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538 orders · Page 10 of 11
The High Court held that the issues raised by the petitioner, including the validity of the satisfaction note, the existence of incriminating material, and the correlation of documents with specific assessment years, required a detailed factual investigation. The Court stated that it could not undertake such an investigation while exercising its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court found no infirmity in the AO's rejection of further objections, as there must be an end to the filing of objections. Regarding the issue of limitation, the Court noted that it was a mixed question of law and fact and that to determine it, the Court would need to ascertain the last date of authorization for the search in the Alankit Group's case, which was not provided by the petitioner. The Court also observed conflicting decisions on the issue of limitation based on case facts. Therefore, the Court concluded that it was premature to presume the assessment order would be against the petitioner and that these issues were best adjudicated by the authorities under the Act. The petitioner was relegated to raising all issues before the authorities under the Act and in any appeal proceedings if not satisfied with the assessment order. The Court declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in such cases involving search and seizure and potential unaccounted income.
The High Court declined to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction, stating that the issues raised involved a mixed question of law and fact requiring factual investigation. Regarding the validity of the notices and the satisfaction note, the court held that examining the co-relation of documents with assessment years is a factual exercise that cannot be undertaken by the High Court under Article 226, and the efficacious remedy lies with the authorities under the Act. On the issue of limitation, the court noted that determining the exact date of the last authorization for search or the date of handing over of documents is a factual matter not sufficiently demonstrated by the petitioner. The court also observed conflicting decisions on limitation based on case facts. Therefore, the court relegated the petitioner to raise all issues before the assessing authorities. The court found no infirmity in the rejection of further objections, as there must be an end to repeated objections. The court did not wish to enter the arena of factual investigation and did not deal with the case laws relied upon by the petitioner. All petitions were dismissed.
The High Court noted that the petitioner had approached the court on January 30, 2025, and had chosen to pursue a writ petition. Given this, the court expected the Appellate Authority to take into consideration the period during which the matter was pending before the High Court when considering any potential delay in filing the appeal. The petitioner was directed to file the appeal within two weeks from the date of communication of the order. The writ petition was disposed of as withdrawn.
The High Court partly allowed the petition. It found that while the respondents' contention regarding the delay in filing an online return until 27 February 2022 had some merit, there was no justification for denying interest from the date of receipt of this return to the actual refund date. Furthermore, the respondents failed to explain why this requirement was not communicated to the petitioner within the six weeks stipulated by the Court's previous order. The Court also noted that the respondents did not seek an extension from the Court. Consequently, the Court directed the respondents to pay interest at 6% per annum (half per cent per month as per Section 244A(1) of the Income Tax Act) on the refunds for the period between 1 March 2022 and 19 October 2022. The petitioner's claim for 15% per annum was rejected. The amount was to be computed and paid within four weeks, failing which the second respondent was to pay a personal cost of Rs. 50,000/- to the petitioner.
The High Court held that the reassessment notice under Section 148, issued after the expiry of four years from the end of Assessment Year 2013-14, was invalid. The Court found that the first proviso to Section 147 of the Act, which requires a failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts for reopening after four years, was not satisfied. The reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer did not demonstrate any such failure. The Court noted that the reasons themselves admitted that issues like export incentives, security deposits, and rationalisation expenses were not disallowed during the original assessment proceedings. Furthermore, the reasons did not specify what material facts were not fully and truly disclosed. The order rejecting the petitioner's objections also failed to rebut the specific plea of no failure to disclose. Therefore, the condition precedent for reopening the assessment after four years was not met. The Court quashed the impugned notice and the order rejecting objections. Other issues raised by the petitioner were not examined, as the notice was quashed on this preliminary ground.
The Bombay High Court held that the impugned assessment order and demand notice were legally unsustainable and therefore liable to be set aside. The Court found that the reopening of assessment for AY 2014-15, beyond 4 years, was contrary to the first proviso to Section 147 of the IT Act, especially since the amount of Rs. 11,61,22,771 was already brought to tax in an earlier assessment year and the respondents had not provided any fresh tangible material to justify the reopening. The Court also noted the violation of principles of natural justice, as the petitioner was not afforded a reasonable opportunity of representation, which is inherent in Section 144B. Citing precedents like Imperial Consultants and Securities Ltd. and Crystal Pride Developers, the Court stated that writ petitions under Article 226 are maintainable in such cases, even if an alternate remedy exists. The Supreme Court's decision in Tin Box Co. was also referred to, emphasizing the necessity of a proper opportunity of being heard before passing an assessment order. Consequently, the Court made the rule absolute, quashing the impugned order and demand notice.
