found no illegality in the demand raised and, in the absence of the Trust staking its claim on a year-to-year basis, found no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The Court dismissed the Writ Petition but permitted the Trust to claim exemption for future years by filing applications with appropriate material.
The High Court noted the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the instruction to withdraw the Writ Petition due to subsequent developments. In view of this statement, the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition as withdrawn. No order as to costs was made. The judgment does not contain any findings on the merits of the case, as the petition was withdrawn before any substantive adjudication.
The High Court held that the first substantial question of law is required to be answered in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent-Revenue. The Court found that the Assessing Officer did not pass a separate order disposing of the objections before proceeding with the reassessment; the objections were dealt with only within the Assessment Order itself. This procedural lapse vitiated the reassessment proceedings and rendered the assumption of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer unsustainable in law. The Court distinguished the present case from Modern Realty (P.) Ltd. and MGM Exports, where remand was considered. It relied on its own decision in KSS Petron Ltd., which held that once reassessment is without jurisdiction and contrary to the directions in GKN Driveshafts, there is no reason to restore the issue to the Assessing Officer as it would lead to unnecessary harassment. Consequently, the impugned order of the Tribunal upholding the reassessment jurisdiction was set aside. In view of this decision on the first substantial question of law, the second substantial question of law was not adjudicated for AY 2010-11. The Assessment Order, CIT(A) order, and the ITAT order for AY 2010-11 were set aside on the ground of non-compliance with jurisdictional parameters for reassessment proceedings.
The High Court held that the first substantial question of law is required to be answered in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent-Revenue. The Court found that the Assessing Officer did not pass a separate order disposing of the objections before proceeding with the reassessment; the objections were dealt with only within the Assessment Order itself. This factual position is materially different from the cases relied upon by the Revenue. The Court, following its own decision in KSS Petron Ltd., held that once reassessment is without jurisdiction and contrary to the directions laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in GKN Driveshaft, there was no reason to restore the issue to the Assessing Officer as it would lead to unnecessary harassment of the Assessee. Therefore, the impugned order of the Tribunal upholding the reassessment was unsustainable in law and liable to be quashed and set aside. The second substantial question of law was not adjudicated as the appeal was allowed on the first ground. The Assessment Order, CIT(A) order, and the ITAT order were set aside on the ground of non-compliance with jurisdictional parameters.
The High Court held that the first substantial question of law is in favour of the assessee. It found that the Assessing Officer did not pass a separate order disposing of the objections before proceeding with the reassessment; the objections were dealt with only within the reassessment order itself. This procedural lapse vitiated the reassessment proceedings and rendered the assumption of jurisdiction unsustainable. The Court distinguished the present case from the precedents relied upon by the Revenue, particularly Modern Realty (P.) Ltd., where the AO had passed an order disposing of objections, albeit inadequately. The Court followed its own decision in KSS Petron Ltd., which held that reassessment without jurisdiction and contrary to GKN Driveshafts directions should not be restored to the AO to avoid unnecessary harassment. Consequently, the Tribunal's order upholding the reassessment for AY 2010-11 was set aside. The second substantial question of law was not adjudicated. For AY 2009-10, the appeal was allowed on similar grounds. Appeals concerning merits were dismissed as infructuous.
The High Court held that the first substantial question of law is required to be answered in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent-Revenue. The Court found that the Assessing Officer did not pass a separate order disposing of the objections before proceeding with the reassessment; the objections were dealt with only within the Assessment Order itself. This factual position is materially different from the cases relied upon by the Revenue. The Court, following its own decision in KSS Petron Ltd., held that once reassessment is without jurisdiction and contrary to the directions laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in GKN Driveshaft, there was no reason to restore the issue to the Assessing Officer as it would lead to unnecessary harassment of the Assessee. Therefore, the impugned order of the Tribunal upholding the reassessment was unsustainable in law and liable to be quashed and set aside. The second substantial question of law was not adjudicated as the appeal was allowed on the first ground. The Assessment Order, CIT(A) order, and the ITAT order were set aside on the ground of non-compliance with jurisdictional parameters.