The Bombay High Court held that the impugned assessment order and demand notice were legally unsustainable and therefore liable to be set aside. The Court found that the reopening of assessment for AY 2014-15, beyond 4 years, was contrary to the first proviso to Section 147 of the IT Act, especially since the amount of Rs. 11,61,22,771 was already brought to tax in an earlier assessment year and the respondents had not provided any fresh tangible material to justify the reopening. The Court also noted the violation of principles of natural justice, as the petitioner was not afforded a reasonable opportunity of representation, which is inherent in Section 144B. Citing precedents like Imperial Consultants and Securities Ltd. and Crystal Pride Developers, the Court stated that writ petitions under Article 226 are maintainable in such cases, even if an alternate remedy exists. The Supreme Court's decision in Tin Box Co. was also referred to, emphasizing the necessity of a proper opportunity of being heard before passing an assessment order. Consequently, the Court made the rule absolute, quashing the impugned order and demand notice.
The High Court held that the reassessment proceedings were wholly without jurisdiction. The reasons provided in the draft assessment order were not consistent with those in the reply, and the reasons did not disclose any undisclosed facts. Crucially, the issue of guarantee fees was already subject to appeal before the Tribunal, which, as per the third proviso to Section 147, debarred the Assessing Officer from initiating reassessment proceedings on the same issue. The Court found that the issue had been examined in the original assessment, and initiating reassessment without fresh tangible material amounted to a change of opinion, which is impermissible. Furthermore, the addition made in the original assessment order meant the income had not escaped assessment. The Court also found substantial compliance with the requirement of filing a return under Section 148, as the petitioner had requested its revised return be treated as such. Consequently, the reassessment notice and the reassessment order were quashed and set aside. The petitioner was directed to withdraw its pending appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeal).
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law admitted were answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee concerning purchases from suppliers other than M/s Neptune Trading Co. and Hari Om Traders. However, with respect to purchases from M/s Neptune Trading Co. and Hari Om Traders, the question was answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The order of the CIT(A) and Tribunal was reversed for these two parties. The Court clarified that total additions would not exceed Rs. 1,00,10,773, which was the total purchase from M/s Neptune Trading Co. and Hari Om Traders. The reasoning was that M/s Neptune Trading Co. and Hari Om Traders did not furnish bank statements, preventing verification of cash withdrawals, which distinguished the case from others where purchases were proven genuine. The Court found several relied-upon judgments distinguishable on facts, particularly concerning the non-submission of bank statements and the applicability of Section 69C.
The Tribunal held that the Chief Commissioner had treated the CBDT guidelines as a binding statute and rejected the compounding application on the sole ground of delay beyond 36 months, without exercising any discretion. This approach was inconsistent with the rulings of the High Court, the Madras High Court, and the Supreme Court in Vinubhai Mohanlal Dobaria. The Supreme Court's decision, particularly paragraph 79, clarified that while guidelines are generally to be followed, they do not exclude the possibility of making an exception in peculiar cases where facts and circumstances warrant it. Therefore, the competent authority can exercise discretion and allow a compounding application notwithstanding a perceived limitation period. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and directed the Chief Commissioner to reconsider the petitioner's application, exercising discretion in light of the Supreme Court's observations in Vinubhai Dobaria, considering all facts and circumstances. All contentions on merits were left open for the Chief Commissioner's decision.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court reasoned that the Petitioner's challenge to the scrutiny assessment selection was vague and broad. Crucially, the Court found that the Petitioner had adequate alternative remedies available under the Income Tax Act. These remedies include raising the very contentions made in the writ petition during the 143(2) proceedings before the Assessing Officer. Furthermore, if the Petitioner remained dissatisfied with the final assessment order, they could pursue further appeals under the Act. The Court explicitly stated that it was not inclined to entertain the writ petition due to the availability of these statutory remedies. All contentions of both parties were kept open to be raised before the Assessing Officer and other relevant authorities. No specific finding was made on the merits of the Petitioner's claim regarding CBDT guidelines or the circular.
The High Court decided to set aside the impugned final assessment order and remit the matter to the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP). The Court found the facts comparable to *Sulzer Pumps India Private Limited*, where a similar lapse by the assessee was condoned, and an additional opportunity was granted because objections were factually pending with the DRP. The Court agreed with the Revenue that the Assessing Officer was not at fault due to the lack of intimation from the Petitioner. However, in the peculiar facts and similarity to *Sulzer Pumps*, the Petitioner was granted relief. The Court distinguished *Undercarriage and Tractor Parts* as having significantly different facts. The Petitioner was directed to pay costs of Rs. 10,000/- to the High Court Employees Medical Welfare Fund at Mumbai within two weeks. Subject to the payment of costs, the impugned assessment order was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the DRP. All parties' contentions on merits were expressly left open.
The High Court held that the final impugned assessment order is a nullity in law and non est due to the non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, which is a jurisdictional requirement under Section 144B of the IT Act. The Court found merit in the petitioner's submission that the respondents failed to grant a reasonable opportunity of being heard before passing the assessment order, thereby violating the principles of audi alteram partem, which are part of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court held that depriving the petitioner of the right to be heard violates their fundamental right. Consequently, the subsequent demand notice under Section 156 and the penalty notices under Section 270A and Section 271AA(1) are also vitiated as they are premised on the invalid assessment order. The Court rejected the revenue's contention regarding the availability of an alternate remedy, stating that in cases of patent illegality and lack of jurisdiction, the appellate remedy may not be effective. The Court also disagreed with the revenue's submission that the petitioner failed to comply with timelines, noting that the petitioner did submit a response and sought a hearing, and that justice should not be a casualty to technicalities. The Court allowed the petition, quashing the impugned assessment order, demand notice, and penalty notices.
The High Court held that the notice dated March 27, 2021, under Section 148 for AY 2014-15 was issued beyond the statutory period of four years from the relevant assessment year, thus transgressing the requirement of the first proviso to Section 147 of the IT Act. Consequently, the notice was ex-facie without jurisdiction and non-est in law. The Court found that the reopening was based on material already available with the AO during the original assessment proceedings, indicating a change of opinion, which is impermissible. Furthermore, the objections filed by the petitioner were not disposed of separately, violating principles of natural justice and the mandate of Section 144B. The Court rejected the revenue's contention regarding the alternate remedy, stating that when an action is ex-facie without jurisdiction and illegal, it is not appropriate to relegate the petitioner to alternate remedies. The assessment order was therefore quashed and set aside. The ratio decidendi is that reopening an assessment beyond four years without fresh tangible material and based on a change of opinion, without disposing of objections, is illegal and without jurisdiction.
The High Court dismissed the petition without deciding the legal contention on whether post-amendment reopening can be done based on an audit opinion, even if a query was raised during assessment. The Court found that the necessary factual foundation for deciding this issue was absent due to the petitioner's failure to annex crucial documents, including the attachments to Exhibit 'C' from the original assessment and the attachments to the belated reply. The Court noted that the petitioner did not file a timely reply to the Section 148A(b) notice or seek an extension. The judgments relied upon by the petitioner were found distinguishable on facts or did not address the post-amendment scenario concerning audit objections. The Court held that it was not appropriate to exercise its discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction to investigate factual issues in writ proceedings and granted the petitioner liberty to raise the validity of reassessment proceedings before the Appellate Authority if reassessment orders are made.
The High Court declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash the impugned order and notice. The Court held that the Petitioner had not made a case for interdicting the assessment proceedings at this stage. The Petitioner's failure to respond to the show-cause notice was not commendable, as the purpose of a notice is to allow the assessee to respond and enable the authorities to address such responses. The Court found that the order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148 could not be styled as wholly without jurisdiction at this stage. The Court noted that an investigation into disputed facts and the limitation issue would be mixed questions of law and fact, making it unsuitable for extraordinary intervention. The Petitioner was advised to avail of alternate and efficacious remedies, including contesting any assessment order through regular appeal channels. All contentions of all parties were left open to be raised during assessment proceedings and statutory remedies.
The Tribunal held that the demand for duty drawback and interest is not maintainable. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons Private Limited v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited and Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited through authorized signatory Vs. Satish Kumar Gupta & others. These judgments establish that upon approval of a resolution plan, all claims not part of the plan stand extinguished, and the corporate debtor is handed over on a "fresh slate." The Court found that the respondents did not lodge their demand during the CIRP, and the claim was not part of the approved resolution plan. Therefore, any claim brought forward after the moratorium period, and not included in the resolution plan, stands waived off. The Court quashed and set aside the impugned order, allowing the writ petition. The Court did not relegate the petitioner to the remedy of appeal, as the case was squarely covered by the Supreme Court's pronouncements.
The High Court held that the revenue ought to have refunded the sum of Rs. 6,05,030/- either upon the petitioner's letter dated November 14, 2023, or at least when passing the stay order on April 17, 2024. The non-consideration of this adjustment while determining the 20% outstanding demand for assessment year 2015-2016 was unjustified, especially since the assessee had voluntarily made the 20% payment much before filing the stay application. The Court also noted the significant delay in disposing of the petitioner's appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal) since 2018, exceeding the one-year period stipulated by Section 250(6A) of the Act. The Court directed the respondent to refund Rs. 6,05,030/- within four weeks, ordered the petitioner to apply for an early hearing of his appeal, and directed the Commissioner (Appeal) to decide it expeditiously, preferably by May 31, 2025. Respondent No. 5 was directed to investigate the reasons for the delay in disposing of the appeal.