The High Court held that the questions formulated by the Appellant did not give rise to a substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 260-A. The first question was deemed a reconsideration of factual conclusions already concurrently decided by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal in favour of the Assessee, without the Department demonstrating ignored evidence or erroneous legal tests. The second question was dismissed as the Tribunal's reliance on its own prior order, confirmed by the High Court, was not arbitrary or perverse. The Court noted that Section 260-A does not grant general appellate jurisdiction for re-appreciating evidence. Furthermore, a co-ordinate bench had previously dismissed a similar appeal for the same assessee and subject matter for a different assessment year, finding no substantial question of law. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
The High Court held that there were no substantial questions of law raised by the Revenue. The Court noted that both the First Appellate Authority and the ITAT had arrived at concurrent findings of fact. The First Appellate Authority had found that the pen drive did not contain incriminating material, one of the individuals whose statement was considered was not an employee of the respondent, and the other employee's statement did not specifically incriminate the assessee. The ITAT had confirmed these findings. Since the ITAT's order was based on concurrent findings of fact by two appellate authorities, the High Court found no substantial question of law to admit the appeals. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that there was no substantial question of law raised by the Revenue. The Court noted that the findings of fact by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) were confirmed by the ITAT, resulting in concurrent findings of fact by two appellate authorities. The Court found that the material sought to be relied upon by the Assessing Officer – a pen drive and statements of purported employees – was not considered incriminating by the lower authorities. Specifically, one individual was not an employee, and the other's statement did not incriminate the assessee. The ITAT had also considered the provisions of Section 153C and arrived at a concurrent finding of fact. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the impugned order passed under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under Section 148 are unsustainable and liable to be quashed. The Court noted that the sanction for the notice under Section 148 was granted by Respondent No. 4 (PCIT) on July 28, 2022, for a notice dated July 29, 2022. Since more than three years had elapsed from the end of AY 2016-17 (which ended on March 31, 2020), the competent authority to grant sanction should have been the one specified under Section 151(ii) of the Act. The Court, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Rajeev Bansal, illustrated that for AY 2017-18, the authority under Section 151(i) could grant sanction only up to June 30, 2021. In the present case, the expiry of the three-year period for AY 2016-17 fell within the period contemplated by Section 3(1) of the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020, meaning the Section 151(i) authority could grant sanction only until June 30, 2021. As the approval was obtained from the Section 151(i) authority after this date, it was from the incorrect authority. Consequently, the order and notice were quashed and set aside. The Rule was made absolute, and the Writ Petition was disposed of.
The High Court held that the notice issued under Section 148 and the order passed under Section 148A(d) were unsustainable and liable to be quashed and set aside. The Court noted that the sanction for the notice under Section 148 was granted by Respondent No. 4 (PCIT) on July 28, 2022, and the notice itself was dated July 29, 2022. Since more than three years had elapsed from the end of AY 2017-18, the competent authority to grant sanction was the one specified under Section 151(ii) of the Act. The Court reproduced Section 151 to clarify the distinction between authorities for reassessment within three years and those for reassessment beyond three years. The Court concluded that approval was obtained from the authority specified under Section 151(i) instead of Section 151(ii). This was supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Rajeev Bansal, which held that for AY 2017-18, the authority under Section 151(i) could grant sanction only up to June 30, 2021. Consequently, the impugned order and notice were quashed and set aside. The rule was made absolute, and the Writ Petition was disposed of.
The High Court dismissed the appeal. It noted that the Supreme Court, in the case of Sharp Business System vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, authoritatively held that non-compete fees are allowable as revenue expenditure under Section 37(1) of the Income Tax Act. This decision, along with the ruling in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Piramal Glass Limited, conclusively settled the issue. The Court found no substantive question of law arising for consideration. The Court observed that since the assessee had accepted the amount to be accounted for as deferred revenue expenditure, it could not claim depreciation on it, as this would be incongruous. The Court was not persuaded to remand the proceedings to the Tribunal, as the law was settled by the Supreme Court and the CIT(A)'s view was confirmed. The Court also noted that an earlier order by the Tribunal dated August 2, 2022, which accepted the assessee's claim for depreciation on non-compete fees, would not be of consequence in light of the Supreme Court's pronouncements.