The High Court held that the ITAT exceeded its jurisdiction by re-adjudicating the issue of whether the income receivable from PGHH was 'income from house property' or 'income from other sources'. The Court noted that this issue had attained finality qua the ITAT, based on its order dated June 6, 2016, and the High Court's own prior order dated March 9, 2018, which had clarified that a Miscellaneous Application under Section 254(2) is not a substantive review. The ITAT's impugned order dated September 2, 2022, was found to be a review of its earlier judgment, which it lacked the jurisdiction to do. The Court emphasized that the ITAT's jurisdiction under Section 254(2) is limited. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside. The matter was remanded back to the ITAT to decide grounds Nos. 1, 4, and 5 of the petitioner's appeal, specifically excluding the re-adjudication of the income classification. The Court clarified that this decision does not affect the revenue's pending appeal before the High Court concerning the classification of income.
The High Court observed that the issue of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to condone delay beyond six months was not raised before the Tribunal, and therefore, the Tribunal did not have an opportunity to decide on it, nor did the revenue have an opportunity to make submissions. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned order and restored the matter to the file of the Tribunal. The petitioner was granted liberty to file a formal reply to the Miscellaneous Application, raising all contentions, including the one regarding the Tribunal's power to condone delay beyond six months, along with a compilation of relied-upon decisions. The revenue was also granted liberty to file a counter and its own compilation of decisions. The Tribunal was directed to dispose of the Miscellaneous Application in accordance with law and on its merits expeditiously, keeping all contentions open. The operative direction was to set aside the impugned order and restore the matter to the Tribunal.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated March 25, 2021, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2013-14, is quashed and set aside. The Court reasoned that the issues for which the reopening was sought were already subject to Section 263 proceedings, and a revised assessment order was passed on December 14, 2018, after proper inquiries. Therefore, any attempt to re-agitate these issues would constitute a change of opinion and a review of the earlier order, which is not permissible. The Court also noted that the reasons recorded for reopening did not clearly state the material facts that were allegedly not disclosed, and the reopening was based on a perusal and verification of records, which did not satisfy the pre-condition of failure to disclose truly and material facts. The Court found the petitioner's reliance on Samet Estates (P.) Ltd. (Supra) to be justified. The rule was made absolute.
The High Court held that the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2013-14, dated March 25, 2021, is quashed and set aside. The Court found that the reasons recorded for reopening did not adequately specify the material facts that were allegedly not disclosed. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Assessing Officer's own justification for reopening, as stated in the order rejecting objections, indicated that the reassessment was based on the predecessor officer's mistake (inadvertence or oversight). If this were the case, the first proviso to Section 147 would apply, meaning no failure to disclose by the petitioner would arise. Crucially, the Court observed that the issues sought to be re-agitated were already examined during the Section 263 proceedings, culminating in an assessment order dated December 14, 2018. Attempting to re-examine these issues now would constitute a change of opinion and a review of the earlier order, which is impermissible. The Court relied on *Samet Estates (P.) Ltd.* and distinguished *Kalyanji Mavji & Co.*.
The High Court held that the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2007-08 is quashed and set aside. The Court found that the issues sought to be reopened, including the write-offs of inventories, sundry debtors, loans & advances, and cost of set-top boxes against share premium, were indeed examined during the original scrutiny assessment. The Court noted that the assessee had made submissions on these issues, and the assessment order, while not making specific additions on all points, indicated an application of mind. Therefore, reopening the case on the same material amounted to a review, which is impermissible. Furthermore, the Court observed that the revenue failed to rebut the assessee's specific objection that there was no double deduction. The Court reasoned that if these items were adjusted against the share premium account (a balance sheet item) and not debited to the profit and loss account, then a claim for deduction could not constitute a double deduction. The Court relied on precedents establishing that reopening is without jurisdiction if the grounds were subject to deliberation in the original assessment. The rule was made absolute, and the petition was disposed of.
The High Court initially expressed an inclination not to grant permission for the extended period due to the insufficient details in the application and its last-minute filing. However, considering the booked tickets for February 21, 2025, and the Applicant's past compliance with court conditions, the Court allowed the Applicant to travel abroad on February 21, 2025. This permission was made subject to the Applicant filing an undertaking to return by March 31, 2025. Further conditions included filing a detailed itinerary with contact details, an undertaking not to seek renewal until return, and an undertaking to return within 96 hours if the Income Tax Department required his presence. The Court clarified that if the Applicant attended before the Income Tax Department, he could return to Dubai under the same order if his travel was before March 31, 2025. The Immigration Authorities were directed to permit the Applicant's departure and arrival without insisting on a certified copy of the order.
The High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and all consequent actions were without jurisdiction and bad in law. The Court reasoned that when a search action under Section 132 is conducted, and materials belonging to or relating to other assessees are seized, the procedure prescribed under Sections 153A and 153C of the Act must be followed. These sections, with their non-obstante clauses, have an overriding effect on the general provisions for assessment or reassessment under Sections 147 and 148. The Court found that the foundation of the present case was indeed a search action, and the information gathered necessitated proceedings under Section 153C read with Section 153A, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd. and the Rajasthan High Court in Shyam Sunder Khandelwal. The Revenue's contention supporting Section 147/148 was rejected as contrary to the legislative intent behind Sections 153A and 153C. The Court explicitly stated that the provisions of Sections 147, 148 are compartmentalized from Sections 153A and 153C, and the latter carve out an exception to regular actions under Section 147. Therefore, the petitions were allowed, quashing the notices and all consequential actions.
The High Court quashed the impugned communication/order dated December 28, 2009, without commenting on its merits or demerits. The Court held that the Revenue could not have issued this communication, as it agreed it was only an advisory or non-statutory exercise. The ITAT's finding that the BCCI's appeal was not maintainable was based on the premise that the DIT's communication was advisory. However, the Court clarified that while the appeal might not be maintainable against an advisory, the Revenue cannot act upon such an advisory to deny exemptions or cancel registration. The issues of exemption and cancellation of registration on merits were left open to be decided by the prescribed statutory authorities, without being influenced by the impugned communication or the ITAT's observations. The Court emphasized that decisions on vital matters like exemption or cancellation cannot be solely based on advisory or non-statutory communications. The Revenue cannot adopt contradictory stances, asserting a communication is advisory while using it to affect an assessee's rights.
The High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 147 and Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and all consequent actions were without jurisdiction and bad in law. The Court reasoned that when reassessment proceedings are initiated based on material seized during a search action under Section 132, and such material belongs to or relates to an assessee other than the one searched, the procedure prescribed under Section 153C read with Section 153A of the Act must be followed. These sections, with their non-obstante clauses, have an overriding effect on the general provisions for assessment or reassessment under Sections 147 and 148. The Court found that the foundation of the present case was indeed a search action, and the information gathered led to the belief that income had escaped assessment. However, the AO should have invoked the special procedure under Section 153A/153C. The Court agreed with the Rajasthan High Court's view in Shyam Sunder Khandelwal and the Supreme Court's interpretation in Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd. The petitions were allowed, quashing the notices and all consequential actions.
The High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 147/148 of the I.T. Act were without jurisdiction and bad in law. The Court agreed with the petitioners' contention that when the basis for reopening is a search action, the special provisions of Sections 153A and 153C of the I.T. Act, which contain non-obstante clauses, must be applied. These sections provide a special procedure for assessment in cases of search or requisition and have an overriding effect over the general provisions for assessment or reassessment under Section 147. The Court found that the seized material from the search action against the group, which indicated accommodation entries provided to the petitioner, necessitated proceedings under Section 153C read with Section 153A. The reasoning was that the legislature intended these special provisions to govern such situations to avoid overlapping with regular reassessment provisions. Therefore, the notices under Section 147/148 were deemed inappropriate and legally unsustainable. The Court allowed the petitions in terms of the prayer clauses.
The High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 147 and all consequent actions were without jurisdiction and bad in law. The Court reasoned that when a search action under Section 132 is undertaken, and materials seized during that search lead to the belief that income has escaped assessment for other assessees, the procedure prescribed under Sections 153A and 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, must be followed. These sections, with their non-obstante clause, override the general provisions for assessment or reassessment under Sections 143 and 147/148. The Court found that the foundation of the present case was indeed a search action, and the information gathered necessitated proceedings under Section 153C read with Section 153A, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd. and the Rajasthan High Court in Shyam Sunder Khandelwal. The Revenue's contention to proceed under Section 147/148 was found to be contrary to the legislative intent. The petitions were allowed, quashing the notices and all consequent actions.
The High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and all consequent actions were without jurisdiction and bad in law. The Court reasoned that when a search action under Section 132 is conducted, and materials belonging to or relating to other assessees are seized, the procedure prescribed under Sections 153A and 153C of the Act must be followed. These sections, with their non-obstante clauses, override the general provisions for assessment or reassessment under Sections 147 and 148. The Court found that the foundation of the present case was indeed a search action, and the information gathered necessitated proceedings under Section 153C read with Section 153A, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd. and the Rajasthan High Court in Shyam Sunder Khandelwal. The Court explicitly disagreed with the Revenue's contention that Section 147/148 proceedings were appropriate, stating that such an approach would go contrary to the legislative intent behind Sections 153A and 153C. The petitions were accordingly allowed, quashing the notices and all consequential actions.
The High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 148 of the I.T. Act and all consequent actions were without jurisdiction and bad in law. The Court reasoned that the foundation of the present case was a search action under Section 132. Materials seized during this search, which belonged to or related to the petitioners, revealed information about accommodation entries from shell companies. In such circumstances, the provisions of Section 153C read with Section 153A of the I.T. Act would be applicable, as these sections have an overriding effect over the general provisions of Section 147/148 due to their non-obstante clauses. The Court agreed with the view that special procedures prescribed under Sections 153A to 153D prevail over regular assessment/reassessment provisions. The Court found the Revenue's reliance on Section 147/148 contrary to the legislative intent behind Sections 153A and 153C. The petitions were allowed, quashing the Section 148 notices.
The High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 147 and all consequent actions were without jurisdiction and bad in law. The Court reasoned that when a search or requisition is made, special procedures are prescribed under Sections 153A and 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. These sections, with their non-obstante clauses, have an overriding effect on the regular provisions for assessment or reassessment under Sections 143 and 147/148. The Court found that the foundation of the present case was a search action, and the materials seized and inquiries conducted revealed information that necessitated proceedings under Section 153C read with Section 153A, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in *Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd.* and the Rajasthan High Court in *Shyam Sunder Khandelwal*. The Court distinguished the facts from *Phool Chand Bajrang Lal*, stating that the present case involved materials gathered under a search, making Section 153A/153C applicable. Consequently, the petitions were allowed, quashing the notices and all consequential actions.
The High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 147 and Section 148 of the I.T. Act, and all consequent actions, were without jurisdiction and bad in law. The Court reasoned that when a search action is conducted under Section 132, and seized material belongs to or relates to another assessee, the procedure prescribed under Section 153C read with Section 153A of the I.T. Act must be followed. These sections, with their non-obstante clauses, override the general provisions for assessment or reassessment under Sections 143 and 147/148. The Court found that the foundation of the present case was the search action against Shilpi Jewellers Pvt. Ltd., and the subsequent information gathered, which necessitated proceedings under Section 153C/153A, not Section 147/148. The Court agreed with the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Shyam Sunder Khandelwal and the Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd. The petitions were allowed, quashing the Section 148 notices and subsequent actions.
The High Court held that the impugned notices under Section 147 and Section 148 of the I.T. Act, and all consequent actions, were without jurisdiction and bad in law. The Court reasoned that the foundation of the present case was a search action under Section 132, which led to the seizure of materials and subsequent inquiries. These inquiries revealed significant information about the petitioner receiving accommodation entries from a suspected shell company. Consequently, the provisions of Section 153C read with Section 153A of the I.T. Act were applicable. The Court emphasized that Sections 153A and 153C, with their non-obstante clauses, override the regular provisions for assessment or reassessment under Sections 147 and 148. The Revenue's contention supporting proceedings under Section 147/148 was found to be contrary to the legislative intent depicted by Sections 153A and 153C. The Court agreed with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in *Shyam Sunder Khandelwal* and the Supreme Court in *Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd.*. The petitions were allowed, quashing the notices and subsequent actions.
The High Court allowed the petition, quashing the notice dated March 31, 2021, and consequential orders. The Court held that the reopening of the assessment was impermissible as there was no fresh tangible material that came to the knowledge of the Assessing Officer. The Court noted that the Petitioner's case was selected for scrutiny, and specific queries regarding claims under Section 35AC and Section 80G were raised and answered. The original assessment order under Section 143(3) had accepted these claims after considering the Petitioner's responses. The Court emphasized that an Assessing Officer cannot reopen an assessment merely on a change of opinion or because another view was possible, especially when the original assessment was based on a thorough examination of the material. The Court found no provision shown to them that would prima facie disallow the deduction claimed under Section 35AC. The Court also referred to the statement of objects and reasons for the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2014, and a CBDT circular which suggested that CSR expenditure of the nature described in Sections 30 to 36 could be allowed as deductions subject to conditions. The Court relied on the precedent set in Castrol India Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax and other similar judgments.
The High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 147 and Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and all consequential actions were without jurisdiction and bad in law. The Court reasoned that when a search or requisition is made, and the seized material belongs to or relates to another assessee, the procedure under Section 153C read with Section 153A of the Act is mandatory. These sections, with their non-obstante clauses, have an overriding effect over the general provisions for assessment or reassessment under Sections 143 and 147/148. The Court found that the foundation of the present case was indeed a search action, and the information gathered led to the initiation of proceedings. Therefore, the special procedure under Sections 153A and 153C was applicable, rendering the Section 148 notices invalid. The petitions were allowed, quashing the notices and all consequent actions.
The High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 148 of the I.T. Act and all consequent actions were without jurisdiction and bad in law. The Court reasoned that when the foundation of the reassessment proceedings is a search action under Section 132, and the seized material belongs to or relates to the assessee, the special procedure prescribed under Sections 153A and 153C of the I.T. Act must be followed. These sections, with their non-obstante clauses, override the general provisions for assessment or reassessment under Sections 143 and 147/148. The Court found that the Revenue's reliance on Section 147/148 was contrary to the legislative intent evident in Sections 153A and 153C. The Court agreed with the Rajasthan High Court's view in Shyam Sunder Khandelwal and the Supreme Court's interpretation in Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd. regarding the purport of Sections 153A and 153C. The petitions were allowed, quashing the notices and consequent actions.
The High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 147/148 of the I.T. Act were without jurisdiction and bad in law. The Court reasoned that when seized material found during a search action on one entity relates to another assessee, the special procedure prescribed under Sections 153A and 153C of the I.T. Act must be followed. These sections, with their non-obstante clauses, override the general provisions for assessment and reassessment under Sections 143 and 147/148. The Court agreed with the principles laid down in *Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd.* and *Shyam Sunder Khandelwal*, emphasizing that the legislature intended these special provisions to govern cases where material is seized during a search and relates to other assessees. The Court found that the foundation of the present case was indeed a search action, and the subsequent inquiries revealed information about the petitioner's transactions. Therefore, proceedings should have been initiated under Section 153C read with Section 153A. The Revenue's reliance on *Phool Chand Bajrang Lal* was distinguished as the facts in the present case were distinct and involved the application of special provisions. Consequently, the notices and all consequent actions were quashed.
The High Court quashed the impugned communication/order dated December 28, 2009, without commenting on its merits or demerits, solely on the ground that the Revenue could not have issued it, as it admitted it was only an advisory or non-statutory exercise. The Court held that while the ITAT was persuaded by the Revenue's contention that the appeal was not maintainable against an advisory order, the Revenue could not simultaneously proceed on the premise that the BCCI's registration stood cancelled or that it was not entitled to exemption based on such an advisory order. The Court emphasized that decisions on exemption or cancellation of registration cannot be based on advisory or non-statutory communications. The issues of exemption or cancellation of registration on merits were left open to be decided by the prescribed statutory authorities in the manner prescribed by the statute, without being influenced by the impugned communication or the ITAT's observations.
The High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 148 of the I.T. Act and all consequent actions were without jurisdiction and bad in law. The Court reasoned that when a search action is conducted under Section 132, and materials belonging to or relating to other assessees are seized, the procedure prescribed under Sections 153A and 153C of the I.T. Act must be followed. These special provisions, with their non-obstante clauses, override the general provisions for assessment or reassessment under Sections 147/148. The Court found that the foundation of the present case was the search action, and the information gathered therein led to the belief that income had escaped assessment. Therefore, the AO should have proceeded under Section 153C read with Section 153A, not Section 147/148. The Court agreed with the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in *Shyam Sunder Khandelwal* and the Supreme Court in *Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd.*. The petitions were allowed, quashing the notices and consequent actions.
The High Court held that the delay in electronically uploading Form 10B should be condoned. The Court reasoned that while the delay was considerable, the Petitioner's lapse was not mala fide, and the Petitioner had not derived any undue advantage from it. The Court emphasized that the quality of the explanation offered for the delay is crucial, and the Petitioner's conduct after being informed of the electronic filing requirement was not characterized by lethargy or indolence. The Petitioner took several steps and consistently pointed out the manual filing within the prescribed time. The Court noted that the possession of the certification (Form 10B) is mandatory, but the mode of proof may not always be. The impugned orders failed to consider the crucial circumstance that Form 10B was physically filed within the prescribed period. Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned orders and condoned the delay, directing that the Petitioner's claim for exemption under Section 11 be considered on merits.
The High Court agreed with the petitioner that the adjustment of Rs.16,81,893/- made by the respondents on 16 February 2024 was invalid. The reasoning was that the adjustment was based on an order that was digitally signed on 22 May 2024. As of 16 February 2024, when the adjustment was made, the penalty order had not yet been finalized or digitally signed. Therefore, it was not reasonable to hold that any amount was due and payable by the petitioner from that order which could be adjusted against their refund. The Court set aside the order dated 16 February 2024 and directed the respondents to refund Rs.16,81,893/- to the petitioner within four weeks. The Court explicitly stated it would not interfere with the penalty order itself, as the petitioner had an alternative and effective remedy to challenge it. All contentions regarding the penalty order were kept open for the appellate authority.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed in the names of RPPL and RPEL after their merger with RIL were bad in law and liable to be quashed and set aside. The Tribunal reasoned that the revenue was informed of the merger through a letter dated 9 October 1995 and notes to the computation of income filed on 30 November 1995, which preceded the assessment orders dated 18 March 1996. Therefore, passing assessments in the names of non-existing companies was legally unsustainable. The Tribunal clarified that this decision did not preclude the revenue from initiating fresh proceedings against the amalgamated company, RIL. The questions of law admitted on merits were not adjudicated upon. The Writ Petition was disposed of as infructuous. The appeals filed by the assessee were allowed, and consequently, the appeals filed by the revenue were rendered infructuous.
The High Court held that the assessment orders passed on March 18, 1996, in the names of RPEL and RPPL were bad in law and liable to be quashed. The Court reasoned that these orders were made against non-existent companies after their amalgamation with RIL, and the revenue had prior knowledge of this merger. Therefore, the assessment orders ought to have been passed in the name of the amalgamated company, RIL. The appeals filed by the assessee were allowed on this ground of jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeals filed by the revenue were rendered infructuous. The Court clarified that this decision does not preclude the revenue from initiating fresh proceedings against the amalgamated company, RIL, in accordance with law. It was also noted that the questions of law admitted by the Court on merits in earlier years were not adjudicated upon.
The High Court held that the assessment orders passed on March 18, 1996, in the names of RPEL and RPPL were bad in law and liable to be quashed. The Court reasoned that these orders were made against non-existent companies after their amalgamation with RIL, and the revenue had prior knowledge of this merger. Therefore, the assessment orders ought to have been passed in the name of the amalgamated company, RIL. The appeals filed by the assessee were allowed on this ground of jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeals filed by the revenue were rendered infructuous. The Court clarified that this decision does not preclude the revenue from initiating fresh proceedings against the amalgamated company, RIL, in accordance with law. It was also noted that the questions of law admitted by the Court on merits in earlier years were not adjudicated upon.
The Court, noting the reasonable approach adopted by the Bank and the Income Tax Department, decided to dispose of the petition. From the Rs. 70,00,000/- deposited in Court, the Petitioner was granted liberty to withdraw Rs. 60,00,000/-. This amount is to be transferred to the Petitioner's bank account within a maximum of one week of the Petitioner providing bank details to the Registry. The Petitioner can receive this amount without prejudice to their rights to pursue ordinary remedies if any grievances remain. The remaining Rs. 10,00,000/- is to be returned to the Bank of Maharashtra. The Court expressed hope that the CBDT and the CMD of the Bank would take cognizance of the incident to its logical conclusion to prevent recurrence.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed in the names of RPPL and RPEL after their merger with RIL were bad in law and liable to be quashed and set aside. The Tribunal reasoned that the revenue was informed of the merger through a letter dated 9 October 1995 and notes to the computation of income filed on 30 November 1995, which preceded the assessment orders dated 18 March 1996. Therefore, passing assessments in the names of non-existing companies was legally unsustainable. The Tribunal clarified that this decision did not preclude the revenue from initiating fresh proceedings against the amalgamated company, RIL. The questions of law admitted on merits were not adjudicated upon. The Writ Petition was disposed of as infructuous. The appeals filed by the assessee were allowed, and consequently, the appeals filed by the revenue were rendered infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed in the names of RPEL and RPPL after their merger with RIL were bad in law and liable to be quashed and set aside. The Tribunal reasoned that the revenue was informed of the merger through documentary evidence prior to the assessment orders, yet proceeded to issue them against the amalgamating companies, which were no longer in existence. The principle established is that assessments cannot be made against entities that have ceased to exist due to amalgamation. Consequently, the appeals filed by the revenue against the deletion of additions would not survive. The Tribunal clarified that this decision does not preclude the revenue from initiating fresh proceedings against the amalgamated company, RIL, in accordance with law. The questions of law admitted on merits in the years 2008 and 2013 were not adjudicated upon. The Writ Petition No.772 of 1999 was disposed of as infructuous based on the assessee's submission.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed in the names of RPEL and RPPL after their merger with RIL were bad in law and liable to be quashed and set aside. The Tribunal reasoned that the revenue was informed of the merger through documentary evidence prior to the assessment orders, yet proceeded to issue them against the amalgamating companies, which were no longer in existence. The principle established is that assessments cannot be made against entities that have ceased to exist due to amalgamation. Consequently, the appeals filed by the revenue against the deletion of additions would not survive. The Tribunal clarified that this decision does not preclude the revenue from initiating fresh proceedings against the amalgamated company, RIL, in accordance with law. The questions of law admitted on merits in the years 2008 and 2013 were not adjudicated upon. The Writ Petition No.772 of 1999 was disposed of as infructuous based on the assessee's submission.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed on March 18, 1996, in the names of RPPL and RPEL were bad in law and liable to be quashed. The reasoning was that the revenue was informed of the merger of RPPL and RPEL with RIL through a letter dated October 9, 1995, and notes to the computation of income filed on November 30, 1995, both of which predated the assessment orders. Therefore, issuing assessment orders against the amalgamating companies, which were no longer in existence post-merger, was legally unsustainable. The Tribunal answered the question of law in favour of the appellant-assessee. Consequently, the appeals filed by the revenue were rendered infructuous, and the writ petition was disposed of as infructuous. The Tribunal clarified that this decision does not preclude the revenue from initiating fresh proceedings against the amalgamated company, RIL, in accordance with law. The Tribunal also noted that the questions of law admitted on merits in earlier years were not adjudicated upon.